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The aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive understanding of Iran’s foreign policy 
and behaviour, roots of continuity and factors of change in the regional context of the South 
Caucasus, using the case studies of its relations with two important neighbouring countries, 
the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
 
To offer a picture of regional geopolitical context in which the subject is examined, the 
study will discuss the importance of South Caucasus in the international system, 
introducing the existing challenges and opportunities in the region, as well as important 
regional and international players involved, their goals and policies towards those goals. 
 
The study will also provide a review of Iran’s foreign policy in different periods and discuss 
factors resulting in different approaches undertaken in each period. The implication of these 
policies will then be examined further in the context of the Middle East, as well as South 
Caucasus. That is to demonstrate the specific strategies Iran has taken in each of these 
regions, and to explain differences between the Middle East policies and that of the South 
Caucasus. Case studies will provide a more detailed picture of how regional policies work 
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In the introduction of his 2013 book, Ramazani, a prominent scholar who spent a decade 
to provide the first systemic study of Iran’s foreign policy back in 1950s and 60s, 
describes how he has been continuously struck by “the poor understanding in the United 
States of Iran’s international role” which existed even during the Shah and under 
friendly circumstances, and the fact that “more than three decades after the revolution, 
Americans still do not really understand Iran”.(ibid) This failure to comprehend Iran 
and its foreign policy is not limited to the United Sates; it is indeed a widespread 
phenomenon exacerbated in the post revolution period due to a variety of reasons. 
While several factors such as lack of consistent (if any) diplomatic relations and 
Tehran’s feeble public diplomacy and miscommunications have played their role in 
creating such circumstances it is difficult to imagine that overcoming these 
shortcomings would eradicate the problem completely. The most important factor in 
creating such dilemma is the complexity of Iran’s foreign policy, which quite frequently 
defies the conventional rules of analysis and makes its examination and modelling 
difficult. 
One reason for such complexity is Iran’s particular geostrategic location situated on the 
Eurasian crossroad, straddling between two important waterways of the world, the 
Persian Gulf in the south and the Caspian Sea to the north; both, house to significant 
volume of valuable hydrocarbon resources. Hence, as a land bridge, Iran connects, on 
the one hand, Central Asia/Caucasus to the Persian Gulf sub region, and on the other, 
Mediterranean/Levant to South Asia. As such, Iran is directly involved in, and 
influenced by geopolitical developments of four sub regions of the Persian Gulf, 
Eastern Mediterranean, Central Asia/Caucasus and South West Asia. The division of 
Persia into spheres of influence under the 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty or Iran’s 
occupation by the British and Russian forces during the World War II for securing the 
Allied supply line through the Persian Corridor, despite Tehran’s official neutrality, is 
evidence of the importance of Iran’s geostrategic location. The following map 
demonstrates the centrality of Iran’s strategic location in Eurasia. 
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Map 1.1: Iran’s Geostrategic Location1 
 
 
While, being among the countries with the highest volume of proven hydrocarbon 
resources as well as having control over the Strait of Hormuz, where 30% of the world’s 
annual consumption of the oil pass through, provides Iran with further strategic 
importance; it also creates further challenges by involving the country in global politics 
of energy security.   
In addition to this geostrategic location in such perpetually turbulent regional setting, 
the exigencies of integration between the ‘Islamic’ and ‘the republican’ essence of the 
state- which at times seem incompatible - exacerbates factional polity and complicates 
decision making and execution within an already complex system of checks and 
balances. While several important attributes such as revolutionary, Third Wordlist, 
rentier state, transpire their effects on the nature of the state, the existing dichotomy and 
constant interplay between ideology and pragmatism, as well as frequent change of 
approach are important factors which have complicated Iran’s foreign policy and its 
application in various contexts and periods, including the post Cold War era.  
Nonetheless, the aforementioned geostrategic importance, as well as the vast area and 
                                                          
1 NeverStop 365 Ran in Uzbakistan. (2013) Available at: <http://neverstop365.blogspot.co.uk/>  (Accessed on 
30.05. 2015) 
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large population of the country, makes Iran an important international player and 
regional power (albeit a medium power), no matter who rules it; a “country which is 
difficult to engage (with), yet impossible to ignore”. (Wright 2010: Introduction)   
According to Ehteshami (2002:134-5) “at least since early 1970s, Iran has been 
regarded as an important regional player; prior to that, it had managed to accumulate 
considerable strategic value as a weighty pawn in the Cold War chessboard…..”. The 
establishment of the Islamic Republic provided Iran with another strategic angle, as 
ever since Tehran constitutionally holds the torch for defending the “rights of all 
Muslims without allying with hegemonic powers”. (ibid) By becoming the reference 
point for oppressed Muslims and particularly the Shiite galaxy Iran has established a 
unique place in the politics of adjacent regions, as well as the great powers. This 
transformation in the state ideology and perceptions resulted in major foreign policy 
overhaul, turning Iran from an anchor of stability in the Persian Gulf and a close ally of 
the US into a “defiant, fiercely independent, proactively religious, and nonaligned 
power” (ibid:283), posing the “greatest challenge that US could face from a single 
country”. (US National Security Strategy 2006) 
While dealing with such an important player requires a deep understanding of the post 
revolutionary developments and various aspects of foreign policy transformations, 
speculations among world politicians, academia and media for interpreting Iran’s 
foreign policy has often resulted in further misunderstandings. As radical 
interpretations of the principles set for Iran’s foreign policy1 by the Islamic Republic’s 
constitution have put the country on a conflicting path with great powers and some 
regional states from the early post revolution days, the chance for developing a fair 
understanding of Iran’s foreign policy in general and its regional policy, in particular, 
was missed.  
Iran, in the early 1990s, was facing a confluence of landmark changes in both domestic 
and international scene. The end of the war with Iraq, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini 
and the presidency of relatively moderate Hashemi Rafsanjani had opened a window of 
opportunity for debates and plans for creating a degree of change to major domestic and 
foreign policies. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
                                                          
1 Rejection of all forms of external domination, preservation of Iran’s independence and territorial integrity, 
defence of the rights of all Muslims without allying with hegemonic powers, the maintenance of peaceful 
relations with all non belligerent states. 
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Union, which resulted in considerable transformation of the international system, had 
created  significant changes at the regional level with great affects on neighbouring 
countries. Among these changes were the emergence of new sovereign states and the 
evolvement of Central Asia and South Caucasus into a buffer zone between Iran, 
Turkey and Russia.  
Based on Buzan and Weaver’s classification (2003:421) the small region of South 
Caucasus is a sub-complex in the post Soviet space, where “not only security questions, 
but a number of political decisions, strategies and alliances are interrelated. The 
unsolved conflicts have an enormous impact on both domestic politics and foreign 
policy strategies”. As Freitag-Wirminghaus (2008:54) has explained, the presence of 
numerous outside players and their rivalry for geopolitical control of this globally 
strategic corner of the world with abundant hydrocarbon resources resulted in a 
phenomenon that many analysts branded it as the new Great Game; while the 
unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea and consequently its hydrocarbon resources 
has further complicated the region’s geopolitical scene. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union provided Iran -which for much of the history has had 
the region as its sphere of influence- the opportunity for the revival of historical 
affinities, with the prospect of opening new horizons of influence. It also presented 
challenges emanating from the initial domestic instabilities in the newly independent 
republics and ongoing conflicts in the region. In many ways the potential for Iran to 
establish closer ties with and to develop considerable influence in Azerbaijan and 
Armenia was far greater compare to other states, as in addition to their shared legacy of 
the Persian Empire, both countries have common borders with Iran.  
Out of these two new neighbours, Azerbaijan seemed initially the best option through 
which Tehran could project power and influence into the Caucasus. The largest among 
South Caucasus countries, with rich natural resources in contrast to other two, 
Azerbaijan has overwhelmingly Muslim population where the majority share the same 
religious sect as Shiite Iran. The existing kinship with large Azeri population of Iran 
was considered another valuable asset for building a lasting alliance. However, as it 
will be demonstrated in this study, regional developments have turned out very different 
from what Iran had hoped for.  
This research intends to study the application and implications of Iran’s foreign policy 
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in a regional context. That is to determine the goals, priorities and policies that Tehran 
pursues in a particular region within the framework of its general foreign policy. The 
aim is to provide a better understanding of Iran’s foreign policy priorities and 
behaviour, roots of continuity and factors of change in regional context. 
 
1.2. Research Assumption, Hypothesis, Questions, Methodology and Ethics 
The research is based on the assumption that:  
‘As a neighbouring region, South Caucasus has a special place in Iran’s foreign policy 
and relations.’ 
The research hypothesis maintains that: 
‘The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new sovereign states that shared 
the legacy of the Persian civilization with Iran; provided this country with significant 
opportunity to project power and influence in the South Caucasus, particularly through 
extensive relationship with the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan.’ 
Hence, the research will explore Iran’s regional policy in the South Caucasus and how 
successful it has been in achieving its goals. 
The main question, this research is intended to answer is: 
 What have been Iran’s priorities and regional policy in the South Caucasus since 
the end of the Cold War and how they have shaped the country’s relations with 
the two Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan? 
To find the answer to this main question the study shall answer the following questions: 
 What is Iran’s general foreign policy? What principles, goals and objectives, 
strategies and approaches Iran has been pursuing since the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic? 
 What have been Iran’s priorities in the South Caucasus after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War? 
 What opportunities Iran was provided and what threats faced with in this post 
7 
Soviet space, and how they have been handled? 
 How have been/are Iran’s relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan and what have 
been the main factors shaping these relations? 
This qualitative exploratory research has a dual approach methodology. The first three 
chapters are generally descriptive analytical while the two chapters on Iran’s relations 
with its two northern neighbours are case studies.  As Bennett and Elman (2007:170-
171) have argued, qualitative methods including case studies have found a prominent 
place in the study of international relations subfields for many decades, as they have 
“considerable advantages in studying complex phenomena”. 
The main basis of data collection for this research is library work using various books, 
journal papers, think tank and governmental publications, in various formats, etc. 
Several databases have been used for data collection including Factiva, First Search, 
Nexus, Google Scholar, as well as BBC Monitoring Service which facilitates access to 
a rich collection of news pieces from across the world.  
The research is not confined only to English language sources and databases. While 
many Persian language papers and books were consulted for this study, several Iranian 
think tanks as well as databases facilitated remote access to Persian materials, among 
them DID Digital library and Noormags. In some cases reliable weblogs, such as the 
weblog of Iran’s present ambassador to Azerbaijan has been consulted. 
Elite interview was initially planned to be at the core of this research, using semi 
structured interviews with former Iranian diplomats. However, due to Iran’s political 
atmosphere at the time of data collection; encouraging these elites for interview proved 
to be a serious challenge, hence the outcomes of limited conducted interviews played 
only a complementary role for data collection.  
As explained by the UK Data Service1, the difference between standardised and semi 
structured interview is the flexibility of the latter. Though like standardised interview, 
the semi structured interview also has interview schedule and predesigned set of 
questions; but it is not confined merely to those concepts and questions and allows for 
examination of relevant themes and topics which come up during the interview. This 
                                                          
1 UK Data Service. Semi Structured Interviews.Available at : <http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/teaching-
resources/interview/semi-structured> (Accessed on 06.09.2015) 
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characteristic provides the opportunity for “pursuing and probing for novel, relevant 
information, through additional questions often noted as prompts on the schedule. The 
interviewer frequently has to formulate impromptu questions in order to follow up leads 
that emerge during the interview.”1 Consequently, the interviewer is constantly engaged 
and involved in reformulating the interview throughout the process.  
The research has observed Durham University School of Government and International 
Affair’s Research Ethics Policy2 as well as ESRC Framework for Research Ethics 
(FRE) 2010 Updated September 20123. Where using direct and indirect quotes from 
books, papers, databases, etc. appropriate referencing has been provided for citations.  
For the limited number of interviews which were undertaken, Ethical Implications 
forms were submitted to the Department’s Ethics Committee in advance. Furthermore, 
interviewees were informed of the place of my study and the purpose of the interview 
and their consent was obtained based on “simple agreement to participate in the 
interview process with the right to withdraw at any point.”4 Strict observation was 
undertaken at all parts of the research process and in written outputs for the cases 
“where a guarantee of anonymity” was “given as part of the process of obtaining 
consent”.5 
 
1.3. Research Context and Significance 
The review of literature for this research was undertaken for the following purposes: 
1- To identify the existing gaps in studies of Iran’s regional policy in the South 
Caucasus and its relations with its northern neighbours. 
2- To examine various theoretical frameworks undertaken for analysing Iran’s 
foreign and regional policy in order to choose the most suitable approach for 
this research. 
This study has examined and reviewed three categories of scholarly publications which 
                                                          
1 Ibid. 
2 Appendix 1. 
3 For details please see: ESRC Research Ethics Framework Available at: 
<http://www.gold.ac.uk/media/ESRC_Re_Ethics_Frame_tcm6-11291.pdf> (Accessed on 20.06.2015) 
4 Durham University School of Government and International Affairs Research Ethics Policy, Principle 6/b 
5 ibid. Principle 7 
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are directly relevant to this study. First are those which have studied Iran’s foreign 
policy in its general capacity and from different aspects, including Iran’s regional 
policy. The second group are works that have focused on the South Caucasus and 
examined various issues such as security, energy, and other important regional 
challenges. The third group are those which have discussed Iran’s bilateral relations 
with the south Caucasus countries.                    
This section will provide a brief and quick review of some of those publications which 
have been helpful in fulfilling the above purposes.  
Ramazani, who has been writing on Iran’s foreign policy since 1950’s has mainly based 
his analysis of Iran’s foreign policy developments on geopolitics and domestic politics. 
For example in one of his earliest post revolution papers, titled ‘Iran’s foreign policy’ 
(1981), he has tried to explain the decision making mechanism in the young Islamic 
Republic. Then, by evaluating different models of decision making in the nonaligned 
countries, he has predicted that Iran’s model would tilt towards Western Europe and 
Japan. As it would be demonstrated by this study, in practice Iran never had the chance 
to move towards this direction. 
In a paper published a decade after the revolution, Ramazani has argued that “Tehran's 
foreign policy has been shaped largely by an acute interplay between its domestic 
situation, not merely factional politics, and its external environment, not merely 
superpower behaviour”.(1998:202) Trying to introduce domestic roots of Iran’s foreign 
policy, he explains that throughout Iran’s long history, there has been a tension between 
religious ideology and pragmatism, which was solidified by the Islamic revolution and 
argues that the shift of the balance towards pragmatism is the result of “dynamic process 
of cultural maturation”.(ibid) However, due to heterogeneous nature of societal 
maturation, one can raise the question of predictability in the face of such uncertainty. 
This means that since the level of cultural maturation is not the same across all levels 
of the society or political factions depending on both domestic and international 
developments this heterogeneity can give way either to ideologically driven policies or 
pragmatism. This, in turn, creates difficulty predicting confidently what would be in 
store for Iran’s foreign policy.  
Employment of constructivist theories for analysing Iran’s foreign policy has not been 
limited to Ramazani and have been a popular approach among many other scholars. For 
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example, Savory (1990:59), has based his paper on the argument that “there is one 
dominant theme that has shaped the foreign policy of Iran and has thus had strong 
influence on its economic policy since the concept of foreign policy was first 
adumbrated….This theme or imperative, is ‘Iranismus’, the idea of a cultural identity 
which is distinct from that of other races and peoples in the Middle East…..”.  
Sariolghalam explains that the revolution resulted in resurfacing Iran’s Islamic identity 
“and demonstrated its degree of relevance and viability in the broad mosaic of Iranian 
sources of identity and political possibilities”.(2003: 82) Arguing that “Iran is a leader 
in the process of rational political change in the Middle East” (ibid: 81) like Ramazani, 
he justifies political oscillations and posturing as the pains of maturation that not only 
“will result in no conceivable damage to others; rather, Iranians could prove to be 
civilizing contributors to evolutionary processes in the Middle East and the Muslim 
world at large”.(ibid: 82) 
In her study of Iran’s foreign policy developments, Rakel has based her analysis on two 
elements of history and religious culture; interpreting Iran’s Islamic revolution as “one 
in a series of events in reaction to the domination of foreign powers and exploitation of 
its wealth and resources by foreigners”. She also examines the role of Shi’ism in Iranian 
foreign policy, as Iran is the only world country with Shi’ism as the state’s religion. 
(2007: 160-163) 
By examining contested interpretations of Iran’s foreign policy motivations; Salamay 
and Othman have assessed “three interrelated foreign policy drivers that have been 
particularly salient in framing the Iranian positions vis-à-vis the various changes in both 
the regional and international arenas: Shiism, Welayat Al-Faqih, and domestic policy 
struggles”.(2011:197) They have concluded, “that Iranian foreign policy is strongly 
shaped by Shia revival and Welayat Al-Faqih ideological discourses”.(ibid)  
By undertaking a generally constructive approach, the papers in ‘Iran and the 
International System’ (2012) have addressed the morals and “firm Islamic tenets and 
beliefs that constitute the theoretical and ideological underpinning of Islamic doctrine” 
as well as “the political rationality of the Islamic Republic in contrast to contemporary 
fundamentalism”.(ibid: 1) The subsequent chapters provide further insight on how 
Iranian elites view the international system and perceive Iran’s role and place in it and 
how this view has shaped Iran’s relations with other countries.  
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Arguing that “ideology is not one explanatory variable among others, but rather the 
primary context within which foreign policy gets shape”, Waarner (2013) has tried in 
his book to explain “how foreign ideas that were current among foreign policy makers 
during Ahmadinejad’s presidency” provided the context for Iran’s foreign policy 
behaviour in that period.  
The review of the literature which have relied on constructivism for interpreting Iran’s 
foreign policy reveals an absence of consensus among scholars; meaning that although 
they find roots of Iran’s behaviour in its ‘identity’, they do not have the same description 
about this identity or those elements which are more influential in shaping Iran’s 
policies and interactions. Some like Marschall (2003:4) consider Iranians’ “sense of 
pride and glory from the knowledge of their past” as the main element of the Iranian 
identity; others like the above mentioned examples consider different aspects of religion 
as the main source of Iran’s political identity. 
Furthermore, although prominent scholars like Hinnebush and Ehteshami, Telhami and 
Barnett, Dassuki and Korany and Halliday, agree that where rationalist approaches fail 
to adequately explain some foreign policy behaviours, ideational factors can fill the gap 
(Warnaar 2013:14); relying merely on ideational factors for analysing Iran’s complex 
foreign policy would deprive the audience of a comprehensive picture in which other 
domestic, regional and international factors shaping Iran’s foreign policy can be 
identified. As Halliday (2005:32-33) has put it “constructivism and its outriders run the 
risk of ignoring interests and material factors, let alone old fashioned deception and 
self- delusion”.   
There are on the other hand scholars who have based their study on examining material 
and structural factors shaping Iran’s foreign policy. In his paper, Sick (1987: 698) has 
emphasised on one cardinal rule that he believes the United States should have learnt 
through experience, “that Iranian foreign policy is produced and conditioned by the 
hard imperatives of domestic politics ..... The supreme goal..... is to assure the 
continuation of theocratic rule and to preserve the legitimacy of the new regime.”  
Calabrese has used ‘security’ as an analytic tool for examining Iran’s post Khomeini 
regional foreign policy. Arguing that traditional definition of ‘national security’ fails to 
capture the breadth and scope of Iran’s multifaceted and interrelated problems which 
threaten both the regime and the state (1994:3) he builds a case for a broader concept 
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of ‘national security’ to address complex challenges faced by Iran as he believes that a 
security environment consisting of two interacting domestic and international sub 
environments shapes Iran’s foreign policy “forming the boundaries within which 
decisions are formulated, setting the limits of effective action”.(ibid: 6-7) 
Hunter’s seminal work, ‘Iran’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet: Reassessing the new 
international order’, which has been a valuable reference for this research has explained 
how the international and regional system has evolved following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and evaluated the effects of the new order on periphery states, particularly 
those in opposing side of the remaining superpower. It has then assessed Iran’s foreign 
policy and its relations with various players and regions in this emerging system with 
the application of realist theories. 
In his chapter on Iran’s foreign policy, Ehteshami has introduced foreign policy 
determinants, foreign policy decision making and behaviour; and concluded that 
“despite its revolutionary zeal and a reputation for non-conformity and defiance since 
the revolution, it can be argued that revolutionary Iran has always been a ‘rational actor’ 
in the classic realist mold. Even some of its excesses can be seen as calculated risks or 
opportunist responses to difficult situations.”(2002:284) The same chapter in the 2014 
edition of the same book describes the role of regional geopolitical developments in 
increasing Iran’s edge, while emphasising on the exacerbated isolation as well as 
economic and domestic challenges which impede Iran from taking further advantage of 
such developments.  
Through the application of structural realism which prescribes “how states should 
behave, as oppose to explain how they actually behave” (Glaser as quoted by Juneau 
2015:6), in ‘Squandered opportunity’, Juneau “has explored causes and consequences 
of Iran’s sub optimal performance” despite the post 2001 favourable strategic 
environment.(2015:1-2) He argues that although Iran’s rising power increased its 
assertiveness “but the peculiar nature of Iran’s power and the intervention of specific 
domestic factors” resulted in deviation of Iran’s foreign policy “from what would be 
considered the potential optimal outcomes”. This conclusion, as the author explains, is 
based on setting an ideal national interest as a normative baseline. However, this raises 
the question of the reference point for determining the national interest as there may be 
a divergence between what a ‘nation’ or its leaders define as their interests and what 
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others in different capacities do. Moreover, to blame ‘Iran’s foreign and domestic 
policies’ as the only source of suboptimal achievements would be ignoring the role of 
the international system in foreign policy developments. As this study has argued the 
response received by Iran towards its ‘less peculiar’ policies and more cooperative 
behaviour was “the Axis of evil” stigma and the consequent unfavourable security 
environment which in turn securitised Iran’s political scene and gave way to the rise of 
more radical elements. 
The above cases are some examples of scholarly works which have tried to provide a 
better understanding of Iran’s foreign policy by identifying material factors that shape 
those policies. Although relying on rationalist theories with their emphasis on ‘state’ 
and ‘interest’ can help in understanding material factors and systemic elements; or as 
Halliday (2005:33) has put it provide a “rational, empirical account” of factors shaping 
a state’s foreign policy; but would deprive the study of examining the values and ideas 
which form the identity of the state and result in certain foreign policy principles and 
behaviours. Due to the centrality of ideology in Iran’s foreign policy and continuous 
emphasis of the Islamic Republic’s policy makers on ideological factors, one cannot 
expect to have a full picture of Iran’s politics by relying merely on rationalist theories.  
As the above arguments about the strengths and weaknesses of major international 
relation theories in interpreting Iran’s foreign policy shows we would be left in the dark 
room with the elephant; unless as this study has decided, take a more comprehensive 
approach and not be content with one single theory. 
There are on the other hand, publications which have examined Iran’s foreign policy 
with regard to major international developments. Many of such scholarly works either 
cover different aspects of Iran’s foreign policy and relations since a particular juncture 
in the history such as the end of the Cold War or the September 11th or focus on bilateral 
and regional relations following such developments. While a significant volume of such 
publications have focused on Iran’s policy and relations in the Middle East, most of the 
works which have looked at Iran’s relations with the South Caucasus have done so in a 
larger context, i.e. together with Central Asia or as part of the Middle East. For example, 
Ehteshami has argued that due to its historical, cultural and religious connections with 
the Middle East, CCARs (that is the 5 Central Asian republics and the two 
Transcaucasian states of Azerbaijan and Armenia) have become de Facto members of 
14 
the Middle East since their independence, “but function very much as the latter’s 
periphery”.(1994: 93) Other scholars, like Menashri and Hunter, on the other hand, have 
considered Central Asia and South Caucasus as one entity with two integral components 
as the latter has more common attributes with Central Asia1 than with the Middle East. 
However, the review of relevant literature helped this research in deciding not to 
consider South Caucasus, either as part of the Middle East or an integral component of 
one entity with Central Asia. Instead, based on Buzan’s concept of Regional Security 
Complex, the study has considered South Caucasus as a sub system of the post-Soviet 
security complex2. 
Scholars who have examined Iran’s policy in the subject region often have contending 
views in this regard. For example, Pahlevan (1998:74) believes that the Islamic 
Republic was “predisposed to interpret the newly acquired independence of the Central 
Asian republics as a victory for Islam.... such analysis of the situation led the Islamic 
Republic’s leadership to predict its policy in Central Asia on Islamic principles”. On 
the other hand, Hooglund (1994:114) argues how those analysts who are (were) 
“convinced that Iran will spread Islamic fundamentalism throughout Central Asia and 
the Middle East unless the West undertakes preventive measures....” were wrong. 
Providing evidence to prove that “Iran’s religious activities in the region actually have 
been muted, paring to insignificance in comparison with the roles of Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia” (ibid: 117) Hooglund concludes that “Iran’s view of its role in Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia is not the promotion of Islamic activism, but the promotion of mutually 
beneficial economic activities.”(ibid) Similarly, Ehteshami (1997:93) describes 
Tehran’s policy towards the region as “incremental engagement, in which Iran seeks to 
minimize threats to its own security by promoting stability in the neighbouring regions 
and by deepening economic exchange”. Then, there are scholars (1998: 93) who have 
a view between those introduced above. For example, Menashri (1998:93) believes that 
it is beyond the argument that “Tehran seeks a ‘return to Islam’ in Central Asia..... But 
precisely what it is doing” and how much sacrifice is prepared to do for such cause is a 
matter of dispute. He reckons that Iran has mostly focused on “politically and 
ideologically mutual topics in its intergovernmental dealings” (ibid: 92) and wherever 
the “revolutionary ideology clashed with national interests, the latter dictated overall 
                                                          
1 Most importantly they share the historical, political and cultural legacy of the Soviet era. 
2 Since in many occasion a same fact or rule applies to both South Caucasus and Central Asia, the study may at 
times mention them together, which does not overrule the fact that they are independent sub systems. 
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policy” without the complete abandonment of the former.  
As demonstrated by the above brief, there are at least three theories regarding Iran’s 
policy in the South Caucasus, one that believe it is ideology based and bound on 
spreading Islamic fundamentalism; another, which believes that Iran’s policy in the 
region has avoided ideology; and the third which argues that Iran has had its ideological 
inclinations, but they were limited due to variety of reasons. Thus, one of the tasks in 
this research was to verify which theory is closer to reality. 
Furthermore, several scholars who agreed with the third theory have offered 
explanations on why it has been so, though, some of their arguments can be questioned 
with valid counterarguments. For example, Haj Yousefi (2008) maintains that despite 
the hostile propaganda, Iran’s policy in Central Asia and Caucasus has been more 
inclined towards economic and cultural affairs rather than religious politics. However, 
what constitutes as “cultural affairs” is, of course, open to debate, particularly when 
there is a high degree of sensitivity in the receiving state. Moreover, since religion is an 
integral part of the Iranian culture; it is very difficult for Islamic Iran to have cultural 
activities which do not involve religion.  
Another example is Entessar and Dorraj (2013) whom by focusing mainly on the broad 
context of socio cultural factors which have shaped and conditioned Iran’s post-Cold 
War foreign policy and “the ways in which strategic factors interfered with its 
geopolitical calculations vis-à-vis the region”(2013: 1) have examined “Iran’s evolving 
interest in, and its foreign policy towards, the states in post-Soviet Central 
Asia/Caucasus”.(ibid) They have argued that Iran’s policy in the South Caucasus is an 
integral part of its Eurasian policy, and among multiple factors with different weights 
that shape Iran’s policy in Eurasia, “the political calculus of national interest overrides 
ideological concerns” and “Islamic ideology is increasingly used as a mask for 
realpolitik”.(ibid: 20) The problem with this argument is the often controversial 
definition of national interest, particularly when ideology is a pillar for the state. The 
blur boundaries of definition, and opposing views on what is in the interest of the nation, 
makes a firm judgment rather difficult while distinguishing true ideologically motivated 
policies from those that just have the ideological mask is another hurdle in the way of 
a fair judgment. 
Based on his examination of Iranian leaders’ foreign policy philosophy in light of 
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existing options “with regard to the country’s resource needs and ideological goals and 
the resulting policy direction” (2012:383) towards the South Caucasus; Sadri, has 
concluded that “Iran’s foreign policy interests in the Caucasus states are manifestly 
realistic” with two major goals of diversifying its energy market and balancing USA’s 
hegemonic influence.(ibid: 386) A similar argument has been made in chapter 8 of the 
book ‘Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World’ (2013), that Sadri has 
co-authored with Vera Muniz. This conclusion, however, raises the question about the 
importance of security and regional stability in Iran’s policies. Is there any evidence to 
show that the aforementioned goals are so important that Iran would readily sacrifice 
regional stability for them? If not, then could it be concluded that Iran has more 
important goals in its South Caucasus policies? Or could it be argued that what Sadri 
considers as Iran’s major goals are in fact Iran’s objectives towards more important 
goals? 
The most important outcome of reviewing the aforementioned literature and other 
similar publications was familiarisation with different angles from which the study can 
examine the subject and the scope it needs to cover. More importantly, was reaching 
the conclusion that in order to have an accurate understanding of Iran’s regional policy, 
instead of focusing on one or two particular aspect/s the research has to initially 
examine the bigger picture, which is the context in which the regional policy is formed, 
including states’ general foreign policy framework and principles, regional geopolitics 
and the international environment.  
The Second group of scholarly works relevant to this research has mainly focused on 
the study of the South Caucasus and discussed Iran’s policy as an important player in 
the region. Among the earlier comprehensive studies of the region is Herzig’s research 
which has examined South Caucasus from different aspects including politics, 
economy, and security deficits. One of the chapters in his book, “The New Caucasus” 
has focused on the international relations of this region; initially introducing factors that 
bear “on the interests and perceptions of sets of actors involved in the development of 
international relations of the Caucasian states”. (1999: 85) It then moves on to examine 
the specific interests and policies of those actors, including Iran, and Turkey, whose 
regional rivalry shortly became irrelevant by the rise of Russia and increased influence 
of other external players. The author has maintained that Tehran “has adopted 
increasingly pragmatic policies …. better suited to its resources, with an emphasis on 
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the resolution of conflicts, the promotion of stability, countering any threat emanating 
from Azeri nationalism, the pursuit of commercial interests, and the development of 
north-south transportation and communication links, including oil and gas pipelines,…, 
roads, railways and power grids.”(ibid: 113)  
Afrasiabi and Maleki’s descriptive paper (2003)1 has provided an introduction various 
policies undertaken by Iran to deal with the post Sep 11th ‘insecure environment’. 
While the paper has provided a useful account of Iran’s initiative for managing its 
security environment, it lacks a theoretical base for analysis. 
Nuriyev’s book offers “both the historical background and the analysis of current 
problems and future possibilities” in the South Caucasus. (2007:6) The third part of his 
book has addressed the question of outside intervention and international diplomacy, 
which also has very briefly discussed the Iranian influence and policy in the region, as 
well as its concerns and relations with various regional states and players. However, as 
the main focus of the book is the South Caucasus itself, the chapter has understandably 
refrained from going into in depth analysis of Iran’s policy and relations in the region. 
In an article in Jafalian’s ‘Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus’, Therme has 
examined Iran’s foreign policy in the region, introducing two reasons for the failure of 
the Islamic Republic to become the first regional power in the post-Soviet era despite 
its numerous assets; the ethnic hurdle, and the fact that the three small republics chose 
to adopt a model shared by small post-colonial states, which is to benefit from relations 
with wide range of states to maximise their own interest, instead of allowing one 
particular power to unduly influence their policies.(2011:138) However, as this study 
has demonstrated, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Caucasus Republics became 
independent; Iran had just come out of a long catastrophic war with Iraq, was under 
sanctions and lacked financial and technological capabilities essential for a major 
regional power to support the emerging states. Hence, Therme’s analysis has 
shortcomings in comprehensive examination of the context. 
German’s ‘Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus’, has been one of the most up 
to date and useful resources that present research benefitted from, as in addition to 
valuable knowledge, it has offered a good example of how different aspects of a 
                                                          
1 With some modification was later included in: Maleki, A. Afrasiabi, K. (2008) Reading in Iran Foreign Policy 
After September 11. Booksurge Publishing. 
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professional research should be approached. She has initially discussed various 
definitions of ‘region’ and arguments about “where exactly South Caucasus is”, and 
why should the three small countries with diverging interests and foreign policies be 
considered as a region. Following extensive discussions on foreign policy positions and 
contemporary security challenges of South Caucasus countries; she has then, examined 
the relations between regional states and various actors, including Turkey and Iran. She 
argues that the region is significant for Iran “both in terms of security, including 
territorial integrity and its economic interests”.(2012:126) Following an examination of 
the consequences of regional geopolitical changes resulting from the collapse of the 
Soviet Union for Iran; the author has discussed the main issues in Iran’s bilateral 
relations with the three South Caucasus states. She has pointed out to the effects of the 
Karabakh conflict on development of Iran’s regional influence, as well as its bilateral 
relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
The third group of relevant scholarly works have focused on Iran’s bilateral relations 
with either Armenia or Azerbaijan. For example in his book, ‘Ravābete Iran va 
Jomhūrie Azerbaijan: Negāhe Azarihā be Iran’, AmirAhmadiān has offered extensive 
information on Iran-Azerbaijan’s cultural and economic relations, followed by an 
examination of Azerbaijan’s history textbooks, continued by discussions on 
Azerbaijan’s foreign and security views, pan Turkism and its threat to Iran’s national 
security, and timeline of Iran-Azerbaijan relations. With the aim of creating a better 
understanding among Iranian policymakers about how Azerbaijan perceives Iran; the 
author has provided accounts of Azerbaijan’s political elite on various aspects of 
bilateral relations, as well as a list of Azerbaijan’s claims and complaints against Iran. 
Despite its chaotic arrangement, lack of sophisticated theoretical analysis and focus on 
limited aspects of bilateral relations, the book provided a valuable source of past data, 
as well as a good insight into Azerbaijan’s political elite’s perception on Iran.  
‘Pathology of Iran-Republic of Azerbaijan’s Recent Relations’, which is a pamphlet 
published amid rising tensions between the two countries in 2012 to examine the 
geopolitical and political factors exacerbating bilateral tensions, suffers from similar 
shortcomings. That is, failing to examine all important factors, focusing on incidents 
rather than roots, chaotic categorisation and lack of theoretical framework and 
analytical rigour.  
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Several publications examining Iran’s bilateral relations with either Azerbaijan or 
Armenia have simply provided good examples of biased analysis and helped this 
research to avoid similar pitfalls.  For example, in the ‘The South Caucasus 2021: Oil, 
Democracy and Geopolitics’ book, which has tried to “address the most vital issues of 
the region, such as territorial conflicts, oil and natural gas resources, geopolitical 
complexities, pipeline politics, important analysis of the geopolitical risks for the next 
decades, geopolitics of the Caucasus-Caspian Basin, religion, demographic and 
migration prospects and the policy course of the superpowers” (2012: viii) a chapter by 
Rubin examines Azerbaijan’s relations with the Middle East. The author has evaluated 
Iran-Azerbaijan relations based on some popular but unproven assumptions, such as 
Iran’ ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, which he believes, if fulfilled, “would be a 
disaster for Azerbaijan”.(2012:224) In the absence of any firm theoretical foundation 
or much reliable empirical evidence, Rubin concludes that Iran’s increased power and 
US decline of power would expose Azerbaijan to a more dangerous environment. 
Similarly, in an article in “Azerbaijan and Its Neighbourhood in 2003-2013”, while 
overemphasising on Azerbaijan’s regional role, Weitz has provided a partisan account 
of existing challenges in Iran-Azerbaijan relations and has focused on ways that the US 
and its allies including Israel can use Baku to contain Iran’s influence in adjacent 
regions. He maintains that “by strengthening Azerbaijan’s soft power, the United States 
would counter Iranian threats because people of the Middle East, Central Asia, and the 
South Caucasus, would view Azerbaijan, a pro-Western, prosperous, and secular state, 
as a superior model to that of Iran’s bankrupt theocracy.”(2014:199) However, 
considering significant rise of Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Western notions in the 
Middle East and Central Asia which has paved the way to increased number and activity 
of radical fundamentalist, one might wonder that if the people of these regions really 
prefer secularism and pro-Westernism as preferable characteristics for their states, 
particularly  the absence of real democratic values. 
A report published by the ‘European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre’, has 
examined the strategic implications of Iran-Armenia relations for the South Caucasus 
Security. The authors claim that Iran-Armenia alliance serves the hidden agenda of 
undermining “efforts undertaken by the international community to bring stability to 
the region and to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.”(2013:3) While numerous reports from international organisations involved in 
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the region and the resolution process of the Karabakh conflict, as well as esteemed 
scholars who have been monitoring regional developments have offered evidence and 
strong arguments to demonstrate how a variety of reasons and a range of failures by 
different actors have left the efforts for resolving the conflict futile; the authors have 
failed to offer concrete evidence to support their controversial claim. They have also 
maintained that Tehran’s strategic choice of relations with Armenia “is indicative of 
Iran’s will to use the Caucasus as a battlefield of a proxy war with the United States 
and the European Union in the framework of its nuclear program”(2013:3) and have 
warned about “the long-term consequences of the strengthening of the Yerevan-Tehran 
axis”.(ibid: 60) However, as this study will demonstrate, for various reasons Iran has 
tried to take a non provocative, non confrontational and pragmatic approach in the 
South Caucasus.  
Nonetheless, there has been a limited number of scholarly works with sound theoretical 
base and strong argument that this study could benefit from. For example; using a 
hermeneutic interpretative method and with a diagnostic approach, Koolaeei and Osuli 
(2012) have examined factors which have securitised Iran-Azerbaijan’s relations from 
1995 to 2012, and introduced a collection of material and ideational and normative 
factors, shaping the securitised bilateral relations, though they have relied more on the 
general and more popular definition and aspects of security, which has a more limited 
scope than the approach taken in this study. 
Amid significant scarcity of up to date resources about contemporary Armenia, 
particularly its politics, Mirzoyan’s thesis has offered “the first systematic study of 
Armenia’s foreign policy during the post-independence period, between 1991 and 
2004”, and has been a valuable source for relevant parts of present study.(2007: vii) 
The dissertation has explored “four sets of relationships with Armenia’s major 
historical ‘partners’: Russia, Iran, Turkey and the West (Europe and the United States), 
considering “both Europe and Iran … as ideational  ‘others’, whose role in Armenia’s 
foreign policy, aside from pragmatic policy considerations, reflects a normative 
quest.”(ibid) Mirzoyan’s chapter on Iran introduces this southern neighbour as the 
‘permanent alternative’ in Armenia’s foreign policy thinking and practice since the 
beginning of its independence, due to the balancing role of Iran “vis-à-vis Turkey and 
Azerbaijan and the Armenians’ perception of their relations with Iran as a political 
constant”.(ibid: 173) The chapter has provided historical background on bilateral 
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relations and the factors which facilitate these relations and has concluded by stating 
that “beyond the fact that the regional geopolitics have created permissive environment 
for this relationship, there is a deeper understanding and mutual amity that saves it from 
opportunistic exploitations and gives it a large degree of permanence.”(ibid: 216)  
The significance of this research is better elaborated following the review of relevant 
literature. The examination of such literature proved that while there is a plethora of 
research on Iran’s policy in the Middle East and its relations with its Arab neighbours 
or other important parts of the world there is a striking deficit of empirical and 
conceptually-based research on Iran’s policy and relations with the South Caucasus. 
The relatively small volume of existing scholarly publications about the subject is 
mostly limited to papers or book chapters, which inherently limit the scope and depth 
of the covered issues. Furthermore, these publications have largely adopted a narrative 
approach and stopped short of employing theoretical framework for analysis. 
Consequently, they have mostly just touched upon Tehran’s most important concerns 
or main aspects of cooperation in its bilateral relations without going into too much 
details or providing any systemic analysis. 
By undertaking a systemic approach and employing multiple theories of international 
relations this research has provided an in depth study of Iran’s policy towards the South 
Caucasus and its bilateral relations with its two South Caucasian neighbours. 
With regard to theoretical framework as demonstrated in the research context, due to 
the complexity of Iran’s foreign policy, which transpires in both decision making and 
implementation no single grand theory have the explanatory capacity for capturing this 
complexity or the fast evolving context in which the policies are shaped. Some scholars 
have therefore argued for using a hybrid model or employing multiple theories to offer 
a comprehensive tool which would be able to explain different aspects of Iran’s foreign 
policy. Based on this argument and in order to offer an enhanced theoretical analysis, 
this research has employed three popular theories of international relations, which 
would be explained further in other parts of this introduction.  
Review of the existing literature also revealed another gap. While the Karabakh conflict 
has been an important factor in shaping regional geopolitical dynamics, as well as Iran’s 
bilateral relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan most scholars have just touched 
upon the issue, without going into detailed analysis of such effects. Moreover, while 
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new data regarding Iran’s involvement in the conflict has been revealed in recent 
yearsthe scholarly community has failed to consider them in their analysis and 
continued to offer analysis about Iran’s approach and performance towards this conflict 
based on old data, and in the case of Western academics, mostly based on the narrations 
from Azerbaijani sources, many of them biased and controversial.  
Using the acquired data through interviews with Iranian diplomats as well as news 
sources, this study offers an alternative narration of Iran’s approach towards the 
Karabakh conflict that would in turn undermine some existing assumptions about Iran’s 
bilateral relations. 
 
1.4. Conceptual Framework 
As it was explained before, in order to offer a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s foreign 
and regional policy, this research has relied on multiple theories of international 
relations, which would be explained briefly in this section. 
To explain the transformation of Iran’s foreign policy direction and principles in the 
post 1979 revolution era the research has relied on constructivism theory. The seminal 
works of Alexander Wendt (1987;1992) Nicholas Onuf (1989) and Friedrich 
Kratochwil (1989) are the basis of “the newest but perhaps the most dynamic” school 
of thought among mainstream International Relations theories, constructivism”. 
(Jackson & Jones 2012:104) As Drezner (2011:67) has put it simply, while material 
factors are considered important by constructivists, the way “social structures filter and 
interpret the meaning of ... material capabilities” are even more important in forming 
the actor’s behaviour in the international arena. “Contrary to both realists and liberals, 
constructivists argue that the kind of goals held by a state or other actor in world politics 
emerge from the actor’s identity.” (Jackson & Jones 2012:104) As Wendt (1992:398) 
has put it, for constructivists, it is the identity that forms the basis of interest. 
Nonetheless, identity is not just about “Selves”, but also “Others”, those who are outside 
the boundaries of “Self”. (Jackson & Jones 2012:105) To see international relations 
through the lens of constructivism, is therefore, to focus on the way states, their leaders 
and various actors conceptualise themselves and perceive their role in the world, which 
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in turn “translate into the sorts of goals and interests that those actors pursue in their 
foreign policy”.(ibid)  
Many scholars have relied merely on constructivist approach for analysing Iran’s 
foreign policy. However, as Rittberger has argued although the two level analysis of 
constructivist that takes both “the international system and domestic society into 
account”(2004:5) is generally the strength of this theory, but “it creates difficulty .... 
when the international and the domestic value based expectations of appropriate 
behaviour which a state acknowledges as defining its role in a given situation are at 
odds with one another.”(ibid) The Islamic Republic is the obvious example of such 
situation, as its value system is in clear contradiction with international norms of 
behaviour. Therefore, this study has limited the application of constructivism to 
explaining the role of ideational factors which have shaped the framework and 
principles of Iran’s foreign policy as well as some aspects of relations with its 
neighbours. 
The research on the other hand, has employed defensive realism theory to explain Iran’s 
altering foreign policy approach, significant differences between its policies in the 
Middle East and that of the South Caucasus and also relations with the Republics of 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Realist theories comprise the eldest school of political 
thought. Different strands of realism are commonly concerned with ‘sovereign state in 
the anarchic world’, with anarchy being the absence of a centralised, legitimate 
authority as the overarching constraint of the world politics.(Drezner 2011:33) 
According to realists, anarchy and the absence of a world government has two direct 
consequences. “First, nothing can impede the normal recurrence of war; and second, 
states are responsible for their own self-preservation.” (Chiaruzzi 2012:39)  
Defensive realism drives primarily from Waltz, who proposed “defensive strategies are 
often the best route to security”. (Lynn-Jones as quoted by Rudloff 2013:46) Waltz 
(1986:129) argued that “states will ally to negate the ascending power of another. Once 
the power equilibrium is restored, the allied states pursue their interests independently, 
only to balance again in the future when one state disrupts the distribution of power”. 
As Taliaferro (2000:129) has further expanded, “under anarchy, many of the means a 
state uses to increase its security decrease the security of other states. This security 
dilemma causes states to worry about one another’s future intentions and relative 
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power”. He argues that “defensive realism proceeds from four auxiliary assumptions 
that specify how structural variables translate into international outcomes and states' 
foreign policies. First, the security dilemma is an intractable feature of anarchy. Second, 
structural modifiers-such as the offense-defence balance, geographic proximity, and 
access to raw materials- influence the severity of the security dilemma between 
particular states. Third, material power drives states' foreign policies through the 
medium of leaders' calculations and perceptions. Finally, domestic politics can limit the 
efficiency of a state's response to the external environment.”(ibid: 131)  
Many scholars have pointed out to the difficulty of distinguishing between defensive 
and offensive realism, as they both assume that states seek power through similar 
means. (Snyder as quoted by Rudloff 2013:46) Hence, they both result in states 
engaging “in similar foreign policy behaviors, but the key difference is in the degree to 
which states engage in these foreign policy strategies”. (Rudloff 2013:46)  
In his 2013 paper, Trevino discussed two distinct theories about Iran’s behaviour 
particularly in the Middle East. One that based on offensive realist perspective holds 
that “Iran sees a chance to become a regional hegemony, meaning it intends to take all 
opportunities and push itself into the dominant possibly even imperial position in the 
Middle East.” Employing defensive realism and considering Iran’s history, the other 
view argues that Iran perceives itself as a survivor in a world full of enemies, hence 
looking to maximise its security as a defensive mean. The existence of two opposing 
interpretations for foreign policy behaviour of one state can stem from two facts. One 
is the complexity of that state’s politics which result in misperceptions. The other is the 
blur boundaries between offensive and defensive realism and the fine line between 
power maximising and security maximising policies. 
The study has also adapted parts of Buzan and colleagues’ security theory. Through his 
early post Cold War works, Buzan made an effort to expand on existing security 
theories to equip them with further analytical tools for analysing and explaining the 
emerging world order and the relations between various actors under the new 
circumstances. The focus of Buzan and his colleagues was particularly on centre-
periphery relations and the affects of new patterns of relations between major powers 
on security agenda of periphery and Third World states. “The replacement of a 
polarized centre by one dominated by the capitalist security community seems almost 
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certain to weaken the position of the periphery in relation to the centre” (Buzan 
1991:451), because “the value of periphery countries as either ideological spoils or 
strategic assets in great-power rivalry” has been lowered.(ibid: 439) He further explains 
that changes in the centre would not only redefine the centre-periphery relations, but 
also the relations between periphery states as well.(ibid: 451) 
Another concept developed by Buzan and his colleagues was ‘regional security’, based 
on the belief that “security is a relational phenomenon. (Hence), one cannot understand 
the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern 
of security interdependence in which it is embedded.”(As quoted by Stone 2009:6) The 
issue of amity and enmity among states is at the core of Buzan’s regional security 
concept, which “represents a spectrum from friendship or alliances to those marked by 
fear”(ibid) and cannot be merely attributed to the balance of power. “The issues that 
can affect these feelings range from things such as ideology, territory, ethnic lines, and 
historical precedent.”(ibid) The regional security concept has been further enhanced 
with the concept of ‘security complex’, which means “a group of states whose primary 
security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another.”(Buzan 2007:190) 
While the study has used the above definitions in analysing inter regional relations in 
the South Caucasus as well as relations with outside players; the concept which has 
played an important role in this research is ‘security sectors’. “The use of sectors 
confines the scope of enquiry to more manageable proportions by reducing the number 
of variables in play. Items identified by sector lack the quality of independent existence. 
The purpose of selecting them is simply reducing the complexity to facilitate analysis. 
”With this purpose in mind, Buzan and his colleagues expanded security sectors from 
military and political, to cover three more areas of social, economy and environment as 
well. As explained in Buzan’s paper (1991:433) “five sectors do not operate in isolation 
from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematique, and a 
way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkage.” As 
they further explain (1998: 7), “one way of looking at sectors is to see them as specific 
types of interaction. In this view the military sector is about relationships of forceful 
coercion, the political sector is about relationship of authority, governing status and 
recognition; the economic sector is about relationship of trade, production and finance; 
the societal sector is about relationship of collective identity; and the environmental 
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sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.” 
In summary, this study has relied on constructivism to explain Iran’s post revolution 
foreign policy overhaul and some aspects of its bilateral relations; used defensive 
realism to interprete different foreign policy approaches and to analyse factors shaping 
its bilateral relations. Regional Security Complex theory has been employed for 
explaining regional dynamics in the South Caucasus, as well as systemic changes in the 
post Cold War era, and applied the sectoral model as the main framework for analysing 
Iran’s relations with the two Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
1.5. Thesis Structure 
In order to have an accurate understanding of Iran’s South Caucasus policy and its 
bilateral relations with the two republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is important to 
have a comprehensive picture of the context in which the policies and relations are 
formed. Iran’s regional policy is developed within a two dimensional context. The first 
dimension is the regional context and the existing dynamics of the particular region in 
question. The second is Iran’s general foreign policy and its international status and 
relations. Iran’s regional policy is the outcome of the continuous complex interaction 
of these two contexts in which the policies and relations are formed. Based on this 
argument the structure of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter two; has focused on introducing the South Caucasus, its significance in the 
international system; and its importance for major regional and external players.  
It has then moved on to introduce each important player (with the exception of Iran 
which would be discussed in subsequent chapters) involved in the South Caucasus, its 
goals and priorities and the policies undertaken for realising those goals. The chapter 
has concluded that the United States’ main goals in the region have been ‘balance of 
power’ and ‘provision of security in its broader term’. Resorting to Pipeline diplomacy, 
initiatives for integrating the former Soviet republics in Western oriented organisations 
and financial aids have been among the most important instruments employed by the 
United States to achieve its goals and establish a comfortable influential position in the 
politics and economies of the region. 
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EU’s main goals have been diversification of energy resources and their transport routs, 
as well as the development of security and stability in the region. Although the Union 
still lacks a grand strategy or even a coherent policy towards the South Caucasus it has 
increased its involvements through major initiatives such as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership Initiative. 
As an organisation whose main mission is the provision of defence and security for its 
members in the post Cold War era, NATO had to rebuild its image for the South 
Caucasus countries while avoiding any tensions with Russia, so it would be able to keep 
a reasonable degree of presence in the region. Therefore, it has been involved in the 
region through programmes such as Partnership for Peace.  
After initial setbacks resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the post Cold 
War struggles to rebuild its strength and presence, Russia’s involvement in the region 
was increased following the adoption of ‘Eurasianism’ approach in its foreign policy. 
To guarantee its interest in this region which is considered as Moscow’s backyard 
Russia has employed different means from competing organisations and pipeline 
networks to manipulating conflicts and economies for balancing its power against the 
US by keeping regional countries under its own sphere of influence. Where none of the 
above means has achieved the expected results, Moscow has used its economic leverage 
or military might (such as the 2008 Georgia War) to get what it wants. 
While its initial ambition to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union with 
its own influence based on historical, political, economic and strategic regional pull 
proved to be unrealistic in the face of the great financial and technological support that 
the newly independent republics required for their initial stability and development 
Turkey has maintained efforts in staying an active influential player in the South 
Caucasus as well as a hub  for connecting energy rich countries of the post Soviet space 
to international markets. 
Chapter three has focused on Iran’s foreign policy. It has initially offered a brief 
outline of Iran’s foreign policy during Pahlavi’s and moved on to review different 
periods of  post revolution foreign policies, with some initial explanations about factors 
shaping Iran’s foreign policy such as history, geopolitics and ideational characteristics. 
It is important to note that while factionalism is an important domestic factor shaping 
Iran’s foreign policy, this study has only made some quick refrences where necessary, 
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as extensive discussion has been out of the scope of this research. 
The section “from revolution to the end of the war”, explains how the establishment of 
the Islamic Republic brought about a new set of religious based norms and identity, 
which although was not entirely exclusive of the ‘Iranian elements of identity’, but 
certainly had different world view, values and priorities which resulted in the complete 
overhaul of Iran’s foreign policy amid the revolutionary atmosphere. The section has 
explored how the radical interpretation of foreign policy principles and the revolutionary 
fervour put Iran on the path of conflict with regional and great powers, and how the war 
with Iraq isolated the country further, pushing Tehran to gradually depart from its 
isolationist approach and to mend its fences and bridges initially with its neighbours and 
then the great powers. 
The next two sections have focused on Rafsanjani and Khatami’s administrations. 
Following some discussions on the consequences of the post Cold War systemic 
changes for Iran’s security, important steps which were undertaken by these two 
presidents for further rapprochement with the world and some of the challenges they 
faced and successes they achieved have been introduced. The chapter has then carried 
on with Iran’s post Sep. 11th foreign policy, explaining the consequences of a securitised 
international atmosphere on Iran’s conciliatory efforts and how those negative effects 
resulted in securitisation of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy, giving chance to the rise 
of Principalists (Neocons) to power and to take a hostile confrontational approach in 
the international arena. By reviewing Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy, the process which 
resulted in deterioration of Iran’s international status including further complication of 
the nuclear dilemma and increased punitive sanctions has been described. The 
following section has reviewed Rouhani’s foreign policy and its relative success in 
defusing the securitised atmosphere against Iran which had portrayed the country as a 
threat to the global security. 
The chapter has concluded by emphasising that Iran’s foreign policy principles have 
remained the same throughout the life of the Islamic Republic. However, while Iran’s 
multifaceted and complex foreign policy apparatus has continuously tried to strike a 
balance between ideology and pragmatism, it has frequently changed its approach in 
response to regional and international developments in order to guarantee state’s 
security and survival. 
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Chapter four has examined Iran’s policy in two regional systems of the Middle East 
and the South Caucasus. Following an introduction explaining Iran’s place in the 
Middle East security complex the chapter has initially explored Iran’s Middle East 
policy during the Cold War, both under Pahlavis and in the post revolution era. 
Providing an analysis of post Cold War systemic changes in the Middle East the chapter 
has continued to examine Iran’s post Cold War Middle East policy under different 
administrations.  
In studying Iran’s policy in the South Caucasus, after provision of a historical 
background on Iran’s relations with this region which used to be an integral part of the 
Persian Empire up until the 19th century the chapter has explained the significant 
consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet Union for Iran, moving on to discuss 
Iran’s post Cold War policy in the South Caucasus. In providing evidence for the 
argument that Iran’s main goals in the region have been extending its influence and 
increasing security; the case of Karabakh conflict and the role Iran has played in it has 
been examined using data which was published in recent years. 
The chapter has concluded by identifying two major drives of ‘security’ and ‘influence’ 
for Iran’s regional policy and arguing that Tehran has exploited various opportunities 
to extend its influence and forge closer relations with various regional players. 
However, while Iran’s efforts for regional integration have been challenged in both 
regions, its lack of success has been more obvious and extensive in the South Caucasus.  
The absence of strong anti Western/American sentiment, as well as lighter ideological 
tendencies and greater financial-economic dependence of regional countries to the 
West, particularly the US are considered as the main reasons for this situation. Another 
reason is the level of attention and investment that Iran has been able to apply to the 
South Caucasus considering resource limitations. 
Chapter five has focused on Iran-Azerbaijan’s bilateral relations. Following some 
information about Azerbaijan’s pre independence history, its foreign policy has been 
reviewed. The chapter has then provided a historical background of Iran’s relations with 
Azerbaijan since the inception of a political entity with the name of Azerbaijan on the 
north of the Aras River, and has moved to examine the bilateral relations in the post 
Cold War era. 
Using Buzan’s sectoral concepts, the chapter has studied the relations under five 
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categories of political, military, societal, economic and environmental. Through the 
examination of political dimension of the relations the study has demonstrated how 
Baku is posing a threat to Iran’s ethno territorial integrity by promoting the myth of 
Southern Azerbaijan and encouraging the idea of the Greater Azerbaijan. The dispute 
over the legal status of the Caspian Sea has also been revisited from Iran’s view point 
of territorial integrity. It has also been explained that opposing states’ natures has 
resulted in perception of political imposition as well as contending patterns of amity 
and enmity in these two countries, which has consequently created more security threats 
and tensions in their bilateral relations. 
The military sector has discussed the limited cooperation in this area, as well as existing 
challenges and threats, such as the militarisation of the Caspian Sea, the potential for 
exploitation of Azerbaijan’s air and land space for attacking Iran, Azerbaijan’s arms 
deal with Israel and its military and intelligence cooperation with the latter against Iran, 
and Tehran’s efforts in countering these threats have been explored in this section. 
The societal sector has reviewed the complex cultural and ethnic relations between the 
two countries. The shared ethnicity which has provided Baku with a precedent for 
irredentist sentiments, shared cultural heritages which have become another bone of 
contention and have extended the scope of rivalry to cultural issues, as well as common 
sectarian confession which is perceived as an element of threat for Azerbaijan’s secular 
state living beside a Shiite theocracy. 
The economic sector has looked at areas of cooperation such as trade and energy, 
discussing barriers to further expansion of cooperation which are mainly either 
infrastructure deficiencies or political barriers, such as sanctions. The section also 
explains that despite their trade and economic co operations, the two countries compete 
over hydrocarbon resources, transport routs and markets. Moreover, the economic 
interdependence is not deep enough to result in closer political relations or to not be 
affected by political tensions. 
The environment sector has introduced the Caspian pollution as the main environmental 
challenge between the two countries, arguing that undetermined legal status of the 
Caspian Sea has resulted in the failure of littoral states to accept responsibility for 
environmental protection of the Sea. 
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The chapter has concluded that while there certainly is room for improvement of 
bilateral relations through confidence building and détente` the existence of geopolitical 
imperatives and conflicting interests such as territorial disputes, resource and market 
rivalries, incompatible nature of states, as well as interference of outside players which 
has securitised the bilateral atmosphere, makes partnership between the two countries 
an unlikely development. 
Chapter six has studied Iran’s relations with the Republic of Armenia, using the same 
structure as chapter five. It has initially provided a historical background about Armenia 
and its relations with Iran over several millennia and then discussed Armenia’s foreign 
policy particularly in the post Cold War era.  
Using the same sectoral model, the chapter has examined various aspects of bilateral 
relations. Several political factors have been accounted for drawing the two countries 
closer together such as isolation, mutual concerns with regard to expansionist 
aspirations of Turkey and Azerbaijan, development of an alliance involving Russia, 
Armenia and Iran, against US, Azerbaijan and Turkey; as well as the importance of 
Armenian lobby for Iran has been discussed in the political sector. The fact that 
Armenia has never considered Iran’s state ideology as an impediment for developing 
relations has been an important factor in facilitating the relations. The least advanced 
aspect of the two countries bilateral relations has arguably been the military sector. 
The societal sector has examined elements of shared heritage which have brought the 
two societies closer and interested in one another’s culture and the role that these 
societal factors play in improving bilateral relations have been discussed along with the 
role of Iranian-Armenians in development of these relations. It has been argued that the 
two countries’ mutual respect and practical appreciation has turned their shared 
heritages into an invaluable asset for their bilateral relations.  
While the economy has been the most important aspect of Iran-Armenia rapport since 
the independence of the latter, the energy has been at the core of these relations. 
Providing Armenia with the much needed essential supplies, particularly the fuel oil in 
the first post independent cold winter was a fundamental step on Iran’s side for building 
a long lasting economic relation which has become stronger through bartering Iran’s 
gas with Armenia’s electricity. Moreover, there have been various joint economic 
projects between Tehran and Yerevan, including an ambitious 470 kilometre railway 
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which would make Armenia a key part of the International North-South Transport 
Corridor, connecting South Caucasus to India through Iran. Both countries have helped 
each other to circumvent economic hurdles resulting from regional blockade (on 
Armenia) and international sanctions (for Iran).  
Due to very short shared border apart from one case of river pollution by Armenian 
industry and a proposal for developing a border park, there has been no other issue 
under the environment sector. The chapter has concluded by maintaining that Iran’s 
pragmatic regional policy together with converging interests shared grievances and 
regional challenges have evolved its friendly relations with Armenia into a strategic 
alliance in recent years. 
Chapter seven has wrapped up the thesis by offering final conclusions of the study. It 
has provided concluding analysis, both on Iran’s South Caucasus policy and on its 
bilateral relations with the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
Note on Refrencing, Translations and Transliterations 
This research has used Harvard system as a guideline for refrencing, and as such most 
refrences have been addressed at the end of the chapters. However, there are two 
exceptions to this rule: 1- where the source is a website with no author, 2- where 
addressing sources of maps. In these two occasions, the refrence has been cited at the 
bottom of the relevant page.  
The research has adopted the most compatible method with the pronouncement of Farsi 
words, which is generally based on the Library of Congress Romanisation table for 
Persian. However, the research has modified this method by spelling well known words, 
particularly names such as Azerbaijan (which is pronounced Azarbaijan in Farsi), 
Hashemi, Baku, regime, etc. in their popular form. All Farsi texts used in this research 
has been translated by the author unless otherwise stated.  
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To offer a more accurate picture of the opportunities and threats that Iran has been 
facing in the South Caucasus, it is important to be familiar with the main regional and 
external players, their goals, interests and policies in this region. Following a brief 
introduction about the South Caucasus and its general importance, this chapter will 
discuss the goals and policies of each major player together with a summarised history 
of their post Cold War involvement with the South Caucasus. Within this framework 
therefore, the relations and interactions of different players with individual countries of 
the South Caucasus has not been discussed in details, unless it has been part of a player’s 
general policy which has regional consequences, i.e. Turkey’s special relations with 
Azerbaijan. The chapter will argue that ‘balance of power’ and ‘increased security’ are 
two main goals of the players in the region. It will demonstrate the importance of energy 
resources and transit routes in exacerbating rivalry and bandwagonning between 
various players, and the way these players manipulate regional dynamics to achieve 
their goals. 
 
2.2. Where is South Caucasus? 
South Caucasus is a mountainous region, with an approximate area of 400,000 sq/km 
and a population of around 18 millions1. It straddles between the Caspian Sea on the 
East and the Black Sea on the West. The southern side of the region is neighbouring 
with the north west of Iran and the south east of Turkey. On the north, it is limited by 
Russia’s southern plains. (AmirAhmadian as quoted by Kazemi 2005: 33) 
The great Caucasus mountains with 1500 km length, starting from Taman peninsula in 
the north of the Black Sea, stretching to Absheron peninsula on the west side of the 
Caspian Sea pass through the great Caucasus land, dividing it into two northern and 
southern parts. On the southern parts of the mountains, from east to west, there are three 
Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. (ibid) 
                                                          




Map 2.1: Map of South Caucasus1 
 
 
2.3. General Importance of the South Caucasus 
South Caucasus; once a closed and forgotten area within the former Soviet Union, 
became “crowded with different kind of international actors, ranging from international 
organizations and states to multinational corporations” following the end of the Cold 
War. (Lynch 2003:15) Far from complementary, the motives behind the involvement 
of all these players in the region and their policies are varied and frequently 
contradictory. In order to have a better understanding and more informed analysis of 
the relations and policies of regional and external players, an overview of their goals 
and motives is necessary.  
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia; the three South Caucasus countries form the most 
                                                          
1  Caucasus - Political. Available at: <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Caucasus-political_en.svg>  
(Accessed on 10.09.2012).  
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complex, combustible and unstable region of the former Soviet Union. Lying at the 
crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the region has traditionally played an 
important role as a transit corridor and been the meeting point of ancient civilisations 
such as Persia, Russia, Europe, and China. “Yet as Alexander Rondeli has pointed out, 
the important geopolitical location of the South Caucasus has been as much, if not more, 
of a liability as it has an asset to regional states.” (Cornell 2004:126) 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the application of the term ‘region’ to 
south Caucasus is defined by the actions of outside players. Regional cooperation 
initiatives are not generated internally among these three countries, but are promoted 
“by external actors seeking stability in the region”. (German 2012:1)  
Russia’s reduced role and diminishing influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia in 
the early 1990s together with the determined efforts of regional states to diversify their 
relations with the outside world opened the doors for external actors to engage in the 
region. For various reasons the emerging new geopolitics became an arena of 
competition and rivalry between different regional and external players. While each of 
these players has different motives; some of the shared reasons for their interest in the 
region are as follows: 
 
 Energy Resources & Transport Routes 
As one of the eldest oil producing regions of the world, the Caspian Sea has increasingly 
became an important source of global energy and as such gained a particular importance 
in the gloal energy security. According to the US Department of Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), although territorial disputes and limited explorations have 
created obstacles for determining the exact amount of hydrocarbon resources, based on 
field level data, “EIA estimates 48 billion barrels of oil and 292 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas in proved and probable reserves in the wider Caspian basins area, both from 
onshore and offshore fields. Because the reserve figures include both proved and 
probable reserves, the figures are closer to a high-end estimate.”1 According to BP’s 
                                                          
1 Available at: <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=CSR> (Accessed on 
20.02.2016) 
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Statistical Review of World Energy1; the region holds about four percent of the world’s 
gas and oil reserves, and that estimate has not even considered Iran and Russia’s 
resources. 
Although Caspian energy resources are not comparable to that of the Persian Gulf, still 
are considerable alternatives for different energy markets such as EU, and some South East 
Asian countries. In order to guarantee the security of energy supplies, consumer countries 
need to diversify their sources. Caspian’s non OPEC hydrocarbon resources have attracted 
considerable investments from giant energy cartels, which could have otherwise be 
invested in the Middle Eastern countries. Hence, Caspian energy resources have become a 
vital factor both for economic development, as well “geopolitical configuration of the 
region”. (Johnson 2001:12) 
Within this energy rich but landlocked region, there is “no single means of exporting 
products without crossing another sovereign territory and no access to navigable waterways 
that are open to international shipping”. (Burke 1999:1) While some scholars describe the 
general struggle “to define the region’s future” as the “new Great Game”; others like 
Moradi (2006) believe that it is the power struggle over the control of hydrocarbon 
resources and transport routes that has created a post-Soviet “Great Game” with more 
players and greater rewards.  However, “the belief that whoever secures the major share of 
oil pipeline transit will gain enhanced influence not only throughout the South Caucasus 
and Central Asia, but also on a global political scale, has highlighted the concerns over the 
future stability of the region.” (Aydin 2012: 172) 
Due to lack of infrastructure or necessary capital for exploration and exploitation of 
resources, or development of transport routes by regional countries; the winners of the 
game were those who could offer more to solve the production or export problems.  
Investment in the region’s energy infrastructure has offered a prosperous perspective 
particularly for Western corporates. 
 Security 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the stability of the newly independent countries 
                                                          
1  Available at : <http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-




and the region has always been of major concern. The significance of security threats 
from unstable neighboring countries for Iran, Turkey, and Russia has been greater due 
to their shared minorities with South Caucasus countries. 
The overwhelming transformation process that Caucasian countries faced in the post 
Cold War era encompassed “the building of new institutions, new states, new borders, 
new identities, new foreign policies and new military system”. (Lynch 2003:8) The 
scale of changes was so enormous that even without any conflicts; there was a great 
risk of instability in the area. However, there existed several other destabilizing factors 
as well. “The stability of the South Caucasus is threatened by its geopolitical 
significance, as well as numerous transnational security challenges including 
unresolved conflicts, organized crime, trafficking and migration.”(German 2012:1) 
Being “sandwiched between the two major routes used for smuggling heroin from 
Afghanistan to Europe”, as well as a “major supplier of arms and nuclear components, 
Russia, and the major markets for these commodities, the Middle East” (Cornell 
2003:37) has exacerbated regional security challenges. 
The political-military and security policies of involved players, as well as the 
smoldering conflicts of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, are other 
factors affecting the security in this region. While the leverage of regional powers, such 
as Turkey and Iran, and of global powers, such as the United States, Russia and China, 
is part of the power configuration in the region, several international organisations are 
also involved. “At the regional level, there is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(B.S.E.C.), the Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR) the Caspian Sea Force (CASFOR), 
the cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (G.U.A.M.) and 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (C.S.T.O.) within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (C.I.S.). At the global level, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(N.A.T.O.) and the European Union also exercise political weight in the South 
Caucasus.”(de Hass 2006:2) 
However, the importance of the security of energy resources and transport routes for 
both producer and consumer countries have continuously been a major continuous 
concern. “The consequence of destabilization in the Caucasus would be felt throughout 
Eurasia and would inevitably have a significant impact even on the remote powers of 




 Consumer Markets 
The independence of South Caucasus republics opened the markets of these countries 
to foreign trade. Different players were looking for trade opportunities in these new 
markets. As their economy developed, so did their trade with different countries.1  
While this small region with the population of just about 18 million may not be 
considered such a large market, but it plays the role of medium and transit for Europe 
and Eastern countries such as China through its transport systems, providing trade 
opportunities for both sides. The prospect of full integrationg into ‘the new Silk Road’ 
through advanced transport and technology infrastructure such as railroads, pipelines, 
fibre optic cables and power transmission grid locks enhances the region’s market 
value. 
2.4. Important Players in the South Caucasus 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the three republics of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; the South Caucasus emerged out of isolation 
catching the attention of various international players both with horrors of violent 
conflicts as well as the promise of fostering democratic developments. It became an 
arena of rivalry between regional players, complemented later with the arrival of 
outside players.  
This section will briefly review the goals, interests and policies of major regional and 
external players in the South Caucasus. Although an important regional player, Iran’s 




                                                          
1 For example US- Azerbaijan trade in goods for July 1992 included $0.1 million exports and $0.2 million imports. 
By July 2012, it has increased to $113.13 million exports and $71.5 million imports. US-Armenia trade in July 
1992 was $3.2 million in exports and $0.1 million in imports. This has increased to $4.0 million export and 8.0 
million imports. United States Census Bureau. Trade in Goods with Armenia. Available at: 
<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4631.html>  (Accessed on 03.10.2012) 
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2.4.1. The United States 
Despite being among the first states to establish diplomatic relations with the South 
Caucasus countries and to support the sovereignty and independence of the newly 
independent states; the region did not bear much significance in the US foreign policy 
for a few years. This insufficient attention has been attributed to the “lack of knowledge 
and initiatives concerning the Caspian region, as well as a lack of realization of 
American interests there. The success of the Armenian lobby in convincing the 
American Congress to impose an embargo on Azerbaijan in the wake of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict illustrates the lack of proactive American policy in the region.” 
(Allison & Acker 1997 as quoted by Oktav 2005:17)  
However, as Brzezinski (1997:52) has advised; in order to secure its global hegemony 
and establish a favourable world order it was crucial for the US to prevent the rise of 
yet another Eurasian empire or strong adversary in the region. US regional policy during 
the first few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union included: 
 Ensuring the independence and sovereignty of the former republics of the Soviet 
Union and preventing their subservience to Russia.  
 Reducing Iran’s strategic influence in the region particularly among the Muslim 
population. In this context, the US public diplomacy apparatus made a great 
effort in portraying a violent and disturbing picture of Iran in contrast with an 
exaggerated ideal picture of Turkey.  
 Making sure “that nuclear or other major weaponry previously under the control 
of the Soviet regime was destroyed or returned to Russia.” (Jaffe 2001:136) 
Despite the US Department of Defense 1994 report describing the South Caucasus as a 
strategically important region due to its potential “to form an area of secular, 
independent, and Western friendly states between Russia and the Middle East” 
(Sherwood-Randall 1998 as quoted by Cornell 2005:111); it was not until the volume 
of Caspian energy resources came to the spotlight that more serious policy 
considerations were given to the region. In addition to US corporate interests; the 
Caspian oil boom has had other advantages for the US. One is the regional economic 
growth resulting from the production and transport of energy which could in turn 
improve the independence and sovereignty of South Caucasus countries and ensure 
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their move away from Russia’s dominance or Iran’s influence. It also offered an 
alternative option to the Middle East hydrocarbon resources. The 1999 US Silk Road 
Strategy Act clearly states that “the region of the South Caucasus and Central Asia 
could produce oil and gas in sufficient quantities to reduce the dependence of the United 
States on energy from the volatile Persian Gulf region.”1 Moreover, the politics of 
energy provided US with a perfect pretext for long term presence in the backyard of its 
rival, Russia and its adversary, Iran; as well as a defining role in regional politics. 
Consequently, since the second half of 1996, US started to take a proactive policy by 
announcing the Caucasus and Caspian basin important for its strategic interests; and 
appointing a ‘special envoy’ for this remote region.2  
As Cohen (2005:3) has pointed out, drawing the entirety of Eurasian Convergence Zone 
into the American geostrategic orbit became a major US military, economic, and 
political policy objective, much of which has been undertaken unilaterally. In order to 
balance the power in its favour; US effectively undertook a double edged policy 
towards regional players which has consequently led to the polarisation of the region. 
With regard to Russia and Iran, US took a zero sum dynamic ensuing isolation to block 
Iran’s influence in the area, and containment to prevent Russia from reasserting its 
hegemony over the region; while bringing Turkey, Israel, and Europe under the same 
umbrella of interest and general aims despite their differing goals and priorities. 
 
 Pipeline Diplomacy 
As Iseri (2009:34-35) has pointed out, “The political objective of the US government 
is to prevent energy transport unification among the industrial zones of Japan, Korea, 
Russia and the EU in the Eurasian landmass and ensure the flow of regional energy 
resources to US led international oil markets without any interruptions.” 
The Silk Road Strategy Act obliged the US government to “assist in the development 
                                                          
1 Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999. Available at: <https://www.eso.org/gen-
fac/pubs/astclim/espas/maidanak/silkroad.html> (Accessed on 21.08.2015). 
2 The Clinton Administration in 1994 established a special inter-agency working group to focus on Caspian policy. 
In May 1998, the US Trade and Development Agency, the US Export–Import Bank and the Overseas Private 
Investment Corp. announced the formation of the Caspian Finance Center in Ankara to facilitate the 
development of energy and other infrastructure projects in the Caspian region. Then in July 1998 President 
Clinton appointed Ambassador Richard Morningstar to the new position of Special Advisor to the President and 
Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy. For further detail see White House Fact Sheet, 
<http://www.usis.it/file9911/alia/99111705.htm> , (Accessed on 1.10.2012). 
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of the infrastructure necessary for communications, transportation, education, health, 
and energy and trade on an East-West axis”.1 However, prior to the Act, US was 
actively engaged in building alternative routes of energy export in partnership with 
several regional players. Despite compelling facts about the economic benefits of a 
north-south route from Russia to southern ports of Iran, US insisted on building east-
west pipelines in order to avoid both Russia and Iran. Despite serious doubts over the 
economic viability of such pipelines, the political advantages were so significant that 
US Energy Secretary took it on himself to directly negotiate with different regional 
heads of states2 to gain their support and commitment to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) project. Washington extended support to four other major pipeline projects 
including the South Caspian Gas Pipeline “which leads Azerbaijani gas via Georgia 
into Turkey and further to Europe.” (Baran 2005: 2) 
The political advantages of multiple pipeline routes for the US include: 
- Reducing Russia’s monopoly over export routes and, therefore, its leverage over 
export/importing countries as well as its control over the market.3 
- Excluding Iran from any major Caspian energy project.4 
- Control over the final destination of petroleum to ensure it reaches US 
controlled energy markets. 
- Sustaining US alliance with regional players through this economic bond. 
- Providing an acceptable justification for long term official US presence in the 
region. 
 
 Financial Aids 
South Caucasus countries have been continuously the subject of US financial aid since 
                                                          
1 Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999. Available at: <https://www.eso.org/gen-
fac/pubs/astclim/espas/maidanak/silkroad.html> (Accessed on 21.08.2015). 
2 Remarks by Secretary of Energy Federico Peña at the Caspian Pipelines Conference. Washington, D.C. 
November 19, 1997.  Available at: <www.osti.gov/news/speeches97/caspian.htm>  (Accessed on 20.08. 2011). 
3 While Iran was completely excluded from such projects, Russia was encouraged in participation, as in the same 
speech Pena says: “Russia, as both an energy producer and transit country, will be an important player in 
developing the Caspian region. We would welcome Russian participation in the east-west energy corridor." 
4 According to the Department of Energy press release, "In each meeting, Pena reinforced the U.S. government's 
opposition to investments in Iran's energy sector and any investment or transit of Caspian oil and gas through 
Iran." Pena said that the U.S. position "is clear -- we do not support conducting ordinary business with a country 
thatfunds, trains, and supports terrorists or seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction." Available at: 
<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/energy/archive/1998/june/de1602.htm>  (Accessed on 
02.10.2012) 
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their independence.1 According to the US Department of State the goal of this assistance 
has been the promotion of regional security through increasing the capability of these 
countries to combat domestic and transnational criminal activities; development of key 
democratic institutions of government and civil society to promote public participation, 
combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law; and far-reaching economic reforms 
which promote stability and sustainable growth in the non-oil sectors of the economy.2  
 
 Integration into Western/Pro Western Structures 
Another strategy to help in moving the Soviet’s ex- republics away from Moscow’s 
sphere of influence was to integrate them into Euro Atlantic structures or draw them 
into pro-Western alliances. GUAM is an example of such US backed initiatives, “a 
political, economic and strategic alliance between the post-Soviet states….. The 
GUAM countries which Moscow saw as a Trojan horse inside the CIS, sought to deepen 
their partnership with Western institutions and organisations like the EU and NATO.” 
(Baban & Shiriyev 2010:96) Russia’s concerns proved right when in 1999, Georgia, 
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan left the CIS and GUAM found a security and military 
dimension following Uzbekistan’s membership. 
 
  
                                                          
1 Cumulative US assistance budgeted for Azerbaijan from FY 1992 through FY 2010 was $976 million (all agencies 
and programmes). Budgeted aid to Azerbaijan was $26.4 million in FY2011 and an estimated $20.9 million in 
FY2012, and the Administration requested $16.3 million for FY2013 -the numbers for FY2011, FY2012, and 
FY2013 include “Function 150” foreign aid, and exclude Defense and Energy Department funds- (Nichols 2012: 
Summary). According to the US Department of State “The U.S. to date (March 2012) has provided Armenia with 
nearly $2 billion in development and humanitarian assistance.”1Also between “2006 to 2011, a Millennium 
Challenge Corporation Compact helped promote Georgian enterprise and economic growth through investments in 
physical infrastructure. In 2013, the MCC awarded Georgia a second compact, focused on education.”1 US 
Department of State. (2012) Armenia. Available at: <http://m.state.gov/md197863.htm>   (Accessed on 03.10.2012) 
AND US Department of State. (2012) Azerbaijan. Available at: <http://m.state.gov/md5253.htm> (Accessed on 
05.11.2014)                                                                                                                  
 
2 US Department of State. (2009) Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Armenia. Available at: 
<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/167286.htm> (Accessed on 10.10.2012) and US Department of State. (2009) 
Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Azerbaijan. Available at: 
<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/106462.htm> (Accessed on 10.10.2012) AND 
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2.4.1.1. US Post Sep. 11th Involvement in the Caucasus 
The Post Sep.11th developments and the war on terror increased the importance of the 
South Caucasus for the United States as its new global strategy required significant 
military presence in that region. “The South Caucasus and Central Asia appeared 
indispensable for the successful prosecution of war in the heart of Asia.” (Cornell 
2005:113). Provision of landing and over flight rights as well as refueling facilities for 
US army by regional countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia, not only facilitated the 
war on terror but also as Socor (quoted by Cornell 2005:113) has pointed out was a 
historical breakthrough; as it provided the opportunity for Western troops to set foot “in 
the heartland of Asia formerly the exclusive preserve of land empires.” Since 
transportation of troops and equipment was faced with various political and logistic 
challenges, these countries’ airspace proved to be “the only realistic route through 
which military aircraft could be deployed from NATO territory to Afghanistan. (ibid) 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, also, took part in the international Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) operations in Afghanistan and “sent troops to the coalition stabilization force in 
Iraq.” (Baban & Shiriev 2010:97) 
However, attention to South Caucasus gradually faded particularly during Obama’s 
initial years of administration not merely due to other pressing priorities, but also due 
to overall change of US foreign strategy. The failure of Bush’s ‘hard power’ strategy 
resulted in the new ‘smart power strategy’, which reduced the instrumental position of 
South Caucasus for US policies. 
As the August 2008 five days war between Georgia and Russia proved to US and other 
Western countries that Moascow’s interest in the South Caucasus cannot be ignored; 
Obama’s ‘reset’ policy towards Russia resulted in US “Move away from a zero sum 
approach to its relations with Moscow in the region”. (Mankoff 2012:18) Consequently; 
the “US policy towards countries in the region essentially became a derivative of 
Russia’s policy” failing to forge substantial long term partnerships. (Charap & Peterson 
as quoted by Koushakjian 2011:79) 
However, in pursuing improved relations with Russia and trying to help in the 
resolution of conflicts through the involvement of regional actors, US managed to 
dismay Azerbaijan so far as pushing it towards Russia. “It did not take long for 
Azerbaijan to react by taking a more pro-Russian turn by signing several key energy 
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deals with Moscow and joining the three party talks over Nagorno-Karabakh where 
Moscow had a dominant role.” (Suchkov 2011:144) 
The failure of Obama’s ‘reset’ efforts to “develop enough momentum to move the 
bilateral ties forward” (Kitazume 2012); as well as Russia’s increasing influence in the 
region, along with Azerbaijan’s tilt towards Russia, and other regional developments; 
triggered a review of US policy towards the South Caucasus. Though the 2010’s US 
defense Secretary and Secretary of State’s tour of South Caucasus was interpreted as a 
‘comeback’ signal from the US, many analysts believe that the United State’s South 
Caucasus policy would not change considerably.  
 
2.4.2. The European Union 
According to German, “the EU is the principal actor from outside of the wider Caucasus 
region engaged in efforts to promote cross border cooperation in the area” primarily as 
means of regional stabilisation. (2012:140) 
Abundant energy deposits of the South Caucasus which can provide the answer for 
Europe’s quest for diversification of energy supplies is a reasonable justification in 
itself for EU’s involvement. However, “EU member states have increasing economic 
interests in the region- a potentially lucrative and attractive place for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) - specially for multinational oil companies.” (Nuriyev 2010:3) 
On the other hand, as explained earlier in this chapter, “the region presents practically 
all security challenges that typify the post Cold War system.” (Gnesotto 2003:7) While 
the post Sep. 11th developments have increased the region’s security importance; 
following the EU’s 2007 enlargement the region has effectively become EU’s 
immediate neighbour, meaning regional security challenges are practically at the EU’s 
doorstep now. Hence, the development and stability of South Caucasus became a 
crucial imperative for EU’s security and economic relationships.  
Nontheless, it took several years before the EU moved towards a more active role and 
closer engagement with the region. The main reason might have been best described by 
Huseynov (2009:48) who argues that the reason was “not only geographical but also 
the mental distance separating the region from EU decision makers”. Helly (2001:2) 
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believes the cause to be “lack of clear analytical grid” in the EU, that unlike US does 
not have a ‘Silk Road Strategy’ to define priorities and draw a road map. As a result, 
despite the fact that “the European Union appeared on the South Caucasian scene from 
the early 1990s, when the process of transition towards market economy and democracy 
began in these countries and when conflict and petroleum loomed over the political 
landscape of the Caucasus” (Dekanozishvili 2003); the growing significance of the 
South Caucasus for EU has been gradual. The Union’s involvement in the region during 
the 1990s was mainly economic, based on short term regional developments and 
priorities of EU’s individual rotating presidents. 
In December 1990, the EU launched TACIS (Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States) programme “to sustain economic reform and 
development process in the CIS countries and to support their integration to the world 
economy”. (Demirag 2005:92) TRACECA and INOGATE are two important initiatives 
developed under TACIS. 
TRACECA which is “the technical assistance program for the development of the 
transport corridor between Europe and Asia across the Black Sea, the countries of the 
South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian countries was launched in May 
1993.”1The programme bears a strategic importance due to the provision of an 
alternative route to Europe which offers the opportunity to avoid the traditional Russian 
route.  
“INOGATE (Interstate Network of Oil & Gas Transport to Europe) which “supports 
energy policy cooperation between the EU and the littoral states of the Black and 
Caspian Seas and their neighboring countries”, was launched in 1995.2 
EU’s growing attention towards the South Caucasus was manifested in 1996 
Partnership & Cooperation Agreement which came into force in 1999. The Agreement 
offered a legal framework for dialogue in main areas. Then in 2001, at its General 
Affairs Council, EU confirmed “its willingness to play a more active political role in 
                                                          
1 European Commission Please Release Database. (2012) EU support to the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport 
Corridor. Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-141_en.htm>  (Accessed on 
05.11.2014) 
2 International Cooperation and Development. Central Asia- Energy. Available at : 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/central-asia/eu-central-asia-energy-cooperation_en>  (Accessed on 
05.11.2014) 
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the South Caucasus region and its intention to look for further ways of prevention and 
resolution of conflicts in the region and to participate in the post conflict rehabilitation”. 
(Alieva 2006:10) The appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South 
Caucasus in July 2003 helped in the acceleration of the process of developing a coherent 
strategy for the region. 
Three South Caucasus countries joined the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 
2004. ENP “is an extension of EU governance regime- norms, standards and values- 
beyond the political borders of the Union.” (Propescu 2006: 2) In 2005, the South 
Caucasus countries started consultation on the provision of Action Plans with the 
European Union. The Action Plans which are in fact road maps to comprehensive 
reforms “provide a point of reference for the programming and assistance to these 
countries”.(Alieva 2006:11) Although the Plans are not legally binding, but the 
provision of enhanced strategic partnership “beyond cooperation and towards 
significant integration” (ibid) with the Union offers an attractive prospect and binding 
incentive for these countries. 
The main rationale behind the ENP for the EU is “developing the zone of prosperity 
and a friendly neighborhood with which EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative 
relationship”.(ibid) However, as some scholars1 have pointed out issues such as lack of 
a definite EU membership prospect for these three countries even after extensive 
reforms, and lack of any ‘conditionality factor’ that ties the progress of these countries 
in the execution of Action Plans to the amount of ENP aid they receive; play as 
hindrance to their real progress.  
Following the 2007 EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the Union undertook the 
Black Sea Synergy (BSS) initiative which also includes the South Caucasus. Based on 
the Commission of European Countries communication with the Council and the 
European Parliament “There are significant opportunities and challenges in the Black 
Sea area that require coordinated action at regional level. These include key sectors 
such as energy, transport, environment, movement and security. Enhanced regional 
cooperation is not intended to deal directly with longstanding conflicts in the region but 
…..  over the time could help remove some of the obstacles in the way.” 
                                                          
1 See Alieva 2006: 32, Mkrtchyan 2009:27. 
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The above document further explains that since the broad EU policy for the region has 
already been set in Turkey’s pre accession strategy, the ENP and the Strategic 
Partnership with Russia; the BSS is supposed to play as a complementary strategy to 
the above policies. The primary task of this inclusive initiative is, therefore, the 
development of cooperation within the Black Sea region and also between the region 
and the European Union. The initiative covers different subject areas from democracy, 
Human Rights and good governance to energy, transport and environment. 
In May 2009, EU launched yet another initiative called ‘the Eastern Partnership 
Initiative’ which aimed to enhance relations with EU’s eastern neighbours including 
the three countries of the South Caucasus. According to the Commission’s documents 
“This would imply new association agreements including deep and comprehensive free 
trade agreements with those countries willing and able to enter into a deeper 
engagement and gradual integration in the EU economy. It would also allow for easier 
travel to the EU through gradual visa liberalisation, accompanied by measures to tackle 
illegal immigration. The Partnership will also promote democracy and good 
governance, strengthen energy security, promote sector reform and environment 
protection, encourage people to people contacts, support economic and social 
development and offer additional funding for projects to reduce socio-economic 
imbalances and increase stability.” (The European Union External Action Service) 
As demonstrated by the above examples while EU appreciates the importance of 
development and cross border cooperation for ensuring regional stability and security; 
it has avoided direct involvement in mediating efforts to end regional conflicts which 
is one of the most serious security threats in the South Caucasus. The Union has left the 
sensitive task of mediation and negotiations for conflict resolution to other international 
organisations such as OSCE, and the Minsk Group. 
 
2.4.3. NATO  
As an organisation whose main mission is the provision of defence and security for its 
members (mainly EU & US), NATO’s objectives changed after the end of the Cold 
War; requiring to reshape its activities and review its relations particularly with the 
former Soviet republics in order to both survive as a viable organisation and to pursue 
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the security interests of its members.  
Keeping in mind that the South Caucasus is “an integral part of the arc of instability 
stretching from North Africa to Southeast Asia, which the U.S. has identified as the 
most likely source of threats against U.S. and Western security interests in the 
foreseeable future” (Cornell 2004:128) wil help in having a better understanding of 
NATO’s role and policies in the region.   
In order to keep a reasonable degree of involvement in the region, the Alliance had to 
rebuild its own image for the South Caucasus countries while avoiding any tensions 
with Russia, who has been sensitive about any Western expansion in its sphere of 
influence. Therefore since 1990s NATO became involved with these countries through 
flexible programmes such as ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PfP), which “allows partners to 
build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for 
cooperation”.1  
This initiative “was launched in January 1994 NATO summit to establish strong links 
between NATO, its new democratic partners in the former Soviet bloc, and some of 
Europe's traditionally neutral countries to enhance European security. It provides a 
framework for enhanced political and military cooperation for joint multilateral crisis 
management activities, such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.”2 
The three South Caucasus republics joined this programme and appointed liaison 
officers in April 1994. Since then they have been active participants of different PfP 
activities. “They also participate in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), 
which offers them the opportunity to hold political discussions and receive assistance 
on political and security issues. In addition all three participate in the Planning and, 
Review Process (PARP) which aims to ensure interoperability between NATO 
members and partner countries.” (German 2012:153) 
As already explained the war on terror increased the importance of the region and raised 
its profile for NATO. Examples of the crucial supporting role that these countries 
played in both Afghanistan and Iraq war have already been discussed. However, for 
                                                          
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2014) The Partnership for Peace Programme. Available at: 
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm > (Accessed on 13.02.2015) 
2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (1995) Fact Sheet: NATO Partnership for Peace, Bureau of Public Affairs. 
Available at: <http://www.fas.org/man/nato/offdocs/us_95/dos950519.htm>  (Accessed on 27.12.12) 
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exactly the same reason following the post September 11th developments the ‘security 
deficit’ of the region, was transformed to “a threat not only to regional security but also 
for Euro Atlantic interests”. (Cornell, McDermott, O’Malley, et al. 2004:13) The 
Alliance, therefore, resorted to another cooperation project called Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) to help in upgrading regional security. 
The IPAP instrument was inaugurated at the 2002 Prague Summit as a mechanism to 
tailor relations with specific countries, which may include eventual membership. “The 
main spheres of cooperation under the IPAP are security, defense and military issues, 
public information, science, environment, and democratic reforms.” (Poghosyan 
2012:4). “In November 2002, Georgia and in April 2003 Azerbaijan officially became 
aspirants to NATO membership which entails working closely with NATO allies, 
particularly US and Turkey for reforming their security sector.” (Cornell, McDermott, 
O’Malley, et al. 2004:26) Armenia was the last country who agreed on an IPAP and 
formally tied itself to NATO in 2005.  
NATO’s involvement in the South Caucasus is generally limited to broad projects, 
rather than regionally focused initiatives (German 2012:156). Moreover, as German 
(2012:155) argues NATO’s very presence and its relationship with the three states led 
indirectly to 2008 Georgia- Russia conflict and, therefore, has undermined regional 
cooperation programmes.  
As it was already mentioned major Euro-Atlantic players have left the task of mediation 
for conflict resolution to Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
and “limited their involvement to political support for the so called OSCE Minsk Group 
process.” (ibid: 158) the OSCE’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh began in 1992 
with the initiation of an international conference in Minsk aiming at the provision of a 
permanent forum for peace negotiations. Nuriyev (2007:314) considers this a major 
breakthrough in peacemaking operations. However, for various reasons such as lack of 
“expertise and interests of Western democracies in the region” or limitation of Western 
democracies’ efforts to “mediating between the sides and producing joint proposals” 
(ibid: 315) or Russia’s biased involvement; the OSCE has not been able to resolve the 
conflict completely and has only managed to establish a degree of containment which 
does not seem long lasting. 
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2.4.4. Russia  
During the first few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, for two main reasons, 
Russia did not have a clear policy towards the South Caucasus. First; Moscow was too 
busy dealing with the aftershocks of such sudden and total collapse of the empire in 
which Russia was the core state. Salvaging the economy from total collapse and 
preventing further disintegration was prior to other policies. Second was the Western 
orientation of statesmen such as the foreign minister Kozyrev who believed that Russia 
“should pay little attention to the former Soviet republics that were not inclined to 
cooperate with Moscow”. (Smolansky 1995:204) 
However, a policy shift towards ‘Eurasianism’ became evident since 1992. This view 
rejected Russia’s subordinate approach towards the West and insisted that Moscow 
must pursue its interests “regardless of whether such course of action was acceptable to 
its Western partners or not…. This meant, in part, re-establishing and maintaining 
Russian influence over the former Soviet Republics.” (ibid: 205) As a result of that 
policy shift and following its economic revival, Russia became the most significant 
outside player in the Caucasus “given its ability to project power on both sides of the 
Caucasus mountains and the array of Soviet-era political, economic, and social links 
between Russia and the Big Caucasus as a whole.” (Mankoff 2012:8)  
The discourse about the priority of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ which had emerged since 
1992, became an official policy from 1993. (Quoted by Buzan & Waever, 2003:404) 
Since then, Russia has taken an assertive approach towards its near abroad, including 
Transcaucasia, with repeated calls from Russian statesmen claiming those regions as 
part of Russia’s strategic sphere of influence.    
According to Nixey (2012:15), “Russia’s 19th-century expansion into the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia remains an important legacy for its 21st-century foreign 
policy decision-makers. It sustains a belief that Russia has a natural right to pre-
eminence in both regions: one ‘legitimized’ by tradition as well as present-day mutual 
interest.” There are, however, several reasons for the importance of the South Caucasus 
for Russia, including: 
1. The region is playing the role of the buffer zone between Russia and the Middle 
East. 
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2. It is neighbouring two other important regional players; Turkey and Iran. 
3. It is the house to a considerable share of the Caspian energy resources, which can 
affect Russia’s share of Europe’s energy market. 
4. Competing energy routes throughout the region which have been launched or 
planned following the Western penetration of the South Caucasus have major 
geopolitical consequences for Russia’s interests and policies. 
 
 
Map 2.2: The South Caucasus and its Neighbours1 
 
 
Contrary to those scholars who believe that Russia still holds imperialistic tendencies; 
others like De Waal (2010) argue that “Russia is undertaking the painful transition to 
being a ‘post-imperial power’, which seeks to be the most powerful actor in its 
neighborhood but no longer wants to re-establish an empire, with all the colonial 
burdens accompanied by such status.” 
One of Putin’s first actions immediately after his rise to power was “to order the revision 
and reformulation of national security and foreign policy concepts as well as the 
military doctrine of the Russian Federation that dated from the Yeltsin era. All three 
revised documents accentuated the Russian determination to facilitate the achievement 
                                                          
1 Melikyan, R. (2011) The New Strategy of U.S policy in the South Caucasus: Priorities and Outlines. Available 
at: <http://romanmelikyan.livejournal.com/3442.html>  (Accessed on 10.09.2012)  
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of a multi-polar system of international relations despite outside attempts to hinder 
Russia’s efforts in this direction.” (Kelikitli 2008:74) In this context, Russia has two 
main goals in the South Caucasus. The first is to make sure that regional countries stay 
under its own sphere of influence. The second is to contain the growing Western 
influence in the region.  In order to achieve these goals, Russia has undertaken several 
policies which the followings are amongst the most important ones: 
 
 Pipeline Diplomacy 
Energy has been the arena for Russia’s intense rivalry with other players. Since most 
energy infrastructures in the region were remaining from the Soviet era, the majority of 
the oil and gas transport routes used to pass through Russia. Securing Russia’s 
monopoly or at least some degree of control over the pipeline networks has been at the 
core of the country’s energy strategy, which is in the context of a rather grander strategy 
of keeping its dominance over Europe’s energy market.  
The new pipeline networks (Like Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan, Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum and 
Turkmenistan–China pipelines or Nabucco) are a source of threat to Russia’s interests 
as they have curbed Russia’s monopoly over the energy transport routes and reduced 
its revenue from transit rights and limited Moscow’s control over the routes and 
Europe’s energy market.  
To counter, or at least limit such threat, Russia has initiated competing pipeline projects 
such as Blue Stream and South Stream. “The main purpose of the South Stream is to 
prevent Nabucco to transport Caspian gas directly to European market bypassing 
Russia. Nabucco is the backbone of Europe’s attempt for diversification of natural gas. 
If South Stream goes forward, Nabucco pipeline will lose its strategic as well as 
commercial importance and Russia will be able to maintain influence over the EU and 
continue using energy dependency as a political weapon against the West. At the same 
time, Russia will be able to increase its political control over the Caucasus and Central 
Asia as well.” (Gogbrishvili 2010: 34) 
It has been contemplated that casting doubts on the security of Western backed 
pipelines and, therefore, reducing the reliability of these routes has been one of Russia’s 
goals in its 2008 war with Georgia. ‘Security’ and ‘viability’ are key issues for partners 
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of such large ventures. “If foreign investors and companies were to lose trust in Georgia 
as a safe transit nation, then the Nabucco project would be shelved.”  
 
Map 2.3: South Caucasus Energy Transport Routs; Where Oil and Water Mix1 
 
 
 Managing Conflicts 
Russia has been actively involved in regional ethno-territorial conflicts either as a 
mediator or an ally for one side. According to Hill & Taspinar (2006:17) “leading 
policy- makers, ...., have sought to apply a policy paradigm of controlled instability in 
the South Caucasus through ‘peacekeeping’ and mediation in ethnic conflicts and 
through military footholds in the region. This policy is based on perpetuating the 
conflicts within predictable and usable parameters, frustrating their settlement without 
allowing their escalation. The primary goal is political leverage over Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, through Russian arbitration among the parties to those 
conflicts and through preservation of local protectorates in areas of Russian troop 
deployment.” 
Nixey (2012:4-10) considers Moscow’s objection to deployment of international peace 
                                                          
1 Ivanova, N. (2009) The Forgotten South Caucasus: Where Oil and Water Mix. Available at: 
<http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2009/world/the-forgotten-south-caucasus-where-oil-and-water-mix/> 
(Accessed on 20.06.2012) 
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keeping forces and adjustments in the make-up of the Minsk group as evidences which 
prove that Russia’s interest to play a central role in the management of Nagorno- 
Kharabakh conflict is more the matter of gaining control rather than genuine interest in 
the resolution of the conflict. As a result, while there has not been considerable 
development in the resolution of the conflict, one of the most significant achievements 
of the process in the past few years has been the consequent rapprochement between 
Moscow and Baku, and the resulting growth of Russian influence over Azerbaijan.  
 
 Managing Alliances 
Moscow’s top policy for countering Western sponsored regional alliances like GUAM 
and OSCE is to manage new regional alliances that would help Russia to keep the 
former Soviet republics under its own sphere of influence. This includes development 
of organisations such as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Using different means, Moscow has managed to 
persuade all three South Caucasus countries to join CIS with Georgia being the last one 
to join in 1993. However, according to German (2012:104) since the former Soviet 
republics were not prepared for ceding any of their sovereignty into any central 
authority, the CIS has failed to develop into an effective regional organisation. As a 
result, while the CIS has been “useful as a forum for certain kinds of interaction and 
association”, but it lacks dynamism. (Nation 2007: 20) Nevertheless, the CIS became 
the origin of Eurasian Economic Community in 2001and is facilitating trade exchange 
and customs among the CIS countries.  
Also in 2002 CSTO emerged from within the CIS and “since then it has striven to assert 
its legitimacy as a regional security forum.” (ibid) However as Nation (2007:28) 
explains; “there is little evidence of any kind of effective security interaction relevant 
to the needs of the region as a whole. Polarization along a fault line defined by great 
power priorities not related intrinsically to the interests of the Caucasus itself defines 
patterns of association in the security realm.” 
According to Hill and Taspinar (2006:12) “insisting on special arrangements (like the 
NATO-Russian Council) … or deliberately undermining institutions (through, for 
example, its efforts to block the budget of the OSCE in 2005)”; are among alternative 
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methods that Russia has employed to achieve its goal of weakening Western sponsored 
alliances. So far it seems that despite incompetency of the Russian led organisations; 
Moscow has achieved this goal - at least partially, as the 2008 war diminished the 
Western leaning GUAM group. Moreover, “the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, of which all three South Caucasus states plus Russia are also 
members, has been weakened by Russia because of disagreements over the institution’s 
democracy promotion agenda.”(Nixey 2012:7) 
 
 Using Economic Leverages 
One of the Soviet era legacies is the interwoven, asymmetric economic relation between 
Russia and South Caucasus countries. “Russia remains the principal economic power 
in the region and many key enterprises are in the hands of Russian investors, including 
critical infrastructure such as mobile telephone communications and energy.” (German 
2012:98) 
In an effort to gain further political leverage over its neighbours, Moscow has tried to 
find a strong foothold in their economies through major investments or ‘equity for debt’ 
deals. The latter is particularly true with regard to Armenia. During Kucharian’s 
presidency, many state owned strategic assets were transferred to Russia in return to 
writing off the country’s debt, creating concerns about Armenia’s sovereignty. Georgia 
is also over relying on Russian capital, not to the same degree but enough to cause 
concerns. “There are numerous examples of Georgian companies, particularly within 
strategic sectors, passing under Russian control.” (Geraman 2012:100) This 
phenomenon has continued even after the 2008 war. 
Owing to its natural resources which have brought economic prosperity, Baku is less 
tangled in Moscow’s grip than its two neighbours. Russia only controls the Baku–
Novorossiysk oil pipeline and has some shares in electricity and aluminium industries. 
(Nixey 2012:5) However, Nixey (ibid: 6) believes that “Russia’s greatest economic 
lever with Azerbaijan and Armenia is in the form of migrant workers and their 
remittances. For example, Azerbaijan has approximately two million citizens working 
in Russia, sending $2.5 billion back home – 10% of GDP. The Azeri population resident 
in Russia constitutes a particularly strong form of leverage insofar as Russia has 
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threatened to deport illegal workers and impose a visa regime.” 
 
2.4.5. Turkey  
One of the main advantages of the independence of the former Soviet republics for 
Turkey was to create a buffer zone between the Russian Federation and Turkey, 
relieveing Ankara from the security challenges of sharing land borders with the Russian 
Federation.  
Turkey’s initial calculation was that if these republics were empowered to a degree that 
they could “resist outside pressure and interventions, then Turkey’s historical, political, 
economic and strategic regional pull would gently push them towards Ankara’s orbit”. 
(Aydin 2012:174) The incentives were strong enough to encourage Ankara to officially 
recognise the independence of these republics even before US or other Western powers 
do so and to support these countries in their process towards gaining political stability.  
The emergence of Turkey as NATO’s new front line state with obvious Westward 
orientation resulted in the assumption by both Turkey and the West particularly the US, 
that Ankara would be able to fill in the vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and play as the new regional superpower who will help in containing Russia to 
rise and spread its influence in the region, and will pave the way for the infiltration of 
the West in the region. It could also help in preventing Iran from drawing Muslim 
republics of the former Soviet Union under its own influence and promoting Islamic 
extremism. As a result, there was a widespread support and propaganda by the West 
towards the ‘Turkish model’ of governance as opposed to the Iranian model. Therefore 
at least for the first decade after the end of the Cold War, Turkey was trying to balance 
the challenging task of an influential regional player while proving its functionality to 
the West both as a NATO ally and as a prospective EU member.  
While quite happy for the Turkey to play a role in containing Iran’s influence and 
development of Islamic extremism in the region; Russia has been otherwise very 
sensitive towards Turkey’s plans. Ankara became eventually aware that “it needs to 
accommodate Russian interests at least until it has consolidated its own influence.” 
(Goskel 2011:20) 
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Although the establishment of the Agency for Turkish Cooperation and Development 
in 1992 provided an instrument for economic cooperation between Turkey and 
Caucasus countries (Steinbach 2012: 155); since Turkey did not have the necessary 
capabilities required for replacing the Soviet Union, less than a decade after the end of 
the Cold War, while Ankara had failed to leave up to its ambitious rhetorics and the 
expectations of the newly independent republics, Russia’s leverage in the region had 
prevailed.  
Faced with regional realities and international distaste, Turkey’s initial fervours for 
fulfilling its pan Turkic aspirations within the post Soviet space faded away 
considerably and was replaced with more economic and security dimensions. 
Nonetheless, Ankara has never quitted playing the role of big brother for Azerbaijan. 
An obvious and ongoing example is Turkey’s border closure with Armenia following 
the occupation of Azeri territories by Yerevan despite all diplomatic and economic 
restrictions that it has brought for Ankara to play the role of an influential regional 
power.  
Turkey has been actively engaged with at least one other important regional geopolitical 
development, which is the pipeline diplomacy.  Since the early 1990s when the policy 
of curtailing Russia’s monopoly over the pipeline routes was undertaken by Western 
players, Turkey has continuously been one of the most active partners in various 
pipeline development projects. “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and the Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE) gas pipeline, as well as the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline 
from Russia and all the other planned connections (Kazakh oil to BTC, Turkmen, 
Iranian and Iraqi gas, further Russian gas through Blue Stream II, and connecting all 
these to Europe through Nabucco) are aimed at making Turkey a regional energy 
player.” (Aydin 2012:175) Turkey’s involvement in pipeline diplomacy has evolved 
throughout the two decades after the end of the Cold War. While Ankara was initially 
happy to be a partner in these projects, and then content for the role of energy corridor; 
under the AKP government the aspiration for becoming a regional energy hub has 
become a pillar in Turkey’s foreign policy. 
The pipelines have further strengthened Ankara- Baku link and created a trilateral 
alliance involving these two as well as Tbilisi. The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict has resulted in the exclusion of Armenia from pipeline projects, despite the 
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potential to provide the shortest route from Azerbaijan to Mediterranean. With US’s 
insistence on boycotting Iran from any pipeline route, the only left option is Georgia. 
The pipeline based cooperation has resulted in Turkey becoming both Azerbaijan and 
Georgia’s biggest trade partner.  
The rise of the AKP to power in 2002 offered an opportunity for Ankara to review its 
foreign policy. The articulation of priorities in this reviwed foreign policy included 
stability in the neighbourhood, zero-problems and increased economic ties with 
neighbours (trade and investment), becoming an energy hub between Eurasia and 
Europe, and bridging the global religious/civilisational divide. (Goskel 2011:17) 
Turkey’s failed attempt for EU membership and the 2003 Iraq war provided the 
opportunity for Ankara to act more independent of the West, as it had fewer incentives 
for appeasing the West. 
However, it was the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict which convinced Turkey to 
assume a more proactive and constructive role in the region, due to concerns over 
exclusion from major regional geopolitical developments, which could in turn affect its 
economic interests particularly as a transport and energy hub. Hence, “Erdogan 
resurrected an idea – earlier proposed by his predecessor, Süleyman Demirel – of a 
Caucasus Peace and Stability Platform (CPSP).” (Oskanian 2011:24)  “The CSCP 
maintained the channels of communication and dialogue open with Russia and has been 
a good tactical move to overcome tensions between Georgia and Russia.” (Punsmann 
2010:3)   
An important characteristic of the CSCP initiative was to focus on regional players and 
exclude the EU and US. However, according to Gorgulu & Krikorian (2012:4) the 
exclusion of Western players “was of particular concern to Georgia, which has close 
relations with both parties.”  Moreover, Turkey was not seen as an objective player as 
it is closer to Azerbaijan than Armenia. “In the end, the platform was rejected by both 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, while Armenia did not directly oppose the initiative.” (ibid) 
Summing up Turkey’s engagement with the South Caucasus it can be concluded that 
although Ankara has not yet succeeded in realising the ambition “for a leading role in a 
region extending from the Adriatic Sea to China, including the Central Asian republics, the 
Caucasus, the region around the Black Sea and the Balkans” (Goskel 2011:5 quoted from 
Freddy De Pauw) but has taken some steps in this direction by “endeavor to solve problems 
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with neighbors, including Armenia, to turn Turkey into an energy hub, to deepen 
collaboration with Russia, to increase the prominence of Islam as a soft power instrument, 
and to position itself as a leader in the Middle East defined Turkey’s geopolitical priorities 
and caused realignments in the Caucasus.” (ibid)  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
The emergence of new geopolitical entities and realities in the area which used to be an 
integral part of the Soviet Union was one of the consequences of the collapse of that 
superpower and the end of the Cold War. 
In addition to security challenges stemming from the geostrategic circumstances of the 
South Caucasus, the region became crowded by numerous regional and outside players 
each seeking their own interests and undertaking policies to ensure those interests. Rivalries 
and competition of various players for influence and power, which has been particularly 
evident with regard to the Caspian energy resources and transport routes resulted in a 
situation branded by some analysts as the ‘new Great Game”. 
‘Balance of power’ and ‘Security’ are the two concepts which can summarise US goals 
generally in Eurasia and particularly in the South Caucasus. Securing the position of the 
‘sole superpower’ by spreading its sphere of influence in the region and preventing the 
rise of any regional power or strong adversary who can challenge such status has been 
the primary objective of US regional policies since the end of the Cold War. Security of 
‘energy resources’, routes and markets are another part of this goal. 
Resorting to Pipeline diplomacy, initiatives for integrating the former Soviet republics 
in Western oriented organisations and financial aids have been among the most 
important instruments employed by the United States to achieve its goals and establish 
a comfortable influential position in the politics and economies of the region. However, 
the overall scope of US interest in the region will depend very much on future strategic 
significance of the region for US policies; including developments in Iran-US relations. 
EU’s main goals in the region have been: 
1- Diversification of energy supplies using Caspian energy resources as well as 
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diversification and increased security of transport routs both for energy and goods. 
2- Development of  security and stability in the region through political and 
economic development 
To achieve these goals EU has gradually increased involvement in the region through 
joint ventures and multifaceted economic and political development programmes. 
However, while various initiatives have increased EU’s involvement in the South 
Caucasus; they “do not yet constitute a coherent policy…… rather serve as building 
blocks of an emerging EU vision for the region.” (Huseynov 2009:51)  
The goal of NATO, as the security and foreign policy arm of the US and EU has been 
improvement of security and stability in the region to ensure the interests of its 
members. To achieve this goal, the organisation has executed various flexible initiatives 
aiming to develop security cooperation with regional countries with the prospect of 
NATO membership which has been particularly attractive for Georgia. 
Russia has employed different means from competing organisations and pipeline 
networks, to manipulating conflicts and economies to balance its power against US by 
keeping regional countries under its own sphere of influence, and containing the 
increasing influence of the West. Where none of those means has achieved the expected 
result, Moscow has used its economic leverage or military might to get what it wants. 
The 2008 war with Georgia was a reminder for other players particularly the United 
States and NATO that Russia would not let any other player get the upper hand in its 
strategic sphere of influence and would not tolerate zero-sum games.  
Despite its initial quest for filling the vacuum left by the Soviet’s collapse, Turkey fell 
short of its ambitions and contented to being a major regional power. Nevertheless, 
through active participation in major pipeline network initiatives, Turkey has not only 
taken steps in becoming the regional energy hub but has also established close relations 
with both Azerbaijan and Georgia. Still, Ankara needs to have some degree of relations 
with all countries of the South Caucasus to be able to play the role of an influential 
regional player. The fact that Turkey’s relations with Armenia have become the hostage 
of Nagorno- Karabakh conflict has reduced Ankara’s influence and manoeuvring 
capacity. 
Further polarisation of the region in the wake of rivalries for power and influence is one 
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of the important post Cold War developments in the South Caucasus, with Armenia 
continuing to be Russia’s loyal ally and Georgia’s considerable tilt towards the West 
and its enthusiasm for integration into Euro- Atlantic alliances which has further 
exacerbated Russia’s sensitivities towards Western players. However, the 2008 
Georgia-Russia war altered the geopolitical balance of the region and forced other 
players to recalculate their strategies. 
With the exception of Iran, the goals and policies of major players in the South 
Caucasus was examined in this chapter. The next chapter will review Iran’s foreign 
policy as an introduction for the consequent chapter which will examine Iran’s regional 
policy in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.  
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CHAPTER THREE  






3.1. Introduction  
Since one country’s relation with a region or a particular country is a part of a greater 
picture, in order to achieve a more accurate analysis of such relations, providing an 
understanding of the context in which the relations are shaped is an imperative. As foreign 
policy “constitutes an attempt to design, manage and control the foreign relations of 
national societies” (Webber & Smith 2002:9) then, it is a crucial part of the context in which 
the relations are shaped along with the overall international system and regional dynamics. 
Keeping the above logic in mind, this chapter will review Iran’s foreign policy particularly 
after the revolution in the context of the Cold War and Post Cold war eras. The chapter 
would introduce fundamentals of Iran’s foreign policy and its journey from a revolutionary 
ideological towards a more pragmatic approach based on geopolitical realities. 
The chapter will examine the evolution of the “neither East, nor West” arch policy 
throughout the history of the Islamic Republic. It will demonstrate how the early 
revolutionary goals of the Islamic Republic such as the ‘establishment of a new 
international system’ and the ‘export of the revolution’ resulted in the isolation of Iran. It 
will discuss how by the late 1980s Iran’s revolutionary leaders came to realise the necessity 
for a change of their modus operandi to survive and will review their efforts for establishing 
relations with different countries. 
The chapter will then provide an account of the persuasion of a more pragmatic approach 
which sought to reintegrate Iran into the international community by Presidents Rafsanjani 
and Khatami. The reaction of the international community towards Iran’s conciliatory 
efforts and the consequences of those reactions for Iran’s domestic development including 
the emergence of a new breed of revolutionary elites branded as ‘Iran’s neoconservatives’ 
will also be portrayed in this chapter, together with the analysis of the foreign policy 
approach undertaken by these new comers and its consequences for Iran’s international 
status and relations. 
Finally the chapter will arrive to the most recent period of Iran’s foreign policy which has 
undertaken steps in search for a degree of rapprochement with great powers that would be 




3.2. Historical Review of Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era  
The rise of Pahlavi into power, first and foremost provided the country with a sense of 
national unity after disastrous developments which had almost cost Iran its sovereignty; as 
the country was carved up between Russia and Britain due to its geopolitical importance in 
their ‘Great Game’. With a collapsed economy and crisis ridden polity, Iran was faced with 
the challenges of the World War II, while belligerent states observed no respect for the 
country’s official neutral stance. 
This section will briefly review Iran’s foreign policy during the Pahlavi era and then the 
post revolution developments in more details. 
 
3.2.1. Imperial Iran’s Foreign Policy: Outlines  
One of the most pressing issues facing any Iranian government in the first half of the 20th 
century was to safeguard the country’s sovereignty. This critical task proved to be 
extremely difficult due to Iran’s immediate proximity of a superpower with proven and 
explicit expansionist tendencies. As Fuller (1991:137) explains, “no other state has 
permanently seized from Iran as much Persian territory- lands that were under long term 
historical Persian cultural domination- as has Russia.”  
After consolidation of his power, Reza Shah tried to redeem the country from further 
devastation as it was left paralyzed and at the mercy of the great powers that had turned it 
into their battleground during the World War I. He developed Iran into a modern nation-
state which “for the first time in well over a hundred years, … was now largely master of 
its own fate, with an independent foreign policy and national army to enforce the will of 
the state….” (ibid: 148) However, at the outbreak of the World War II; Iran’s neutral stand 
was once again undermined by the great powers particularly Britain who found Iran’s vast 
oil resources and strategic location critical for logistical purposes. With the country under 
virtual occupation of the Allied forces, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate the throne in 
favour of his son Mohammad Reza.  
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The young Shah was still in his mid twenties when the country was challenged by the crisis 
of 1945-6, in which Russia initially refused to withdraw the Red Army out of Iran following 
the end of the World War II. Under pressure from the West and following three UN 
resolutions, the troops were eventually pulled out; but not before provoking the Azarbaijan– 
Mahabad crisis1 and receiving major oil concessions from Tehran. However, with the 
United State’s support, the Iranian parliament refused to ratify the agreement on the 
concession. While the crisis became one of the important episodes which mounted to the 
development of the Cold War; it helped Iran to find an ally which seemed to provide support 
for resisting the pressures of other great powers. 
Tehran’s foreign policy which was essentially defensive between 1953-1963; evolved from 
initial passive dependency and then defensiveness to that of self confidence and 
assertiveness, resulted mainly from internal stability and economic growth. (Nyrop 
1978:226) This evolvement together with Iran’s role as a major energy supplier for the 
West became valuable assets for establishing cordial diplomatic relations with over 120 
countries and playing an active role in international organisations. 
Up until the start of the revolution, Iran was receiving economic and military assistance 
from both superpowers but was generally considered as an American ally. While many 
scholars believe that in trying to limit threats and ensure Iran’s security, Shah was cleverly 
playing one superpower against the other; in fact fearful of the “Soviet power and intentions 
…. Mohammad Reza Shah violated the basically non aligned orientation of his father to 
move further towards alliance with the West.” (Fuller 1991:154)  
 
3.2.2 Iran’s Post Revolution Foreign Policy  
In order to have a better understanding of Iran’s contemporary foreign policy, particular 
attention needs to be paid to important invariable determinants. A combination of various 
geopolitical factors has continuously influenced Iranian foreign policy. “Situated on an 
ancient landmass empire on the Eurasian crossroads, the modern state’s regional reach 
extends to much of western Asia.” (Ehteshami 2014: 263) Straddled between two important 
energy hubs of the world in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf; Iran plays as a land 
bridge providing the only link between South Asia and the Mediterranean Sea. While this 
                                                          
1 Will be discussed in chapter 4 
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geography has “facilitated the spread of the Persian influence in Asia” (ibid) the importance 
of geostrategic location has been one of the main factors which has turned the country into 
the battlefield of rival tribes and dynasties in ancient times, and occupation or outright 
interference of great powers in modern history. 
Hence, history has left significant marks on the Iranians’ collective identity. There is on the 
one hand the glorious legacy of the Persian Empire, which ruled considerable parts of the 
world for centuries; while the combination of rich Persian and Islamic cultural and 
civilisation heritage is the everlasting source of national pride and self respect for Iranians. 
On the other hand the aforementioned “history of subjection to outside conquerors and 
dominant powers” has created “cultural features that foreigners find so baffling”. (Keddie 
& Gasiorowski 1990:3) Those bitter experiences have resulted in a strong sense of national 
resistance to any kind of foreign interference and sensitivity towards sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence.  
This collective national identity resulting from Iran’s particular geopolitics and history, has 
a determining influence on foreign policy decision makings irrespective of the state’s 
ideological background. It is also an important parameter for the public to evaluate the 
performance of their politicians. Iranians strive to see themselves once again in a superior 
position corresponding to their glorious history and culture. The effects of this psyche 
resurfaced in years prior to the 1979’s revolution and played an important role in mobilizing 
the public against the Pahlavi monarchy.  
 
 
3.2.2.1. From Revolution to the End of War (1979-1989) 
Despite his determined efforts for turning Iran into the most modern yet formidable state 
in the region; Shah’s de facto alliance with the United States and the latter’s support of his 
dictatorship had convinced the public that “the shah's regime reflected American interests 
as faithfully as Vidkun Quisling's puppet government in Norway reflected the interests of 
Nazi Germany in World War II.” (Cottam 1979:4) This in turn was interpreted “as a sign 
of Iran’s complete subservience to the United States and its loss of independence…which 
developed into a profound source of alienation.”(Ramazani 1989:203) 
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The more religious sectors of the society also felt that their traditional values have been 
threatened by Shah’s secular efforts, which limited religious influence, not only by 
imposing restrictions on Islamic manifestations, but also through ever increasing import of 
Western culture mainly via media and trade. There were, of course, many other reasons 
which can be considered as roots of the 1978-9 Islamic revolution but are less relevant to 
this study.  
Revolutionary leaders reinterpreted Iranians’ shared national identity, their friends and 
foes, by focusing on the aforementioned sensitivities and set a different perspective for 
Iran’s place in the world throughout the course of the revolution and immediately after the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic. The country took a turn from the secularisation path 
pioneered by Pahlavis, towards a more religious identity, in which the ‘Iranian’ dimension 
of national identity came second to its ‘Islamic’ dimension.  
As Wendt (199:337) has put it, “structural change, or cultural change, occurs when actors 
redefine who they are and what they want.” The Islamic Republic brought with itself a new 
set of religious based norms and identity which although was not entirely exclusive of the 
elements of the ‘Iranian identity’, but certainly had a different world view, values and 
priorities which resulted in the complete overhaul of Iran’s foreign policy amid the 
revolutionary atmosphere. “For an Islamic regime, state borders within the international system 
are artificial constructs, created largely by the former colonial or imperialist powers of Europe. 
Hence they lack legitimacy.” (Karabell1996:81) As Moshirzadeh (2006: 22) explains, from an 
Islamic point of view, the international system does not consist of several units as nation states, 
but is comprised of two camps, ‘Daar ul Islam’ and ‘Dar ul Kufr’. In such system, all Muslims 
are part of one great entity called ‘Ummah’. As emphasised in many statements by the leaders 
of the Islamic republic, they saw it as their duty to unify the Ummah under the umbrella of 
Islam. While Shiism has been Iran’s official religious sect since the Constitutional Revolution; 
the above mentioned view provided a plural approach towards the Muslims in the Islamic 
Republic’s foreign policy. An examination of Ayatullah Khomeini’s correspondences and 
speeches reveals the importance he attached to ‘unity’ throughout his political life, and his firm 
belief that unity has been the secret for the victory of the revolution.1 
Expanding on another Islamic rule called “the rejection of authority (ghāedeye Nafye 
Sabil)”; which means that under no circumstances should non Muslims be allowed to have 
                                                          
1 Sahifeye Nur, collection of Ayatullah Khomeini’s correspondences and speeches 
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authority over Muslims, Moshirzadeh (2006:23-24) explains how resisting superpowers’ 
hegemony in the international system received a priority in Iran’s foreign policy agenda. 
Karabell (1996:85) considers Iran’s persistent negation of Israel’s legitimacy and refusal to 
recognise it as a local manifestation of that belief.  
To this date the above mentioned principles which conveniently also fulfil Iranians’ 
national sensitivities towards their country’s sovereignty and independence, have been the 
cornerstone of Iran’s foreign policy. These principles and notions were crystallised in one 
slogan taken from Ayatollah Khomeini’s speech, ‘neither East, nor West, only the Islamic 
Republic’. Although different groups of elites have had different interpretations about the 
limits of the above statement, the resulting interactions have at times contradicted the norms 
of neorealist international relations.  According to neorealist, the international system is the 
most influential element in defining and formulating the state’s behaviour in the 
international arena. Haji Yousefi (2008:63) believes that since at the time of the Islamic 
revolution, the international system was still bipolar; Iran’s main foreign policy framework 
should not have changed. He explains that despite the complete transformation of Iran’s 
political system, according to the logics of bipolar world and the Cold War era, Iran should 
have still allied with one of the superpowers. However, Iran’s new foreign policy was based 
on the assumption that the Cold War and bipolar system could not have a serious effect on 
the country’s foreign policy. (ibid: 64) Failing to see any logic in making an alliance with 
either superpowers Tehran sought to keep a distance from both. 
Determined to transform the existing international system by establishing Islamic norms, 
Iran refused to commit to the status quo, and adopted a revisionist approach, urging 
developing, and particularly Muslim countries to help in reshaping the world order. The 
export of the revolution became, therefore, a top agenda for revolutionary idealists. The 
first task set for the post revolution provisional government was termination of the 
“subservient de facto alliance of the Shah’s regime with the United States” (Ramazani 
1989:204) and placing the bilateral relations on a plane of equality. Bazargan, the 
provisional prime minister adapted a non-aligned or in his own word “negative 
equilibrium” policy, an accommodationist approach, which “sought to maintain Iran’s 
independence within the context of the existing international system on nation state.” 
(Ramazani 1989:206)  
However, for revolutionary extremists who called themselves ‘Maktabis’, or ‘follower’s of 
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the Imam path’ (pairove khate Emam), the export of the revolution in order to establish an 
Islamic world order took priority to national interests, hence completely ignorant towards 
the imperatives of the existing international order or necessary arrangements for achieving 
their goals, they become frustrated with the provisional government’s soft approach 
towards the West and eventually took the matters in their own hands. Iranian’s deep anger 
and hatred resulted from the 1953  coup against democratically elected prime minister of 
Iran …. and US government ardent support of the Shah’s… dictatorship for the next 25 
years” (Hornberger 2005),  was fused with genuine fear that the US government would 
repeat that story when the  United States decided to receive Shah. (ibid) This encouraged a 
group of students to capture the US embassy on 4th November 1979 and take hostage its 
diplomats for 444 days with the full support of Ayatollah Khomeini1, though the 
provisional prime minister resigned in objection to the events. The event provided a sound 
basis for isolation of Iran and a good justification for the US to even attack the country. 
Many Iranian elites believe that throughout the next decades Iran has been paying the price 
for the hostage taking.  
With resignation of the provisional government, the Maktabi’s era marked with radicalism 
and emphasis on relations with the nations started. The state attached high importance to 
relations with various movements, providing cultural, economic, political and sometimes 
military support for freedom movements. (Izadi 2010:23)  Ehteshami (2002:297) calls this 
period as the “consolidation stage..... characterised by the power struggle between liberals 
and more radical forces (Maktabis), gradual entrenchment of clergies in power and 
rejection of Middle East status quo”, resulting in “the emergence of post Pahlavi foreign 
policy and domination of Maktabis in the government machinery by the end of the this 
period.”(ibid)  
Iran’s domestic instabilities, its international isolation and the hostility of regional countries 
rooted in the sense of threat from Iran’s intention for the export of the revolution 
encouraged Saddam to seize its neighbour's time of weakness for settling old border 
disputes through military confrontation. “Iraq claimed territories inhabited by Arabs (the 
Southwestern oil-producing province of Iran called Khouzestan), as well as Iraq's right over 
                                                          
1 “The United States expects our young people to sit and watch while they take Shah over there for conspiracy and have 
another base for conspiracy in here.” Speech delivered on 5th Nov 1979.  Available at: 
<http://www.jamaran.ir/fa/NewsContent-id_12991.aspx>  (Accessed on 27.06.2015) 
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Shatt el-Arab (Arvandroud)...... Iraq claimed the 200-kilometer channel up to the Iranian 
shore as its territory, while Iran insisted that the thalweg--a line running down the middle 
of the waterway--negotiated last in 1975, was the official border.”1  
To win the international support, Saddam justified the invasion on the basis of the threat 
posed by Iran’s efforts to export the revolution. Adib Moghaddam (2007:1999) emphasizes 
that “Saddam Hussein was convinced that military confrontation with Iran would be 
tolerated because the international community did not suggest otherwise; external signals 
were interpreted as green light-if not carte blanche- by government elites.” Reviving the 
old Arab-Ajam animosity, Saddam managed to have the support and sympathy of most 
Arab countries. The war increased Iran’s isolation leaving it with no friends but Syria, 
Libya and Lebanon. Tehran’s refusal to settle the hostage crisis on time resulted in the UN 
Security Council’s refusal to take the prompt action against Iraq’s invasion, although it was 
in clear violation of the UN charter. (Halliday 2011:5) 
In addition to Iran’s anti Western foreign policy, Maziar (1999:20) has suggested further 
reasons for prolonged isolation of Iran, including: “the role of some Western powers, 
specially France, in supplying the Iraqi war effort and providing sanctuary for IRI’s exiled 
opposition figures”; as well as “the Regan administration’s emphasis on restoring 
America’s prestige abroad and combating terrorism with force.” However, Ehteshami 
(2002:297) considers “the pro-Iraq line of the moderate Arab forces, who had during this 
period been totally alienated by Tehran” as the main element of Iran’s isolation. 
The Iran-Iraq war was a clear manifestation of unfairness and hypocracy of power politics, 
where all great powers rallied behind Saddam Hussain, turning a blind eye not only on the 
act of invasion itself but also on his inhumane atrocities. Even Iran’s official complaints 
against war crimes such as the use of chemical weapons by Iraq were ignored for several 
years.2  
Moreover, the United State’s policy of neutrality and containment aiming at restraining 
both countries gradually became Iran’s containment policy. The State Department’s 
                                                          
1 Iran- Iraq War (1980-1988). Available at:  <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm>  
(Accessed on 20. 04.2011) 
2 “Complaints from the Iranian side were made as early as November 1980. Yet it took the international community, 
including the most prominent none governmental organizations (NGOs) at least three and half years to investigate the 
allegations systematically. The Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) testified to that in May 
1984.” (Adib Moghaddam 2007:104) 
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Information Memorandum of October 1983 officially declared an end to containment 
policy towards Iraq except for arms sales.  
This total ignorance and silence towards Saddam’s atrocities by the international 
community in general and the great powers in particular became a major building block of 
Iran’s wall of distrust which exacerbated its siege mentality, and became the basis for 
overemphasis on self reliance.1 
As the provision of arms and other war necessities became more difficult and the economic 
stagnation resulted from the war, sanctions and isolation, taught some tough reality lessons 
to Iran’s leaders; the urgency for breaking the isolation was realised; as “a policy of 
unrelenting hostility and pressure ..... was hampering Iran’s ability to sustain itself at home 
while fighting a total war.” (Sick 1987:702)  
Ayatollah Khomeini’s belief that the preservation of the system (state) is the most essential 
duty2 allowed any policy adjustment necessary for survival. In October 1982, his approval 
“marked a fundamental shift, not in Tehran’s foreign policy goals but in its strategy for 
pursuing those goals.” (ibid)  With his support, Iran’s foreign policy of open doors was 
launched on July 1984 by President Khamenei who explained the policy as involving 
“rational, sound and healthy relations with all countries” and aimed at serving Iran’s 
interest and ideology. (Ramazani 1989: 212) The new conciliatory foreign policy did not 
overrule the principle of ‘neither East, nor West’. It simply meant that “in pursuing its 
overriding goals of the Islamic revolution and Iranian independence, Iran must reject both 
Eastern and Western domination of any kind.”(ibid) In practice, desperation for the supply 
of arms pushed the door as wide open as a gate. The ‘Irangate’ or ‘Iran-Contra’ involved 
the purchase of arms from the US, through Israel, in such high prices that the gained profit 
was used by Washington to finance the Contras. Irangate is an example of the victory of 
pragmatism over ideology in Iran’s foreign policy approach. 
The new approach started paying off in other fronts as well, including improvement of 
relations with the Soviet Union which had gradually deteriorated particularly following the 
arrest and prosecution of the communist Tudeh party members. The Soviet Union’s initial 
                                                          
1 President Obmama made a point about this in his 14.07.2015 interview with the NewYork Times “We have had in the 
past supported Saddam Hussein when we knew he used chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq, and so, as 
a consequence, they have their own security concerns, their own narrative.” Available at: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/opinion/thomas-friedman-obama-makes-his-case-on-iran-nuclear-deal.html> 
(Accesssed on 17.07.2015) 
2 Hefze nezām az aujabe vājebat ast.  
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welcoming reaction to the Islamic revolution based on calculating the anti imperialist 
nature of the new government in Tehran as a potential instrument for securing Soviet’s 
interests in the region proved to be unsubstantiated both due to the Soviet’s dark history 
with Iran and its invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, “the crusade to export the revolution 
…., aggravated the difficulties in Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union. The ethnic and 
geographic proximity of the two countries fuelled the USSR concern about the possible 
contagion of the Islamic revolution among Soviet Muslims.” (Ramazani 1989:210) 
However, following the 1985 visit of Iran’s economic delegation to the Soviet Union, slow 
but steady development of relations was resumed. 
In response to Iran’s efforts to improve relations with its neighbours, Arab countries of the 
region, while maintaining their civil relations with Tehran and “accommodating Iranian 
policy on oil and other issues …., without harm to their own basic interests”, also 
“reaffirmed their support for Iraq” as a realistic approach to dangers of power imbalance in 
favour of Iran. (Sick 1987:713) 
Eventually, following continuous defeats in war fronts which resulted in great number of 
casualties, considerable loss of equipments, and lives, and increased probability of direct 
US involvement in the war, Iran accepted the UN 598 resolution in July 1998.  
The end of the war opened new prospects for Iran’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, just when 
the hopes for normal relations with the West were booming, the death decree against 
Rushdie proved that striking a balance between ideology and pragmatism was more 
difficult than initially perceived. In objection to the decree, several West European 
governments reduced their diplomatic mission in Tehran which consequently hindered 
normalisation of relations with the West. 
 
3.2.2.2. Rafsanjani’s Administration (1989-1997) 
The Rushdie case was still a source of tension with the world, when Ayatollah Khomeini 
passed away in June 1989; opening a completely new chapter in the history of Iran. “A 
major reason why such an eclectic collection of revolutionaries was able to operate together 
effectively was the charismatic presence of …., Ayatollah Khomeini. (He) was … the 
essential steady hand on the tiller, and when he died a potentially dangerous vacuum was 
left at the heart of Islamic Republic.” (Ansari 2007:12)  
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However, the vacuum was quickly filled by the complementary role played by then the 
president Khamenei and the head of parliament Hashemi Rafsanjani. Iran’s political scene 
was reconfigured with Khamenei assuming the role of the leader and Rafsanjani becoming 
the president. Despite their differences on various issues including foreign policy,1 the two 
mostly demonstrated a united front and managed a smooth transition to the post Khomeini 
era. 
Though a surprisingly fortunate consequence of Iran’s sanctions was that the country 
emerged out of 8 years long war “with negligible financial debt” (ibid), there was still an 
urgent need for foreign investments and loans if the war torn country was going to be back 
on development track. Hence the ‘era of reconstruction’ started, with Rafsanjani at the helm 
pledging “to rebuild the nation's war-ravaged economy and avoid a new war”2 in his oath 
to the office, while emphasising that political independence is not possible without 
economic independence. His economic policies required reintegration of Iran into the 
international system through reconciliatory strategies, for which he took immediate action. 
While the economy was a top priority in this period, the main approach was to avoid making 
enemies and increase efforts in improving Iran’s reputation in the international arena. 
Within three years at his helm, the country reportedly gained an 8.3% growth in GNP 
without any foreign investments,3 and made a strong return to the international oil market.  
The end of hostility with Iraq and the Soviet’s withdrawal from Afghanistan drew Iran closer 
to its northern neighbour. Shevardnadze’s direct talk with Ayatollah Khomeini and the latter’s 
emphasis on improving relations with the Soviet Union in order to counter Western threats had 
already paved Rafsanjani’s way to improve bilateral relations with Moscow. A series of 
agreements reached in 1989 established the foundation for future Russian-Iranian relations. 
The agreements included a “multibillion dollar trade and military cooperation” (Ehteshami 
                                                          
1 For example, look at: Teimourian, H. (1989) report in the Times (London): Rafsanjani’s delay in taking helm; Iran, 
claiming that “The Ayatollah had demanded to be allowed to appoint 'an ambassador at large' to represent him at 
international gatherings, but Hojatoleslam Rafsanjani had resisted, apparently fearing that the Ayatollah might acquire 
the power to make foreign policy independent of Government.” “Another sign of the power struggle in Tehran coming 
… was a militant speech by Ayatollah Khamenei on the subject of talks with US on the Western hostages in 
Lebanon.Denouncing Hojatoleslam Rafsanjani's advocacy of such talks in the strongest terms except in name, the new 
nominal leader of Iran said that no one in the country would negotiate with the United States unless Washington ended 
'its deceitful policies and its support for Israel.”Available at: 
<http://www.nexis.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/search/newssubmitForm.do> (Accessed on 15.07.2015). 
2 Xinhua General News Service, (1989) Iranian President Pledges Reconstruction, Peace. Available at: 
<http://www.nexis.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/search/newssubmitForm.do> (Accessed on 13.07.2015) 
3 Xinhua General News Service, 24 August 1992, Iran Achieves 8.3 Percent Growth Rate in gnp. Available at: 
<http://www.nexis.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/search/newssubmitForm.do>  (Accessed on 13.07.2015) 
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2002:299) between the two countries.  
Wary of formation of Arab alliances in the region which “could only lead to the 
marginalization of Iran's regional role” (ibid: 300); efforts were made to improve relations 
with Pakistan and Turkey “who were also the founding members of Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO)”. (ibid)  
In summer 1990 diplomatic relations with Iraq were resumed. Iran’s neutral stand in the 
first Gulf War, “which was in sharp contrast to its interventionist and adventurist policies 
of the post revolution period” (ibid:301) paved the way for improving relations with 
regional and trans regional countries, including the resumption of diplomatic relations with 
Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the Gulf war brought with itself a dilemma that Iran had 
profoundly tried to avoid. The Western military forces which had heavily moved into the 
Persian Gulf in the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait were to stay there based on 
security pacts signed with some GCC countries.  
While Tehran was looking forward to a more fortunate future in the international arena, the 
turn of events, and in particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, raised new serious challenges for the country. 
3.3. Post Cold War Era  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War marked a new era in the 
international arena. The most significant development in macro level was the transformation 
of the international system, which ultimately affected regional orders. It is, therefore, necessary 
to have a brief review of the systemic changes following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
before examining Iran’s foreign policy in the post Cold War era. 
 
3.3.1. Systemic Changes 
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was much 
contemplation about ‘the new international order’ among scholars and politicians alike. For 
many, particularly in the West, a unipolar system with the United States as the sole 
superpower was the obvious option, “something for which it (US) was culturally and 
institutionally unprepared.” (Friedman 2012) Nonetheless, the US posture and behaviour 
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in those years was a confirmation of that expectation, as the 1992 ‘Draft Defence Planning 
Guidance’ asserted that “other powers must recognize that World order is ultimately backed 
by US”. (Quoted by Hunter 2010:5) However, further international developments, many 
initiated or advanced by Washington’s actions prevented the full establishment of US 
hegemony and cast serious doubts about “America’s ability to perform as the global 
hegemon”. (ibid: 4) Since then, rapid world developments have prevented any particular 
international system to be established and stabilised.  
After discussing characteristics of different international systems, Huntington (1999:35) 
concludes that the post-Soviet system is Uni-Multi polar. In this system, there is only one 
superpower, but needs the cooperation of some great powers in tackling major international 
problems. Hunter (2010:4) believes that “the post Soviet international system is still 
evolving and the outcome of this evolution is hard to predict.” Vaezi (2011:36) on the other 
hand believes that despite all the efforts for establishing an absolute unipolar system, 
neither that nor any new sustainable and stable structure could have taken shape and the 
international arena is in a “transitional state”.  Despite this transitional status, there is no 
doubt that since the end of the Cold War, the balance of power in any respect has still been 
in favour of the West, with the East lagging far behind. (Hunter 2010:4) 
As Hunter (2010:xi) has explained “less powerful states are far worse off within a system 
either dominated by a single hegemonic power or jointly managed by a small group of key 
actors; specially when these middle powers are of particular interests to key players.” 
Despite steps taken for raproachment with the world, Iran’s relations with the US had 
remained hostile with Rafsanjani emphasising that “The Americans should - in deed, not 
in words-prove to our people that they have changed their policy and their stand is like that 
of ... the Europeans".1 Hence, in the post Cold War international system, Iran, which is a 
“typical potential middle power, located in a geopolitically sensitive region” (ibid), had a 
difficult time adjusting and surviving. 
It was in such environment, that the country had to continue its post war reconstructions 
and develop its relations with the international community. Perhaps Ramazani’s 1992 
paper; “both North and South”2 has summarised Iran’s efforts to survive in this new 
environment by improving its regional relationships with both Southern and Northern 
                                                          
1 The Globe & Mail (Canada), 23.04.1991: No ties with U.S. until Hostility Ends, Iran says. 
2 a counterstatement for the popular ‘Neither East, Nor West’ post revolution tenet. 
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neighbours.  
As Ehteshami (2002:265) has argued there was a range of factors in addition to the end of 
the Cold War, that was affecting Middle East politics, including: “the impact of 
globalization, structural economic difficulties…, deepening sub regionalism … and finally 
political Islam emerging as a divisive rather than unifying force.” (ibid) 
 
 
3.3.2. Continuation of Rafsanjani’s Administration (1990-1997) 
While his administration coincided with developments which eventually resulted in the 
collapse of the Soviet Union; due to various considerations including Iran’s need for 
sophisticated arms, Rafsanjani was careful not to alienate Moscow at the time of its 
weakness. Iran’s reaction to Azerbaijan’s independence was both a manifestation of 
pragmatism and an example of the importance it observed for its northern neighbour. 
“Unlike Turkey, Iran did not recognize Azerbaijan’s independence until after USSR 
collapse.” (Friedman 2000:69) 
The ‘geographical separation’ resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
independence of its southern republics provided Tehran with more confidence in dealing 
with Moscow. (Tarock 1997:207) However, the importance of bilateral relations was 
emphasised repeatedly by Iranian officials, including Rafsanjani’s July 1995 interview, in 
which he explained that the “promotion of Iran-Russia relations serves the interests of both 
nations in finding political solutions to regional conflicts, i.e. in Central Asia and the 
Middle East”. (ibid) Unfortunately, Iranian political elites failed to recognise that at that 
particular juncture of history, Moscow needed Tehran more than Tehran needed Moscow, 
as the latter was faced with various challenges in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran was 
Russia’s only partner that could support it through regional crises and help in preventing 
the expansion of Western influence. This lack of accurate evaluation of Iran’s value for 
Russia resulted in Tehran’s failure to bargain effectively with Moscow. (ibid) 
As for Russia; interestingly all three major groups of Duma legislators, with different 
foreign policy priorities, were emphasizing on Moscow’s improved relations with ‘near 
abroad’, with a scope that included Iran. Therefore, even in the early 90’s that Russia’s 
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foreign policy had a “strong pro-Western tilt” due to its Atlantisist approach; still a 
reasonable degree of relations with Iran was maintained. “Iran’s low-key reaction toward 
the first Muslim insurgency in Chechnya (1994-1996) and toward Russia’s pro-Serb and 
anti Muslim policy in Bosnia in 1993-1995 helped cement relations further.”(Friedman 
2002: 66-69) 
Following Rafsanjani’s efforts for improving diplomatic relations with Arab neighbours; 
with focus on encouraging the GCC countries to enter into a regional security alliance with 
Iran; an important signal for such conciliatory efforts came in December 1991 GCC summit 
affirmation to “lend momentum to bilateral relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
the service of common interests….” (Ramazani 1992: 402) Yet, these positive gestures 
never went as far as Iran was hoping for. The US vehement objection to inclusion of Iran 
in the Persian Gulf security arrangements; concerns of member countries about Iran’s 
aspirations to become a dominant regional player, and the conflict over the three islands 
with the UAE, were among the reasons for GCC not to enter in a security pact with Iran. 
(ibid)  Iran’s disappointment in reaching a regional security arrangement became a 
hindrance in further development of relations with these countries.  
To survive the threats of a world dominated by a hostile superpower, Iran also took 
initiatives to improve relations with European countries. Following the 1992 declaration of 
Edinburgh’s European Council, which stated EU’s interest in holding “Critical Dialogues” 
with Iran, seven rounds of critical dialogues between Iran and the European Community 
helped improving bilateral relations, particularly in trade and economy. However, upon the 
German court’s decision about the involvement of Iranian officials in Berlin assassination1, 
European ambassadors were recalled and dialogues were suspended. As Halliday has 
argued (1994:326) despite Iran’s enthusiasm to improve relations with Europe its initiatives 
“were not sufficient to overcome the international isolation in which Iran found itself, or to 
address its growing impasse”.  At the end of the day, the best outcome of those efforts was 
the coexistence of hostility with trade and diplomatic initiatives, and “limited prospects of 
normalization.” (ibid) 
US hostile approach towards the Islamic Republic did not change much in response to 
Iran’s considerable efforts in rationalising its foreign policy approach and performance.  
The Clinton administration passed the Iran-Libya Non-Proliferation Act in 1992 and in 
                                                          
1 The Mykonos case 
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1993 established the ‘dual containment policy’ against both Iraq and Iran “with the 
objective to isolate these regimes politically, economically, and militarily.” (Rakel 
2007:172) The 1995 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), prohibiting investment in these two 
countries’ energy sector was an extension to this policy. Many European countries opposed 
and even acted against these sanctions. For example, in July 1995, the French-based oil 
company, Total and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) signed a deal for 
development of offshore oil and gas fields in Sirri. The EU threatened to complain to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) if Washington put ILSA into effect. (ibid: 171) 
Notwithstanding such objections, the sanctions left their undeniable marks on Iran’s image 
and conciliation efforts both internationally and domestically. Internationally, it created a 
psychological environment in which foreign investments in Iran appeared to be risky. 
Politically, whilst Iran was trying to improve relations particularly with Europe, the US 
managed to highlight issues regarding Iran’s support of terrorism, Human Rights violations, 
opposition to the Middle East peace process, efforts for acquiring WMDs, etc. Such profile 
would obviously resulted in distrust and damaged the profile Iran was trying to build as a 
rational actor. As Sajjadpour (2007:149-150) explains, the containment policy also had 
military consequences for Iran, as US managed to convince Europe to avoid selling arms 
and military or dual use equipments to Iran. Domestically, sanctions were used by hard 
liners as evidence against moderate pragmatists to prove that playing by Western rules and 
engagement with the West will only result in further pressure and increase efforts for 
regime change. 
As Rakel (2007:177) has concluded Iran’ foreign policy under Rafsanjani remained 
“generally Islamist-based, non-aligned, and pro-South.” Pragmatism was merely an 
approach and did reorient Iran’s foreign policy. 
 
3.3.3. Khatami’s Presidency (1997-2005) 
The 1997 election of Khatami to the presidency flourished hopes for reforms in several aspects 
including the foreign policy. While taking the presidential oath, Khatami introduced his 
conciliatory foreign policy by saying “My government considers dialogue between 
civilisations in the contemporary world essential, and will avoid any action or behavior 
causing tension…….. We will have relations with any government that observes our 
independence and sovereignty, meaning the decisions made within our national interests. 
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But we will resist any power wishing to exercise dominance over us... (and we will 
continue) to defend the rights of the Moslems and the oppressed, especially the Palestinian 
nation, and stand against the expansionism of the arrogant powers.”1 With that vision, 
‘détente’ and ‘confidence building’ through ‘rapprochement’ was at the core of his foreign 
policy, which not only “reinforced the non-ideological aspects of Rafsanjani’s foreign policy” 
but took further steps by “preaching compromise, rule of law and moderation. (Ehteshami 
2002:302) 
In executing his détente and rapprochement strategies, Khatami not only used the official 
foreign policy apparatus but managed to facilitate track II diplomacy, benefitting from the 
development of the ‘civil society’ that he was fostering. Many of the NGOs which were 
developed as part of the civil society during his administration established some sort of 
communications with their peers abroad. The same happened with scholars, academia and 
many other walks of the society. For the first time in decades, the international community 
could see beyond the official face of Iranians, which helped in the creation of mutual 
understandings and sympathy. This in turn helped in softening official international 
approach towards Iran.  Soon, positive responses came from all over the world, even the 
most unlikely countries such as Israel2 and Iraq.3 However, Khatami’s most important 
achievement in the first four years of administration was improving Iran’s international 
status and image, particularly with the EU. As a result, a few months into his administration, 
EU ambassadors who had left Iran following the Mykonos affair returned to the country. 
The gesture was reciprocated by Iranian diplomats; Iran-EU diplomatic relations were 
resumed. The new round of Iran-EU dialogues called Constructive Dialogues started in 
July 1998, discussing important topics in bilateral relations, as well as regional and 
international issues. 
Moreover, the ghost of Rushdie fatwa which was haunting Iran’ relations with Britain for 
years, was laid to rest following Khatami’s initiative in assuring the British government 
that Iran does not intend to take any actions for implementing the fatwa. (Sabet Saeidi 2008: 
63) Full diplomatic relations with Britain were resumed following the 1998 meeting of 
                                                          
1 Mid East Mirror, 1997, Mohammad Khatami’s Third Republic?  4th August [online] Available at: 
<http://www.nexis.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/search/newssubmitForm.do>  (Accessed on 30.08.2015) 
2 For further details see Agance France Press report of 29th August 1997, Israel Mulling Repayment of Debt to Iran as 
goodwill gesture. Available at: <http://www.nexis.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/search/newssubmitForm.do> (Accessed on 
14.07.2015) 
3 For further details see Agance France Press report of 9th August 1997, Iraq urges Iran to Respond to Saddam's Appeal 
for Friendship. Available at: <http://www.nexis.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/search/newssubmitForm.do> (Accessed on 
10.06.2015) 
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foreign ministers of the two countries in New York. For the first time since the revolution, 
reciprocal visits between Iran and EU’s most high ranking officials were exchanged1. 
Notwithstanding the immense pressure from domestic hardliners, each one of these visits 
not only had remarkable effects in improving Iran’s image but also resulted in considerable 
trade and economic deals and financial agreements. 
As some analysts have suggested Russia’s willingness to improve relations with Iran 
further, was in the face of concerns over the possibility of Iran-US rapprochement which 
particularly was quite strong during the first years of Khatami’s administration. Khatami 
took the first step in this direction by proposing in his 1998 CNN interview, for the 
exchange of writers, scholars, artists, etc. between the two countries with the purpose of 
creating a “crack in the wall of mistrust”2; emphasising that “all doors should now be open 
for such dialogue and understanding and the possibility for contact between Iranian and 
American citizens”.3 The most obvious US gesture for rapprochement was Albright’s 
March 2000 speech, which offered an apology for the role that the US had played in 1953 
Coup. “The Clinton Administration and Congress later eased sanctions to allow U.S. 
exports to Iran of food and medical supplies and importation from Iran of goods such as 
carpets and caviar.”(Katzman 2002: summary) 
These positive gestures remained futile when Iran’s supreme leader refused to accept the 
offer for dialogue without some tough preconditions for the United States including formal 
withdrawal of support for Isreal, lift of various sanctions imposed on the country, ending 
various accusations and stopping the official policy of considering Iran a rogue state that 
sponsors terrorism; and US administration refused to comply with those demands. An 
unrepeatable opportunity was missed so hesitantly that in his 2004 press conference 
Khatami declared his regret of the fact that “the Islamic government did not use the 
opportunity offered by the Clinton Administration.”4  
Khatami’s proposal to declare the 2001 as the year for “Dialogue among Civilizations”, not 
only “bestowed much respect upon Iran and its president” (Ehteshami and Zewiri 2011: 
xv), but also provided yet another chance to build a respectable international image for Iran. 
                                                          
1 i.e. Italy’s prime minister visited Iran in 1997 and in 1999 President Khatami visited France and Italy. 
2 Transcript of interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (January 1998), Available at: 
<http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html>  (Accessed on 20.03.2011) 
3 ibid 
4 Khatami Regrets Lost Opportunity for Normalization of US-Iran Relations (2004). As quoted from Radio Farda 
Newsroom on <http://www.payvand.com/news/04/aug/1282.html> (Accessed on 18.05.2011) 
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As Sajjadpour (2002:157) explains; attractive conceptualisations such as dialogue among 
civilisations had an effective role in disarming many anti Iranian elements. This ability 
together with proactive foreign policy and a successful public diplomacy were among the 
factors which resulted in the failure of US containment policy and brought about relative 
success for Iran at that period. Nonetheless, the unresolved US-Iran animosity prevented 
Tehran from completely breaking its international isolation, or to have an even hand in its 
relations with different countries. 
 
3.3.3.1. Post September 11th Foreign Policy 
Before fully adjusting to realities of the post Cold War era and finding its right place in the 
evolving international and regional system; Iran was faced with a new era brought about 
by September 11th events and rapid consequent developments. As the US president 
announced a black and white policy of ‘either with us or against us, an immediate global 
polarisation was shaped and evolved in a short span of time. “NATO unanimously invoked 
article five of the North Atlantic Treaty, which describes an attack on one member as attack to 
all.” (Burke 2011:27) Soon, other important international actors such as China and Russia who 
were also concerned over the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and militancy joined in 
supporting the US cause. (Hunter 2010:5) 
During the first post Cold War decade US had behaved mostly as a “conservative hegemon” 
with the principle goal of maintaining its supremacy and preventing the emergence of 
another regional or global competitor, acting cautiously on its transformative impulses. 
Therefore even the ultimate goal of regime change in countries branded as ‘rogue’, like 
Iran, Syria, Iraq and Libya was mainly pursued through a policy of isolation and 
containment. September 11th events provided the Bush administration the required 
justification for “pursuing an idealistic and transformative foreign policy that included the 
use of force.” (ibid)  
Iran’s sincere state and public response to the shocking events, from Khatami’s strong 
condemnation of the act, to the youth candle vigils sympathising with the American people, 
did not help much in distancing the country from the political crusade that the US had 
started. Neither did all the tacit help and support that Tehran provided for the US to uproot 
Al-Qaida from Afghanistan and to establish an allied backed government. More important 
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than the search and rescue missions for finding stranded US pilots, was the political support 
that Iran provided for allies to reach a positive outcome during the Bonn summit. “(Iran) 
used its longstanding influence to persuade the leaders of the Northern Alliance to sign the 
Bonn Accords in December 2001, in which the main Afghan political factions agreed on 
the formation and makeup of an interim post-Taliban government under Hamid Karzai. 
This agreement was essential to US-led efforts to overthrow the Taliban.” (Rajaeei 
2004:166) 
Iran’s accommodationist approach continued despite serious concerns over US military 
presence in its immediate neighbourhood. The logic was that since Iran’s claims about 
Taliban’s threats have proved right, its good gestures will not only help in eradicating the 
Salafis’ threat on its borders, but would eventually result in a degree of confidence building 
required for rapprochement with the US and playing a greater regional role. The hopes were 
crushed with Bush’s 2002 Statement of the Union address in which Iran was declared as part 
of the ‘Axis of evil’. The statement “very publicly humiliated Khatami …making mockery 
of his ambition to build bridges with the West.” (Ansari 2007:47) As Maloney (quoted by 
Salvin 2012) has explained “the dialogue that existed on Afghanistan was the single 
unparalleled opportunity to create a diplomatic process with Iran since the 1979 Islamic 
revolution.” Such great opportunity was spoilt not only by Bush’s speech but also by his 
administration’s continuous ignorance towards any subsequent Iranian initiatives, including 
the proposal to assist in training of 20,000 new Afghan army recruits which was offered only 
2 months after the ‘Axis of evil’ speech, or the agenda for comprehensive negotiations sent 
to the State Department in May 2003, and the same year’s proposal to trade senior Al-Qaeda 
detainees for members of MKO1 in Iraq, etc.  
Iran’s re-emerging alienation from Europe as a result of the Post Sep.11th regional and 
international realignment around the US war on terror, and lack of “any meaningful allies 
to rest on for international support and protection” left it vulnerable under increasing 
international pressure. (Ehteshami 2004:186) The second Gulf War and the fall of the 
Baathist regime, though eradicated the threat of Iran’s vicious neighbour and regional rival, 
created a more complicated dilemma. Already branded as part of the axis of evil, and under 
pressure for permanent suspension of its nuclear activities; Iran was challenged by 
American client states constituting a larger realignment affecting Central Asia and the 
                                                          
1 Mojahedine Khalgh Organisation (People’s Mojahedin Organisation) 
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Caspian basin to the detriment of Iran’s long term interests; and completely encircled “by 
a pro-US security belt comprised of Kuwait, Turkey, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
and Iraq.” (Afrasiabi & Maleki 2003:25) 
Facing with such security dilemma, Iran’s political atmosphere started a gradual but 
extensive securitisation, resulting in a more robust, less flexible approach. The first signs 
of such evolvement appeared by principalists winning the control of the parliament 
(Majles) in which “Iran’s much heralded agreement to suspend its uranium enrichment and 
sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to the NPT was dismissed …..as irresponsible and 
irrelevant.” (Ansari 2007:47) The strong open criticisms and accusations with which the 
Iranian negotiating team was faced despite the supreme leader’s prior firm support during 
negotiations and the fact that in such crucial issues of national interest, no agreement could 
have been made without his full confirmation, was tip of an iceberg which surfaced fully 
by the 2005 victory of Ahmadinejad in presidential election. As his last executive act, 
President Khatami ended the self-imposed suspension of uranium enrichment. (Ehteshami 
& Zewiri 2011:143)  
As explained by Azghandi (Quoted by Haji Yousefi 2010:5-6) Iran’s foreign policy 
developments during Rafsanjani and Khatami “required Iran to accept the dominant order 
of international relations, to respect international rules and principles, to attempt for 
creating peaceful coexistence with other countries, particularly cooperation with the 
neighbouring and European countries….”. As the outcomes of such approach was 
undermined by the post September 11th negative atmosphere, conservative elements of the 
state who objected the aforementioned approach vociferously, found ample evidence to rest 
their case, which in turn provided opportunity for their rise to power.  
 
3.3.4. Ahmadinejad’s Presidency (2005-2013) 
In a survey undertaken regarding Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech, Heradestvit and Bonham 
(2007:421) concluded that the “metaphor had an impact on political discourse in Iran and 
strengthened the rhetorical position of conservatives vis-à-vis reformers by reviving 
militant revolutionary language with the Great Satan as the main target of the theocratic 
and conservative forces.” The metaphor was interpreted as Bush’s declaration of a crusade 
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against the three mentioned countries1 and resulted in further securitisation of the 
international system against Tehran, exacerbated by the Iraq war. The public perception 
was that the US would attack Iran after settling the post war Iraq, and that prospect was so 
offputting that could justify policy adjustments and strategies to prevent it. As Yafe 
(2008:40) has explained, the threat of a prospective US occupation was perceived by 
Iranians as “not just a threat to the Islamic Republic, (but) a threat to 2500 years of Persian 
history and modern Iranian nationalism”. 
Iran’s significant domestic response to securitisation of international politics came with 
Ahmadinejad’s administration “dominated by the security apparatus and an agenda largely 
driven by the political paranoia of the revolutionary era”. (Ehteshami & Zewiri 2011: 141) 
Ansari (2007:45) explains that while moving away from ‘dialogue’ and emphasis on 
confrontational policies towards the West was at the heart of principalist’s foreign policy; 
their strategy for keeping in power had “three components: political and economic 
populism, repression and the sustenance of crisis in foreign relations.” Ahmadinejad 
effectively took a rejectionist policy reviving the anti Israeli, anti imperialist, pan Islamist 
notions of the immediate post revolutionary period with a strong flavour of messianic 
Shiism. According to his foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki; this policy included three 
main elements: (a) strong anti Western stand (b) diversification of international partners, 
(c) self reliance.2 
 
 Strong anti Western Stand 
The core of principalists foreign policy -whom Ahmadinejad posed as one- constituted a 
sustained robust and confrontational approach towards the West (Ansari 2007:46), based 
on the argument that the West and particularly the US have existential problem with the 
essence of the Islamic Republic due to its incompatibility “with the notion of international 
integration and collaboration”. (ibid) This approach though won Ahmadinejad the support 
of conservatives at home -at least throughout his first term- had disastrous international 
                                                          
1 Based on Bush’s remarks on 16th Sep 2001, when he said “This crusade.... This war on terrorism is going to take a 
while”, many analysts have reffered to consequenct various forms of aggressions towards other nations as his crusade. 
For example, look at page. 4 of Fayazmanesh, S. (2013) Containing Iran: Obama’s Policy of Tough Diplomacy, or 
Kracofe, C.A. (2009) George W.Bush and the Dark Crusade.   
2. Iran Foreign Policy: After 1 Year. Manuchehr Mottaki’s lecture at the roundtable held by Institute for Middle East 
Strategic Studies. Available at: <http://en.merc.ir/View/tabid/98/ArticleId/273/Iran-s-Foreign-Policy-After-One-
Year.aspx>  (Accessed on 15.01.2012) 
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consequences. Within months, the confidence that his predecessors had built with the 
international community over the years crumbled down like a sand castle. His blunt 
comments about wiping Israel off the map, “questioning the validity of the Holocaust” 
(Ehteshami & Zewiri, 2011:143) and suggesting to the West to make up for their crimes 
against Jews by giving away a part of their own land instead of Palestine, was followed “by 
a chorus of condemnation from across the world” (ibid), even the United Nations Secretary 
General and the Palestinian National Authority. Concerns over regional and international 
consequences of his actions resulted in his foreign minister being summoned to the 
parliament to answer for the relevance of his comments with the country’s national security 
and interests.1 However, the supreme leader’s full support of his approach2 proved that 
Ahmadinejad is not acting outside the framework approved by the supreme leader, who has 
the final say in such matters. It was also an evidence of increased divergence of views on 
Iran’s foreign policy among the key decision makers. 
Paradoxically, despite all his tough postures, Ahmadinejad was one of the most ardent 
advocates of direct negotiations with the US. (Maloney & Taykeh 2011: A35) Western 
analysts, who had always believed that Iran-US rapprochement would only happen when 
someone from the leader’s camp would govern the country, were optimistic that 
Ahmadinejad would be able to end decades of Iran-US hostility. His 2006 letter to George 
Bush was a clumsy opening to some kind of dialogue, which was snobbed off with the US 
administration’s refusal to respond.  
Listing Iran at the top of the 2006 US security concerns by the US global strategy document 
and allocation of funds to promote democracy in Iran, destabilise the country and bring 
about regime change are just some of the hostile signals sent to Tehran, resulting in further 
securitisation of the country (ibid). While repeatedly rejecting any form of dialogue 
between the two countries without Iran unconditionally giving up all its nuclear activities, 
the Bush administration was “the active leader of a Western policy towards Iran that 
combines economic sanctions and threats of military intervention in an attempt to influence 
Iran’s national and foreign policy”. (Rasmussen 2009:5) 
                                                          
1dpa German Newsagency. (2007) Ahamdinejad’s Foreign Policy Under Fire in the Parliament. Available at: 
<http://rawstory.com/news/2007/Ahmadinejad_s_foreign_policy_under__01232007.html>  (Accessed on 29.02.2012) 
2. Klinghoffer, J. (2009) Khamenei Stands by Ahmadinejad’s Foreign Policy. Available at: 
<http://politicalmavens.com/index.php/2009/06/09/khamenei-stands-by-ahmadinejads-foreign-policy/>  (Accessed on 
29.02.2012). Khamenei reportedly said:  “I do not accept the sayings of those who imagine that our nation has become 
belittled in the world because of its commitment to its principles, this path will continue until final victory.” 
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Based on Obama’s criticism of the Bush administration’s policy towards Iran and his 
promise for a different approach, hopes were raised that he would adopt a different 
approach towards Iran. An analysis of Obama’s comments and statements regarding Iran, 
particularly his 2008 speech in the AIPAC annual conference1 in which he introduced Iran 
as “the greatest strategic challenge to the United States and Israel”2 indicates that there was 
initially no considerable difference in his attitude towards Iran from that of the Bush 
administration. However, it should be kept in mind that domestic and international 
pressures coming from Israel and the Arab allies of the US who demanded time limits for 
negotiations with Tehran or their concerns on the extent of the potential US-Iran 
rapprochement created serious obstacle for Obama’s first administration in taking 
constructive diplomatic steps. While the confrontational voices coming from Tehran had 
already created a sense of threat; Iran’s nuclear ambition and the post 2003 regional 
geopolitical shift in favour of Tehran had intensified the atmosphere of power rivalry, 
reflected in both obvious and clandestine efforts by regional countries to undermine Iran’s 
influence. As Hunter (2010:70) has explained; Secretary Clinton and “other US officials 
made it clear that improving ties with Iran cannot and will not come at the expense of US 
relations with its Arab allies, who expressed anxiety over possible US-Iran reconciliation.”  
Obama’s 2009 Nauruz message to Iranian people and leaders, expressing conditional “US 
extended hand”3, received a cautious response by Iranian officials including the supreme 
leaeder who stated that “if the United States changed its behaviour toward Iran; Iran would 
also change its behaviour toward America”. (ibid: 70) However, before reciprocal positive 
gestures can get the two countries to any significant milestone; Iran’s post presidential 
election upheavals blocked the way for any further improvements. Throughout the whole 
second term of Ahmadinezhad, the situation was so tense that the question was not ‘whether 
a military confrontation between the US and Iran would happen’; but was ‘when and how’ 
it would happen.  
On the other hand, EU countries that prior to Sep.11th events had maintained their relations 
with Iran independent of US policies, started “to routinely mimic Washington’s concerns 
about Iran’s ‘three sins’ (Human Rights violations, support of terrorism, nuclear 
                                                          
1 Just a few days before his nomination for presidency by his party. 
2 Transcript: Obama’s Speech at AIPAC. (2008) Available at: 
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91150432>  (Accessed on 01.08.2012) 
3 Providing that Iranians would “unclench their fist” and “accept some real responsibilities”. 
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proliferations) at every encounter with Iranian officials.”(Ehteshami 2004:192) While 
Ahmadinejad’s bellicose comments created a deep crack in the shaky foundations of Iran-
EU trust, the nuclear standoff helped the US and its allies to securitise ‘Iran related’ issues 
and build a consensus against the country in the West. In his speech after Western sanctions 
were imposed on Iran’s Central Bank, Ahmadinejad called Europeans as puppets and the 
US as their puppet master, elaborating that like impotent servants, Europeans immediately 
repeat what their master says.1 
On one side, Iran accused the West led by the US of trying for the regime change by various 
means from inflaming public discontent, and supporting irredentism in minorities to 
crippling sanctions and constant threat of war. The West, on the other side, accused Iran of 
developing nuclear technology beyond civilian purposes and moving towards achieving 
military capabilities. The nuclear standoff had practically obstructed any outlook for Iran-
West reconciliation. 
 
 Diversification of International Partners  
Ahmadinejad’s administration pursued a policy of diversifying partners in order to curb 
increasing US efforts to further isolate Iran perhaps more seriously, and definitely more 
vocally than his predecessors. His provocative comments could be interpreted as a seriously 
miscalculated measure to build some form of union against a common enemy (Israel) in the 
Muslim world, which of course back fired. “For the first time in many years Tehran was finding 
itself distant from both its Arab and non-Arab Muslim neighbours.”(Ehteshami & Zweiri 
2011:143) Though his comments and postures captured the attention and admiration of the 
public in the Muslim world, they were antagonised by various forms of political structures, 
regionally and internationally.  
Iran also made considerable efforts in building alliances with Latin America, exploiting the 
existing populist and anti US trend in the region. Although post revolutionary Iran has 
already had longstanding and robust bilateral ties with countries like Cuba and Venezuela, 
the relations with the region increased significantly during Ahmadinejad. Within four years 
of his first administration, “Iran opened six new embassies in Latin America including 
                                                          




Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, in addition to the five 
embassies already in operation – Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico and 
Venezuela.”(O’Conner & Sheridan 2009 as cited in Stubits 2009:10) 
According to a report by the International Monetary Fund “trade between Iran and Latin 
America tripled between 2007 and 2008, rising to $2.9 billion—almost half of which was 
between Brazil and Iran.” (Quoted by Romero 2009:41)  
In its active quest for allies in Latin America; Tehran was more looking for political support 
than economic relations. (Farhi 2009:25) Nonetheless, trade and economic relations with 
those countries could provide a degree of relief from ever increasing international sanctions 
bending on crippling Iran’s economy.1  
This increased attention towards Latin America was domestically portrayed as part of 
Tehran’s ‘aggressive foreign policy’ touted by Ahmadinejad as opposed to his 
predecessors’ ‘passive’ policy in the face of hostile policies of other countries. (Farhi 
2009:25) Ahmadinejad’s candid statement was an evidence of Iran’s effort to give the US 
a taste of its own medicine; “when the Western countries were trying to isolate Iran, we 
went to the U.S. backyard.”2 
Another aspect of the diversification initiative was the ‘East look’ policy, based on the 
assumption that “moving towards the East is less risky than building relations with the West 
with its hegemonic tendencies.” (Ehteshami & Zewiri 2011: xiv) Russia and China are the 
two most important Eastern countries that Iran focused on expanding its relations with. “As 
major world powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council, both nations are 
essential to either inhibiting or shielding Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions.”(Fite 
2011:3) 
Common characteristics facilitate the relations between Iran and the aforementioned 
countries. All three have been great empires in the past, and have gone through major 
revolutions with international consequences. Their shared anti West/US hegemony 
sentiment is not only essential in creating better retrospective understanding of foreign 
                                                          
1 For example as Morgenthau (quoted by Farah 2009:18) has pointed out “Hugo Chávez’s decision to allow the 
establishment of Iran’s Banco Internacional de Desarrollo (BID) in Caracas provided Iran with a ‘foothold into the 
Venezuelan banking system’, ‘a perfect sanctions busting’ method”. 
2 Press Tv. (2009) Ahmadinejad Defends Presence in US Backyard. Available at: 
<http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/96234.html> (Accessed on 10.04.2012). 
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policy dilemmas, but also offers the prospect of an alliance which can “offset the 
geopolitical dominance of the US. The three countries seek the construction of a multi-
polar international system. Central to this arrangement is the control of oil and gas 
resources.” (Ahari as quoted by Jun & Lei 2010:51) This prospect becomes more realistic 
at times of increased discontent between Chin/Russia and the United States. For example 
as China’s relations with the United States became tense following the US intervention in 
China’s maritime disputes with her neighbours; in May 2014 China’s President called for 
the creation of “a new Asian structure for security cooperation based on a regional group 
that includes Russia and Iran and excludes the United States.”1However, “the ties that bind 
China and Russia to Iran are primarily based on opportunistic assessment of the costs and 
benefits of partnership. Leaders in Moscow and Beijing are principally concerned with the 
security and prosperity of their nations, and they will pursue international relationships 
from that standpoint.” (Fite 2011:4) Iran’s relations with these two countries have been on 
a very pragmatic terms with no ideological baggage, preconditions or even extreme 
reactions to the fact that in several occasions both countries have caved in under the US 
pressure and voted for imposing further sanctions on Iran in the Security Council. This 
pragmatic approach has paid off to some degree. “In 2005, Iran was granted the observer 
status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Organization, which is 
dominated by China and Russia, often espouses views which challenge US leadership in 
the global system. Iran’s position in the SCO places the Sino-Iranian relationship in a 
multilateral framework and seriously undermines US-led attempts to politically isolate Iran 
for its suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons.” (Fite 2011:9) 
However, Tehran’s asymmetric economic and political reliance on these countries has 
developed so deep that one can argue that Iran’s extreme measures for ‘nor West’ has 
resulted in ‘just East’ policy.2 Moreover, as many analysts have pointed out, with their 
opportunistic approach China and Russia are exploiting Iran’s unfortunate circumstances 
to their own interest. Therefore, the relations will only survive as long as the acquired 
benefits by China and Russia through Iran would outweigh the value of their relations with 
the West particularly the US. 
                                                          
1 CBS News. (2014) China Calls for New Security Pact with Russia, Iran. Available at: 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-calls-for-new-security-pact-with-russia-iran/>  (Accessed on 26.09.2014) 
2 As in contrast to the ‘neither East, nor West’ policy, that had been the cornerstone of Iran’s post revolution foreign 
policy for many years. 
101 
 Self Reliance 
Although the nuclear programme has been mainly portrayed by the Islamic Republic as a 
symbol of resistance to the Western sponsored world order, and as a proof of Iran’s strategic 
threat to the international community by the US and Israel; it can also be viewed as a 
measure of self reliance. In addition to the bitter experience of the 8 years war with Iraq in 
which Iran learnt that no one will scratch its back, the absence of any meaningful alliance 
and reliable strategic partnership based on mutual interest and respect has left Iran with no 
other option than self reliance, and a focus on science and technology development 
particularly in security sector, as a major avenue to this end. “Self reliance…. runs deep in 
the Islamic Republic and, if Iran’s sense of isolation continues to deepen its siege mentality, 
then it would be logical for it to look at nuclear option even as a tactical pawn.” (Kori & 
Yaphe as quoted by Ehteshami 2004:193) While investment on technological 
developments had been initiated by previous administrations; it was conceptualised and 
vocally portrayed as part of self reliance policy to justify the nuclear development project 
by Ahmadinejad’s administration. Tehran’s emphasis on the “country’s right to peaceful 
use of nuclear technology, know how, and power” (Ehteshami & Zewiri 2011:145) within 
NPT framework, while faced with increased international isolation and hostility may be 
better understood if this outlook is added to Iran’s ‘Western resistance’ approach. 
As Leverett (2010) has argued, based on Wikileaks documents, the Obama’s first 
administration was not actually looking for a solution to Iran’s nuclear dilemma; instead, it 
was looking for a “pivot to pursue crippling sanctions on Iran”.  Therefore when Iran 
requested the IAEA to help in providing Uranium for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), 
and Brazil and Turkey offered to mediate, the administration judged that “if the United 
States continued to insist on certain conditions in any prospective arrangements to refuel 
the TRR, it could effectively guarantee that Tehran would never accept a deal”; (ibid) 
driving Iran to pursue Uranium enrichment of 20% and significantly increasing the number 
and improving the technology of centrifuges. 
This in fact provided justification for the US to intensify its efforts on moving the 
international community towards more punitive sanctions on Iran. (Hunter 2010:75) 
Moreover, the United States and Israel undertook parallel paths to sabotage Iran’s nuclear 
programme and slow down the progress. These efforts included infecting nuclear facilities 
with Stuxnet virus (Langner 2013), preventing the shipment of dual use or required 
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materials for nuclear development projects, the assassination of Iran nuclear scientists, etc. 
The situation became more critical when in Nov 2011 the IAEA reported that accumulated 
intelligence from ten governments suggested that Iran was secretly working on nuclear 
weaponry. Consequently, “four resolutions have included progressively expansive 
sanctions to persuade Tehran to comply. In addition to four rounds of UN expansive 
sanctions; EU and the United States have imposed additional sanctions on Iranian oil 
exports and banks since 2012.” (Forgwe 2015) 
 
3.3.5. Rouhani’s Presidency (2013-Present) 
Iran’s “petroleum exports, which provided about 85 percent of government revenues, 
declined to about 1.5 million .... in 2012 from about 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011.”1 
The currency devaluation had reached over 60% by October 2012, and the economy was 
on the verge of hyper inflation due to a combination of severing international sanctions, 
deep rooted corruption and gross mismanagement of the economy by the government. 
Hence, quite understandably, the most important concerns of the electorates from different 
factions and levels of the society were the economy and foreign policy particularly the 
unresolved nuclear dilemma.2  
Rouhani won the June 2013 presidential election on the platform of ‘prudence’ and ‘hope’, 
with an immediate focus on the resolution of the nuclear dilemma and economic 
development through various means including sanctions relief.  
In his inauguration speech, President Rouhani outlined the framework of Iran’s foreign 
policy under his administration: 
“The administration will try in its international interactions to increase national and 
regional security through mutual trust between Iran and regional and international 
countries. Transparency is the key for establishing trust. Détente, creation of mutual trust 
                                                          
1 2014 Index of Economic Freedom. Available at: <http://www.heritage.org/index/country/iran> (Accessed on 
20.03.2014) 
2 The fact that during the pre election televised debates between the eight presidential candidates, the performance and 
achievements of Iran’s principle nuclear negotiator, who was a candidate himself, were criticised one way or another by 
all other 7 candidates was a reflection of the widespread disenchantment with the path and direction that Iran’s foreign 
policy, particularly the nuclear negotiations had taken. 
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and constructive engagement will lighten up our path. I openly emphasize that Iran has 
never been looking to fight with the world. We direct all our efforts to restrain hawks and 
warmongers…. The only way for interaction with Iran is dialogue on an equal stance, 
confidence building, mutual respect and reduction of enmities…. I openly announce that if 
you want an appropriate response, then talk with Iran not with the language of sanctions, 
but the language of reverence.”1 
In a paper published in May-June 2014 issue of the “Foreign Affairs”, Iran’s Foreign 
Minister Javad Zarif elaborated Iran’s foreign policy under the new administration “based 
on achieving understanding and consensus at the national level and constructive 
engagement and effective cooperation with the outside world. Iran’s policies will be guided 
by the principles of dignity, rationality, and prudence.”(2014:8) He has then explained 
Iran’s key goals, pursued through its foreign policy. The first outstanding goal is to “expand 
and deepen its bilateral and multilateral relations through meaningful engagement with a 
wide range of states and organizations, including international economic institutions…. 
Multilateralism will play a central role in Iran’s external relations. That will involve active 
contributions to global norm-setting and assertive participation in coalitions of like-minded 
states to promote peace and stability.”(ibid) Another key goal is to “continue to support the 
cause of oppressed people across the world, especially in Palestine, and will continue its 
principled rejection of Zionist encroachments in the Muslim world.”(ibid: 9)  
Summing up Rouhani’s statement together with his foreign minister’s paper, it can be 
concluded that Iran’s foreign policy principles have remained the same as all other post 
revolutionary periods. The approach for achieving the key goals has, however, changed 
from confrontational to détente and dialogue, the same approach which was initiated by 
Rafsanjani and widely promoted under Khatami’s administration. This change of approach 
which was manifested internationally by Rouhani’s speech at the UN general assembly was 
welcomed by most countries, and his phone conversation with Obama signaled the potential 
to end to decades of Iran-US stalemate and the positive resolution of the nuclear standoff. 
Just two months in taking the office he achieved relative success towards one of his most 
urgent aims described by Zarif as “to diffuse and ultimately defeat the international anti-
Iranian campaign, spearheaded by Israel and its American benefactors, who seek to 
‘securitize’ Iran—that is, to delegitimize the Islamic Republic by portraying it as a threat 
                                                          
1 Riāsat Jomhūrie Eslāmie Iran. (2013) Matne Kāmele Sokhānāne Dr. Rouhani dar Marāseme Tahlif. Available at: 
<http://www.president.ir/fa/70145>  (Accessed on 01.01.2014) 
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to the global order.”(ibid) Iran’s new team of nuclear negotiators headed by the foreign 
minister managed to strike a historic deal in July 2015 to much dismay of the world’s hawks 
from US Senate to Iran, Israel and some Persian Gulf countries. Despite heavy criticisms 
from radical conservative factions, the supreme leader demonstrated his support for 
Rouhani’s approach, in general, and the negotiating team in particular throughout the 
negotiation process. His support was quintessential in containing the damage that radical 
groups could have inflicted on the progress and the outcome of negotiations. 
Within days of striking the final deal with 5+1, Tehran was hosting political and economic 
delegates from all over the world, particularly Western countries such as Germany, France, 
and Italy, who were negotiating for business and investment in Iran. 
 
 
3.4. Conclusions  
In order to provide an understanding of the context in which Iran’s relations are shaped, 
this chapter has provided an account of Iran’s foreign policy before and after the end of the 
Cold War. Following a brief review of imperial Iran’s foreign policy; the chapter has 
mainly focused on Iran’s post revolution foreign policy. It has initially explained the role 
of invariable determinants such as geopolitical factors in defining the foreign policy. Then 
by using constructivist theory of international relations, has described how the change of 
state identity as a consequence of the Islamic revolution resulted in structural and cultural 
changes which brought about foreign policy transformation due to evolved worldview and 
role assumption. The establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran not only changed the 
course of Iran’s foreign policy but created such serious challenges for the international 
system both at regional and global level that no major actor could afford to remain 
indifferent or ignorant towards it, making Iran a determining factor in domestic policies of 
many countries. (Halliday 1991:3) 
Through review of different post revolution periods, the chapter has demonstrated that 
Iran’s foreign policy is based on two pillars of ideology and pragmatism. Whilst the 
ideology defines the principles, the pragmatism drives a rather complex game to insure the 
survival of the state. A continuous interplay of domestic and international factors defines 
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the weight of ideology and pragmatism in foreign policy decision making. An examination 
of different approaches taken towards the grand foreign policy rule of “neither East nor 
West”, in different periods has provided an insight to the above fact.  
As described in the chapter, during its first post revolution phase, Iran had a radical 
rejectionist foreign policy, with emphasis on the export of the revolution and support of 
freedom movements across the world, which resulted in isolation from the international 
community. In mid 80s, facing grave threats to its survival and learning from the harsh 
realities of the world politics, the country started to break out of its isolation and establish 
relations with other countries, yet insisting on its ideological manifestos both vocally and 
practically.  
With reconstruction and economic development as the main priority of the post war era, a 
more pragmatic approach was adopted and practical steps were taken under Rafsanjani’s 
administration, in order to reestablish relations with other countries and attract foreign 
investments. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union that left US as 
the only remaining superpower resulted in systemic changes in the international arena. “It 
brought to fore the importance of geopolitics, geostrategic instability and globalization in 
Iranian foreign relations.”(Ehteshami 2002:302) 
With a more proactive and stronger pace, the foreign policy trend set by Rafsanjani was 
continued under Khatami’s administration with a ‘détente’ and ‘reconciliation’ approach. 
While Rafsanjani’s prime goal was economic developments; Khatami’s focus was on 
political developments. As Suzhin (2006:152) had put it, “the efforts of Rafsanjani and 
Khatami and their associates furnished the country with an economic infrastructure that 
enables it to make a leap into the future.” According to him “in spite of certain 
controversies, mistakes and errors, the 16 years leadership between those two outstanding 
presidents was responsible for Iran’s real strengthening and evolution as a leading power 
in the Middle East.”  
However, the post September 11th dramatic developments created such hostile and 
securitised the environment around Iran, which not only frustrated its efforts and hopes for 
building constructive relations with other countrie, but also exacerbated Tehran’s siege 
mentality which resulted in securitisation of its politics and empowerment of 
neoconservative elites represented by ascendance of Ahmadinejad to presidential office. 
106 
Iran’s new uncompromising foreign policy posture particularly with regard to its nuclear 
profile; left Tehran once again isolated and challenged with increased security concerns. 
The ideologist essence of Iran’s foreign policy manifested and practiced in different forms 
of anti Israel; anti US alliances left its conciliatory efforts for confidence building and 
integration in the international community rather futile. In addition to post 2003 
geopolitical developments which have increased regional power rivalries; the nuclear 
standoff resulted in further punitive sanctions and mounting pressures leaving the country 
on the verge of economic collapse and under serious threat of military attack. This critical 
situation required an urgent reevaluation and adjustment of foreign policy approach for 
paving the way towards fruitful negotiations aiming at resolving the crisis instead of just 
buying time. 
Rouhani’s administration put once again into effect the ‘détente’ and ‘confidence building’ 
policy which had in the past helped Iran to establish and benefit from a positive relationship 
with the world. The immediate outcome of this policy was the reduction of securitised 
environment against Iran, and reaching a final nuclear deal in negotiations with world 
powers. 
As demonstrated by this review, “despite its revolutionary zeal, and reputation for non-
conformity and defiance since the revolution, it can be argued that revolutionary Iran has 
always been a rational actor in the classic realist mold. Even some of its excesses can be 
seen as calculated risks or opportunist responses to difficult situations. Looking back at the 
post Khomeini era, one cannot help but be struck by how normal, largely non aggressive, 
and pragmatic Iran’s foreign policy has been since 1989.” (Ehteshami 2002: 284) While 
“the challenge for Iranian policymakers…. is to build Iran up as a bridge between East and 
West, not as the exclusive domain of any world’s individual power blocks” (Mafinezam & 
Mehrabi 2008:84); increased international pressure and isolation has moved its foreign 
policy from the initial ‘neither East nor West’ towards a ‘more East’ direction. However, 
this may change, as a result of relative repprochment with the West following the 2015 
nuclear deal between Iran and 5+1. 
Through the review of Iran’s post revolution foreign policy, the following conclusions can 
be drawn: 
 Throughout the three and half decades since the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic, Iran’s foreign policy principles have remained the same. These principles 
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include the rejection of the present international system, avoiding the hegemony of 
any particular power and striving to stay independent, rejection of ‘the Zionist 
regime’ and support of oppressed people.  
 Iran’s complex foreign policy apparatus which involves several state and quasi- 
state organisations has constantly tried to strike a balance between ideology and 
pragmatism to ensure independence and security of the state, through an extremely 
complex process.  
 While foreign policy principles are set by constitution; and the foreign policy 
apparatus and the framework is supervised by the supreme leader; the president and 
his foreign policy team have a pivotal role in shaping the foreign policy approach. 
The review undertaken in this chapter and a comparison of developments under four 
post-Khomeini presidents demonstrates how despite invariable principles and 
agencies, the character and world view of the president and his executive team 
(variable agencies) can affect the state’s destiny in the international arena. 
 As history has proved, so long as Iran refuses to accept the norms and realities of 
the international system and to play by the rules, it remains isolated, under constant 
threat and robbed of its most obvious rights and opportunities.  
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As it was argued in the introduction and demonstrated in chapter 3, Iran has a complex 
foreign policy, in which one can see both elements of change and factors of continuity 
and many inconsistencies. This chapter will examine regional implications of Iran’s 
foreign policy developments, both in the Middle East and in the South Caucasus.  
While Iran is also involved in regional developments of Central and South Asia, this 
chapter will only focuse on making a comparative analysis between its policies in the 
Middle East and that of the South Caucasus, as despite the existing common factors 
such as considerable energy resources, there is a more significant contrast necessary for 
facilitating a better comparison.  
In analysing Iran’s regional policy, some important ideational and geopolitical factors 
must be taken into account as they shape the dynamics between Iran and the regions in 
which it is a medium power and a major player.  
1. In both regions, Iran is one of the few countries which has never been officially 
colonised and managed to sustain its sovereignty throughout the history despite 
continuous foreign interventions. Being one of the few natural states in both 
regions and the fact that “nearly every one of Iran's neighbours sits on a land 
that constituted Iranian territory at one time” (Mokhtari 2005:210), has 
convinced Iran that it has the potential and interest to play a major role well 
beyond its borders. 
2. As explained in chapter 3, while Iran’s strategic location and its rich resources 
has made it an attractive target for great power rivalries throughout the history, 
the failure to secure its territorial integrity or prevent foreign interventions in 
the past, has left Iranians with an unhealed wound sensitive to involvement of 
the great powers in the neighbouring regions.1 Being located within or adjacent 
to penetrated systems, subject to high level of external intervention2 has 
exacerbated and can in part explain Iran’s approach in both regions, based on a 
                                                          
1 See also Ehteshami 2002:285 
2 For more details see Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2002: 2 
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“conspiratorial interpretation of politics and an obsessive fear of internationally-
orchestrated instability.” (Maloney & Takeyh 2008:4) 
The origin of factors shaping Iran’s regional policy, as Mesbahi (2010:176) has put it, 
is in “the Iranian penchant for projective ideational policy, a sense of mission and 
purpose, but also in the twin factors of geographical realities of being a linchpin-pivotal 
state, and the disproportionate impact of its relations with the US for the mega-regional 
complex of the Middle East/Persian Gulf/Eurasia.” 
Keeping the above factors in perspective, this chapter will demonstrate that since the 
end of the war with Iraq, Iran has pragmatically adopted a cooperative approach in its 
regional policies. In order to curb isolation and make up for its vulnerabilities in the 
face of the new international order and growing trend of globalisation, Iran has 
continuously emphasised on regionalism through the establishment of regional 
institutions which exclude outside powers, creation of closer co operations with 
regional countries and proposing development of regional security arrangements. This 
approach however has had decreasing effect in achieving Iran’s regional aims and 
objectives due to several reasons including deep seated mistrusts and rivalries, external 
interventions, and what Hunter (2010:172) calls “peculiarities of Iran’s foreign policy”. 
Since this study will provide further details of Iran’s bilateral relations with its South 
Caucasus neighbours in the next chapters; this chapter will only discuss issues at 
regional level with regard to Iran’s policy in the South Caucasus. The case of Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict will also be examined as a comprehensive example in which many 
aspects of Iran’s South Caucasus policy can be demonstrated. Iran’s Middle East policy 
on the other hand will be discussed in more details based on important political 
milestones such as different post revolution or post Cold war periods as this chapter is 
the only opportunity to review Iran’s policy in that region. Therefore, a significant 
difference between the structures and the level in which the two regions would be 
discussed can be noticed. 
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4.2. Iran’s Regional Policy in the Middle East 
While the Middle East has been the main focus of Iran’s foreign policy particularly 
after the Islamic revolution, Iran has been effectively a defining actor in the post 2003 
regional developments. Although Iran has always assumed an important role in the 
Middle East developments and sustained its goal “to be the dominant power in the 
Persian Gulf” since biblical times (Friedman 2011), this section will demonstrate that 
its post revolution policies have been considerably different from that of the Pahlavi 
era. 
 
4.2.1. Iran in the Middle East Security Complex 
As Buzan & Waever (2003:188) have explained; more than 20 states, many relatively 
equal in weight form the Middle East Regional Security Complex (RSC). Due to the 
number and dispersed geography of countries, the RSC has developed in three sub-
complexes, with the Levant and the Persian Gulf as the two main sub-complexes.  
The Persian Gulf sub-complex was formed less than a decade before Iran’s revolution 
and following Britain’s withdrawal from the area in 1971. “In recent decades the centre 
of gravity in the Middle East has shifted from the Levant to the Persian Gulf.” 
(Hokayem & Logrenzi as quoted by Chubin 2009:168) While the Persian Gulf energy 
resources which constitute nearly 70% of the world’s proven energy deposits are one 
of the main factors for the importance of this sub complex; the role it plays as a major 
transit route for the export of energy is also crucial for the global economy which is 
dependent on sustainable flow of energy from the region.    
In addition to having the longest Persian Gulf shore, “Iran is the largest, most populous 
and resources rich (except for oil) country in the region”. (Hunter 2010:187) 
Considering the aforementioned facts as well as the cultural and political influence 
which according to Tarock (1997:199) makes Iran’s importance in the region 
comparable to China in South East Asia or Germany in Europe; it is only logical to 
conclude that as a major regional player “Iran cannot be ignored or kept out of the 
political game, for what happens in Iran makes a significant impact not only on the 
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Persian Gulf but also on the Middle East as a whole. This was so under the Shah and it 
is more so under Ayatollah’s.” (ibid) 
 
4.2.2. Iran’s Middle East Policy in the Cold War Era 
More than two decades of Iran’s modern Middle East policy was shaped during the 
Cold War era, influenced by characteristics and imperatives of the bipolar world order. 
This section would review the two pre and post revolution periods of Iran’s Middle East 
policy during the Cold War. 
 
4.2.2.1. Imperial Iran’s Middle East Policy 
The post World War international developments as well as the oil revenue provided 
Iran with the opportunity and capability to gradually become a significant regional 
actor. Concerned with the possibility of the Soviet Union filling the vacuum resulted 
from the British evacuation of the Persian Gulf; in 1969 US called upon its allies “to 
accept a much larger share of the burden of their own defence against communism 
(Nixon Doctrine)”. (Milani 1994:331) US temptation to replace Britain in the Persian 
Gulf was challenged by Iran’s serious objection to any foreign intervention, despite 
Shah’s pro US tendencies. As Milani (ibid) has argued, the US desire for presence in 
the Persian Gulf goes back to 1960s, and Iran’s opposition to “an American military 
presence predates the establishment of the Islamic Republic”. Consequently, Iran took 
a more proactive policy in the region which could also guarantee Western interests 
without their direct presence.   
Using significant oil revenue gained from quadrupling oil prices, Shah managed to 
build up significant military capabilities and fill the vacuum quickly by establishing its 
hegemony in the Persian Gulf. It is important to bear in mind that US confidence in 
Shah as its own proxy in the Persian Gulf for insuring America’s interest was the only 
reason for accepting Iran’s superiority in the region. Even then US was trying to balance 
Iran’s power with the application of the twin pillar policy; though it actually relied 
primarily on Iran to perform the role of the ‘policeman’ of the Persian Gulf region, “as 
Saudi lacked the necessary population or military to play an important regional security 
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role”. Back then Iran was the main pillar of stability in the Persian Gulf. (Ramazani 
1979:826) 
Shah’s general Middle East policy was based on ‘détente’ and ‘diplomatic resolution 
of the conflicts’. As the security of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz was of 
vital importance for Iran’s trade and oil export; “on January 27, 1968, the Shah 
expressed Iran's readiness to cooperate with any littoral state to ensure the security and 
stability of the region.” (Nyrop 1978:236)  
While relations with small Persian Gulf littoral states was cordial; following the 
conclusion of “a continental shelf agreement regarding the seabed rights in the Persian 
Gulf” the relations with Saudi Arabia improved continuously. (ibid: 236-237) However, 
negotiations on joint security arrangements for the Persian Gulf did not bear any fruits 
due to trilateral rivalry between Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.  
According to Hunter (2010: 188-189); Iran’s relations with the Arab countries of the 
Middle East was a reflection of its relations with the West. “Before the revolution, Iran 
strengthened the position of pro Western governments, while its own security was 
undermined by radical Arab states” (ibid) due to tense relations with pro Soviet radical 
Arab countries. It was in this context that despite Saudi Arabia’s rivalry, Iran had 
friendly relations with this country and other Persian Gulf littoral states.  
For radical Arab regimes such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq; Iran was not only a rival for 
regional influence, but also a major obstacle for achieving their goals. Another bone of 
contention in relations with these countries was Iran’s political and economic relations 
with Israel, which was primarily based on a shared sense of ‘strategic loneliness’ and 
isolation between Iran and Israel. While Iran supplied 50% of Israel’s oil, it consistently 
“reaffirmed its position that Israeli forces should be withdrawn from territories 
occupied in the June 1967 war, including Jerusalem, that the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people should be reinstated, and that all parties in the Arab-Israeli 
confrontation should be guaranteed the right to survival.” (ibid) 
Iran’s relation with Iraq was normalised following the 1975 Algiers Accord which 
offered settlement of old border disputes, yet the pattern of power rivalry did not 
change. Although full diplomatic relations with Damascus was established after the 
1946 independence of Syria; the relations were not smooth, particularly due to Shah’s 
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refusal to take Syria’s side against Israel and supported Sadat’s conflict resolution 
efforts. (Maltzahn 2013: 18-21)  
The relations with Egypt which was unilaterally discontinued by Nasser due to Iran’s 
relations with Israel, was improved under Sadat. Shah supported Sadat’s negotiations 
with Israel and tried to encourage other Arab countries to choose the same path. Shah’s 
support of Sadat brought them so close together, that Egypt was the only country who 
warmly welcomed the ousted Shah and his family following the 1979 revolution.  
 
4.2.2.2 Iran’s Post Revolution Middle East Policy  
As discussed in chapter 3, the establishment of the Islamic Republic changed Iran’s 
political identity and system, which in turn resulted in a different world view, role 
perception and foreign policy. Rejecting the international system which is perceived to 
have given free hand to great powers for oppressing Muslims and robbing them off their 
resources; the new leaders of Iran perceived Islam as “the preeminent weapon for the 
world’s exploited people to use against great powers” (Bakhash 2003:248), and the 
Islamic revolution as the way to establish a system which would champion Islamic 
ideals. Based on this view they sought to export the revolution initially to the Middle 
East.   
To enlighten the masses in the neighbouring countries, Iranian leadership felt little 
compunction in publicly denouncing other Muslim heads of states as tyrants and corrupt 
leader(s) who have strayed from the Islamic path (ibid). Ayatollah Khomeini called the 
practice of Islam by pro Western governments as ‘the American Islam’. Iran saw itself 
as the master of ‘true Islam’, the protector of the ‘oppressed’, and the torch holder for 
the uprising of the Islamic Ummah. Therefore “since 1979, where geopolitics has 
mattered, Iran has added a religious dimension to its power projection ability…. Since 
the revolution, Islamic issues have emerged to affect Iran’s regional profile and its 
policies toward many of its neighbours.” (Ehteshami 2002:287)  
Insisting on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as an issue concerning all Muslims, the 
Islamic Republic provided strong rhetorical and material support for the Palestinian 
cause. By opposing to various peace talks and criticizing Arab leaders for their 
compromising approach, it made a great appeal among the Muslim public. “Iranian 
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leaders supported Islamic movements beyond their borders out of both conviction and 
calculation” (Bakhash 2003:249) as such support “served as means of projecting Iranian 
influence abroad and allowed Iran to create for itself a presence in Lebanon or to 
become a player…. in the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict.”(ibid)  
Tehran’s appeal among the Arab masses came at the price of deeper animosity and 
rivalry from Arab leaders, particularly Iraq which was looking for championing the 
Palestinian cause, Saudi Arabia which as the guardian of Muslim holy places, saw 
Muslim leadership as its own right, and Egypt which considered itself as the major 
player in the Arab-Israel negotiations. Each of these governments saw their roles being 
undermined by Iran. As such Iran was left “with only one major ally in the region and 
that was Syria.” (Ramazani 1989:210) Iran’s regional isolation during the 8 years war- 
which was extensively discussed in previous chapter- can be partly blamed on the above 
mentioned factors as well as Arab nationalism and the role of outside powers. 
 
4.2.3. Iran’s Post Cold war Middle East Policy 
The most obvious systemic change resulting from the end of the Cold War for the 
Middle East was as Halliday, (as quoted by Haji Yousefi 2006:61) has put it, the shift 
in regional alignments. As explained by the neorealist theory of international relations 
the change in the structure of international system would result in change in the 
behaviour of states due to creation of a new self help system. In the post Cold War new 
self help system, the allies of the former Soviet Union or those like Iran who had chosen 
to stay independent had a more difficult time for remaining independent or forging new 
alliances.  
As Buzan had suggested (1991:439) the effects of the post Cold War systemic 
developments was not limited to changes at the centre, or the centre- periphery 
relations, but had consequences for relations between periphery states as well. Hunter 
(2010:8) argues that, Iran’s significance as a bulwark which could prevent “Soviet 
expansion in sensitive regions such as the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Middle 
East” was eroded. Subsequently countries in the aforementioned regions, who were not 
concerned about the Soviet inroads anymore, “adopted a less cooperative and at times 
even a hostile posture towards Iran.”(ibid: 7)  
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Haji Yousefi (2007:65) on the other hand, believes that the most important implication 
of the collapse of the bipolar system in the Middle East was that the formal Arab allies 
of the USSR turned to US to guarantee their security; while Iran’s resistance was 
exploited by various countries as a stage to enhance their own regional position and 
value to the West. 
 
4.2.3.1. Rafsanjani’s Administration (1989-1997) 
Although “by the end of Iran-Iraq war, the Persian Gulf region had become more 
volatile, with no clear hegemonic force, but many rivals for the position” (Milani 
1994:337); the end of the war provided a more favourable environment for improving 
Iran’s regional relations.  
Since Rafsanjani’s main priority was economic development and this was only possible 
through the establishment of closer regional and international ties, “a more concerted 
attempt to mute the ideology and reinforce pragmatic strain in foreign policy came with 
Rafsanjani’s presidency in 1989.” (Bakhash 2003:252) Calculating that improved 
relations with the Persian Gulf countries would increase Iran’s influence in OPEC for 
higher oil revenue which was much needed for economic development; “Iran, the 
champion of radical changes in 1980s, became the advocate of regional stability.” 
(Milani 1994:336) 
After months of negotiations between foreign ministers, Iran’s relations with Saudi 
which were cut off after the Bloody Hajj1 were resumed in 1991. As an initial step for 
reconciliations with all GCC states; Iran also took forget and forgive approach towards 
Iraq’s major bankroller during the 8 years war, Kuwait. Emphasising on the 
commitment to regional stability and refraining from intervening in domestic affairs of 
the Persian Gulf States; Rafsanjani also befriended small littoral sheikhdoms, with 
Oman playing the role of mediator. (Milani 1994:339) 
Tehran’s approach to 1990-1991 American war for expelling Iraq from Kuwait was 
proof of its emerging pragmatism. While Iran was “the first Persian Gulf country to 
condemn Iraq and demand its withdrawal from Kuwait”, to ensure its national interest; 
                                                          
1 Explained in Chapter 3 
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Tehran opted for active neutrality. (ibid) The administration also used that war as a 
pretext to re-establish diplomatic relations with Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. These 
efforts paid off generally, except for Egypt which was reluctant to show any flexibility.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Kuwait war hopes were rising for development of 
some kind of regional security arrangement, which reflected Iran’s long term goal of 
maintaining regional security by littoral powers. However, Tehran’s hopes turned to 
concerns over the possibility of exclusion from such arrangements following the 
Damascus Declaration and Egypt’s strong opposition to Iran’s active involvement. (The 
Independent 21.02.1991, quoted by Rakel 2007) Iran was further disappointed when 
Kuwait and Bahrain signed separate long term security pacts with the United States, 
which provided the opportunity for the latter to contain Iran and isolate it from the 
international community in order to force it “to adopt a more accommodating foreign 
policy vis-à-vis the West and its allies in the Persian Gulf.” (quoted by Tarock 
1995:204-5) The Kuwait war had the most undesirable regional consequences for Iran, 
as it provided the opportunity for direct and extensive US presence in the Persian Gulf. 
Finally recognising the GCC’s lack of desire to form any meaningful alliance with Iran; 
Tehran reoriented its foreign policy and took a ‘de-Arabisation’ approach. “Iranian 
policy-makers stated that Iran should no longer focus on Persian Gulf countries if the 
latter were not willing to give up their American orientation. Iran should rather stress 
the importance of countries such as India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, those of CEA, and 
China, which were more sympathetic to Iran.” (Marschall as quoted by Rakel 2007: 
175)  
 
4.2.3.2. Khatami’s Administration (1997-2005) 
As explained in chapter 3, Khatami’s foreign policy was focused on ‘confidence 
building’ and ‘détente’. While Rafsanjani’s painstaking reconciliatory efforts had 
already paved the way for improved relations, Khatami’s sincere belief in ‘tolerance’, 
and ‘respect’ towards others reflected in his character and demeanor, had a great impact 
on improving Iran’s international image which consequently helped his ‘confidence 
building’ efforts.  
Making the best use of the opportunity arisen from Khatami’s chairmanship of the 
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Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC); efforts were made in mending the fences and 
reducing tensions with the Arab countries. The most obvious signs of improved 
relations came with the Saudi King Abdullah’s attendance in Tehran Summit. 
Rafsanjani’s February 1998 visit from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain provided the 
momentum for improving relations with the Persian Gulf countries. Relations with 
smaller GCC states, particularly Qatar and Oman improved and UAE became one of 
Iran’s most important trading partners despite territorial disputes over the three islands1. 
During Khatami’s May 1999 visit from Saudi, the two countries came to an agreement 
to reduce the negative affects of price fluctuations by stabilising oil prices through 
cooperation for output management in OPEC. These developments were followed by 
the supreme leader’s favourable message for stronger relations with Saudi Arabia which 
was reciprocated by an invitation, followed by reciprocal visits between the two 
countries’ Defence Ministers discussing the possibility of a security agreement.  
It is important to keep in mind that despite Khatami’s policy of ‘détente’ and ‘dialogue’, 
certain elements of Iran’s foreign policy including animosity towards Israel and support 
of groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, still continued, though 
with reduced intensity. 
Russia’s fall 2000 announcement for resuming arms sales to Iran and expansion of 
technological cooperation was another significant development in Iran’s regional 
relations. “The Moscow-Tehran alliance gained a new momentum following the official 
visit by (the) Iranian President ….  to Russia in March 2001, an event Khatami hoped 
would mark ‘a new spring’ in the two countries' cooperation.” (Jalali 2001:1)  In 
October 2001, Russia signed an agreement to sell Iran up to $300 million a year in 
conventional arms. (ibid) The arms deals and consolidation of relations were widely 
seen in Iran as strategic alliance in the face of mutual “national security challenges. 
However, since the ‘Treaty on Foundations & Principles of Cooperation’ merely stated 
that “if one side was subject of the aggression, the other side would not help the 
aggressor”, the relations stopped short of strategic partnership. (Hunter 2010:112) 
Just a few months into Khatami’s second term and while Iran was still adjusting to 
regional consequences of the end of the Cold War and US presence in the Persian Gulf; 
                                                          
1 There is a long term dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over strategic Islands of Abu Musa, 
Greater and Lesser Tunb. 
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the September 11th events and the following international developments once again 
altered regional patterns of alliance. 
Iran took a cooperative approach towards the US led alliance in Afghanistan hoping to 
achieve three goals of uprooting the Talibans from its eastern neighbourhood, 
developing stability in the region, as well as indirect and limited means of reducing 
tensions with the US. To this end, in addition to providing some logistic support such 
as search and rescue missions, Iran used its influence over the Afghan Northern 
Alliance to establish Karzai’s government. However, the US response to Iran’s good 
will was to brand it among the ‘Axis of Evil’. The domestic and international backlash 
for this negative development was discussed in chapter 3. Regionally, it triggered the 
sensitivities among neighbours and raised suspicions about Iran’s intentions once again. 
US hardened posture towards Iran emboldened Persian Gulf Arab countries for tougher 
stance towards Iran. 
Another regional development which could potentially make the situation even more 
difficult for Iran was the May 2003 ‘Road map’ for resolving the Palestine-Israel 
conflict, which among other plans, was supposed to create a Palestinian state by the end 
of 2005. If fully implemented, the road map could have “eventually open the floodgates 
to better Arab-Israeli relations, establishment of ties with Syria and Lebanon, and open 
diplomatic and economic relations between Israel and Iran’s (Persian) Gulf 
neighbours.” (Ehteshami 2004:191) 
Some experts believe that the key to Iran-US grid locked relation is Israel. While Iran’s 
positive approach and support towards US war on terror did not go unnoticed in 
Washington; “The underlying reality is that no matter what Iran does, unless it alters its 
attitude toward Israel .... no fundamental policy change in Washington will occur.” 
(Sariolghalam 2003:70) 
With Afghanistan still in turmoil, “Tehran had hardly had time to catch its breath when 
the fall of Baghdad in April 2003 caused an even bigger shake up on its western 
doorstep.” (Ehteshami 2004:187) Feeling encircled by the US presence in the Persian 
Gulf, the east and the west of the country, even Iranian public felt anxious about the 
next US move. There were assumptions that the encirclement is part of a bigger plan 
for war with Iran; while Iran’s rivals and adversaries were hoping that further 
developments in the neighbouring countries will reduce Iran’s regional influence and 
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bring gradual change both in Iran and in the region. The Persian Gulf states were almost 
sure that Iran’s encirclement by the US would contain the country and check its 
influence. However, regional developments did not exactly take the direction that these 
states were hoping for. 
While the immediate positive consequence of Iraq war for Iran was the overthrow of its 
arch regional enemy, further developments provided more positive outcomes for 
Tehran, as Iraqi oppositions who had spent decades of their exile in Iran returned to 
their country, bidding for influencial roles in the new Iraq. Iran “encouraged its closest 
allies—the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Badr Organization (ISCI’s 
former militia), the Islamic Dawa Party, and …. the Sadrists—to participate in politics 
and help shape Iraq’s nascent institutions. Tehran’s goal has been to unite Iraq’s Shiite 
parties so that they can translate their demographic weight (some 60 percent of the 
country’s population) into political influence, thereby consolidating Shiite control over 
the government.” (Eisenstadt, Knights & Ali 2011: ix) By doing so, Iran was trying to 
ensure the establishment of a friendly government who can sympathise with Iran’s 
grievances; to maximise its interest by exerting influence, and to limit damages 
resulting from the US military involvement in its neighbourhood; just like any other 
rational actor. While the Iraqi government tries to balance between the US and Iran’s 
demands; Tehran has clearly made the Iraqi leadership aware that it would “oppose any 
Iraqi-American security pact that would permit an extended US military presence in 
Iraq or allow US forces to monitor or attack Iran from Iraqi bases.”(Yaphe 2008:407) 
Nonetheless, while the ‘establishment of a friendly government has been an important 
issue for Iran; but its top priority has always been ‘Iraq’s relative stability’. This factor 
has been so important that in 2008 Yaphe (406) wrote “if Iran were forced to choose 
between a precarious Islamic state and a stable, united, secular state, it would almost 
certainly choose the latter.” 
Although capturing the Middle East security interdependence merely based on ethnic 
and religious terms, is an oversimplification (Buzan & Waver 2003:188), these two are 
among the most important factors formulating relations in this region. In addition to 
perception of regional countries; as Ehteshami (2004:188) explains, the fact that Iran is 
one of the few non Arab players among several Arab, largely Sunni actors has a bearing 
on Iran’s regional role perception and further complicates its status as the only non-
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Arab and Shiite state. The history has proven repeatedly that unless there is a deep 
rooted pre existing enmity between two Arab states, Arab nationalism takes precedence 
to any relations between Iran and any Arab country. The most obvious example is Iran’s 
relations with Syria. Syria was the only regional Arab country that stood by Iran during 
the Iran- Iraq war as its rivalry and enmity with Iraq took priority over its pan Arab 
tendencies. However, despite developments of its relationship with Iran to the degree 
of ‘strategic alliance’; throughout more than three decades of cooperation between these 
two countries, “Syria has never sacrificed its Arab connection for Iran’s sake. It has 
always supported Arab positions in their disputes with Iran, including the Islands 
dispute with the UAE.” (Hunter 2010:209) 
With such sensitivities towards Iran; the Arab countries of the region became seriously 
alarmed of Iraq’s developments for several reasons. The establishment of a Shiite 
dominated government in Baghdad holding close friendly relations with Tehran, as well 
as Iran’s increased influence in this country tipped the regional balance of power in 
favour of Tehran. There were also sectarian concerns about the rise of Shiites in the 
region and the threat that it could pose particularly to those countries with some Shiite 
population. “King Abdullah II of Jordan had already coined the term Shiite Crescent 
(al-Hilal ash-Shi’i) in an interview with the Washington Post in Dec 2004. He predicted 
that an alleged Shiite expansion would alter the traditional Sunni dominated make up 
of the Middle East, a creeping danger which might split up the Arab and the Muslim 
world.” (Broning, Hajiyousefi, Puelings & etal as quoted by Allul 2010:1)  
 
 
4.2.3.3. Ahmadinejad’s Administration (2005-2012) 
Despite Ahmadinejad’s serious criticisms of his predecessors and his vows for a return 
to the post revolution values, Iran’s regional policy did not change dramatically during 
his administration. With regional stability, cooperation and influence being top 
priorities, and the US presence in the region as a major concern; Iran’s policy under 
Ahmadinejad continued not only in the same direction but also with similar conciliatory 
approach, though with an aggressive posture. It was exactly this posture 
uncompromising posture particularly towards Israel, that alarmed the world. Negatively 
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affecting Iran’s relations with the Persian Gulf States; it provided perfect evidence for 
the US and Israel to prove Iran’s existential threat for the latter and its potential threat 
for the world security. 
“Despite a much less congenial atmosphere, Ahmadinejad’s government demonstrated 
great eagerness to expand relations with the Gulf Arab states.” (Hunter 2010:211) 
During his 2007 landmark visit for attending the annual GCC meeting and tour of GCC 
member countries, Iran’s proposals for development of a joint organisation for the 
Persian Gulf security system and an economic cooperation council were repeated. 
While the US failure in fully achieving its goals either in Afghanistan or Iraq caused its 
regional allies “to suffer a rather sharp deficit in legitimacy, a much buoyed Iran felt 
itself in a position to build important security, intelligence and military infrastructure 
in neighbouring countries.” (Hadian & Hormuzi 2011:18) Moreover, Ahmadinejad 
intended “to deflect Gulf states fears of Iran’s nuclear program….. and to reassure them 
about Iran’s intentions in Iraq”. (Hunter 2010:199)  
Nonetheless, increased concerns over Tehran’s growing influence in the region, 
encouraged regional countries to look for ways to become more active in Iraq’s 
developments and to contain Iran’s influence and prevent the formation a ‘Shiite 
Crescent’ in the region. In 2006 “a former security advisor to the Saudi King Abdullah 
was quoted saying that Saudi Arabia has ―the religious responsibility to intervene in 
Iraq because the country was ―the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the 
world's Sunni community.” (Terhalle as quoted by Allul 2010:1) 
In another development, Iran’s regional stature accentuated following Israel’s defeat in 
its 2006 attack on Hezbollah’s strongholds in Lebanon. During the 34 days military 
conflict with Israel which ended in Hezbollah’s acclaimed victory, Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guards Corps (IRGC) who had already trained highly qualified Hezbollah militia 
provided enhanced logistic and human support for their ally. Looking at Hezbollah’s 
achievements through the prism of Iran- Israel proxy war, this was yet another victory 
which demonstrated Iran’s outreach in the region. 
Before Ahamdinejad’s charm offensive and his proposal to Saudis for cooperation in 
stabilizing both Iraq and Lebanon gets anywhere, Israel’s December 2008 attack on 
Gaza and the consequent blockade which prevented Palestinians from access to basic 
humanitarian needs highly strained Iran’s relations with the Arab states. While Arab 
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officials took a passive approach towards the horrific Gaza events that shook the world 
and Egypt even cooperated with Israel in completing the blockade by closing the Rafah 
passage; Iran uncompromisingly and vocally supported Palestinians. This in turn 
increased public criticism of the governments in the Arab world for their passive 
approach towards Gaza. 
As Ehteshami (2009:1) has explained, “deepening its financial, political and military 
links with the essentially Sunni Palestinian rejectionist groups (Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad)”, has given Tehran new levers to pull at the heart of the Arab politics. This in 
turn has resulted in Arab government’s resentment of Iran’s interference in inter Arab 
affairs percieved as “Iran’s plan to dominate the Arab world”. The blunt statement by 
the Head of Egypt’s Foreign Committee that emphasised “Egypt would not tolerate the 
presence of an Iranian Islamic Emirate in Gaza” (quoted by Chubin: 2009); and some 
Arab states indication that “they would not attend the Arab Summit which was to be 
held in Doha if Qatar invited Iran to participate as an observer” (quoted by Hunter 2010: 
199)1; were clear manifestations of such resentment. 
Iran’s conciliatory efforts such as the foreign Minister’s 2009 visit to Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and UAE with the purpose of defusing tensions had only short term effects. 
While some GCC countries like Qatar and Oman continued to enjoy good relations with 
Iran; the downward spiral of relations with others such as Saudi, Kuwait, and Bahrain 
has continued ever since. US policies for building an anti-Shiite coalition focused on 
Iran in order to jump start the Arab- Israeli peace process and repeated talks of a US 
attack on Iran have been other important elements in emboldening Arabs to take a 
tougher stand towards Iran. (Hunter 2010: 200) 
Another important factor which has added “a new layer of authority” (Ehteshami, 
2009:2) to Iran’s increasing regional stature and consequently exacerbated negative 
feelings among its rivals was the ongoing nuclear development which was presumed 
by the West and its allies to have a military dimension. Insisting that the enrichment 
activities are only for civil and peaceful purposes; for years, Iran resisted increasing 
international pressure to suspend its enrichment project. “The quo dos from being an 
independent political, military and now scientific actor are in some ways immeasurable. 
                                                          
1 Entekhāb News, March 17, 2009 ‘Amr Moussa: Az Iran barāye hozur dar conferānce Doha da`wat nashodeh ast’, 
Available at: <http://ww.entekhab.org/portal/index.php?news=1750&print> (Accessed on 25.06 2013) 
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But they do reinforce the impression and image of a powerful Iran acting in its national 
interest on the international stage…. Iran’s apparent prowess has invited 
counterbalancing instead of band-wagoning and Iran’s pro-Western neighbours have 
chosen to draw closer to the US and seek protection from the West and also from India 
and China as a way of heading off Iran’s influence.” (ibid) 
The ascendance in Iran’s regional power has created an unprecedented development in 
the Arab- Israeli relations. The shared goal of containing Iran’s influence and outreach 
in the region has brought the two sides closer together in their quest for tougher 
international posture towards Iran.  
Economic diplomacy was an important dimension of Iran’s policy towards the GCC 
countries during Ahmadinejad’s first five years. “By increasing its volume of trade and 
investment with GCC countries, Iran was hoping to enhance its value to these countries 
as an economic partner. Aside from this deliberate policy, Iran was also forced to rely 
more on trade with GCC countries—the UAE in particular—as a result of the escalating 
sanctions.” (Habibi 2010:1) However, this strategy became futile in the face of 
increasing pressures particularly since Iran’s banking system became yet another target 
of punitive sanctions. Tougher international sanctions, as well as concerns over Iran’s 
growing regional influence, limited Iran’s economic relations with regional countries, 
particularly its main partner UAE. “In the past, GCC countries often exhibited a 
lukewarm attitude both toward international economic sanctions and with respect to 
possible military action against Iran’s nuclear program. While reluctantly going along 
with the UN-approved international sanctions (though the record varies from country 
to country), GCC countries generally refused to cooperate with unilateral U.S. 
sanctions.”(ibid) As of January 2010, some GCC countries, offered greater cooperation 
with U.S. efforts to isolate Iran economically, which resulted in a major setback in 
Tehran’s efforts for maintaining its ties with these countries.  
While the application of its soft power has been an important aspect of Iran’s regional 
policy, two important developments diminished the affects of this policy during 
Ahmadinejad’s second term. First was the 2009 controversial presidential election and the 
robust crackdown of mass oppositions to the results which presented a cruel anti democratic 
image of the Islamic Republic to the world, including the Muslim people. 
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Second, was Iran’s contradictory response to the uprisings in different Middle Eastern 
countries. Iran vocally supported the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Bahrain; 
even claiming that they have been inspired by Iran’s Islamic revolution. This in turn 
resulted in more concerns about Iran’s interference in domestic affairs of the Arab 
world. Following the events in Bahrain, where the Shiite majority called for reforms by 
their Sunni rulers, fingers were once again pointed at Iran, accusing Tehran of 
instigating Shiite opposition and interfering in her neighbour’s internal politics. This in 
turn resulted in Bahrain’s further band-wagoning with Saudi Arabia to a degree that 
Saudi troops were deployed to suppress demonstrators. There were even calls for 
Bahrain’s integration with Saudi Arabia in order to counter Iran’s threat, a development 
which was faced with Iran’s vehement objection. Subsequently, Bahrain became one of 
the battlegrounds for Iran-Saudi proxy war for influence. 
On the other hand, Iran took an exactly opposite approach towards the Syrian uprising 
as it threatened the Islamic Republic’s long term ally, the Assads. Since early 1980s, 
Syria has hosted the lifeline between Iran and the resistance groups in Lebanon and 
Palestine. This facilitated the formation of an axis of resistance in the Middle East, 
which has subsequently provided Tehran with a strategic depth right at the heart of the 
Arab world. Without Assad or a similar ally of the same weight Iran’s regional 
influence would decline and Tehran would lose a strong foothold in the Levant. 
Syria’s uprising with calls for comprehensive reforms rapidly evolved into a sectarian 
battle, with Iran openly and officially providing moral, financial, and military supports 
for the Syrian regime, while the Persian Gulf States such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
arm and support anti Assad  fighters. In other words, developments in Syria opened yet 
another front for Iran- Saudi Arabia proxy war. As the heavy crackdown of Syria’s 
uprising developed into what Bashar Al Assad officially declared in mid 2012 as a civil 
war with regional consequences; public opinion, particularly in the Arab world, turned 
against the Assad regime and its allies. This negative opinion became more sever 
towards Iran due to undeniable hypocrisy in Tehran’s approach towards uprisings in 
various Arab countries. These developments consequently perished Iran’s prospect of 
developing friendly relations with post uprising governments in the Arab world, 
particularly Egypt. Although there initially were positive signs which raised hopes for 
defrosting Iran-Egypt relations, Tehran received cold shoulder in response to its warm 
rapport towards Morsi’s government, apparently due to its support of the Syrian regime. 
130 
In other words, the post Arab Spring regional developments and Iran’s role particularly 
in Syria has undermined the umbrella image that the Islamic Republic had since the 
victory of the Islamic revolution made for itself as the guardian of the whole Muslim 
Ummah and downgraded its outreach to sectarian level. 
Graph 4.1, which demonstrates the results of a poll conducted by the Pew Research 
Centre with regards to Iran’s favorability rating in the Middle East reflects considerable 
decline in favourable views towards Iran in the Arab countries of the Middle East.1 
Another negative consequence of Iran’s policy in Syria was the breakaway of Hamas 
from the axis of resistance, as it refused to support the Syrian government. Hoping to 
find similar support from the Arab countries, particularly Egypt, Hamas external 
leadership who were hosted by the Syrian government for years, left the country in 
2012.  
To limit the damage and in order to be able to maintain some leverage in Syria in case 
Assad is removed, Tehran took some precautionary steps. On the one hand Iran and 
Hezbollah have built “a network of militias inside Syria to preserve and protect their 
interests in case President Bashar al-Assad’s government falls or is forced to retreat 
from Damascus….” (DeYoung and Warrick 2013) While these militias are fighting 
alongside Assad forces for now, “officials think Iran’s long-term goal is to have reliable 
operatives in Syria in case the country fractures into ethnic and sectarian 
enclaves.”(ibid)   
On the other hand, continuously emphasizing that the Syrian crisis should be resolved 
through national dialogue; Iran, has made several attempts in brokering deals through 
negotiations with more moderate factions of the Syrian opposition, despite being left 
out of internationally organised peace talks.2 Moreover, Tehran hosted a 29 nation 
conference in August 2012 as well as holding talks with some Syrian opposition groups 
in the same summer. Although, according to Ali Larijani, Iran’s Speaker of the 
                                                          
1 Pew Research Centre. (2014) Declining Rating for Iran in Middle East. Available at: 
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/06/18/irans-global-image-largely-negative/iran-report-6/> (Accessed on 
07.05.2015) 
2 According to a member of Syrian National Council’s executive committee, “as early as 2011, Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei sent three emissaries to Istanbul in late October to try to broker the deal. The Supreme leader has 
reportedly sought to coax the Islamist group into supporting President Bashar Assad in exchange for four high-
ranking positions in the Syrian government.” (Birnbaum 2012) The Committee however, refused to meet with 
emissaries and declared that as long as Iran supports Assad against the Syrian people they would not meet or 
negotiate with its representatives. 
131 
Parliament; little progress was made (Bozorgmehr 2012) Iran is still insisting on finding 
a political solution for Syria’s predicament. 
Graph 4.1: “Declining Ratings for Iran in Middle East”
 
 
4.2.3.4. Rouhani’s Administration (2013-Present) 
In a paper published in the first issue of Foreign Affairs after Rouhani’s election; 
Mohsen Milani (2013) predicted that the new administration will start delivering on the 
promise of bringing moderation and rationality to Iran’s foreign policy “with a charm 
offensive toward all of Iran’s neighbors, particularly the Arab states of the Persian 
Gulf”, which would include “reaching out to Saudi Arabia to explore the possibility of 
ending their lingering cold war and finding a way to manage their competition”. 
However, increased turmoils in the region proved that prediction to be easier said than 
done. 
The relations with the Persian Gulf countries initially seemed to take an upward slope 
with the two sides sending positive signals for each other. The September 2013 
appointment of Admiral Shamkhani, who is the most prominent ethnic Arab in the 
Islamic Republic’s state apparatus as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security 
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Council, was interpreted as a step for building bridges with the Arab neighbours. 
Similarly the removal of Prince Bandar Bin Sultan -who had time and again 
demonstrated clear anti Iran stance- from the head of Saudi Intelligence Services in the 
early 2014, was reported as King Abdullah’s positive step for mending fences with the 
Islamic Republic. Moreover, Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al Faisal1, invited Foreign 
Minister Zarif to attend the two day meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
in Jeddah in June 2014, though the latter was not able to attend as it coincided with yet 
another round of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. 
Relations with the smaller Persian Gulf countries seemed to pick up as well. Zarif’s 
tour of Persian Gulf countries2 in December 2013 opened the way for return visits by 
officials from these states. On March 2014 the first ever joint political committee 
between Iran and Qatar was convened in Tehran, discussing further development of 
bilateral ties with the purpose of bringing the two countries closer together and support 
of political dialogue, starting with extensive discussions about regional security issues 
in that meeting. Consequently, the two countries reached an agreement to cooperate for 
resolving Syria’s humanitarian crisis. (Osiewicks 2014:256) 
The already warm rapport with Oman demonstrated in the fact that Sultan Qaboos was 
“the first official guest” (ibid) of Iran’s appointed president after his inauguration; was 
furthered with Rouhani’s visit in March 2014; emphasising upon his departure on the 
importance that Iran attaches to its relations with “littoral states of the Persian Gulf and 
the Gulf of Oman due to significance of strategic Hormuz Strait”. (ibid) 
More important, was the landmark visit of the Kuwait Emir Sheikh Sabah, who “flew 
in at the head of a high-level delegation including the foreign, oil, finance, commerce 
and industry ministers.”3 The two sides signed several cooperation agreements 
“including a memorandum of understanding to coordinate their security efforts. The 
visit also focused on controversial regional issues, including Iran’s military 
                                                          
1 Also known to have unfriendly feelings towards Iran. 
2 Though avoiding Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. 




involvement in Syria, the situation in Iraq and Egypt, and the Middle East peace 
process.....”1 
This positive trend did not last long though. As the radical Salafi group ISIL which had 
gained momentum in Iraq and expanded into Syria, proclaimed worldwide caliphate in 
2014 and made significant advances in Iraq, capturing strategic areas and moving closer 
to Iran’s borders as well as Iraq’s centre; Iran-Saudi initial war of words turned to 
hostile actions while each side pointed the finger at the other. Tehran, which had 
continuously warned about the empowerment of extremist groups in Syria financed by 
the Persian Gulf states, accused particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia of helping the ISIL 
to ascend in the region; while Arab countries blamed Iran for its strong support of the 
Al-Mailki Shiite government in Iraq despite its highly discriminatory policies which 
had alienated Sunnis, pushing them into the arms of extremist groups. 
The rise of ISIL - recognised as a major threat to the international peace and security- 
in Iraq; created a serious security challenge for Iran due to its geographical proximity 
to its borders as well as deep enmity towards Shiites. In response to this challenge, Iran 
was quick into action, providing full political and military support to counter any further 
advances. While supporting transition of power from Maliki to Al Ebadi’s government 
in Baghdad; Iran has officially provided various Shiite and Kurd militias with supply 
of arms and equipments, training and strategic consultations. The involvement of Iran’s 
Qods brigade which was initially discreet and reportedly limited to advisory role 
became a significant factor in pushing back the ISIL advances; while the international 
coalition against the terrorist group, which also includes Arab countries limited their 
support to air strikes and provision of equipment and training for the Iraqi army and 
Kurdish militant groups. 
Iran’s enhanced influence in Iraq due to its direct involvement in countering the ISIL, 
parallel to the positive progress of nuclear negotiations exacerbated the concerns of its 
regional rivals further and the relations once again took a downward spiral, specially 
after the death of King Abdullah who had a relatively softer approach towards Iran and 
the coming to power of a more hardliner and hawkish King Salman in January 2015. 
                                                          
1 ibid 
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In September 2014, another development complicated the already tense relations 
further. “Taking advantage of Yemen’s fractured and weak government, the Houthis 
emerged from their northern base and seized Yemen’s capital, Sana, …” (Juneau 2015: 
5) As the Houthis who “rightly believe that the political order in Yemen has long 
excluded them and is dominated by Sana-based elite with no interest in giving them a 
greater say” (ibid) continued to advance into more strategic parts of the country; their 
ties with Iran provided the pretext for “overblown accusations that Tehran has taken 
over yet another Arab country”. (ibid) To contain Houthis further advances and offset 
Iran’s increasing influence in Saudi’s backyard; Riyadh, spearheading a coalition of 
nine countries started military intervention in Yemen in March 2015.  
Iran has so far stayed committed to its détente policy; vocally condemning military 
intervention in Yemen and offering a proposal for diplomatic resolution of the conflict, 
while providing humanitarian, advisory and possibly some financial aid to Houthis. As 
many analysts have argued, there is no evidence of Iran’s military or logistic support of 
the Houthis.  
While the policy has contained the escalation of Riyadh-Tehran tensions into military 
confrontation, with Yemen becoming another proxy battleground, rhetorical remarks 
from officials on both sides have become more confrontational. Iran’s Supreme Leader 
warned Saudis vehemently against their “crime” and “genocide” in Yemen, predicting 
that they will definitely lose their war with Houthis and “their nose will be rubbed to 
the soil”. (Abi Habib 2015) On the other hand, addressing a GCC Summit in Riyadh in 
early May 2015, Saudi King Salman “called on fellow Gulf leaders to stand up to Iran, 
saying there was a need to confront an external threat that ‘aims to expand control and 
impose its hegemony’, threatening regional stability and creating sectarian sedition”. 
(Vela 2015) 
The concerns of Iran’s rivals and adversaries became more overwhelming with 
finalisation of Iran’s nuclear deal, as it is effectively the recognition of Iran as a de facto 
nuclear state, providing Tehran with further prestige and enhancing its regional 
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influence. Moreover, “lifting of sanction will release tens of billions of dollars of frozen 
Iranian assets, allowing Tehran to meddle in the region even more”1.  
In yet another attempt for building confidence with neighbours, Foreign Minister Zarif 
visited 3 Perian Gulf countries in the immediate weeks after reaching the historic 
nuclear agreement with the world powers; and proposed for establishing an assembly 
for regional dialogue among Persian Gulf countries.2 
 
4.3. Iran’s Regional Policy in the South Caucasus 
The importance of South Caucasus for other regional and international players and their 
policies in this region was discussed in chapter 2. This section will focus on Iran’s 
interests and policies in the South Caucasus, starting with a brief historical review of 
regional developments since its separation from Persia. 
 
4.3.1. The South Caucasus: Separation from Persia, Autonomy under the Soviet 
As discussed in chapter 2, due to its sensitive geopolitical position at the crossroad of 
regional and global powers, throughout the history, South Caucasus has been the centre 
of many security developments particularly as its geographical openness has left it 
vulnerable to various armies and empires sweeping across the territory. (Sadri 2010:1) 
Although Iran has three millennia of shared history with the region; this study will 
discuss developments of post Russia-Persia wars of the 19th century. During the first 
round of wars, the Russian Tsar conquered the Persian Khanates of Shuragel, Sheka 
and Shiravan in 1804, Karabakh in 1805 and Baku in 1806. The Talysh Khanate went 
under Russia’s control in 1813. 
The second Russia-Persia war (1826-1828) ended in yet another painful chapter of 
Iran’s history as Abbas Mirza, the Qajar crown prince was forced to sign the 
                                                          
1 Financial Times (2015) Obama’s Hard Truth for the Gulf States on Iran, Available at: 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/79969e84-f8a2-11e4-be00-00144feab7de.html#axzz3aP76rPMA> (Accessed on 
16.05.2015) 
2 VOA. (2015) Pishnahāde Zarif barāye tashkile majma’e gofto guhāye mantaghe’ie keshvarhāye Khalije Fars 
Available at: <http://www.voanewsfarsi.com/content/iran-zarif-gulf/2896630.html> (Accessed on 24.08.2015). 
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Turkmenchay Treaty in order to contain further advancement of the Tsarist army 
through the Persian territory. Under the 1828 treaty, Persia’s rule over the South 
Caucasus was completely surrendered to Russia, leaving the Aras River as the new 
border between the two countries. The conquered territories gradually underwent the 
process of integration into the Russian Empire, first as the Transcaucasian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic, and later as individual Soviet republics with reengineered 
borders and demographics, as well as relative autonomy. (ibid: 9-10) 
 
Map 4.1: Persian Territorial Losses after Two Treaties with Russians1 
 
 
4.3.2. Iran & the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, could have been a blessing for Iran, as the threat 
of living in the immediate proximity of a superpower with a history of expansionist 
tendencies was eradicated. It created a new geopolitical situation on Iran’s northern 
borders with significant implications for its foreign policy. 
As already discussed in chapter 3, the post Cold War systemic changes both at regional 
and international level “activated a totally new set of dynamics” and “forced Iran, largely 
unprepared, to engage in unknown prospects or regional competitions, pressures and 
opportunities in the new Northern frontier”. (Mesbahi 2004: 109-110) While the 
eradication of the most important threat to Iran’s territorial integrity and stability, and 
                                                          
1 Availble at: http://www.iranpoliticsclub.net/maps/maps10/index.htm   (Accessed on 28.05.2015) 
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creation of an opportunity for Tehran to revive its historic ties with the Caucasus were 
the most significant positive outcomes of the Soviet’s dissolution; the negative 
consequences comprise a list including the followings:  
 The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the loss of a bulwark against further 
pressure and regional intervention from the West. While still a superpower, the 
Soviet Union was acting as a counterbalance to Western inroads, forcing a more 
cautious approach, especially if the subject of Western enmity was located in 
the proximity of the communist superpower. The collapse of the superpower 
and demands of the newly independent republics opened the region’s doors to 
presence and intervention of external powers that mostly had strenuous relations 
with Iran. 
 The “competitive dimensions of relations between the great powers and middle-
sized powers with the potential to become credible regional powers” was 
accentuated, leaving a war ridden Iran in fierce competition with other regional 
powers. (Hunter 2010:8) Consequently, the perception of some neighbouring 
medium powers towards Iran was changed. For countries like Turkey and 
Pakistan, Iran was no longer a partner against the Soviet inroads as it became a 
rival in the new system. 
 A stable powerful country with long history of statehood was replaced by 
several weak, unstable republics with little or no history of statehood. These 
new republics were facing domestic challenges such as nation-state building, 
legitimacy, economy, etc. as well as external challenges such as foreign policy 
approach, alliances, boundaries, conflict with neighbours, etc.  
To put it simply, a relatively sound and stable neighbourhood was turned into a 
completely unstable and conflict ridden region, posing serious threats to Iran’s 
security and stability.  
 The emergence of new Caspian littoral states created more shareholders and 
therefore rivals for the Caspian basin and resources which used to be under the 
shared ownership of Iran and the Soviet Union who were peacefully using the 




4.3.3. The Importance of South Caucasus for Iran 
According to Iran’s former Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi; “on the one hand due to 
civilizational, historical, cultural commonalities, and the fact that two of its three 
countries are Iran’s immediate neighbours; and on the other hand because of its 
particular geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic position, South Caucasus is of 
special importance in Iran’s foreign policy. Particularly, because due to several 
determining internal factors such as ethnic conflicts and border disputes, as well as 
external factors such as great power rivalries, the region has inherently more potential 
for destabilisation and tension”.(quoted by Moradi 2006: 38)  
The above remarks demonstrate the importance of the South Caucasus for Iran in three 
dimensions: 
1- Cultural-historical commonalities: The fact that the region used to be part of 
Persia’s sphere of influence for numerous centuries has created a particular bond 
between the South Caucasus and Iran. The remaining cultural commonalities 
strengthen this bond. 
2- Geographical location which bears geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-
strategic importance: While an extensive discussion in Chapter 2 has covered 
these aspects in general, one important issue for Iran is the access that the region 
can provide for Iran to north and east European markets. Likewise, Iran can 
provide access to the Persian Gulf for European countries. However, Iran has 
also been directly affected by policies of different players who have been drawn 
to this region exactly because of the aforementioned importance.  
3- Security and stability: Due to proximity of the region to Iran’s borders, any 
instabilitay and conflict can affect Iran’s security and in some cases internal 
stability. Likewise, security challenges faced by Iran can affect the security and 
stability of this small region. Furthermore, South Caucasus is the buffer zone 
between Iran and other regional and international powers. Their role and 




4.3.4. Iran’s Post Cold War Policy in the South Caucasus 
Frustrated with its strategic loneliness, Iran was hoping to build up close relations with 
the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. There were great 
expectations among many Iranian decision makers that “in the absence of superpower 
pressure, Tehran is better placed to create a new regional order in which Iran would be 
holding the balance of power”. (Ehteshami 2002:304) This ambition was primarily 
based on Iran’s natural bond with the people of some Soviet successor states due to 
geographical contiguity, as well as cultural and historic commonalities.  
Iran’s natural role as the key transit link between the Caucasus and the Middle East, the 
Persian Gulf and the open sea; and its political importance as an influential power in 
the Middle East and Southwest Asia, were among the elements which strengthened 
Iran’s self perception as a nexus and centre of regional economic and political activities. 
(Mesbahi 2004: 120-121)  
However, the aforementioned threats rsulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union 
were more immediate and real than hypothetical opportunities. The most immediate 
threat was various consequences of the Karabakh conflict, from refugee crisis, to spill 
over in Iran’s neighbouring provinces. Iran’s policy with regard to the Karabkh conflict 
has been discussed later in this chapter as an example of its priorities and policies in the 
South Caucasus. 
The presumed opportunities, however, turned out to be more wishful thinking than 
reality for several reasons. First, as a country which had just come out of an 8 years 
long war without any international support, Iran lacked the financial and technological 
resources that the newly independent republics needed to build their infrastructure and 
achieve economic development. Moreover, Iran was not the only neighbour who had 
the opportunity and desire for playing a greater role in the region.Turkey, was a 
significant rival, with much stronger economy and more advanced technology, while 
after just a few years, Moscow was on the rise again; claiming its place as the main 
regional power, whom others have to be watchful of. 
On the other hand, a significant part of what Iran perceived as an asset called ‘shared 
cultural and historical heritage’ with newly idependent Soviet repblics, was the Islamic 
culture, which was irrelevant to the Republics of Georgia and Armenia. The Republic 
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of Azerbaijan, Iran’s best bet in exploiting its religious connections for further influence 
in the region, was indeed the most secular republic among previously Soviet republics, 
where its first post independence president announced very early on that “we shall build 
a secular state”. (Khovratovich 1991) As it would be demonstrated later in this chapter 
and the next, all presidents of the Republic of Azerbaijan took a firm stance against any 
ideological influence by Iran. Far from becoming an asset in developing closer relations 
and spreading influence in Azerbaijan; religion became a bone of contention between 
the two countries and ultimately counterproductive.  
Furthermore, very soon, US involvement in the region, and its firm policy of 
‘everything without Iran’, rubbed Tehran off material opportunities, such as transport 
routs.  
With such landscape, Iran’s South Caucasus policy had to focus more on containing the 
threats, than exploiting opportunities. Developing regional stability and improving 
security both across the region and for Iran’s interests; while containing the threats 
emanating from the involvement of outside powers, particularly the United States, and 
their efforts to marginalise Iran, became Tehran’s main goals in the region. 
Iran’s objectives for achieving the above goals have been to: 
 Participate in conflict resolution initiatives. 
 Establish partnerships with regional countries through economic and cultural 
cooperation. 
 “Achieve a balance of power vis-à-vis other regional players” (Sharashenidze 
2013) 
 Establish delimitation plans which maximise Iran’s share of the Caspian Sea 
resources. 
Conflict resolution initiative was one of the main strategies undertaken by Tehran for 
improving regional stability. By pursuing this diplomacy, Iran was hoping to also limit 
external powers’ intervention, while enhancing its regional influence and leverage.  
During the reconstruction era which coincided with the demise of the Soviet Union, 
Iran effectively undertook a regionalist approach to counterbalance its vulnerabilities 
in the face of the growing trend of globalisation, hoping to facilitate its economic 
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recovery by “expanding trade and attracting investment through development of 
mutually beneficial state-to-state relations and integration into the global economy”. 
(Maleki 2009: 3) 
Development of economic and cultural ties with South Caucasus countries was 
considered as the most suitable step “for a general intensification of relations with the 
neighbouring countries, whose economies used to be oriented towards Moscow and 
inter republican trade of the Soviet Union.” (Mohsenin 174:2001) While such relations 
could provide new markets for Iran’s non- oil exports, as well as “potential suppliers of 
raw materials for its industries, and potential partners in economic cooperation of all 
kinds, particularly the energy” (ibid); it could become the foundation for closer 
cooperation and also increase Iran’s sphere of influence. Tehran’s efforts in evolving 
the RCD1 into a platform for regional integration by reviving the moribund organisation 
and transforming it into the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) and helping 
the newly independent Muslim republics of Central Asia and the Caspian basin to join 
the organisation was an important step in this direction. Several organisations which 
facilitate trade, communication and transport among member countries are established 
under the auspices of ECO, including a shipping line and an investment and 
development bank. However, as Dorraj and Entessar (2013:10-11) have explained in 
detail, notwithstanding Iran’s enthusiasm and efforts in championing ECO, significant 
obstacles have reduced the success of the Organisation. The economic vulnerability of 
member states, which is more due to mismanagement, widespread corruption, and lack 
of sophisticated infrastructure, is a major impediment for ECO’s success. Moreover, 
the “political and ideological divisions, especially between Iran and the ECO’s 
increasingly neo-liberal and pro-Western Eurasian states, will continue to hamper 
robust and meaningful cooperation among the organization’s members.”(ibid: 11)2  
Despite Tehran’s continuous emphasis on self reliance and exclusion of extra regional 
powers; major regional players lacked sufficient economic, technological and financial 
resources to fully support the needs of the newly independent states. Consequently 
                                                          
1 Regional Cooperation for Development 
2 According to ECO 2014 Statistics report, Iran has had the lowest share of intra-regional trade of merchandise in 
2011 (p.51). None of the ECO countries are among Iran’s 5 top export destinations. Available at: 
<http://www.ecosecretariat.org/in2.htm> (Accessed on 24.04.2016) According to ECO forecasts Iran’s share of 
total regional trade turnover by 2030 is unlikely to exceed more than 5%. Available at: 
<http://www.ecosecretariat.org/in2.htm> (Accessed on 24.04.2016) 
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Western countries who were able to offer substantial investments in developing security 
and infrastructure were welcomed by new republics; creating a situation in which 
“Iran’s strategic predicament (was) not shared by any of its regional neighbours”. 
(Herzig 2012: 505-506) Therefore, “Tehran's interest in using regionalism to exclude 
the United States or assert its own leadership role has often been counterproductive 
when it comes to engaging neighbouring states in cooperation.” (ibid: 505) 
The existing hostility between Iran and the United States has been a major factor in 
shaping Iran’s regional relations. While increased Western penetration of the region 
was of major concern for Iran and preventing such development a top agenda; Tehran’s 
nightmare came true with the Caspian oil boom in the early 1990s, followed by the 
expansion of US presence in the region. Consequently the South Caucasus became “one 
of the newest fronts in US-Iranian competition”. (Cordesman 2013: VI)  
The ideological nature of Iran’s political system provided the best ammunition for 
Western public diplomacy apparatus to raise concerns about Iran’s influence in the post 
Soviet space, particularly in Muslim countries. Before Iran’s sustained pragmatic 
approach which kept a low profile on ideology and gave priority to regional stability 
and cooperation surprises the world, continuous propaganda about Tehran’s intention 
to export the revolution had taken its toll and pushed regional countries into a defensive 
mode. 
Taking major steps for further penetration of the region based on the Silk Road Strategy 
Act1; US effectively undertook a policy of isolating Iran and preventing the country 
from reaping the benefits of its strategic location, network infrastructure and resources 
in the region by total exclusion of Iran from development projects. Iran could have 
provided “the pivotal route in and out of Azerbaijan” (Karagian 2002:167) which would 
have been “strategically very advantageous” due to “extensive network of ports, 
highways and roads along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea” as well as “an 
extensive pipeline network for crude oil and natural gas and many well equipped ports 
on the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman”. (ibid) The Iranian route was 
also “the safest option for the long term export of Azerbaijan’s oil”. (ibid) However, 
based on US strategy of ‘everything without Iran’, other players were eventually 
convinced to avoid the Iranian route at all costs. According to Johnson (2001:21) “Iran 
                                                          
1 Introduced in Chapter 2 
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could have developed into a key state for the export of Caspian gas ….. had not the 
USA maintained its policy of isolating it internationally and effectively locked it out 
from influence in the Caspian region.”  
Moreover, to keep US happy, regional countries maintained a cap on their level of 
relationship with Iran, while some played skillfully with Iran card for increasing their 
value to the West. This situation in turn has had two important results regarding Iran’s 
regional relations. First and foremost, it has enhanced Iran’s Russio-centric policy. 
Furthermore, “the character and range of Iran’s relation with Central Asian and 
Caucasian countries has become dependent on the latter’s and not Iran’s priorities and 
objectives”. (Hunter 2010:172) In other words despite their smaller size and population, 
and much smaller resources, these countries set the terms and defined priorities and 
character of their relationship with Iran. If it wasn’t for the West’s determination to 
contain Iran’s influence through isolation which consequently limited the country’s 
options, Tehran should have been the determining player in bilateral relations. (ibid: 
173) 
Iran’s isolation has not only limited its success in achieving economic and political 
goals in the region but has deserted it from a powerful stand in the Caspian demarcation 
negotiations to reach a domestically convincing legal regime. The Caspian Sea, is the 
world’s largest inland body of water and “contains great fishery resources, including 
90% of the world’s stock of sturgeon, as well as vast oil and gas deposits in the subsoil. 
It is crossed by important transportation routes connecting Europe and Central Asia.” 
(Janusz 2005:2)  
The emergence of new littoral states following the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted 
in the dispute over the legal regime of the Sea and corresponding mining rights. 
Numerous rounds of negotiations have been held over the years, “the five countries 
(have) agreed not to operate exploration and extraction projects in the disputed sectors 
of the Caspian Sea before its legal regime is finalized. The countries could recover 
hydrocarbon only in their own sectors of the Caspian coasts.” (Beheshtipour 2014)  
Various proposals for dividing the Sea between the littoral states based on historical 
treaties and different approaches towards the nature of the Caspian have been put 
forward. Tehran initially argued that the Caspian is actually the largest lake in the world, 
and not a ‘sea’ as it is landlocked. Hence, the international Law of Seas cannot be 
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applied to determine the legal rights of littoral states, proposing the Soviet-Iranian 
Treaties of 1921 and 1940 as a governing regime until the five littoral states jointly 
devise a new legal framework. This meant the division of Caspian surface and shared 
ownership of the seabed which contained minerals, as otherwise by dividing the 
Caspian based on “the prevailing median (or modified median) line approach to 
delimitation, Iran would have by far the smallest share of undersea access rights.” 
(Blum 2003:618) The shared ownership would have given Iran the chance of more 
benefit from the Caspian hydrocarbon resources. The plan could also prevent or at least 
limit the presence of Western powers based on “the twin principles of condominium1 
and consensus”. (Mehdiyoun 2000:183) 
As Azerbaijan adamantly opposed the ‘shared ownership’ proposal and Russia’s 
position on the Principle of Condominium kept altering according to developments in 
its relationship with Western countries, Iran became further isolated in the region. 
Tehran officially announced on Sep 1998 that it accepts the principle of sectoral 
division, on the condition that a single division scheme would be applied to both surface 
and the seabed. “In addition, Iran has argued that such a division must be equal (i.e. that 
each littoral state’s share must be 20 percent of the waters and the seabed).” (ibid: 184)  
After more than two decades of negotiations, the five Caspian bordering countries have 
managed to achieve certain progress, “admitting the possibility of applying the principle 
of sectoral sectioning on the Caspian Sea.” (Kapyshev 2012:25) What convinced Iran 
and Russia to accept the principle of sectoral division was not the compelling legal 
arguments of their opponents, but the domestic and international forces of politics that 
left them with no other viable options.  
The prolonged negotiations have resulted in some agreements considering important 
issues. In 2003, the littoral states signed their first agreement called the Caspian Sea 
Environmental Convention in Tehran. During the second summit of the Caspian littoral 
states in 2007, agreements were reached about fishing and shipping in the Caspian Sea. 
“An important outcome of this summit was that the five Presidents agreed in their 25-
point summit declaration that their military forces are not aimed for use to attack any 
of the parties" and that "under no circumstances they will allow for their territories to 
be used by other states. The five leaders appeared united in preventing the US from 
                                                          
1 To put it simply condominium is the shared sovereignty of two or more states over a territory. Shared ownership. 
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undertaking military action from bases in any of the Caspian littoral states.” (Katz 2008) 
In 2010 a military and security treaty was signed by the five countries in Baku and in 
2014 a political declaration by presidents of all five countries set out “a fundamental 
principle for guaranteeing stability and security, namely, that only the Caspian littoral 
states have the right to have their armed forces present on the Caspian”. The declaration 
implicitly rules out any future possible deployment of NATO forces in the basin.1 
(Dettoni 2014) 
Table 4.1 has provided a summary of two different approaches to the status of the 
Caspian Sea and their legal implications. 
 
Table 4.1: Caspian Legal Status Alternatives2 
Classification Applicable regime Effect 
Sea 
United Nations 
Convention on Law of 
the Sea 
(UNCLOS, 1982) 
- Coastal states have 'territorial sea', breadth not exceeding 
12 miles, and continental shelf. 
- Territorial seas do not extend 'beyond the median line 
every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points 
on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
seas of each of the two states is measured.' 
- Land-locked states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 




governing border lakes 
- Border states regulate use of water through international 
agreements. 
- Each state has exclusive rights over resources and water 
surface in its national sector. 
- Lakes can be delimited several different ways, such as 
by coastal line or median line. 
Sources: UNCLOS 1982, Chatham House 2005 
Caspian Legal Status Alternatives 
 
Iran’s approach to the South Caucasus became even more cautious in the post 
September 11th era. Tehran has “toned down its rhetoric, and even been willing to 
engage in issue-area negotiations with the United States in Geneva. Such stylistic 
alterations do not reflect shifts in Iran’s threat perceptions …… but do signal calculated 
                                                          
1 For 2014 Caspian Summit Statement see Appendix 4.1. 
2 US Energy Information Administration. Overview of Oil and Natural Gas in the Caspian Sea. Available at: 
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=csr>  (Accessed on 11.05.2015) 
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adjustments to a new regional and international environment.” (Sariolghalam 2003:69) 
However, the adjustments did not stop US containment efforts towards Iran, if anything 
the nuclear dilemma added a new justification for mounting regional as well as 
international pressures.  The 2012 blunt remarks of the then US Undersecretary of State 
for Central Asia and Caucasus which stated that “consistent with America’s sanctions 
on Iran, the United States is encouraging all of the countries of the region to avoid trade 
and other transactions with the government of Iran in order to pressure Iran to engage 
with the international community about its concern about Iran’s nuclear program” (Witt 
2012) was a clear manifestation of significant exacerbation of a policy which was 
already in place since the end of the Cold War. 
Nonetheless, Tehran has used every window of opportunity to forge closer relations 
with regional countries. A significant example of such approach is Iran’s closer relation 
with Georgia following the 2008 five days war with Russia. As Georgia became further 
under pressure by Russia’s sanctions and rising gas prices; Tehran extended the hand 
of friendship, providing Georgia with gas supplies, thus relieving the pressure. 
Subsequently, Iran’s relation with its Western oriented neighbour was developed to the 
level of visa free regime just when Iran’s international isolation had intensified.  
As tensions over Iran’s nuclear dilemma increased, and Israel threatened to attack Iran, 
the South Caucasus was being contemplated as a viable platform for carrying such 
attack. While these small countries worried about the consequences of potential war for 
them, Iran was concerned that either Azerbaijan or Georgia, may let their air or land be 
used by adversaries to carry out military attacks. 
 
4.3.4.1. The Case of Karabakh: Conflict & Mediation 
Background on Conflict 
Among several ethno territorial conflicts which have been going on since late 1980s, 
the Karabakh conflict has been of particular concern to Iran primarily due to its shared 
borders with the war zone, as well as geopolitics of the conflict which has involved 
extra regional players.  
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While most historians and analysts consider the ‘divide and rule’ policy of Stalin as the 
root of the conflict, a thorough examination of the history reveals that the foundations of 
this conflict were laid down by Tsar in late 19th century, when Moscow started the 
integration campaign of the Persian conquered territories into Russia. During this period 
due to their shared Christian religion, Armenians established a close relationship with the 
Russians, and “were settled by the Russians in territory inhabited by Azeri populations, 
leading to conflicts between Christian Armenians and Muslim Azeri Turks”. (Sadri 
2010:10) Then in the 1920s and 1930s Stalin carved out the borders of the Soviet 
republics precisely in a way to make them “weak and vulnerable, and to cut off local 
ethnic communities from each other”. (Nygren 2010:14) 
The autonomous status of the Nagorno-Karabakh with large Armenian population had 
left both Azeri and Armenians dissatisfied, as the Azeris considered Nagorno-Karabakh 
their own territory and Karabakh Armenians were looking for unification with their 
brethrens in Armenia. “Conversely in Armenia, Azeris were moved from their homes 
and relocated to Azerbaijan.” (Sadri 2010:11) The ethno territorial tensions between the 
two ethnic groups which were simmering for decades; was being managed within the 
confines of the Soviet Union, though with every change of government calls for the 
change in the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh were renewed by Armenians. 
The conflict resurfaced during the Soviet Perestroika, as the controls were relaxed. In 
February 1988, the legislative assembly of Nagorno-Karabakh with the majority of 
Armenians “passed a resolution demanding freedom from the Azerbaijan SSR and 
status under the jurisdiction of Armenian USSR.” (Nuriyev 2007:163) The call was 
rejected by the USSR Supreme Council which endorsed Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over 
Nagorno-Karabakh. To contain the secessionist movements in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Azerbaijan authorities appealed to Moscow for granting equal autonomy to 
Azerbaijanis in Armenia. The call was faced with the brutal reaction of Armenia who 
violently expelled Azeri’s. Azerbaijan reacted by withdrawing the autonomous status 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh which was followed by further violence from both sides. 
Soviet government’s failure in undertaking any action to contain the violence resulted 
in further deterioration of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan to a degree that in 
late 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union a full scale war was erupted 
between the two republics, while the Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed independence. 
(ibid)   
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Map 4.2: The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict1 
 
Exploiting Azerbaijan’s domestic instability in which, three presidents were appointed 
over the course of two years; in 1992 and 1993 Armenian militia not only occupied 
Karabakh, but also the neighbouring cities of Lachin, Kelbajar, Qubadli, Fizuli, 
Aghdam and Jabrayil, eventually occupying nearly 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory. 
Though to this date, neither Armenia nor any other UN member states have recognised 
Karabakh’s independence, it has an active government and elections and receives 
financial and political support from Armenians all over the world, particularly 
Armenians in the US. Moreover, the self proclaimed republic has an army2, and 
representative offices in the US, France and Britain. Amid tardiness and power plays of 
regional and international players, Karabakh is effectively moving towards full 
independence. Meanwhile, Armenia has been adamant towards Azerbaijan’s repeated 
demands for withdrawal from the occupied territories and provide the opportunity for 
Azeri refugees to return to their homes. (Nuriyev 2007:166) 
Based on its history of ideologically motivated policies, the initial expectation was that 
Iran would overtly take side with Muslim Shiite Azerbaijan against the Christian 
Armenia. Meanwhile, the existence of a large Azeri population across the country, 
particularly in the north, as well as considerable Armenians; had exacerbated the impact 
of this conflict for Iran’s domestic stability as Tehran did not want to disgruntle any of 
                                                          
1 Available at: <http://www.nonformality.org/2007/12/conflicts-europe/>  (Accessed on 28.05.2015) 
2 The Karabakh army has about 18,000 soldiers and around 40,000 militias, with considerable volume of 
equipments such as armoured personnel carriers, T72 and T55 tanks, artillery, missiles, etc. (Amirahmadian 2007) 
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these minorities. Therefore, while condemning Armenians violation of Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity and providing humanitarian aid to Azeri refugees, Iran officially 
took an active neutrality stand to avoid openly taking any sides the way Turkey did. 
Nonetheless, revealed evidence in recent years shows that despite its official neutral 
stance, Iran had initially supported and helped Azerbaijanis in their war with 
Armenians. In his 2011 message for the anniversary of Ali Ekram Hemmatev1; 
Ayatollah Ameli, Ardebil’s Friday Imam and the supreme leader’s representative in 
Ardebil province2 described Iran’s support during the first few years of Azeris’ struggle, 
emphasising:  
“Iran undertook large scale actions (to support Azerbaijan). Many young people from 
Azerbaijan came to Iran for training in asymmetric warfare. Plenty of armaments were 
given to young people who were longing for some military equipment to defend Shusha. 
Also with the government’s consent and based on requests from Rovshan Javadov3 and 
Rahim Ghasiev4 for establishing a defence system, a joint military base was established. 
In these military bases, Ardebili and Tabrizi military commanders helped their Azeri 
brothers wholeheartedly to prevent Armenian aggression and establish refugee 
camps.”5 
Ameli also said that Iran assisted Azerbaijan in bringing ‘thousands of gunmen’ to the 
front line from Afghanistan. Though Azerbaijan’s media tried to refute Ameli’s claims; 
in response to Yeni Musavat’s newspaper, Sardar Hamidov, the commander of the 
Azerbaijani battalion which took part in Aghdam defence confirmed the participation 
of Afghans and mercenaries of other ethnic origins who were brought to Azerbaijan by 
Iran. Moreover, in an interview with the local media, the former speaker of the 
Azerbaijani parliament Yagub Mamedov confirmed Ameli’s claims. This information 
                                                          
1 the deceased president of Tallish Autonomous Republic. 
2 One of Iran’s northern provinces which has majority Azari population 
3 special unit of the Interior Troops (OMON) 
4 Azerbaijani Minister of Defence in 1992-1993 













was also confirmed by the former Azerbaijani Defence Minister Rahim Gaziyev and 
the former leader of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan Haji Nuriyev. Speaking to 
Azerbaijani media, Nuriyev said “Time has already come to open the facts about Iran’s 
help to Azerbaijan. We remember Iran’s help, which was provided in the battlefield; 
we would have been in a more difficult situation without it.”(Baghdasaryan 2011) 
In a more recent comment, Mohsen Rezaei the Secretary for Iran’s Expediency Council 
and the former Commander in Chief of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has 
described Iran’s support of Azerbaijan in the early years of the Karabakh conflict in an 
interview with Sahar International TV channel. 1 
“I had personally ordered for the situation in Karabakh to be assessed and for the Azeri 
army to be suitably equipped and trained…. Many Iranians participated in the 
Karabakh war. In addition to those casualties who were carried back to Iran; numerous 
Iranian martyrs are buried in Baku…..” 
Describing the situation in 1991 Azerbaijan, Yunusov (2003:7) has stated that “there 
were even reports of Islamic Revolutionary Guards arriving from Iran with large 
quantities of weapons.” The Head of Nongovernmental Centre for International War 
against Terrorism has also confirmed Iranians’ claims.  Rovshan Noruz Oghlu, 
emphasises that “Iran’s demeanour regarding attack on the Republic of Azerbaijan has 
always been honest and grand, something we observed in the Karabakh conflict.”2 He 
confirms that 
“Iranians were fighting alongside Azerbaijan people in the Karabakh. They knew the 
meaning of the war. Tens of Iranian citizens, who had participated in Iraq War took 
part in the Karabakh fronts as well. They were from all Iranian ethnicities; Fars and 
Kurds as well as Azeris…. We have investigated and found out that in Feb 1992 in 
Khujali, Iranians fought alongside Azeris against separatists. Some of their graves are 
in Khujali, Lachin, Kelebjer, Qubadli and Shusha. We have found graves of 11 
Iranians… Iranian volunteer warriors arrived in Azerbaijan in groups and fought in 
                                                          
1 Mohsen Rezaei: Shohadāye Iranie jange Gharehbāgh niz dar Baku madfun hastand.  Available at:  
<http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4291588>,  (Accessed on 01.11.2014) 
2 Young Journalists Club. (2013) Some Iranian Martyred in Karabakh War- Azerbaijani Expert. Available at: 
http://www.yjc.ir/en/news/319/some-iranian-martyred-in-karabakh-war-azerbaijani-expert (Accessed on 
01.11.2014) 
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various fronts in Karabakh. Their goal was to help Azerbaijan Republic and defend a 
Muslim country.”1 
In an interview with Azerbaijan’s Interpress, the commander of Bozghurd battalion, 
Nuruddin Khuja explains that “we requested Iran’s help in Zangilan events. If it wasn’t 
for Iranian’s artillery support Zangilan people would have been massacered; a tragedy 
worse than Khojali.”2 
The remarks of the Vice Chairman of Iranian parliament’s National Security and 
Foreign Policy Committee in response to a critical letter from Siyavush Novruzov, a 
representative of Azerbaijan’s ruling party Yeni Azerbaijan, provides another evidence 
for Iran’s initial support of Azeri’s struggle in Karabakh. Mansour Haghighat Pour, 
previously an IRGC commanders and the governor of Ardabil Province has written: 
“I was a special adviser to former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev during the 
Karabakh war. So, casting a doubt on the truthfulness of my words, you indirectly 
blame your late President. ….. through the efforts of chief of the Special Purpose Police 
Detachment of Azerbaijan, Rovshan Javadov, more than 2,000 Afghan warriors 
(Mojaheds) were transferred by IRGC from Afghanistan to Azerbaijan to fight against 
Armenians.”3 
The fact that Afghan Mujahedin were fighting for Azerbaijan was subsequently 
confirmed by Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ohanian. He said, “at some points Afghan 
warriors were based in Karabakh, but later they left upon the reached agreement.”4 
Examining the above evidence, the question then arises as to why and when Iran ceased 
its military support of Azerbaijan. Describing developments which led to 
discontinuation of Iran’s cooperation; Mr. Ameli quotes Rovshan Javadov; “After the 
revolution and following the presidential inauguration, he (Elchibay) invited me 
(Javadov) for the first official visit. I knew he is going to ask me about my plans for 
Karabakh, so I took the operation plan in a folder with me and went to the meeting. But 
                                                          
1 Ibid. 
2 Dānā News. (2014) E`terāfe farmāndeye Gordāne Bozghurd darbāreye naghshe Iran dar jange Azerbaijan va 
Armanestan. Available at: <http://www.dana.ir/News/85349.html>  (Accessed on 27.08.2015) 
3 Panorama. (2013) Former Iranian General: More than 2,000 Afghan Militants Fought on Part of Azerbaijan in 
Karabakh War. Available at: http://www.panorama.am/en/analytics/2013/04/08/mansour-haghighat-pour/  
(Accessed on 10.05.2013)  
4 Asre Iran. ( 2011) Jange Azerbaijan va Armanestan; āyā Iran jangjuyāne Afghan rā be mantaghe e`zām mikard?, 
Available at: <http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/165286/%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-
%D8%A2%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8>  (Accessed on 01.11.2014) 
152 
the president pointed out to a folder which was on his desk -the folder was transferred 
from Israel to Turkey and from there to his desk- and said ‘I’m aware of your 
cooperation with Iranians. From now on you have to discontinue all your relations with 
Iran. We do not need Iran’s help. If I know that I can get back Karabakh with Iran’s 
help, I prefer to hand it to Armenians. Karabakh is not a serious problem and would be 
resolved by itself in a short matter of time. Our war is with Iran. We have to prepare 
ourselves to fight Iran. Our main enemy is not Armenia; it is Persians (Fars)’.”1 
Mr. Ameli continued his explanation by saying “After that, things changed. First 
Azerbaijan stopped cooperation and refrained from receiving Iran’s help. Then the 
Iranians who had gone to help Azerbaijan were indecently imprisoned. Even more 
surprising was the fact that they were interrogated and tortured by Israeli and Turkish 
interrogators. Later all their services were considered as treason. Those Azeris who 
were trained in Iran were arrested and tortured to confess that they were not trained to 
fight for Karabakh, but for establishing another Hezbollah to fight for Iran’s 
interest.”(ibid) 
The conclusion which can be drawn from the above evidence is: 
 Contrary to popular perception and despite its official neutral position, Iran was 
initially involved in direct military and humanitarian aid towards Azerbaijan. 
This aspect of Iran’s policy was largely an outcome of its ideological nature, 
based on which defending oppressed Muslims is the duty of a Muslim state. 
Nevertheless, even with ideological goals in mind, ‘influencing Muslim 
brothers’ and ‘keeping them under the umbrella of Islam’ would have been the 
next priority after the liberation of Karabakh, serving the political goal of 
‘spreading its sphere of influence.’ 
 Discontinuation of Iran’s military support for Azerbaijan was not a policy 
choice made by Iran, but the consequence of Azerbaijan’s domestic 
developments and foreign policy orientation. 
The evidence also proves that Iran’s approach towards the Karabakh conflict in early 
                                                          





%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B4%D9%87-%D9%82>  ( Accessed on 8.05.2013) 
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years was multifaceted both driven by ideology, as well as pragmatism. Sending men 
and armament as well as establishing training camps for Azeri warriors, was 
ideologically based. Keeping such enormous help a secret for many years, despite all 
negative propaganda by Baku, was rooted in pragmatism, as supporting Azerbaijan 
openly would have dragged Iran into the quagmire of the conflict, ruined its blossoming 
relations with Armenia and undermined its status as an impartial mediator. Moreover, 
it would have not definitely been tolerated by Russia. ‘Avoiding antagonising Moscow’ 
has been an important element of Iran’s regional policy even before the end of the Cold 
War; hence the covert involvement in the Karabakh. This strategy also helped in 
avoiding direct involvement of other players and giving them an excuse for military 
presence on Iran’s northern border. 
 
Mediation Efforts 
Tehran’s mediation efforts in Karabakh conflicts are more comprehendible within the 
framework of Iran’s Realpolitik. Understandably, the first and foremost incentive for 
Iran to offer its mediation services was to secure its borders and resume stability in the 
region. According to Ramezanzadeh (Quoted by Suleymanov & Ditrych 2007:106), 
“Iran mobilized its efforts only after Armenian troops reached the Azerbaijani-Iranian 
border at the Araxes. Their further advance to the east might have caused not only a 
tremendous flow of refugees across the river but even the collapse of the Azerbaijani 
state. The latter could have had catastrophic consequences for the security of the 
Caspian region.”  
Ramezanzadeh also believes that Iran's role as the mediator “should be seen as part of 
its North-West Asia strategy. Iran emphasizes the inviolability of recognized 
international borders. It does not accept territorial claims based on historical arguments 
as legitimate, as such claims and arguments would lead to endless conflicts in the 
region.”(1996:2) 
In his book, Iran’s chief negotiator in the Karabakh conflict, Vaezi (2008:129) provides 
other reasons for Iran’s mediation. He argues that one of the main reasons was to 
balance the power between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as a strong Christian Armenia or 
a powerful Azerbaijan who could support irredentism in Iran’s northern provinces was 
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not favourable by Tehran. He explains that based on political realism Iran was trying to 
institutionalise and stabilise its political involvement in the region through mediation. 
Describing the context in which Iran’s mediation was initiated, he points out to the 
militariy imbalance in the war fronts, and the negative effects of political disputes and 
power rivalries in Baku on morale while political groups were exploiting the war and 
military forces to achieve their factional goals. (ibid: 131) 
In an atmosphere filled with toxic political disputes, Baku’s unstable interim 
government was unable to make essential decision for resolving the conflict. Moreover, 
Elchibey’s radical nationalism had left Azerbaijan with no regional ally but Turkey. 
Incontrast with Azerbaijan, there was a relative political stability and unity in Armenia. 
None of political parties and factions let their differences to go beyond a certain degree 
and threaten the Republic’s political stability. Karabakhians, on the other hand, were 
not showing any flexibility. According to chief negotiator Vaezi (2008:131), this was 
due to their victories in Stepankerat, the occupation of most of Karabakh and the fall of 
Khojali. 
Under such difficult circumstances, while enjoying the trust and confidence of both 
sides, Iran started its mediation efforts. It took a process of six months active 
engagement starting from January 1992 after the partial occupation of Karabakh till 
May 1992. Eventually, following the March 1992 Tehran negotiations with 
participation of high ranking delegates from both sides, an agreement was reached for 
“a temporary cease-fire, a lifting of the blockade of Armenia by the Azeri side, the 
deployment of observer forces and an exchange of prisoners of war and bodies”. 
(Ramezanzadeh 1996:3)  
Iran’s mediation efforts continued despite violation of the ceasefire within a week. On 
May 1992, Iran’s President Rafsanjani hosted and met with the presidents of the two 
belligerent republics and consequently a joint declaration was signed and issued 
emphasising on “restoring stability in the region, based on international law and the 
principles of the UN Charter”. (ibid) However, the intensification of war while the three 
presidents were negotiating for peace in Tehran had resulted in Armenian forces’ 
occupation of Shusha. The fall of Shusha, followed by the occupation of yet another 
strategic city of Lachin was not only a turning point in the war but also a breaking point 
in Iran’s mediations.  
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Shusha was Azerbaijan’s most important stronghold in the Karabakh. “The occupation 
of these two cities opened a strategic roadway into Armenia through which arms and 
supplies could flow.” (Sadri 2010:34) Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a 
statement expressing concerns and condemning “any military operations aimed at 
occupying new areas”. It called upon all involved parties to “refrain from any 
provocative act while continuing efforts towards peaceful solutions”.1 The statement 
was followed by President Rafsanjani’s message to the Armenian president expressing 
“Iranian nation and officials’ concerns over recent developments in Karabakh.”2 
However, the above developments not only hampered Iran’s mediation efforts but also 
raised domestic criticism of the government for not taking a firm stance against 
Armenia. Although Iranian officials have repeatedly declared their willingness for 
further mediation, the regional and international atmosphere has been even less 
favourable for Iran to play such an influential role in the region.  
SajjadPour believes (1995:208) that as a consequence of the above developments; Iran 
has since resorted to a ‘guarded neutrality’ and been assertive on the “issue of non 
violability of international borders….. The principle of the sanctity of borders is 
contrary to those formulas which prescribe a land exchange between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan3: giving a corridor from Armenia to Azerbaijan to connect Azerbaijan to 
Nakhjavan, and a corridor from Azerbaijan to Armenia, to connect Armenia to 
Karabakh. Such formula would deprive Iran from a common border with Armenia.” 
Consequently Iran’s common border with Azerbaijan would extend significantly, 
which considering irredentist activities and rhetorics of Azerbaijan it is perceived as a 
security threat by Iran. 
Iran has consistently urged for a solution by regional countries and without the 
interference of outside powers. In 2010, Bahrami, Iran’s then ambassador to Azerbaijan 
criticised outside powers for merely looking out for their own interests.4 On February 
2013, the new Iranian envoy to Azerbaijan “warned against possible deployment of 
peacekeeping forces in Karabakh, saying the move would cause new security problems 
in the region.” Speaking to IRNA, Mr. Pak Ayeen emphasised “The deployment of 
                                                          
1 Channel 1, IRIB Television. 14.30 GMT. 9 May 1992 
2 English IRNA, 06:14 GMT, 13 May 1992 
3 i.e. The Goble plan 
4 TREND Newsagency. (2013) Iran Ready to Mediate in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Envoy.  Available at: 
<http://ilna.ir/en/news/news.cfm?id=319>  (Accessed on  01.05.2013) 
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peacekeeping forces to the Karabakh region is not only an ineffective measure to 
resolve the region's dispute, but will create new security problems in the region.”1Iran’s 
insistence on a solution by regional players and its opposition to the deployment of 
peace keeping forces arise from its security concerns particularly its antagonistic 
relations with the West.  
The Karabakh conflict is far from over despite years of mediation by various players 
including Russia and OSCE. “Since 1994, a self-controlled ceasefire has been in place, 
but exchanges of fire are a regular occurrence along the Line of Contact (LoC) between 
NK and Azerbaijan, causing both military and civilian casualties.” (Centre for Security 
Studies 2013:1) Like a smoldering volcano, the conflict has the potential of activation, 
melting away regional stability and international security at any time. Nonetheless, as 
de Waal (2009:1) has argued “although it is in the long-term interests of everyone to 
affect a peaceful resolution of the dispute, yet all the key players are more or less 
comfortable with the status quo, despite all its negative aspects. The leaders responsible 
for taking decisions on a peace process prefer not to make decisions that could win their 
countries long-term benefits, calculating that the risks involved in making compromise 
are too great.”  
Due to its international isolation and poor relations with Azerbaijan, Iran is currently 
what de Waal (2013:4) calls “the sleeping giant of the conflict”. Any change in Iran’s 
domestic circumstances or its international status may have grave effects on this 
conflict. However, under present circumstances, like other players, Iran is happy with 
the status quo, as the conflict reduces Azerbaijan’s chances of seriously investing on its 
irredentist ambitions. Armenia’s regional isolation has provided Iran with a close and 
sympathetic regional ally while Turkey has been unable to spread its regional influence 
as it aspires due to its closed borders with Armenia.  
Through the prism of the Karabakh conflict one can see different aspects of Iran’s 
regional policy, from ideological support of its Shiite Muslim brethren to official 
neutral stance and active mediation; insisting on the sanctity of international borders 
while opposing the deployment of peacekeeping forces on its shared borders with the 
                                                          
1 Press TV. (2015) Peacekeepers Will Intensify Woes in Karabakh: Iran Envoy, Available at: 
<http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/02/21/290060/iran-opposed-to-karabakh-peacekeepers/> (Accessed on 
30.10.2014) 
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conflict zone; it all comes down to two major concepts: ‘security’ and ‘influence’. 
 
4.4. Conclusions 
A combination of several ideational elements, and geographical realities of being a 
linchpin pivotal state, as well as the nature and consequences of Iran’s general foreign 
policy have shaped Iran’s regional policy in both the Middle East and South Caucasus. 
While there is controversy among various scholars about whether Iran is in search of 
hegemony in adjacent regions or not; a brief review of Iran’s policies in the Middle East 
(the Persian Gulf and the Levant) and the South Caucasus identifies two major drives 
of ‘security’ and ‘influence’ in Iran’s regional policy.  
With ‘security’ in perspective, one can see how in the face of strategic its loneliness 
engendered by its particular normative identity; Iran has employed various means to 
maintain stability in its immediate neighbourhood in both the Middle East and the South 
Caucasus. Tehran has constantly emphasised that the regional security should be 
maintained through regional arrangements and cooperation and made futile efforts in 
keeping the transregional countries out of its adjacent regions. 
As part of its security measures throughout the decades Iran has built a strong network 
of proxies in the heart of the Arab world which provides Tehran with strategic depth in 
the Middle East and has been relatively effective in fighting the battles away from Iran’s 
borders. This strategy has also helped Iran to develop its regional influence and 
outreach. 
Despite decades of relentless efforts by rivals and adversaries, particularly the United 
States for isolating Iran out of regional dynamics, Tehran has exploited limited 
opportunities mainly emanating from the failure of other players to extend its influence 
and forge closer relations with different players. An obvious example in the Middle 
East is the case of Iraq. While most Arab states were playing as spectators in the 
immediate post 2003 period, refusing to open embassies or forgo accumulated debts 
under Saddam; Iran seized the right moment by political empowerment of Iraqi Shiites 
and establishment of friendly relations with Iraqi Kurds to develop its sphere of 
influence deep into layers of Iraqi administration, economy and society.(Chubin 
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2009:170) As a result, Iran’s influence has increased considerably tipping the regional 
balance of power in favour of Tehran. Similarly, Iran took advantage of Georgia’s post 
2008 war to forge closer relations with this country at the time it was suffering from 
Russian gas embargo and US reluctance to engage in its struggle, by offering to export 
gas to Tbilisi.  
While Iran has attached different degrees of importance to each region, with the Middle 
East enjoying the outmost importance; its regional approach, particularly since the end 
of the war with Iraq, has been similar in many ways. Emphasising on regionalism, Iran 
has pragmatically taken an accommodating and constructive approach towards its 
neighbours, particularly in the South Caucasus. Such understanding is completely true 
if one ignores the early months of the Karabakh conflict, when despite its official 
neutral stance, Iran provided Azerbaijan with military support based on ideological 
beliefs which perceived Azerbaijan as a Muslim land and its support as a religious duty. 
However, Azerbaijan’s unappreciative response to this support taught Iran some bitter 
lessons about the limits of ideological investment on a secular state, which resulted in 
Tehran taking a pragmatist approach in the South Caucasus ever since.  
Notwithstanding, Iran’s pragmatic policies, together with its regionalist approach have 
been increasingly unsuccessful particularly in the post Sep 11th era. The US strategy of 
containing Iran’s influence in its northern neighbourhood together with mounting 
international sanctions have effectively limited Iran’s influence in the South Caucasus 
and deserted Teran from reapping significant potentials in its relations with this region. 
It may not be an overestimation to say that Russia has been the top beneficiary of Iran-
US animosity and US policies to isolate Iran in both regions, as the consequent 
vulnerabilities has been the main factor in development of Iran's Russo-centric policy. 
Faced with various degrees of animosity or rivalry by other important players, Tehran 
has constantly tried to avoid antagonising Russia by observing Moscow’s concerns and 
sensitivities in the region even at the expense of its own regional policies and priorities. 
While Iran’s efforts for developing extensive regional cooperation have been 
challenged both in the Middle East and the South Caucasus, the failure has been more 
obvious and extensive in the South Caucasus. The absence of strong anti Western / 
American sentiment, as well as lighter ideological tendencies and greater financial- 
economic dependence of regional countries to the West, particularly the US; have been 
159 
the main reasons for this situation. Unlike Middle Eastern countries who were at times 
prepared to resist US pressure to some degree to cooperate and have close relations with 
Iran particularly from the end of Iran-Iraq war till mid 2000’s; South Caucasus countries 
easily gave in to US strategy of ‘everything without Iran’ and ignored Iran’s proposals 
for a regional security arrangement or opportunities that Iran’s strategic location and 
infrastructure could have offered them. 
Another reason is the level of attention and investment that Iran has been able to apply 
to the South Caucasus considering the limitation of its resources. In other words, the 
heavy burden of confronting US influence and allies in the Middle East by supporting 
proxies, building alliances, and managing developments in that region has severly 
limited country’s resources for due attention towards the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, 
there is the fact that a more proactive policy and increased outreach by Iran would have 
undermined Iran’s strategy of ‘not antagonising’ Russia.  
The next two chapters will examine Iran’s bilateral relations with its two neighbours in 
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IRAN’S RELATIONS WITH THE 





In 1918, a new political entity was established in the North of Aras River, which its 
founders chose to call it the Republic of Azerbaijan. This politically motivated name 
selection became the first brick in building future relations between Iran and the newly 
founded republic in north of Aras. This chapter will examine Iran’s relations with its 
most important neighbour in the South Caucasus, the Republic of Azerbaijan since its 
inception.  
The chapter will discuss the integration process of the short lived Azerbaijan 
Democratic Republic into the Soviet system, and demonstrate that while the Azerbaijan 
Soviet Republic had no sovereignty or independent foreign relations; it was a valuable 
asset for the Soviet’s expansionist aspirations particularly towards Persia. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union provided the Soviet Azerbaijan with the opportunity to regain its 
independence and conduct foreign policy and relations as a sovereign state. As such, 
Azerbaijan’s history has been reviewed in three unequal periods, one as short as two 
years and the other two, as long as several decades. This historical review is mainly 
focused on developments relevant to Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran and excludes 
other less relevant historical developments. 
The chapter will then provide background on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, particularly 
in the post independence era, and its relations with main players in the region during 
different administrations. It will subsequently evaluate Iran’s bilateral relations with 
Azerbaijan, adapting Buzan’s sectoral security model. However, while Buzan’s 
categories look at the subject from a security perspective and mainly focuses on threats; 
the perspective for this study is ‘relations’, and therefore, in each category, it looks at 
opportunities as well.  
Through this analysis it will be demonstrated how the two countries’ shared heritage 
which, could have provided them with ample opportunities, has negatively affected 
their bilateral relations due to several reasons, including lack of trust and opposing 
nature of the states. This negative dynamics, together with regional and international 
developments have securitised the relations between the two countries and created 
further tensions.   
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The chapter will conclude that as a result of several misperceptions and miscalculations; 
Iran has failed to have a consistent realistic and proactive policy towards Azerbaijan 
which in turn has resulted in short term, reactive policies. It will also conclude that Iran-
Azerbaijan relations in general can be analysed based on defensive realism theory of 
international relations. 
Since the chapter is not only studying historical developments, but also important recent 
events, most of the data is retrieved from sources like news agencies and networks; 
think tanks etc.  
 
5.2. Azerbaijan’s State Formation 
Located on the eastern side of the South Caucasus and on the Western coast of the 
Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan is Iran’s north Western neighbour sharing 676 Km of common 
borders. Iran can essentially provide Azerbaijan with the shortest and the most 
economic transport route to the Persian Gulf and from there to the international markets. 
This is a significant opportunity for a landlocked country with no direct access to open 
seas. Iran is also Azerbaijan’s mere access provider to its outer part, the Autonomous 
Republic of Nakhjavan in the west which is separated from the mainland Azerbaijan by 
the territory of the Armenian Republic.  
As Cornell (2011:3) has put it, the most appropriate single word which can describe 
Azerbaijan throughout its history is ‘crossroads’. “Situated between Europe and Asia, 
Azerbaijan is marked by major routes of migration, conquest, trade and transit from 
east to west and from north to south.”(ibid) This important geographical location is the 
reason that Azerbaijan can open the CIS and European market’s gateway for Iran. Dr. 
Maleki, Iran’s former deputy foreign minister has emphasised on the importance of 
Azerbaijan for Iran by stating that “although Azerbaijan has particular problems, but I 
always think if I was the foreign minister, I would have deployed my strongest men to 
Baku, as it can both be a threat or can open Europe’s doors to Iran.”1 
                                                          
1 Taghire siāsate hasteie Iran ghat’ei ast.  Available at: 
<http://irdiplomacy.ir/fa/page/1920117/تغییر+سیاست+هسته+ای+ایران+قطعی+است+.html>  (Accessed on 10.12.2013) 
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5.2.1. Brief Pre Independence History 
“The earliest political entity known to have occupied the geographic space of the 
modern state of Azerbaijan is Caucasian Albania.” (Sadri 2007:29) According to 
Cornell (2011:5), significant establishment of Turkic tribes in the Caucasus goes back 
to the ninth and tenth centuries when warrior clans “entered into the service of the 
Sassanid dynasty of Persian Empire and gained impetus in subsequent centuries with 
the emergence of the Oghuz Turks Seljuk dynasty.”  
While the establishment of Turkic tribes in the Caucasus Albania provided an ethnic 
link between them, Azeri Turks of Persia and Ottoman Turks; “Azeri Turks have been 
separated from their brothers in Turkey by religious persuasion. …. The Azeri Turks 
mixed Islam with their pre Islamic religious beliefs.” (Sadri 2007:30) The resulting 
mixture was bent towards mysticism. Tolerance of Shiism towards mysticism was an 
essential factor in its adaptation by Azeris. From these Turkic Shiite tribes, the Safavids 
who emerged from Ardebil in fifteenth century, were particularly strong, constituted a 
“military brotherhood of Turkish nomads” (ibid) and established a dynasty in Iran’s 
Azerbaijan. As the expansionist aspirations of Ottoman Turks brought them in direct 
conflict with Safavids, the shared ethnic heritage between the two dynasties proved to 
be of less importance compared to religious orientation or territorial struggles. “In the 
ensuing battles between the Ottoman and Safavid armies, very few Safavid Turks 
deserted to the Ottoman Turkish enemy.” (ibid) 
Over the time, both Muslim empires grew weaker and their influence in the Caucasus 
waned while the Russian Empire was on the rise with great expansionist agenda. 
Although the 1747 assassination of Nadir Shah effectively ended Persia’s direct rule 
over territories located on the northern side of the Aras River, the khanates were still 
considered as part of Persia’s political and cultural orbit. 
Russia’s efforts to annex Persia’s Caucasian khanates had started in the late 18th to 
early 19th centuries. The desire for the annexation of the region was not merely rooted 
in Russia’s geographical location or its greatest goals in the Middle and Near East. In 
addition to economic interests; “Peter I wanted to put an end to the rule of Iran in the 
Transcaucasus and to prevent the Ottoman Empire capture the territory.” (Seyid-zade 
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2010:8) Following Iran’s defeat in the first Russia-Persia war (1804-1828) and the 
signing of the Gulistan Treaty by the two warring Empires, several cities and khanates 
of Persia were ceded to Russia. These included Karabakh, Ganje, Baku, Shaki, Shervan, 
Darband (Derbent), Quba, Lankaran Khanates and a part of Talysh Khanate. All these 
khanates were parts of the Aran region1constituting parts of the present day Republic 
of Azerbaijan.  
The ambiguities of the Gulistan treaty which had left the extent of borders open to 
interpretations; together with mounting pressures from the public particularly clergies 
who were pushing for the resumption of Muslim territories pushed Persia into yet 
another losing war with Russia in 1826, ending in dramatic defeat of Persians and 
concluded by the 1828 Turkmanchai Treaty. Upon this treaty, the Aras River was set 
as the precise border between Russia and Persia. Also Nakhjavan and Yerevan 
Khanates were ceded to Russia in perpetuity. Map 5.1 shows the Persian territories lost 
to Russian Empire under the two treaties of Gulistan and Turkmanchai. Persia’s loss of 
sovereignty over the Caucasus khanates had serious ethnographic consequences for 
Turkish people living in the northern parts of this country as Caucasus Albanian Turks 
were separated from their brethrens living in Persia. 
In contrast to their general policy in other Muslim territories of the Empire, throughout 
the 19th century Russians did not interfere with the traditional system of governance in 
the South Caucasus. This resulted in the speedy development of trade and seasonal or 
permanent migration of a vast number of Persian labours to the Caucasus. 
Consequently, there was an overwhelming feeling of connection and belonging towards 
Persia among Caucasian people till the early years of the 20th century. (Bayat 2009:4) 
During this period, Russians extracted commodities from the region without making 
appropriate investments. They rushed to Baku only at the end of the nineteenth century 
for exploiting oil reserves. “It was at that time when fundamental and radical changes 
in socio-economic, political and cultural life occurred in Azerbaijan.” (Nuriyev 
2007:32) Producing then more than half of the world’s oil turned Baku, the largest city 
of the Caucasus into “one of the most dynamic industrial world centers of the time” 
                                                          
1 in its old non-political definition. 
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(ibid); drawing prominent Western investors and entrepreneurs such as Rockefeller and 
Rothschild to invest in development of local industries and infrastructure. 
 
Map 5.1: Persian Khanates Prior to 1803 Russia-Persia War1 
 
 
The economic development was followed by a dramatic social change notable in the 
emergence of a middle class who were influenced by the mainstream European life. 
Baku was transformed “into a cosmopolitan centre, with a large proletariat living and 
working in appalling conditions under Russian control. As such the city was a receptive 
target for both nationalist groups and early Bolshevik movement.  Further the Russian 
revolution of 1905 brought a political awakening in Azerbaijan.” (ibid: 33) The 
awakening provided fertile ground for the formation of various political organisations. 
In such atmosphere, the ‘Musavat Democratic Islamic Party’ was founded in Baku in 
1911. The party “had begun as a pan Islamic modernist party seeking to liberate and 
modernize the wider Islamic world. But with Rasulzadeh at its helm it drifted 
increasingly in a Turkish direction” (Cornell 2010:18) particularly when it was merged 
with the ‘Turkish Federalism Party’ and renamed ‘Turkish Federalist Musavat Party’ 
in 1917. In May 1918, the party seized the opportunity arisen from the collapse of the 
                                                          
1 Available at: <http://www.iranpoliticsclub.net/maps/maps10/index.htm>  (Accessed on 28.05.2015) 
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Tsarist Empire and the weakening of the Russian authority over its southern periphery 
as a result of the First World War; to break away the territory north of the Aras River 
known as Aran, from the Russian’s rule and to establish a new country.  
According to the prominent Russian historian Barthold, “the easternmost country 
populated mainly by Turks and Tatars was to be named the Eastern and Southern 
Transcaucasia Republic”. (As quoted by Ghalichian 2012:17) However, to serve the 
expansionist aspirations of the party’s leaders who were supported by pan Turanist 
ottomans; Rasoulzadeh, then the leader of Musavat party, suggested calling this new 
entity as the ‘Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan’ (ADR). Baku, Elizabeth Guberniasi, 
the southern areas of Tbilisi and Yerevan and the territory of Zaghatala were considered 
as parts of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. (AmirAhmadian 2005:30) “With 
this single decision of the Musavat party, the various peoples, tribes and minorities 
living in the area, which until then had been called by the general name of Turks (or 
Tatars) became ‘Azerbaijanis’ or ‘Azeris’.” (Alekparov as quoted by Ghalichian 
2012:17) 
The action was met with surprise and serious objections from the Persian elites, 
including prominent Iranian Azerbaijani politicians such as Shaeikh Mohammad 
Khiabani and Ahmad Kasravi. The latter wrote; “It is rather strange that they call Aran, 
Azerbaijan now, as Azerbaijan or Azerbaygan is the name of another territory, which 
in Pahlavi Aran is larger and more popular than it….. These two territories have always 
been separate and Aran has never been called Azerbaijan before”. (As quoted by Bayat 
2011:1) Also, the Iranian Embassy in Turkey objected to calling the newly established 
country as “Azerbaijan”; but no further actions were taken by the government. In the 
opening chapter of his book which has documented and reviewed correspondents 
between Baku- Tehran elites and newspapers regarding the name of this new country, 
Bayat argues that although many Iranian elites failed to trace Ottoman’s pan Turkish 
(Turanist) footprints behind this name selection, there was an outcry against it, 
manifested by heated debates in both Iran and the new country’s newspapers. (2011:12-
13) 
The ADR was rather short lived as it was invaded by the Bolshevik’s Red Army in 
1920. The government was swiftly overtrown without facing much resistance since “the 
bulk of the Azerbaijani forces were engaged in suppressing an Armenian separatist 
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uprising that had just broken out in Nagorno-Karabakh”. (Nuriyev 2007:35) In 1922, 
the area now popularly recognised as ‘Azerbaijan’ was integrated into a new political 
entity called ‘Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic’ (TSFR). This 
political entity was later abolished to give room for the practice of Lenin’s doctrine of 
‘recognition and protection of ethnic identities’. The practice of the doctrine had several 
consequences, some of which are directly relevant to this chapter, including: 
1. What constituted the ADR was recognised as the Soviet Socialist Republic 
of Azerbaijan. 
2. Since the creation of convoluted boundaries was an imperative for the 
practice of Lenin’s doctrine; over the time upon Soviet leader’s decision, 
about 28000 sq/Km of the Azeri territory was given away to neighbouring 
Soviet republics. In 1924, Gavije and Zangezur provinces were separated 
from Azerbaijan’s territory and annexed to Armenia.(Amirahmadian 
2005:2) 
3. In the same year, an autonomous province called Nagorno Karabakh with 
majority Armenian population was established in the mountainous part of 
the old Karabakh province which was well in the borders of the Azerbaijan 
Soviet Republic. (ibid, and Sadri 2010:32) 
4. Nakhjavan, “a region with large Azeri population, was cut off from 
Azerbaijan by the territory of Armenia, whose Soviet determined borders 
stretched all the way south to the Iranian borders. Despite this recognition 
of their identities, Azeris in Nakhjavan really wished to be joined with 
Azerbaijan and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh wished to be joined to 
Armenia. The Soviet refusal to do so meant that the Azeris and Armenians 
would go to war to redraw their boundaries as soon as they gained 
independence.”(Sadri 2010:32) 
The new political entity which was established in the territory ruled by Musavats, not 
only kept the name of Azerbaijan but also its perceived functionalities. In fact the new 
‘Soviet Azerbaijan’ had the same role in the Bolshevik’s general strategy that it had in 
the general strategy of Ottomans, which was to be the bridge for political expansion 
towards the East. Bolshevik’s support of Pishevari’s secessionist movement and their 
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direct intervention in Persia’s internal affairs by sending troops to Azerbaijan province 
and deployment of armed military brigades in Anzali in 1921 was indeed undertaken 
under the banner of the ‘Republic of Azerbaijan’. (Bayat 2011:14) 
 
 
Map 5.2: Map of the Republic of Azerbaijan & the Neighbouring Countries 1 
 
 
Map 5.2, demonstrates how Nakhjavan has been separated from the mainland 
Azerbaijan by the Armenian territory. 
As the relaxation of political atmosphere under Gorbachev provided the opportunity for 
the revival of nationalist sentiments in the Soviet Republics, calls for transfer of 
autonomous oblast of Mountainous Karabakh and autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic of Nakhjavan to Armenia increased, but the demand was refused by the Soviet 
authorities. Consequently, systemic harassment of Azeri inhabitants of Karabakh by 
radicalised Armenians was increased to a degree that they were forced to leave. Wave 
after wave of tens of thousands of Azeri refugees reached Baku and the neighbouring 
towns and villages in early 1988. “The rise of Azerbaijani nationalism was very much 
                                                          
1 Available at: <http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/10.2/focus/ismaylov/ismaylov-img-3.jpg> (Accessed on 
13.11.2013) 
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an awakening spurred by conflict in mountainous Karabakh and a response to the threat 
of Armenian expansionism. …. Nothing did more to mobilize Azerbaijan’s population 
and spur the Azerbaijani national movement than the issue of Mountainous 
Karabakh.”(Cornell 2010:46-7) Continued unrest resulted in further organisation of 
Azeri nationalists, particularly Azerbaijan’s Popular Front which over the next few 
years developed such an outreach and influence among Azeri public that it could easily 
start and stop widespread crippling strikes which could further damage Soviet’s 
troubled economy. 
In November 1989, “Moscow simply ended its direct rule over the Karabakh and 
returned the territory under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction”. (ibid: 53) Armenians retaliated 
almost immediately by annexing the province just after three days and allocating a 
budget for it. The extreme reluctance of Baku Communist leaders to even condemn the 
Armenian’s act resulted in demonstrations and harassment of Armenians of Baku by 
angry Azeris. The simmering tensions reached a point that in January 1990, Moscow 
declared a state of emergency and moved troops to Baku in order to crush the Popular 
Front who was the main organizer of the unrests, leading to the events of ‘Black 
January’ that resulted in high death toll.  
The heavy handed reaction of the Soviet security forces aiming at the protection of local 
communist authorities’ and containment of national movements not only in Azerbaijan 
but also in other Soviet Republics backfired. “Azerbaijan became the first of the USSR's 
Muslim republics to declare independence, issuing the ‘Declaration on Restoring the 
State of Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan’ on 30 August 1991, and was first 
to be recognised by the outside world, initially by Turkey, on 9 November 
1991.”(Landau as quoted by Hemming 1998:8) 
Azerbaijan’s short history of statehood, its Soviet history and the rise of Azeri 
nationalism played an important role in shaping the foreign policy of the newly 
independent Azerbaijan in its initial years of independence. Moreover, it has been an 





5.2.2. Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy 
As Aliyev (2013:2) has put it “for a predominantly Muslim country with a post-Soviet 
history, yet one that is on the political map of Europe, but has a neighbourhood that 
includes Russia, Iran and Turkey, effective foreign policy is not just an international 
relations instrument - it is a survival tool.”A collection of several factors has turned 
Azerbaijan into the most strategic state in the South Caucasus. Located on an East-West 
crossroad, the country is a “a natural bridge between Europe and Asia, the Muslim and 
Christian worlds and a gateway to energy and transportation corridors for the entire 
region in which it is located.” (ibid)  
Contrary to the above favourable factors, Azerbaijan is faced with geopolitical barriers 
which certainly affect its foreign policy. Lacking natural defences, this small country 
of over 9 million populations is sandwiched between two regional powers, Russia and 
Iran. The country does not share any borders with Turkey, the one regional power 
considered as its natural ally due to cultural and linguistic bonds. As a result, while 
Azerbaijan is deprived of the benefits of common borders with Turkey, it still has to 
consider Ankara’s role and influence in its calculations. In order to have a tension free 
relations with its powerful neighbours, Baku has to consider their interests and 
sensitivities which quite often are far from complementary and quite contradictory. 
 
5.2.2.1. Historical Review of Azerbaijan’s Post Independence Foreign Policy 
Azerbaijan’s main priority, in the immediate aftermath of its independence, was to 
protect state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ayaz Mutalibov, the leader of 
Azerbaijan’s Communist party under Gorbachev became the first appointed president 
of the newly independent Republic of Azerbaijan. The general understanding is that 
during his short term presidency he was executing policies dictated by Moscow. While 
this can be considered as an overestimation of his dependence to Russia, it obviously 
shows Russia’s degree of influence and the direction of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy 
during Mutalibov’s administration.  
While Azerbaijanis were busy with their internal power struggle, Armenians pulled 
together to separate Karabakh from Azerbaijan through military confrontation. The 
Armenians’ occupation of Shusha and Lachin in May 1992 was a final shot on 
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Mutalibov’s legitimacy. He was ousted by the nationalists who elected Elçibey as the 
next president. 
Elçibey’s radical nationalist policies not only failed to prevent Armenians from further 
advances; but also resulted in Azerbaijan’s isolation both regionally and internationally. 
Elcibey’s policies were in sharp contrast with the country’s urgent need to develop its 
regional relations and to employ these relations as leverage against Armenia. “The crux 
of the nationalist movement in Azerbaijan consisted of shedding the Russo-Soviet 
legacy and of (re)asserting Turkic identity through emphasizing common ethnic origins 
and a language similar to that of the Anatolian Turks. Some nationalists also spoke of 
reunification with the Iranian province of Azerbaijan – referred to almost exclusively 
as southern Azerbaijan in the Republic of Azerbaijan – and welcomed the propagation 
of Islam.”(Mehdiyeva 2010:273) Both Azerbaijan and Elçibey paid a heavy price for 
such policies. “The PFA’s unconditionally pro-Turkish stance reduced gains from the 
Azerbaijani-Turkish partnership, as Turkey became increasingly anxious to show its 
unwillingness to antagonize Russia.” (ibid)  Elçibey “declined membership of 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), arguing that it would create another 
version of Russian dominance.” (Aliyeva 2002:3) Upon his persistent demand all 
Russian forces and border troops withdrew in May 1993, making Azerbaijan the only 
former Soviet Republic with no Russian troops on its territory. However, while pulling 
out from Ganje, the 104th Russian Airborne Division left behind their artillery. About 
three weeks later “a coup led by the popular army commander Surat Huseinove toppled 
President Elçibey and his Popular Front government, bringing back to power Heidar 
Aliyev, the former Azerbaijani Communist party leader.” Husainov was the 
commander of the 709th Brigade of Azerbaijani Army based in Ganje. (Human Rights 
Watch 1994:32) Analysts, interpret the consequent election of Aliyev as people’s cry 
for political stability, the much needed pretext for economic development. 
Unlike his two predecessors who defined Azerbaijan’s foreign policy around their 
ideological amities and enmities towards regional powers; Aliyev who was an 
experienced politician, devised his foreign policy based on his percieved state identity 
and assessment of national interests and priorities. For a poverty stricken, 
underdeveloped country which had lost its territorial integrity in armed conflict with its 
smallest neighbour and was faced with potential security threats from three regional 
powers; the immediate objectives were containment- if not the resolution of the conflict, 
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reducing regional security threats and attracting foreign investment for developing  the 
economy. Azerbaijan’s level of relationship with any of major regional and 
international actors, therefore, has been determined based on two priorities; the 
‘Karabakh conflict’ and the ‘economic development’. 
To achieve these objectives, Aliyev undertook a multi vector foreign policy involving 
both regional and international actors. In this pragmatic approach, Baku was skilfully 
flexible in managing relations with major regional and international players in a way 
that it could avoid “being pulled into one of the great powers’ orbits and pursue an 
independent foreign policy. There are not many states that can simultaneously and 
effectively sustain active membership in the CIS and the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation while being dedicated to certain levels of Euro-Atlantic integration.” 
(Aliyev 2013: 11) This policy also meant Azerbaijan’s commitment “to the principle of 
maintaining a secure corridor between Europe and Asia for the free flow of trade, 
people, energy, resources, technology and communications. Ensuring its openness in 
both directions in Eurasia is a crucial guideline for Azerbaijan in formulating its foreign 
policy strategy.” (ibid: 3) 
In addition to their cultural, ethnic and linguistic similarities; Turkey is Azerbaijan’s 
“sole link to Euro Atlantic block.” (Nuriyev 2007: 17) Therefore, it has always been 
considered as Azerbaijan’s closest ally in the region. Nevertheless as Mehtiyev (2012) 
has argued; in order to prevent Turkey’s excessive influence which may reduce their 
hold on Azerbaijan, over the years Aliyev’s have been trying to keep Ankara at arm’s 
length, and strengthen an ‘Azeri’ identity distinct from ‘Turkish’ identity. 
Since none of the regional powers could provide the heavy investment required for the 
development of necessary infrastructure and networks for exploiting its natural 
resources, Azerbaijan resorted to the partnership with Western countries. Negotiations 
were already stepped up during Elçibey following Baku’s bid for developing its oil 
fields. A deal with a consortium of eight large Western companies was close to 
conclusion when the coup happened. Upon his ascendance to power, Aliyev took a firm 
bargaining approach in renegotiating with Western companies for a more favorable 
deal; the first major oil contract was signed in Sep 1994. The deal which focused on 
development of Azeri – Chirag - Guneshli deepwater oil fields and involved 8 Western 
oil companies; was labeled as the contract of the century and “helped Heidar Aliyev to 
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stabilize political situation by extending implicit foreign presence which led to future 
oil contracts.” (Afandiyev 2008:40) 
Although Azerbaijan’s natural resources and transport links were of major interest to 
Western countries, there were also further political incentives for their heavy 
investments not only in economic projects but also in more political social ones. In the 
immediate post independent years, Western countries were hoping to turn Azerbaijan 
into a model Muslim democracy that is friendly both towards the West and Israel. More 
than two decades later, while there is a positive relationship between Azerbaijan and 
the West, as well as Israel, democracy has generally received more of a lip service than 
actual policy attention. “When Azerbaijan joined the Council of Europe (CoE) in 2001, 
the country ratified a list of treaties, and undertook certain, clearly-defined obligations 
– e.g., to consolidate democratic institutions, respect the rule of law, and fundamental 
human rights.”(Amani 2013) However, according to 2013 Freedom House report 
“Azerbaijan is ruled by an authoritarian regime characterised by intolerance for dissent 
and disregard for civil liberties and political rights.”1Upon taking the power in 1991; 
Heidar Aliyev “established relative domestic stability, but he also instituted a Soviet-
style, vertical power system based on patronage and the suppression of political dissent. 
Ilham Aliyev succeeded his father in 2003, continuing and intensifying the most 
repressive aspects of his father’s rule.” (ibid) Despite its dark democracy and Human 
Rights records, as explained in details in chapter 2, Baku has grown closer to the US as 
a result of its practical support for US war on terror. 
Fully aware of the consequences of antagonising Moscow, and in order to avoid 
destabilising effects of such development; and in a bid to attract Russia’s sympathy (if 
not support) regarding the Karabakh conflict; Aliyev took on some appeasement 
initiatives. “He …. agreed to join CIS, vowed a different FP from his predecessor. Also 
signed up to a treaty on Collective Security and Economic Cooperation. By making 
some concessions to Moscow in the oil sector, Azerbaijan’s new government counted 
on the creation of a pro Azerbaijan lobby in Moscow. In fact, influential members of 
the Russian energy lobby did contribute to relaxing pressure on Azerbaijan.” (Nasibli 
2004:161) However, Russia did not back out on its outright support for Armenia, and 
Aliyevs have continuously stood up to Russia’s pressure for stationing its troops on 
                                                          
1 Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2013/azerbaijan> (Accessed on 23.11.2013) 
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Iran-Azerbaijan border and establishment of CIS antiaircraft defence system. (ibid) 
Over the time, “Baku also countered the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement by leaning 
closer towards Russia and fostering a new agreement over the Caspian Sea using rights. 
As a result, Russia has no power to destabilize Azerbaijan internally and the Western 
ties and energy policies give Baku ample space to maneuver.”(Mazziotti, Sauerborn & 
Scianna 2013:7) 
Azerbaijan has also developed a close relationship with the United State’s strategic ally 
in the Middle East, Israel. In fact no other Muslim country has such close relationship 
with Israel and this in itself is an incentive for Azerbaijan: a partnership with Israel 
which no other Muslim state has, no matter how rich, strong or secular they are. This 
unique relation is a bargain chip for Azerbaijan among Western guardians of Israel. 
“For Azerbaijan, developing its strategic and political relations with Israel is a key 
foreign policy priority.” (Aliyev 2013:8) The relationship practically “extends far 
beyond all levels of cooperation between the two states, including common policies in 
increasing people to-people contacts” (ibid) and has several benefits for Azerbaijan. 
First of all it has resulted in Israel’s heavy investment in Azerbaijan’s market and 
infrastructure. Moreover, it has guaranteed “the support of the Israel lobby particularly 
in Congress” (ibid: 9) which can relatively make up for the absence of a strong 
Azerbaijani lobby to counteract the powerful Armenian lobby. Israel is a major arms 
supplier for Azerbaijan while Baku provides about 30% of Israel’s energy needs. 
While significantly contributing to “the realization of such major regional projects as 
TRASECA, the Great Silk Road, alternative oil pipelines, and GUUAM” (Nuriyev 
2004:15) as well as working closely with NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program; as 
many analysts have pointed out, joining the Non Alliance Movement in 2011 was a 
manifestation of Baku’s policy to keep its options open and to not lose its flexibility 




5.3. Iran-Azerbaijan Relations 
Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan can be reviewed in three main periods. First is from the 
establishment to the collapse of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. The second 
period is after integration in the Soviet Republic. Finally, the third period focuses on 
the post Cold War era. 
 
5.3.1. Relations with the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920) 
As discussed before, although the Caucasus became officially the territory of the 
Russian Empire following the execution of Gulistan and Turkmanchay treaties; it took 
many years and forceful policies to distance its people from their Persian background 
and neighbour. Wary of creating further discontent among the Caucasian public, the 
Tsarist Empire had avoided annotation of boundaries in areas where Aras was not the 
border. People could travel back and forth from Persia to Caucasian cities. Nomads 
were seasonally migrating between the northern parts of Persia and southern parts of 
Russia. Kinship relations and marriages continued regardless of the two treaties. (Amiri 
2006: 243) As a result of Russia’s further investment in the Caucasus, trade relations 
between Persia’s northern provinces and Caucasus was developed. The industrial boom 
in Baku following the exploitation of Caspian oil resulted in increased employment 
opportunities. During the latest years of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th 
century, 50% of Baku’s Muslim workers were from Persia. (ibid) 
The establishment of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) provided the first 
instance of state to state relationship between Baku and Tehran. Initially, this 
relationship was not close enough to reciprocate the existing connections between the 
two nations. While Bayat (2009:13) considers the heavy influence of Ottomans as the 
source of this deficiency, Amiri (2006:245) provides further reasons. According to his 
research, in addition to controversial name selection, the followings were among the 
reasons for the slow development and cold relations between the two countries prior to 
August 1919: 
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 Persia’s territorial claims over considerable parts of Azerbaijan and Nakhjavan, 
sending an official petition to Paris Peace conference hoping for Britain’s 
support. 
 Persia’s concerns based on rumours that Azerbaijani agents are seeking political 
and cultural influence in Tabriz. 
Nonetheless, ADR’s gradual realisation of the Ottomans’ complete ignorance towards 
the identity and independent nature of the state of Azerbaijan melt away its icy approach 
towards Persia. Following the Ottoman’s World War defeat and reduction of its direct 
interference in the Caucasus affairs, efforts were made by the ADR for strengthening 
both its independence and its relations with Persia. The followings are the heights of 
Persia-Azerbaijan relations from the second half of 1919 to April 1920: 
 Official recognition of Caucasian Azerbaijan’s independence by Persia. For 
a small newly established country recognition of its independence by its 
important neighbour was a major achievement. 
 Establishment of diplomatic relations and exchange of official delegations 
to the other’s capital and the opening of consulates with wide arrays of 
activities. 
 Increased trade relations between the two countries and improved economic 
cooperation both at people to people and state to state level. (Amiri 2006: 
246)  
Generally speaking Persia-Azerbaijan relations had stabilised during the last few 
months. If the independence of the Caucasus Republics had continued, many problems 
and challenges resulted from the Tsarist rule and Ottoman’s interference may have been 
resolved in those days. The proposal made by Baku delegate during the 1919 Tehran- 
Baku negotiations in Paris is an example of how things could have worked out for 
Persia. During these negotiations, Toopchibashev, Baku’s special envoy had proposed 





5.3.2. The Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan (1920-1991) 
Despite the integration of ADR into the Soviet Union, “the name Azerbaijan, although 
barely two years old, was maintained since it suited the newly established communist 
authorities, who could use it in the future as a political lever to expand their influence 
and rule over the similarly named province in Iran, with the final aim of joining this 
province with the communist controlled state via the Soviet Socialist Republic of 
Azerbaijan.” (Galichian 2012:21) 
When stabilised, Bolsheviks undertook policies that had grave affects in shaping Persia-
Azerbaijan relations for decades to come. These policies were part of a new phase 
which started in national differentiation of various groups, particularly Muslims. In this 
phase, Moscow replaced the horizontal relations between the capitals of the republics, 
with “direct vertical relations between Moscow and each republic”. (Cornell 2010:39) 
Consequently, Moscow sought to “isolate each national group within the Soviet Union 
and hence to prevent contacts with the outside world- in the case of Azerbaijan, 
specifically with Turkey and Iran.” (ibid) In order to achieve this goal, Azerbaijan had 
to be cut off both from its kin and its history. The first step towards this objective was 
to officially rename the population who used to be called ‘Turks’, as ‘Azerbaijanis’ 
without any reference to their background. Change of alphabet for the second time in 
about ten years, was the next step. The population who were just getting used to learning 
Latin which had replaced Arabic alphabet, were faced with an overnight change to 
Cyrillic. “In one stroke, this policy made the majority of the population illiterate.” (ibid) 
Another policy was onslaught of literary and cultural figures of Azerbaijan which had 
the enduring consequence of “blackening the memories of national and cultural leaders, 
distorting their words and misinterpreting their intentions, confiscating their published 
writings and manipulating the content of literature and school curricula. These policies 
reached beyond the lives of destroyed individuals, to affect later generations in ways 
that the present generation is only beginning to grasp.” (Altsadat as quoted by Cornell 
2010:39)  
De-Persianisation was another step in Moscow’s centralisation plan. One aspect of this 
policy was the wide spread attack on anything which had any signs of Persia and 
Persians in the Caucasus.  Under the Soviet pressures all Persian schools and Farsi 
teaching institutes were shut down by 1931. Persian residents of the Caucasus were 
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forced to either change their nationality or face deportation. Consequently tens of 
thousands of people who were robbed of their livelihood were forced back to Iran within 
the time space of 1933-1938. (Bayat 2009:16) Mehdiyeva (2003:280) considers the 
purpose to have been “the breaking (of) Azerbaijan’s historical bonds with Persia.” 
However, these steps were just a preamble to a more sophisticated plan which also 
involved inventing the history. Forging a distorted history for a population of majority 
illiterates, who had lost many of its cultural elite as well as their Persian acquaintances 
- exactly the sort of people who could decry the fake- was not a difficult task.  
According to Mehdiyeva (ibid) “to make this historical revisionism more acceptable, 
the Soviet authorities falsified documents and rewrote history books.” Galichian 
(2012:21) describes how purportedly ‘scientific’ and ‘historical’ efforts for proving the 
Republic of Azerbaijan as an ancient political entity which included publication of 
openly anti Armenian, anti Persian materials were undertaken. In these publications 
Persia was portrayed as a foreign hegemonic power with no relations other than ruthless 
oppression towards the Caucasus. The province of Azerbaijan (the real historical 
Azerbaijan) in north of Persia was reduced to ‘Southern Azerbaijan’. Due to relevant 
isolation of the Soviets in the period between the two World Wars these developments 
with important strategic implications in the Soviet’s foreign policy were remained 
unnoticed in Iran. (Bayat 2009: 16-17) 
The events following the World war II proved the integrity of the Russian orientalist, 
Barthold, who had argued that the purpose of the above historiographic forgeries were 
to pave the way for the future annexation of Iran’s1 Azarbaijan provinces. Following 
the occupation of Iran by Allied forces despite declaration of neutrality by Tehran, “a 
succession of crises, in large part the product of foreign intervention, with which the 
Iranian government was ill equipped to deal, led to a final denouement in 1946.” 
(Fawcett 1992:2) When the war ended, while the United Kingdom and the United States 
pulled out their troops from the Iranian’s occupied territories; the Soviets refused to do 
so. Providing support for secessionist parties, Moscow managed the establishment of 
two People's Democratic Republics of Azerbaijan and Mahabad within Iran’s territory. 
Preventing Iranian army and government forces to reach the province of Azarbaijan; 
the Soviets helped the People’s Republic of Azerbaijan to declare autonomy after a 
                                                          
1  Upon the formal request of Reza Shah Pahlavi, Persia was to be renamed as Iran since 1935. 
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coup de tat. Although the republics were short lived and collapsed following the Soviets 
forced withdrawal (thanks to pressures from the Western governments) in December 
1946, the nightmare of secession has lived in the psyche of the Iranian elite ever since.  
Following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops the famous Iron Curtain prevailed. The 
north and south of the Aras were practically separated with strict border lines and non 
indigenous guards. Although the Caucasus was officially given away to Russia in 
1820s; but for over 70 years since these treaties had come to affect people from the two 
sides of the Aras had maintained their close relations with the other side. Contrary to 
the common belief, it was not after the signing of the treaties, but at this juncture of the 
history when the Iron Curtain fell that people and ethnicities from the two sides of the 
River were practically separated. Following these developments; Iran’s relations with 
Azerbaijan became limited within the framework of Iran-Soviet relations. Nonetheless 
“Baku continued to produce many literary and other works that expressed a strong 
desire to renew ties with Iranian Azerbaijanis”, heavily criticising Iranian Azerbaijanis 
circumstances. (Shaffer 2002:57) 
Generally speaking, following the 1946 events, the Soviet Azerbaijan had a negative 
place in Iran- Soviet relations. Iran’s government viewed Radio Baku’s propagandas as 
interference in its domestic affairs. Socialist Azerbaijan, especially Baku had become 
the heaven for Iranian and Azerbaijani socialists, where left wing parties particularly 
the Tudeh party were receiving continuous support. (Bayat 2009:23) However, 
following the improvement of Tehran’s relations with Moscow during Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi’s era; up until the collapse of the Soviet Union most of trade and economic 
relations of Iran with the USSR, Eastern Europe and even Scandinavian countries were 
undertaken through Azerbaijan. (Valigholizadeh 2012:18)  
Following the improvements of Tehran-Moscow relations in the post 1979 revolution 
era; Rafsanjani, then the speaker of Iran’s parliament travelled to the Soviet Union. In 
this trip he also visited Baku, demonstrating the importance of Azerbaijan for Iran and 
laying “the groundwork for building relations with the Republics of Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia nearly two years before the Soviet collapse.” (Calabrese 1994:81) 
However, the turn of events leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union directed the 
transformation towards channels which were probably unforeseen by Iran. As months 
passed on towards the 1989 fall, “the issue of connections and unity with the 
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Azerbaijanis in Iran became a focal point of PFA activity.” (Shaffer 2002:136) While 
many nationalist activists of the Soviet Azerbaijan, were simply looking for stronger 
relations with Iranian Azerbaijanis through trade and cultural communications, “others 
adopted a more militant approach and sought to directly confront Iran over control of 
south Azerbaijan.” (ibid) “On December 31, 1989, after about a month of relatively 
passive protest, large numbers of demonstrators attacked border stations and the fence 
separating the two countries. This was followed in Baku on January 4, 1990, by a 
150,000-person protest against the tight border restrictions with Iran. In addition, 
thousands of Azerbaijanis began crossing the border illegally (and legally when the 
regimes tried to ‘release steam’ and arranged for mass meetings and reunions), reaching 
a peak of 5,000 on January 18, 1990—only four days after the Karabakh-motivated 
violence in Baku.” (Brown 2004:557) 
Considering the situation as an opportunity for extending its influence in the Soviet 
Azerbaijan, Iran took a positive approach to these crossings and meetings by providing 
accommodations and special headquarters for these guests. With considerable leniency 
from the Soviet border guards and Iranian authorities’ cooperation, Azerbaijani’s 
border crossings continued up until the Black January and the events which led to the 
independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan.  
An important point to be considered with regards to Azeribaijanis’ border crossing into 
Iran was the way it was interpreted by the Islamic Republic’s media. The border 
crossings were certainly the result of the PFA’s agitation for ‘the removal of all political 
borders for development of economic and cultural relations with southern Azerbaijan’. 
While demonstrators at the borders were clearly chanting ‘Azerbaijans to be united, 
Tabriz to be the capital’; the Iranian media reflected the events as the cries of ‘Muslim’ 
Azerbaijanis to join their ‘Muslim’ brethren in Iran, portraying a predominantly 
nationalist move as religious aspirations. This demonstrates the degree of misperception 
which existed in Tehran with regards to public demands, incentives and aspirations in 
the Republic of Azerbaijan. Such misperception has been consistently, but in varying 
degrees the root of miscalculations in Iran’s policies towards Azerbaijan. 
 
5.3.3. Republic of Azerbaijan (1991-Present) 
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Since Azerbaijan’s foreign policy and relations in the immediate post independence era, 
is distinctive from the following years that Aliyev brought a degree of stability to the 
country, and a clear foreign and security policy was compiled, Iran’s relations with the 
Republic of Azerbaijan will be reviewed within two periods of early years and Aliyev’s 
era.  
 
5.3.3.1. Early Years (1991-1993) 
Despite its enthusiasm for developing relations with the former Soviet republics; in 
order to avoid antagonising Moscow, Tehran took a cautious approach in doing so and 
only recognised Azerbaijan’s independence after the official dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Nonetheless, Iran was the first country to open an embassy in Baku and start 
diplomatic relations with this country. Moreover, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued a special order for provision of help and support for Azerbaijani diplomats and 
public.1 
“At the time … the Azerbaijanis saw in Iran a country inhabited by millions of ethnic 
Azerbaijanis, and if perhaps not a direct military ally, at least a pro-Azerbaijani oriented 
mediator in the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. There was a great increase of Iranian 
religious missionaries in Azerbaijan, where there were a lack of qualified mullahs. 
Trade between the two states also went through a period of unprecedented 
growth.”(Souleimanov 2011) In the immediate aftermath of Azerbaijan’s 
independence, both as a consequence of the general collapse of the Soviet’s economy 
and the Karabakh conflict; most agricultural and industrial sectors of Azerbaijan had 
collapsed, therefore, Iran’s role in providing necessities for Azerbaijan was crucial. 
Counting on the support which Iran could provide for his country, Azerbaijan’s 
President Mutalibov’s first destination abroad was Tehran. In his 1991 visit “an 
agreement was reached in Tehran to use the territory of Iran for contacts with 
Nakhjavan under blockade by the Armenians. Documents were also signed for setting 
up a Free Economic Zone in Nakhjavan and expanding the relations between the two 
countries.”(Nasibli 2004:164) Though down played and generally ignored; Iran’s role 
in providing basic services to Nakhjavan’s population was crucial. The quote from 
                                                          
1 Heydar Aliyev va didgāhe dūstie dāemi bā Iran. Available at : 
<http://www.baku.mfa.ir/index.aspx?siteid=193&pageid=24893> (Accessed on 26.04.2016) 
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Heidar Aliyev’s memoires could best demonstrate the importance of the support 
provided by Iran:  
Duo to Armenia’s advances, the Autonomous Republic of Nakhjavan was completely 
disconnected with Baku and other cities of Azerbaijan. We did not have gas and 
electricity there, the water was not enough either, life had become very difficult for us. 
It was then that Ali Akbar Velayati the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, then Iran’s president invited me to Tehran. We discussed provision of aid 
to Nakhjavan and signed a protocol, based on which Iran started the export of 
electricity to Nakhjavan. Particular supplies of food aid were also sent to Nakhjavan. 
Iran facilitated the traffic between Nakhjavan and Azerbijan via a bridge. Many other 
types of help were also provided.1  
Repeating similar comments, Aliyev has emphasised; undoubtedly, it was Iran’s 
brotherly, fair and right approach that made these developments possible.2  
As extensively discussed in chapter 4, Iran also took two other important strategies with 
regards to the Karabakh conflict. First was the provision of military support including 
arms and training for Azerbaijani militias.  
The second was mediation and futile efforts in the conflict resolution. The failed 
mediation attempt was perhaps the first incident which directly affected the trust and 
friendship between the two countries. As explained previously, just as the two 
belligerent sides reached a ceasefire agreement on May 1992 in Tehran; Armenians 
occupied the most strategic military stronghold of Azerbaijan in Shusha. “This 
spontaneous military operation against Azerbaijan damaged the regional status of Iran 
as a mediator in the eyes of Azeris, especially when rumors arose saying that Ter 
Petrosian knew about the attack in advance and used the trilateral meeting in Tehran in 
order to cover this plot and to catch the Azeri military off guard.” (Dyanat 1998:191) 
Iran on the other hand, has always had its own suspicions regarding Armenian’s 
advances in Shusha, a mountainous fortress with high walls overlooking Armenian 
frontiers in surrounding areas. Iran’s former ambassador to Armenia emphasises that 
Shusha is naturally indomitable. There was no way to occupy the fortress unless 
                                                          
1 Sefārate Jomhurie Eslamie Iran dar Baku.  Aliyev va Didgāhe Dūstie Dā’emi bā Iran. Available at: 
<http://baku.mfa.ir/index.aspx?siteid=193&pageid=24893> (Accessed on 20.10.2013). 
2 ibid. and  <http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/290737/weblog/paakaein> (Accessed on 20.10.2013) 
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through airborne operations, which Armenians did not have. Shusha was somehow 
given away by some parties in Azerbaijan in their bid for power.1The unfortunate 
developments put indeed an end to Mutalibov’s government. 
Elçibey’s presidency reversed Tehran-Baku course of friendly relations. His call for 
Iran’s downfall in an interview in Turkey “stirred up serious protests among the Iranian 
elites and alienated Iranian public opinion.” (Alaolmolki as quoted by Suleimanov 
2011)  “The politicization of the myth of Greater Azerbaijan – ardent demands for 
cultural autonomy for the Azeri population of Iran, which would be the first step to 
unification of the two Azerbaijans – formed part of Elçibey’s public discourse and 
foreign policy strategy.” (Mehdiyeva 2003:281) These developments worked as a 
wakeup call for Iran to realise the potential threat emanating from its newly independent 
neighbour and to overcome the illusion of brotherhood. The stark reality encouraged 
Tehran to get involved in re-arranging Baku’s political scene in a more favourable 
shape through clandestine but influential steps. “The most effective response was on 
the unofficial level when Iran used Elçibey’s vehement anti-Iranian, pro-Turkish 
rhetoric to encourage separatist sentiments among the Talysh ethnic minority…. 
Because the Talyshs had succeeded in preserving their essentially Persian ethnic 
identity throughout the Soviet period, Elçibey’s ‘Turkification’ campaign alienated and 
embittered many of them. So it is only understandable that they became very receptive 
to Iranian incitement…. In June 1993, the Talyshs, under the leadership of Alikram 
Gumbatov, proclaimed the formation of an autonomous Talysh- Mughan Republic 
which was widely regarded as an Iranian puppet regime. The secessionist attempt might 
have succeeded had the timing not coincided with Elçibey’s ousting from power.” 
(Mediyeva 2003:271-272)  
Overwhelmed by continuous Armenian advances as well as instability and economic 
meltdown which had taken the country on the verge of total collapse; Elçibey invited 
the experienced politician in Nakhjavan, Heidar Aliyev to come to the rescue. An 
interesting fact which has not been reflected much is that Aliyev was reportedly flown 
to Baku in President Rafsanjani’s private jet. (Uli Nasab 2013) This apparently minor 
detail shows Iran’s close involvement in early developments of Azerbaijan, as well as 
its friendly relations with key politicians. While there are some speculations about 
                                                          
1 Interview with Iran’s former ambassador in Armenia. August 2013 
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Iran’s role in the coup against Elçibey, no clear evidence has been put forward. These 
claims however provide an indirect connection between Iran and the coup. For example 
Azerbaijan’s former ambassador to Iran writes: “Discontented with Elçibey’s policy 
with respect to Iran…… Tehran started supporting the opposition in Azerbaijan … This 
resulted in the June 1993 Coup d’état against Elçibey’s government.” (Nasibli 
2004:165) 
 
5.3.3.2. Aliyevs’ Era (1993-Present) 
In order to stabilise the country both domestically and internationally, Aliyev took steps 
in rebuilding relations with its powerful neighbours, including Iran. “In contrast to his 
nationalist opponents, Heydar Aliyev’s stance on the issue of Azerbaijanis in Iran was 
significantly more pragmatic and followed the concept of ‘sanctity of territorial 
integrity’ that served as the basis for his overall foreign policy concept.” (Brown 
2004:584) Emphasis on cultural historical bonds between the two countries replaced 
the irredentist notions promoted by APF government. Following Aliyev’s positive 
gestures, the relations between the two countries “entered a period that some analysts 
have called détente.”(Souleimanov & Dytrich 2007:104) Several high profile visits 
were made by the heads of states and other politicians of the two countries to mark the 
change in the course of bilateral relations. 
The effects of efforts in improving bilateral relations were clearly manifested in Iran’s 
stance towards the war. In his July 1993 trip to Tabriz which could be interpreted as a 
symbolic manifestation of support for Azerbaijan in the face of Armenia’s occupation 
of Aghdam, Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei said: The government of Armenia and 
the Armenians of Karabakh are oppressing the Muslims of the region, and we denounce 
the recent actions by the Armenians of Karabakh who acted with the support of the 
government of Armenia. We also expect the Armenians in our country to denounce these 
actions.1 This development which can also be interpreted as an immediate response to 
Aliyev’s conciliatory steps towards Iran was followed by the condemnation of 
                                                          
1 Sokhanrānie rahbare enghelāb dar ejtemā’e azime mardome Tabriz. (1993) Available at: 
<http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=10527>  (Accessed on 30.08.2015). 
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Armenian offensive against Azeri cities by the leaders of Iranian Armenians community 
in Tehran.1  
When Armenians reached the city of Kalbajar in August 1993, Iran demanded 
Armenia’s immediate withdrawal in a telegram forwarded to Armenia’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, terming their action as ‘aggression’. (Mirzoyan 2007:191) Further 
Armenian advances towards Nakhjavan provided Iran with a perfect pretext to overtly 
get involved in the conflict. Initially, Iran’s ambassador to Armenia warned the 
Armenian president against any further penetration of the Azeri territory.2 This warning 
was immediately backed by Iranian forces crossing the Aras and their presence in 
Azerbaijan’s territory to prevent further Armenian advances.3 As Cornell explains “an 
occupation of central lowland parts of Azerbaijan would bring Baku under a direct 
threat of Armenian incursion that could have catastrophic consequences for regional 
security.”(Quoted by Souleimanov 2011) This was part of the reason for Iran’s firm and 
decisive action at this stage despite its official neutral stance and Russia’s serious 
objection.  There were also reports of continuous presence of Iran “at Baku's request 
protecting an area around two dams being built on the river Araks  (Aras)”4, pointing 
out to two hydroelectric dams of Khodā Āfarin and Ghizghalesi, which were under 
construction as joint ventures by the two countries. 
Furthermore, together with Turkey, Iran pushed for the UN resolutions 874 and 884 
which called for preservation of ceasefire and end of hostilities, and demanded for 
withdrawal of Armenian troops from the recently occupied territories of Azerbaijan. “It 
was the uncompromising stance taken by Teheran (and Ankara) that at last nearly 
eliminated the determination of the Armenians to annex the Azerbaijani 
enclave.”(Ramezanzadeh as quoted by Souleimanov 2011) 
                                                          
1 Armenians of Iran condemn Karabakh Armenians. (1993), Available at: 
<http://www.nexis.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=2
1_T22564694679&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=26&resultsUrlKey=29_T22
564694635&cisb=22_T22564707807&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10903&docNo=29>   
(Accessed on 20.11.2012). 
2 Interview with Dr. Koleini. Iran’s former ambassador to Armenia. August 2013 
3 ibid. 




(Accessed on 24.06.2012) 
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Moreover Iran cordially welcomed hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijani refugees by 
setting up camps in Azerbaijani side of the border. To understand the sentimental value 
of the help Iran provided for Azerbaijani refugees; one need to remember that at the 
time Iran’s economy was still recovering from the ruins of 8 years war, while hosting 
more than two million Afghan refugees, as well as its own displaced population 
resulting from war with Iraq.1 Tehran also mobilised the Imam Khomeini Relief 
Committee (IKRC), a charitable organisation for providing relief and shelter for the 
poor and needy, to provide services for Azerbaijani refugees.  
However, before the relations really take off; Azerbaijan’s close relation with the West 
proved to be a serious impediment in forging closer ties with Iran. While the Contract 
of the Century was being finalised; US sanctions on Iran were escalating. Upon a 
Congressional Act, US companies were banned from entering into any project in which 
Iran was involved. Consequently Richard Kauzlarich, the US ambassador to 
Azerbaijan, “openly threatened that, should Baku not accept the American demand to 
expel the Iranian company from AIOC, US companies — with their almost 40 percent 
share — would leave the consortium”. (ibid) Baku caved in under the US pressure; 
ignoring its commitment under the treaty it had already signed with Iran upon which 
the NIOC2 was allocated some shares in the same consortium, and Iran was eventually 
expelled from the Contract of the Century. This was a major blow to the efforts made 
by both sides to rebuild bilateral relations. Tehran’s outrage was manifested in its firmer 
approach towards the Caspian demarcation issue. Iran’s Foreign Minister immediately 
announced that “as long as the legal status of the Caspian Sea is not clear, such 
agreements (Contract of Century) are not applicable.”3 
While verbally claiming that the two countries historic ties were too strong to be 
affected by Iran’s dismissal from the consortium; in practice, Tehran took immediate 
steps to show Baku the price of betrayal. “Iran took considerable pains to prevent the 
construction of a main export pipeline (MEP) from the Caspian Sea at Baku and limit 
the exploitation of Caspian oil resources. Tehran … announced that it would not consent 
                                                          
1 BBC Farsi. Iran digar panāhjuye Afghāni va Arāghi nemipazirad. (2005) Available at : 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/story/2005/04/050419_l-afghan-iraq-iran.shtml> (Accessed on 
12.12.2013) 
2 National Iranian Oil Company. 
3 Moscow Times. (1995) Azeris Cut Iran Out of Caspian Oil Accord. Available at: 
<http://www.nexis.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T2256474133
5&format=GNBFI&sort=DATE,A,H&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T22564741329&cisb=22_T225647413
28&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=145252&docNo=1>  (Accessed on 12.03.2012) 
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to a proposed oil pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan via Iran’s territory, and that it 
instead preferred the MEP to lead to terminals on the Persian Gulf.”(Souleimanov & 
Dytrich 2007:105) Though Aliyev tried to make amends by offering “a 10 percent share 
in the consortium in Shah-Deniz, another prospective field with no U.S. interests”, and 
signing another Azerbaijani-Iranian treaty allowing Iranian companies to participate in 
the exploitation of two more Azerbaijani fields — Lenkoran and Talysh— amounting 
to a $1.5 billion deal a year later (ibid), the wound inflicted by Iran’s expelling from 
the Contract of the Century remained unhealed. 
Tehran-Baku bilateral relations stayed relatively trouble free from 1995 till 2003 when 
Heidar Aliyev passed away. He visited Iran and was cordially received 5 times from 
1994 to 2002. The bulk of his period coincided with Khatami’s administration, under 
which a policy of détente and rapprochement in foreign relations, particularly with 
regional countries, was undertaken. Despite closer military cooperation between 
Azerbaijan and the West and modernisation of Azerbaijan’s airbases by the US in 2003 
and negotiations between Azerbaijan and NATO about closer cooperation, the relations 
between the two countries did not become strenuous. (Khatin Ughlu 2013) The fact that 
both heads of states were avoiding tensions was quintessential in improving relations, 
despite considerable differences.  
Bilateral relations between the two neighbours took a downward spiral during 
Ahmadinejad’s administration. Since his initially uncompromising, confrontational 
approach negatively affected Iran’s relations with the West and isolated the country 
internationally, regional countries, in general, showed less interest in close relations 
with Iran, particularly in the face of mounting US pressure. Yet the situation was worse 
in the case of Azerbaijan. The two countries in total summoned each other’s 
ambassadors six times. Iran recalled its ambassador from Baku once. Till 2012, a total 
of 60 civilians from both sides were arrested in the other country accused of espionage 
and terrorist activities. Each country issued protest notes against the arrest of its 
respective civilians in the other country. (Khatin Ughlu 2012) 
Among a spectrum of Baku’s accusations against Iran, one can find “efforts for 
establishing religious extremist groups, broadcasting destructive and divisive 
programmes from the Iranian Azeri language channel- Sahar, espionage activities and 
efforts for establishing terrorist groups in Azerbaijan, and developing relations with 
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Armenia.” (ibid) Baku officials and experts complained that even Iranian ambassadors 
in this period had a ‘security’ approach. They also criticised the interference and parallel 
actions of the IRGC in issues under the jurisdiction of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.1Iran, on the other hand, complained from Baku’s irredentist incitements among 
Iranian Azeris, close relations with US and Israel, cooperation with Israel for espionage 
and assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, promoting Western cultures such as 
Eurovision contests, anti religious approach and efforts for clamping down the rights 
and demands of Muslim population including banning hijab in schools.2 
Amid all the tensions, however, both countries’ officials generally kept up the 
appearance in the public, shaking hands, smiling and emphasising on ‘brotherly’ or 
even ‘strategic’3 relationship based on strong historic foundations. Such positive 
remarks were particularly prevalent among Iranian officials. Tehran’s continued 
détente policy gradually led to development of an interesting phenomenon during 
Ahmadinejad’s administration. In this phenomenon, as Iran became further isolated and 
economically weaker while Azerbaijan grew both economically and politically stronger 
and more internationally integrated; a particular style of bilateral relations emerged 
between the two countries, called by some Iranian experts and scholars as the ‘unilateral 
reverence diplomacy’4. What the critics of Iranian diplomacy meant by this ironic title 
was that despite its relevant might and influence; Iran’s diplomatic apparatus kept an 
overfriendly approach towards Azerbaijan, ignoring frequent offensive or provocative 
actions, overreaching the hand of friendship in the face of obvious hostile postures from 
Baku. 
A comparison of the visits paid by the heads of states in this period with other periods 
might best demonstrate the reverse term that bilateral relations had taken under 
Ahmadinejad. During the 10 years reign of Heidar Aliyev as the head of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan; he visited Iran five times, two of them for taking part in regional 
summits. During the same period only Hashemi Rafsanjani as the head of Iranian state 
once visited Azerbaijan officially in 1994. From 2003 to 2013, Iran’s heads of state paid 
6 official visits to Baku (one by Khatami, 5 by Ahmadinejad), two of them for taking 
                                                          
1 Deutsche Welle. (2013) Badtarin dorāne monāsebāte Iran va Azerbaijan dar zamāne Ahmadinejad. Available at: 
<http://www.dw.de/ احمدینژاد-نزما-در-آذربایجان-و-ایران-مناسبات-دوران-بدترین /a-16856511>  (Accessed on 12.11.2013) 
2 ibid. 
3 Farsnewss. (2013) Iran dar Jomhurie Azerbaijan: Ravābete Tehran-Baku strategic ast.  Available at: 
<http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920325000739>  (Accessed on 10.01.2014) 
4 Modele Ehterame yek Janebe. 
194 
part in regional summits. Elham Aliyev, on the other hand, visited Iran only three times, 
two of which were for taking part in regional summits. Ahmadinejad’s last visit was 
less than two months after Aliyev’s refusal to take part in the summit of the Non 
Aligned Movement in Tehran, apparently ‘to demonstrate Iran’s ultimate effort in 
strengthening bilateral relations.’1 This statistics shows how the deterioration of 
bilateral relations had resulted in the reverse order of high rank visits. Looking at the 
context one can conclude that increased number of visits by Iran’s president particularly 
from 2009 onwards has been out of concern and with the purpose of confidence 
building, rather than the outcome of close friendship. 
The relations between the two countries deteriorated to a degree that in an interview 
with a prominent diplomacy website, Hassan Rouhani; then the presidential candidate2 
remarked that it is not an exaggeration to say that the Republic of Azerbaijan has 
become a security threat for Iran. Some anti Iranian actions undertaken in the Republic 
of Azerbaijan indicate the inclination of some Azeri officials to endanger the security 
and territorial integrity of Iran. Iranian officials should in no way be indifferent or 
ignorant towards such actions. This in no way means creating crisis and adding further 
to the tensions to confront this situation, there is a need to prudence, tolerance and 
assertiveness; which hopefully will be paid attention to in the coming administration.3 
More than two years into Rouhani’s administration, as the general international 
atmosphere towards Iran seems more positive; its bilateral relation with Baku has taken 
off quite rapidly. As prescribed during his campaign; Rouhani’s government took a firm 
stand when in November 2013 Azerbaijan closed its borders in Poldasht and Shah 
Takhti following an anonymous shoot out with no casualties in the area.4 Though a 
minor event, it was a sign for the end of the ‘unilateral reverence diplomacy’. 
                                                          






%D8%A2%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86>  (Accessed on on 
15.10.2013) 
2 Became Iran’s 11th president in 2013. 
3 Diplomācie Irani. (2013) Hasan Rouhani: Jomhurie Azerbaijan be tahdide amniati barāye Iran tabdil shodeh ast. 
Available at: 
<http://fa.arannews.com/?MID=21&type=news&BasesID=2&TypeID=1&id=38532#sthash.NhA8S17a.dpbs>    
(Accessed on 20.10.2013) 
4 When Iran’s requests for opening the borders did not get any results; it closed its borders on Azerbaijan in Jolfa 
and Bilesavar with prior notice to Baku’s officials.4 ISNA (2013) Yek maghāme Sefārate Iran dar Baku baste 
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The new administration has tried to reshape the relations on a more proportionate status, 
while taking a positive and opportunity based approach (Taraghi Nejad 2015), down 
playing existing threats such as Azerbaijan’s close relations with Israel.1 Aliyev’s visit 
in spring 2014 was reciprocated by Rouhani’s visit in autumn, followed by a series of 
officials’ visits from various sectors with the purpose of expanding the relations 
particularly in economy and trade. As the result of this win-win diplomacy, as Iran’s 
ambassador has put it the two countries have passed the confidence building stage 
rapidly and are looking to improvement of bilateral relations.(ibid) 
 
5.3.4. Iran-Azerbaijan Relations: Sectoral Analysis 
In order to provide an analytical view of Iran-Azerbaijan bilateral relations, to 
understand the pattern of enmity and amity between the two countries and the obstacles 
for closer relations this section provides analysis based on Buzan’s idea of security 
sectors. “Sectors might identify distinctive patterns, but they remain inseparable parts 
of complex wholes. The purpose of selecting them is simply to reduce complexity to 
facilitate analysis.” (Buzan, Weaver & de Wild 1997:8)   
 
5.3.4.1. Political Sector 
According to Buzan, “political security concerns the organisational stability of states, 
system of government, and the ideologies that gives them stability” (Buzan, Weaver & 
de Wild 1997:8) Expanding on this he explains that “political threats are aimed at the 
organizational stability of the state. Their purpose may range from pressuring the 
government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the government, or fomenting 
secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state, so as to weaken it….” 
(1991:118) Based on this definition and a general review of political relations between 
                                                          
shodane marzhāye Jolfa va Bilesavar rā ta’eid kard. Available at: http://isna.ir/fa/news/92081710928/-یک-مقام
 .(Accessed on 28.11.2013)  سفارت-ایران-در-باکو-بسته-شدن-مرزهای
1 Iran’s ambassador in Baku calimed in an interview that Azerbaijan-Israel relations are not strategic... Zionist 
media are trying to influence Tehran-Baku relations negatively by propagating Baku-Tel avive relations. More 




%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B4%D8%AF> (Accessed on 23.04.2016) 
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the two countries provided in previous sections; the followings can be considered as 
main political issues Iran-Azerbaijan relations.  
 
5.3.4.1.1. Territorial claims 
Iran’s Northern Provinces 
Despite variations in statistics, most authenticated sources consider relative percentage 
population of Iranian Azeris about 16% of Iran’s total population.1 Some specialists 
believe that Iranian Azeris are of different ethnic origin from that of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, as the first one has a Persian/Aryan background and the latter is of 
Caucasian Albania ethnicity. According to these experts, the shared Azeri language is 
not a definitive factor in proving shared ethnicity. This study is not focusing on the 
aforementioned argument but on the fact that using the perceived shared ethnicity; 
Azerbaijan has time and again, through different platforms incited secessionist notions, 
threatening Iran’s territorial integrity by promoting concepts such as the Greater 
Azerbaijan and Northern/ Southern Azerbaijan. 
As explained before “the name Azerbaijan was first used to denote the territory of the 
modern-day Republic of Azerbaijan only in 1918. This happened under the auspices of 
the Ottoman Porte, which used the post-revolutionary chaos and the Civil War in 
Russia, the weakness of Iran and the relative lack of interest of Britain (who at the time 
had occupied large parts of Iran) to promulgate its own imperial ambitions.” 
(Mehdiyeva 2010: 275)  
Irredentist sentiments which were initially encouraged by the Soviet Union to serve 
Moscow’s expansionist ideas received a momentum under the AFG through Elçibey’s 
idea of creating a Greater Azerbaijan; damaging the trust of Iranian officials had 
towards Azerbaijan. “Although Elçhibey’s statements did not fuel nationalist 
sentiments among the Azerbaijani population of Iran, their impact upon Iranian 
perceptions of the Azerbaijani threat can hardly be questioned.” (Souleimanov & 
Dytrich 2007:104) 
                                                          
1 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html> (Accessed on 03.03.2014) 
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Despite Heidar Aliyev’s efforts in damage control as well as managing ultra nationalist 
voices coming from his country, the issue remained highly sensitive and later created 
considerable tensions in bilateral relations. Generally following on his father’s 
footsteps, Elham Aliyev tried to stay away from such controversial issues in relations 
with Iran during his early years of leadership. About a year into his reign, Brown 
(2004:592) wrote “Ilham simply does not make reference to the Southern Azerbaijan 
issue at all, and almost never even mentions the Azeris there, generally preferring to 
refer to compatriots who live in different countries of the world. More amazingly, while 
his Presidential website has long transcripts of his talks to Azeris living in the Ukraine, 
Georgia, Byelorussia, Moldova, Russia, Europe, and Turkey, there is no mention of the 
Azeris in Iran.” While this approach helped in containing the tensions to some degree; 
the substitute idea of calling the Republic of Azerbaijan as the ‘common motherland’ 
for all Azerbaijanis of the world and Aliyev as the leader of all Azerbaijanis is still 
irritating for Iran as the first notion is ignorant towards the fact that Iran is home to the 
majority population of the world Azerbaijanis and the latter notion bears the 
connotation of Iranian Azeris’ allegiance to Aliyev and the Republic of Azerbaijan and, 
therefore, pose a threat to Iran’s political security.  
Moreover, the policy of distancing from irredentist notions did not last long. Parallel to 
deterioration of Iran’s status in the international community and increased isolation, as 
well as deterioration of its relations with Azerbaijan, the myth of the ‘Greater 
Azerbaijan’ was revisited more frequently and through different platforms. “The idea 
of the New or Greater Azerbaijan was periodically revisited, even in 2012, by various 
politicians, organizations or media from Azerbaijan or Turkey. There is talk that 
Azerbaijan should take advantage of the situation created by the Arab spring and by a 
potential destabilization of Iran, in order to turn the idea into reality. The territorial 
limits of the Great Azerbaijan dream are not precisely drawn; however, references were 
made about Dagestan and Georgia, including northern Iran and an exit to the Persian 
Gulf.”(Pivariu 2012) One example of such efforts is a proposal put by some Azerbaijani 
MP’s to change the name of their country to the “Republic of Northern Azerbaijan”.1 
                                                          
1 BBC Farsi. (2012) Talāsh dar pārlemāne Jomhurie Azerbaijan barāye afzudane onvāne shomāli be nāme in 
keshvar. Available at: 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2012/02/120209_l23_iran_azarbayjan_change_name.shtml>  (Accessed on 
06.03.2014) 
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In March 2013, the secessionist South Azerbaijan National Liberation Front held a 
conference with the title of “the Down of Southern Azerbaijan” in Baku.1 Iranian Azeris 
were encouraged by speakers of this conference in which some Azeri MPs and former 
officials attended, to seize the opportunity of Iran’s economic struggle and international 
isolation to build an independent state. (Aghayev 2013) Consequently, Azerbaijan’s 
ambassador to Tehran was summoned to be warned that such provocative actions can 
seriously damage neighbourly ties. (ibid) “A few days later, the Iranian 
newspaper Kayhan, which is close to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei, published an article calling for a referendum on the accession of Azerbaijan 
to the Iranian Republic. In April, the Iranian parliament began to draft a law providing 
for the annexation of Azerbaijan.”(Weiss 2013) 
Irredentists’ voices and claims coming from Baku have initiated a vicious circle in 
which some Iranian nationalists have started a counterattack by promoting the idea of 
“northern Iran” for the Republic of Azerbaijan and demanding reintegration of this 
republic into Iran, playing into the hands of media for creating further phobia of Iran 
among the Azerbaijani public.  
In addition to encouraging secessionist movements; Baku is generally following two 
paths for promoting the myth of the Greater Azerbaijan. One is through the change of 
Azerbaijani nationals’ perception, not only towards present day Iran but also the 
historical facts about the relations between the two countries. Through the publication 
of books, papers, specific brochures targeting ethnography… in several languages 
“with the support of the officials of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Science and 
government ministries” and financed heavily by Heydar Aliyev Foundation (Galichian 
2012:38) Azerbaijanis learn a fabricated history which convinces them of their right to 
demand for the integration of the Southern Azerbaijan into the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
This fabrication of history has particularly targeted younger generations. Azerbaijan’s 
curricular books were revised in 1991. In the revised version of history books from the 
fifth grade in primary school to university, there is a great emphasis on national values 
and sentiments of Azeri nation, while Azerbaijan’s geography is introduced way over 
the present day Republic of Azerbaijan’s borders, covering the whole north western 
parts of Iran. (AmirAhmadian 2005:186) The Republic of Azerbaijan is introduced in 
                                                          
1 Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. (2012) Mahāfele Iranie tajzieh talab dar Jomhurie Azerbaijan be Amrica 
vābaste hastand. Available at: <http://news.irib.ir/NewsPage.aspx?newsid=28796>  (Accessed on 06.03.2014) 
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its curricular history books as an ancient country which has been constantly under the 
threat of occupation by Persian kings. Iranian public figures such as Nezāmi Ganjavi 
and Khāghāni1, Khāje Nasir Tusi,2 etc. are introduced as Azeri public figures and 
Iranian cities such as Tabriz and Ardabil are introduced as Azerbaijani cities. The 
Teacher’s Guidance book for History specifically introduces Azerbaijan as an 
independent country which was divided in two during Iran-Russia wars, the northern 
part has acquired its independence quickly, and the second part is still under Iran’s 
occupation. (ibid) Through this strategy, Azerbaijan’s new generation grows up 
believing to have territorial rights over Iran’s north western provinces with grudges 
against Iran in their hearts. 
Proactive promotion of the myth of the Greater Azerbaijan, both by politician and 
scholars has been another strategy to communicate the idea internationally, particularly 
among Western scholars and politicians. Lack of active scholarly and often political 
response by Iranian scholars and officials have convinced some Western audience of 
the reality of Azerbaijan’s claims, so much that some of these scholars use these myths 
as facts for analyzing the two countries’ behaviour and propose solutions based on their 
perceived facts. Relying on these analyses, efforts have been made to encourage 
Western, particularly US politicians to support the cause for realizing the Greater 
Azerbaijan dream. In 2012, Congressman Rohrabacher wrote to the US Secretary of 
State to urge the United States to back struggles for freedom of Azeris from Iran. He 
stated, “The people of Azerbaijan are geographically divided and many are calling for 
the reunification of their homeland after nearly two centuries of foreign rule. Aiding the 
legitimate aspirations of the Azeri people for independence is a worthy cause in itself. 
Yet, it also poses a greater danger to the Iranian tyrants than the threat of bombing its 
underground nuclear research bunkers.”3 Although his proposal received a cold 
shoulder by the US Department of State,4 the case shows the extent of efforts made in 
this regard. In the face of such clear and outright threat to its territorial integrity, the 
Islamic Republic, like any other state in the world’s anarchic system, is expected to take 
                                                          
1 Persian language poets born in present day cities of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
2 Born in Tus, a non Azeri north east province of Iran, died in Baghdad. 
3 PRESS RELEASE*** Rep. Rohrabacher Urges Secretary Clinton to Back Freedom from Iran for Azeris. 
Availabe at:< http://rohrabacher.house.gov/press-release/press-release-rep-rohrabacher-urges-secretary-clinton-
back-freedom-iran-azeris>   (Accessed on 06.03.2014) 
4 BBC Farsi. (2012) Nāmeye Ozve Kongereye Amrica darbāreye Jodā Shodane Azerbaijan az Iran. Available at: 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/world/2012/08/120829_u06_rohrabacher_letter_clinton_azeri.shtml>  (Accessed 
on 06.03.2014) 
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measures to ensure its own security and integrity. As pointed out in an event at Harvard 
University “truly, the main difficulties in the relations between Tehran and Baku 
emanate from this factor”.1 
An important point that many scholars and politicians often tend to miss is Azerbaijan’s 
double standards over the relations between ethnicity and territorial claims. While Baku 
categorically denies Armenian’s claims over Nagorno Karabakh based on the principle 
of the sanctity of territorial integrity; it encourages irredentism based on presumed 
shared ethnicity with regard to Iranian Azerbaijanis.2  
 
Caspian Sea Demarcation 
Over the last two and half decades, the two countries’ dispute over the Caspian Sea 
demarcation has not been resolved. Azerbaijan which was the first among littoral states 
to undermine the existing treaties on the legal status of the Caspian Sea and to sign 
contracts for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources; insists on 
considering  Astara-Hossain Gholi Khan as the defining line for maritime border 
between the two countries. Based on this division, Iran would only receive 11% share 
from the seabed resources. Tehran, however, insists on equal division, based on which 
it could have a 20% share. The dispute over the Caspian Sea demarcation has had many 
consequences, including militarisation of the Sea. An example of the seriousness and 
sensitivity of the issue was the 2001 maritime incident in which an Iranian military boat 
ordered two Azerbaijani ships operated by BP out of the disputed area. While the 
Azerbaijani government had licensed the BP led consortium to carry out exploratory 
activities in the field called by Baku as Arax-Alov-Sharq, Iran had licensed national 
companies to explore the same block which it calls Alborz. 
While most analysts see these developments through the prism of rivalry over 
hydrocarbon resources, one should keep in mind the profound importance of territorial 
                                                          
1 Kennedy School of Government. Azerbaijan- Iran Relations: Challenges and Prospects (Event Summary) 
Available at:< http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/12750/azerbaijan_iran_relations.html>  (Accessed 
on 13.03.2014). 
2 For more detailed analysis of Azerbaijan’s double standard approach with regard to the issue of ethnicity and 
territorial integrity see: Brown, c. “Wanting to Have Their Cake and Their Neighbor’s Too: Azerbaijani attitudes 
towards Karabakh and Iranian Azerbaijan.” In: Middle East Journal. Vol.58. No.4. Autumn 2004, pp.577-600. 
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integrity for the Islamic Republic. Time and again Iranian authorities have emphasised 
that Iran’s territorial integrity is not negotiable. They, in fact, take pride in not losing 
an inch of the country’s territory despite 8 years of war and 35 years of international 
pressures and various territorial claims by neighbours. As Iran’s former ambassador to 
Armenia emphasizes “Iran had lost considerable parts of its territory under various 
dynasties. Even under Pahlavi’s, Sadrak was given to Turkey and Bahrain was 
separated from Iran. The Islamic Republic has not and will not let this happen again.”1 
 
5.3.4.1.2. Opposing State Ideologies & Policies 
Since Iran has a theocratic system in which all the affairs of the state are overseen by 
religious authorities to ensure they are within the confines of religious teachings and 
Azerbaijan has a secular state in which there is an emphasis on separation between the 
church (or the mosque in this case) and the state affairs, the two states are essentially 
incompatible. This opposing nature has resulted in the escalation of tensions between 
the two countries in more than one way, which will be briefly discussed in this section. 
 
 
Perception of Political Imposition 
 
Despite Iran’s pragmatic policy towards Caucasian countries which was discussed in 
Chapter 4, there has been a widespread perception among Azeri political elites that 
Tehran is trying to impose its own model of governance on Azerbaijan. Revolutionary 
ideals such as export of Islamic values can be a precedent for such perception, but 
Azeris have also evidence to prove their perception. Iran’s active cultural and religious 
presence in Azerbaijan which will be discussed further in the societal section is one, 
though as Iran has argued in the past, such activities could be considered as efforts to 
increase social relations between the two nations based on cultural commonalities.  
                                                          
1 Interview held in August 2013. 
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Iran’s objection to accelerated Westernisation and secularisation of Azerbaijan is 
considered as another evidence of its political imposition on Azerbaijan. As in some 
occasions, increased criticisms over Azerbaijan’s secularisation process in the Iranian 
public sphere coincided with mass demonstrations and protests towards government 
policies in Azerbaijan, Baku authorities have argued such domestic developments to be 
incited by Iran. Iranian elites, however, reject the accusation, pointing out to the fact 
that accelerated secularisation process has coincided with the Arab spring instigating 
Azeri people’s protests and objection towards government policies. 
 
Amities & Enmities 
As Buzan has put it, the concepts of amity and enmity cannot be attributed solely to the 
balance of power. Issues that can affect the quality of relations range from elements 
such as ideology, territory, ethnic lines, and historical precedent. (Stone 2009:6)  
Diverging geopolitical alignments in the South Caucasus have resulted in a particular 
pattern of amity and enmity between Iran and Azerbaijan and their allies. In this pattern, 
each country is allied with the enemy of the other, seriously damaging the mutual trust 
necessary for friendly relations.  
Azerbaijan Allies: As explained in chapter 3, defined by its ideological essence, the 
Islamic Republic’s foreign policy rejects the present international system and its 
affiliated norms and patterns of behaviour. The Islamic Republic’s efforts to resist, alter 
or at least correct what it perceives wrong and unjust has left Iran in conflict with 
present international system and Western powers who sponsor it, and has turned them 
to the country’s powerful adversaries. 
Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has no problem with this system. Through establishing 
a positive approach towards the system, it has made efforts to exploit the existing 
opportunities to its own interest. This means establishing close relations and alliances 
with exactly those countries that Iran antagonizes. Azerbaijan’s partnership with such 
countries means prioritizing their demands and interests over Tehran’s, which can 
obviously pose various kinds of security threats to Iran. Controversies over transport 
routs which resulted in bypassing Iran despite being the shortest and most economic 
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route or the case of Baku- Ceyhan-Tbilisi project from which Iran was suspended both 
due to US pressure, are examples of such dilemmas. 
Speculations on how far Baku is willing to go with its allies and against the interests of 
Iran have at times tarnished the relations further. In 2011 for example, there were 
speculations about relocating members of the terrorist group MKO1from Iraq to 
Azerbaijan. In a vehement response to these speculations, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ spokesman remarked that “we hope that neighbouring countries will note our 
sensitivity and do not do anything to damage their good relations with Iran by taking 
measures which will have very negative consequences for them.”(Kaleji 2012) Iranian 
Azeri MPs demonstrated an even tougher reaction to these speculations by proposing 
the revision of Turkmanchai treaty, emphasizing that Iranian Azeri speaking population 
will show an unpredictable response to conspiracies of Azerbaijani authorities if they 
continue their anti Iranian, anti Islamic conspiracies.2  
While Iran has always been critical of Azerbaijan’s close relations with Western 
countries, particularly US; it has always tried to cope with the needs of the South 
Caucasus countries for the presence of Western countries and organisations for 
developing their economy and security. However, Tehran has not been and could not 
have been so compromising towards Baku-Tel Aviv’s increasingly close relations, 
which in turn has affected Tehran-Baku relations seriously.  
Although, Baku has refrained from opening an embassy in Israel out of concerns about 
other Muslim countries’ reactions; the two countries have had a flourishing relationship, 
particularly since the early 2000s. Aliyev’s remarks revealed in a 2011 Wikileaks cable 
can best demonstrate how far these relations have gone. According to the cable, during 
the May 2008 visit of the Israeli Agriculture Minister, Aliyev described the bilateral 
relations as ‘the tip of an iceberg which nine-tenths of it is below the surface’. This 
clearly implies a much deeper and broader relationship between the two countries than 
meets the eyes.3 The summary of the same cable reports that “Azerbaijan’s relations 
with Israel are discreet but close. Each country finds it easy to identify with the other’s 
                                                          
1 Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (People's Mojahedin of Iran) 
2 Fararu. (2011)  Iran momken ast dar Ahdnāmeye Torkamanchāy bāznegari konad. Available at : 
<http://fararu.com/fa/news/99433/ کند-بازنگری-ترکمنچای-عهدنامه-در-است-ممکن-ایران  
(Accessed on 09.03.2014) 
3 The full text of the relevant cable can be found in the complementary section of the article Wikileaks: Azerbaijan-
Israel Relations behind the scenes. Published in Feb 2011, Available at: 
<http://azerireport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2618> (Accessed on 20.01.2014) 
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geopolitical difficulties and both rank Iran as an existential security threat…..  and the 
two countries’ cooperation flows from this shared recognition.” Further down in the 
same cable there is an interesting evidence of Baku’s closeness to Tel Aviv as in 
contrast to its relations with Tehran: 
“The Azerbaijani authorities assiduously protect Israeli interests in Baku. For example, 
xxxxxxx told Emboff that the GOAJ1 had noticeably improved local security at the 
Israeli Embassy when the most recent operations began in Gaza. When authorities got 
word of a planned demonstration on January 2, they dispatched buses to the place where 
the protesters were preparing to set off for the Embassy and arrested them on the spot. 
Police detained 25 of the 150 demonstrators rounded up, and 20 of them were sentenced 
to 10 or 15 days, detention. In sharp contrast, the GOAJ allows demonstrators to picket 
the Iranian Embassy, so long as the subject of the protest is the treatment of Azeris in 
Iran.”(ibid) 
Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister’s reaction to criticisms coming from Iran with regard to 
Israeli President’s visit is another clear example of Baku’s priorities. When Iran’s Chief 
of Armed Forces warned that “Peres’s visit would create problems between Iran and 
Azerbaijan” (RFL/ June 05 2009); Elmar Mammadyarov replied to Firuzabadi’s remark 
by saying that “Iran's latest statements about a planned visit to Baku by Israeli President 
Shimon Peres are regrettable and should not have come from Iran's military forces. ….. 
Azerbaijan does not interfere in other countries' foreign affairs and will not allow other 
countries to do so." (ibid) This frank response was in sharp contrast to the soft and 
appeasing tone that Azeri officials normally take towards their powerful neighbours.  
While Iran’s concern about the involvement of its adversaries in the neighbourhood is 
natural, it is more understandable in the case of Israel’s activities in Azerbaijan since 
they pose a direct threat to Iran’s security. This issue will be further discussed in the 
military sector. Azerbaijan’s partnership with Western countries and Israel has created 
a vicious circle in its bilateral relations with Iran. In this circle, the closer Azerbaijan 
gets to its allies the more tension is created in its relations with Tehran. On the other 
hand, the more isolated Iran has become internationally the more provocative Baku has 
become. 
                                                          
1 Government of Azerbaijan 
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Iran’s Ally: Azerbaijan has long been complaining about Iran’s partnership with 
Armenia and has particularly tried to justify its alliance with Israel based on Iran’s 
partnership with Armenia. While Iran has always officially supported Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity, its partnership has provided Armenia with the opportunity to bypass 
the sanctions and blockade imposed by both Azerbaijan and Turkey. Without the 
provision of a lifeline by Iran, Armenia may have had to give in to economic pressures 
and take a more compromising approach in the Karabakh conflict.  
However, Azerbaijani elite conveniently ignore Iran’s crucial support of Azerbaijan in 
the early years of the conflict and Baku’s ungracious response to those supports. Iran’s 
alliance with Armenia is the direct consequence of two developments in Azerbaijan’s 
domestic and foreign policies. First was the promotion of the myth of Greater 
Azerbaijan as a core policy of Elçibey’s government and continuous residual effects of 
that policy in Azerbaijan’s approach towards Iran. “The consequences of the thirteen 
month-long Elçibey government was remarkable and — from an Azerbaijani 
perspective — quite catastrophic. Iran, a country that had until that time, by statute, 
backed Islamic movements around the world, started to support Christian Armenia, 
which found itself at war with Shia Azerbaijan. (Cornell as quoted by Souleimanov and 
Dytrich 2007:104) PFG’s policy towards Russia and Iran resulted in the emergence of 
“a new geopolitical triangle encompassing Moscow-Tehran-Yerevan.” (Nasibli 
2004:158) 
Another development was Azerbaijan’s partnership with the West which undermined 
Iran’s policy of excluding or marginalizing foreign powers from regional dynamics and 
establishing partnership with regional countries. Iran’s former ambassador to Armenia 
emphasises that as long as Azerbaijan is not prepared for a real partnership, Iran would 
not invest beyond a certain degree in its relations with this country.1 Meaning that 
Tehran would certainly do not sacrifice its relations with other regional countries for 
the sake of Azerbaijan. As a result of the aforementioned developments and with Iran’s 
Russia centric regional politics as a catalyst, Iran together with Russia, Armenia and 
Greece established a strategic partnership (Valigholizadeh 2012:32) Regardless of the 
roots and causes of Iran’s partnership with Armenia, Baku views this relationship as a 
threat to positive developments in the Karabakh conflict. 
                                                          
1 Interview with Dr. Koleini held on August 2013  
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5.3.4.2. Military Sector 
According to Buzan and colleagues (1998:51) military security is “the two level 
interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states’ perception of each 
other’s intentions”. Regional and international geopolitical developments, particularly 
in recent decade have resulted in the replacement of military cooperation opportunities 
between Iran and Azerbaijan with posing military threats for one another. As it will be 
demonstrated in this section, transregional actors have had a pivotal role in the 
escalation of such threats and tensions. 
Over 600 kms of shared borders have bound the two countries with considerable degree 
of mutual security concerns; while their tension ridden political relation has limited 
military and defence cooperation and at time has taken them on the verge of military 
confrontation. Iran’s cooperation with Azerbaijan in this area is based on the need for 
ensuring its border and domestic security.  
Tehran’s military and technical cooperation with Azerbaijan officially started in March 
1992 when the two countries signed an agreement based on which Iran provided 
training for Azerbaijani soldiers. These trainings never included Azerbaijani officers 
and ended in 1996. The first military pact between the two countries was signed during 
Khatami’s administration. In the same period, Defence Ministers met to discuss further 
defence co operations. Despite several such meetings and verbal emphasis on further 
co operations, there is not much evidence to show that these promises have actually 
been materialised, and there is not much likelihood of that under difficult relations that 
the two countries have had particularly within the last few years. The only significant 
achievement in this area was an MOU signed between Iran’s Interior Minister and his 
Azerbaijani counterpart in 2010. Based on this MOU the two countries have committed 
on cooperation in combating organised crimes, drug trafficking, money laundering etc. 
(Moradi 2011) Furthermore, following the April 2015 visit of Iran’s Minister of 
Defence from Baku, the two sides agreed on establishing a joint working group 
comprised of officials and experts from both side to boost cooperation in defence and 
security areas. (Niayesh 2015) 
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Although the shared borders are conflict free but drug trafficking has become an 
increasingly worrying concern for Azerbaijan. Despite heavy anti narcotics penalties 
and continuous conflict with drug trafficking mafia which has resulted in the death of 
thousands of Iranian soldiers; drug smugglings from Afghanistan, through Iran into 
other countries has witnessed dramatic increase in recent years. According to a 2009 
US embassy cable from Baku released on Wikileaks, the volume of heroin smuggled 
from Iran to Azerbaijan had increased from 20 kg in 2006 to 59 tons in 2009.1 Despite 
this report and claims by Azerbaijani officials about the involvement of Iranian security 
services in trafficking drugs to Azerbaijan2, the United Nations office on Drug and 
Crime has pronounced Iran as one of the most active countries in fighting against 
narcotics.3  
While tensions and disputes between the two countries have never degenerated into an 
actual military conflict, the two countries bear military threat to each other. One aspect 
of such threats is the militarisation of the Caspian Sea. Although both countries have in 
the past emphasised on demilitarisation of the Sea, regional geopolitical 
transformations following NATO’s involvement and increased tensions among littoral 
states due to undetermined legal status of the Caspian Sea have mounted the arms race 
in this region. With the exception of Russia and Iran which have always had a strong 
naval presence in the Caspian Sea, up until 2002 the other three littoral states only had 
small coast guards with fishing control boats equipped with small arms. (Sargsyan 
2010) However, following the failure of the Ashgabat summit in April 2002 in reaching 
an agreement on the legal status; a series of manoeuvres were exercised by littoral states 
with the purpose of asserting their might and will to safeguard what they perceive as 
their share of the Sea. In August 2003, Azerbaijan held the “GOPLAT naval 
manoeuvres on the protection of oil and gas producing platforms with the participation 
of 18 US seamen.” (ibid) In other words, Azerbaijan opened the path for the US 
presence in the Caspian Sea, a development which both Iran and Russia despise very 
much. 
                                                          
1  BBC Farsi. (2012) Iran va Azerbaijan dar Wikileaks: pulshu’ei va mavāde mokhadder. (2012) Available at: 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2012/06/120609_l23_lp_neighbours_wikileaks_iran_azarbayjan.shtml> 
(Accessed on 10.10.2013). 
2 ibid 
3 New York Times. (2012) The West’s Stalwart Ally in the War on Drugs: Iran (Yes, That Iran). (2012) Available 
at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/middleeast/iran-fights-drug-smuggling-at-borders.html?_r=0> 
(Accessed on 15.02.2014). 
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In 2003, “the former US Coast Guard Cutter Point Brower was officially turned over to 
Azerbaijan.”1 This was “the third patrol boat of its type that the US government has 
given Azerbaijan….. Two smaller US Coast Guard cutters were given to Azerbaijan in 
2000.”(ibid) In 2005, a budget of $100 million was allocated “for Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan to build a comprehensive maritime surveillance, command and control and 
quick reaction capability in the Caspian”. (Blank 2005) This was in obvious 
contradiction of Ilham Aliyev’s 2004 call for demilitarisation of the Caspian Sea which 
was backed and hailed by Iranian Officials.2 An overhaul of its Caspian naval fleet has 
been an important part of Azerbaijan’s explosive military expenditure in recent years. 
This includes “a series of new vessels, including two new submarines and the country’s 
first destroyer.”(Rimmer 2013) Moreover, Azerbaijan “inaugurated a new base for its 
navy on the Caspian Sea, which it calls "the largest and most modern military object in 
the Caspian basin" in late June 2015 and has planned to carry out the first ever joint 
naval exercise with Russia in September 2015. (Kucera 2015)  
While Russia’s Caspian Flotilla is also set to be equipped with new shore-based 
supersonic antiship missiles, as well as two more missile ships and 3 landing ships as 
the first stage of receiving 16 ships by the end of 2020; Iran, the second major power in 
the Caspian; announced in 2011 that it intends to “add another 75 missile ships to its 
fleet.” The present fleet contains 90 vessels at sea. (Aryan 2011)  
Although to this date no US or NATO bases has been established in Azerbaijan; 
“experts do not exclude that at least two naval bases of the USA can occur in the 
Caspian region – in Aktau and Baku.”3 The two airports are already quietly in use by 
the US as “transit hubs for military material for its forces in Afghanistan.”(ibid) 
Moreover, “in 2005 the United States signed an agreement on operating two radars in 
Azerbaijan which are likely to be used for monitoring Iran.”(IISS 2006:193) 
When in mid March 2007 Azerbaijan granted NATO “the permission to use two of its 
military bases and an airport ‘to back up its peace-keeping operation in Afghanistan’ 
including support for NATO’s “supply route to Afghanistan”; US Undersecretary of 
                                                          
1 Global Security. Caspian Guard. Available at : <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/caspian-guard.htm> 
(Accessed on 19.02.2014) 
2 Radio Free Europe. (2004) Iran Backs Azerbaijani Caspian Proposal. Available at: 
<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143095.html>  (Accessed on 14.01.2014) 
3 Pulitzer Centre. (2012) Militarizing the Caspian. (2012) Available at: 
<http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/caucasus-caspian-azerbaijan-kazakhstan-turkmenistan-militarization-oil-russia-
united-states-iran>  (Accessed on 10.02.2014) 
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State Matthew Bryza, indicated at a press conference in Georgia (March 30) that “the 
United States hopes for permission to use airfields in Azerbaijan for military 
purposes.”(Chossudovsky 2007) In response, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence 
released a statement emphasizing that “Azerbaijan’s territory will not be at the disposal 
of any country for hostile acts against neighbours.” (Chossudovsky 2007) Nonetheless, 
Iran deployed “troops and military hardware along the Iranian-Azerbaijani border” in 
early April just to warn Azerbaijan of the consequences of such developments.1 This 
was, however, not the last time that the utilisation of Azeri airbases for attacking Iran 
was probed. In March 2012, in the heat of risen tensions between Israel and Iran over 
the latter’s nuclear programme; an article published by the Foreign Policy magazine 
contemplated Azerbaijan’s airbases and airspace as the ‘secret staging ground’ for 
Israel’s attack on Iran. The analysis was based on a US cable released by Wikileaks 
titled as ‘Azerbaijan's discreet symbiosis with Israel’. (Perry, 2012) While Azerbaijan’s 
Defence Minister was quick to dismiss the contemplations;2 they still left a mark on 
Iranians’ psyche. 
Azerbaijan’s arms deal with Israel has added yet another dimension to Baku’s potential 
military threats for Iran. In 2012 “Azerbaijan purchased a variety of weaponry, 
including aerial drones and an advanced anti-missile capable radar, from Israel under a 
$1.6 bln contract signed in 2011.”3(Rianovosti 27.03.2012) “At the end of February, 
the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Tehran Javanshir 
Akhundov to explain the arms deal with Israel and to provide assurances that the Israeli 
weaponry would not be used against Iran. Akhundov reportedly said the weapons were 
bought “to liberate occupied Azerbaijani land…..”(ibid) Nonetheless, some purchased 
items make Akhundov’s claim hard to believe. “According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers 
Database, Baku bought an unknown number of Gabriel anti-ship missiles.”(ibid) Since 
Azerbaijan has no maritime borders with Armenia, and Armenia has no body of water 
                                                          
1 “Military experts think that the deployment of troops and hardware pursue defence ends. This means that the 
troops are being pushed forward to repel attacks… The start of an information [propaganda] war is obvious. An 
intelligence expert has told Turan that recent publications in the media saying that Iran has drawn up a list of 
facilities in Azerbaijan that will be bombed in case of a US attack [on Iran] are a glaring example of this. Most 
likely, the reports were prepared and passed to the mass media by the Iranian secret services to exert 
psychological pressure on Baku. The goal is to deter Baku from supporting Washington in a military conflict with 
Tehran. (Turan as quoted by ibid Available at: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-iran-war-theater-s-northern-
front-azerbaijan-and-the-us-sponsored-war-on-iran/5322>  (Accessed on 5.12.2013). 
2 “The Republic of Azerbaijan, like always in the past, will never permit any country to take advantage of its land, 
or air, against the Islamic Republic of Iran, which we consider our brother and friend country”. Source: ibid.  
3 Sputnik. (2012) Azerbaijan Spent $1.6 Bln on Israeli Arms in 2011. Available at: 
<http://www.sputniknews.com/military/20120327/172423044.html> (Accesed on 08.09.2015) 
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suitable for shipping, it is only logical to wonder what use anti ship missiles could have 
in Baku’s war with Armenia. Moreover, if the above statement is the exact words of 
Akhundove, then it must add to Iran’s concerns rather than reducing it; as many 
Azerbaijani politicians have the discreet ambition what they perceive ‘liberating’ Iran’s 
Azeri provinces to make the Greater Azerbaijan a reality. 
Moreover, there were 10 Hermes-450 drones equipped with GPS among Azerbaijan’s 
military purchases from Israel. This means “they can also provide an outside observer 
with satellite images sent by the drone.”1 In late 2012, these drones were reported to 
conduct spy mission flights along the Iranian borders. (ibid) Moreover, in August 2014, 
Iran’s media reported that an Israeli stealth drone flying towards Natanz nuclear 
facilities have been targeted down by the Revolutionary Guard.2Since the limited range 
of the device made it unlikely to have been launched from Israel; the head of the 
Guard’s Airspace Division concluded that it was launched from a neighbouring country. 
(Crone 2014) Meanwhile providing an analysis of past and present reports and evidence 
from Azerbaijani forces parade; the professional aviation journalist, David Cenciotti 
(2014) concluded in his weblog that the drone was possibly launched from Azerbaijan.  
In Dec 2012, Press TV quoted a report claiming that “following a rise in the US radar 
activities in the Astara Rayon region of Azerbaijan as well as the presence of Israeli 
military advisors in the country, Azerbaijan has been using Orbiter ultra-light drones 
assembled with the help of Israeli experts to carry out operations along the border with 
Iran and Karabakh.”3 Furthermore, Israel has reportedly set up a drone construction 
plant in Azerbaijan in 2013..... “Both local and Israeli staff is in charge of 
maintenance.”4  
Despite the existence of a non aggression pact between the two neighbours since 2005, 
based on which the two countries are committed to not let their territory to be used by 
a third country for an attack against the other; as Azerbaijan has already caved in under 
                                                          
1 Press TV (2012) Israeli-Azeri Drones Conduct Spy Missions along Iran Border: Report. Available at:  
<http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/12/08/276935/israeliazeri-drones-spying-over-iran/> (Accessed on 
27.01.2014) 
2 Guardian. (2014) Israeli Stealth Drone Downed at Nuclear Facility, Iran Claims. Available at: 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/24/israeli-stealth-drone-nuclear-facility-iran-natanz> (Accessed on 
15.05.2014): 
3 Press TV. (2012) Israeli-Azeri Drones Conduct Spy Missions Along Iran Border: Report. Available at: 
<http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/12/08/276935/israeliazeri-drones-spying-over-iran/> (Accessed on 
10.12.2013) 
4 Deutsche Welle. (2012) Arms Race on The Caspian Sea Heat Up. Available at :< http://www.dw.de/arms-race-
on-the-caspian-sea-heats-up/a-16246863> (Accessed on 15.02.2014) 
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the US pressures for isolating Iran in the region and due to Baku’s increasingly close 
relations with Tel Aviv, Tehran with its siege mentality and years of pre-war status 
cannot ignore the potential threats arising from its northern neighbour.  
On the other hand, like other neighbours, Azerbaijan has serious concerns with regard 
to Iran’s nuclear programme. While Baku apparently supports Iran’s right for 
developing civil nuclear technology1; it has been concerned about the consequences of 
a war against Iran both for the region and the country, knowing in the event of any 
attack by Israel or Western governments, as their closest ally in the region, it would 
likely get caught in the crossfire.  
Recent International developments have resulted in the emergence of new forms of 
threat which have not yet been decisively determined by theorists as to which security 
sector they can fit into. As “cyberspace has become a new international battlefield” 
(Adamas as quoted by Pettalides 2012) Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009) have argued 
that cyber security can be considered as a new sector in security theories. However, 
they have also discussed difficulties in drawing a clear line between cyber security and 
other security sectors. Despite the aforementioned uncertainties; this study discusses 
cyber security under the military sector, as the cases discussed are normally undertaken 
by military and intelligence agencies. 
On January 2012, twenty five Azerbaijani state related websites including the website 
of Azerbaijan’s ruling party, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology, Ministry of Education, Customs Committee, were 
hacked. Hackers who called themselves Azerbaijani Cyber Army left photos and 
comments regarding Hijab ban, Israel and its relations with Azerbaijan on these 
websites. According to Azerbaijan’s Minister of Communications 24 cases of these 
attacks were carried out from inside Iran. (Menshu 2011) While the media pointed the 
finger at Iran, Azerbaijan’s minister explained that Iran might have been used as a 
transit country and these attacks might have been carried out by a third country; 
expressing hopes that the Iranian government have not been involved in these attacks. 
Iran’s embassy in Baku also denied allegations of Iran’s involvement. (Valiyev 2012) 
In another incident on February 2012, Azerbaijan’s state TV website was reportedly 
                                                          
1 Tehran Times. Azerbaijan’s Supports Iran’s Nuclear Program. Available at: 
<http://tehrantimes.com/politics/105907-azerbaijan-supports-irans-nuclear-program> (Accessed on 20.02.2014) 
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hacked by Iran’s cyber army with messages about Baku’s close relations with Tel 
Aviv.1  
Iran claims to have the world’s 4th most powerful cyber army.2 Israel’s Institute for 
National Security Studies has also confirmed Iran as a major cyber power. (ibid) One 
can assume that while Iran has avoided direct military conflict with its northern 
neighbour, it is willing to engage in cyber war at least as a warning or punishment for 
cooperating with Iran’s enemies or applying domestic policies which may affects Iran’s 
interest.  
Terrorism and espionage are two other controversial topics with regard to the security 
sector under which they should be categorised. One can argue that as terrorism is mostly 
used to pressure states to change their behaviour, it is, therefore, a political threat. 
However, it can also be argued that state sponsored acts of terrorism should be 
categorised under the military sector. The same argument could be made with regard to 
espionage. While the referent subject of espionage could be in any security sector; the 
fact that it is mostly undertaken by states’ intelligence agencies makes it logical to be 
categorised under the military sector. 
Both Iran and Azerbaijan have frequently accused each other of supporting or carrying 
out acts of espionage and terrorism in the other’s territory. The first instance which 
brought the bilateral relations under the spotlight was the 2007 trial and “ultimate 
conviction of 15 Azerbaijani men found guilty of passing information on Western 
embassies and companies operating in Azerbaijan to Iranian intelligence…… The 
defendants, all members of Nima, a small Islamist group, were found guilty of 
cooperating with Iranian special services in plotting a coup against the government of 
President Ilham Aliyev. The group's leader …... staunchly denied any ties to Iranian 
intelligence…… Iran expressed deep anger over the verdict and the accusations, by 
extension, that it sought to destabilize the Azerbaijani government. Officials in Tehran 
summoned Azerbaijan's ambassador to the Foreign Ministry and called the court 
proceedings a comedy." (Allnutt 2007) In 2011-2012 Azerbaijan arrested around 40 
                                                          
1 BBC Farsi (2012) Hamleye arteshe cyberie Iran be site televeisione dowlatie Azerbaijan. Available at: 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2012/02/120223_008-iran-azerbaijan.shtml> (Accessed on 10.01.2014) 
2 Hackread (2012) Israeli Think Tank Acknowledges Iran as Major Cyber Power, Iran Claims its 4th Biggest 
Cyber Army in World. Available at: <http://hackread.com/iran-biggest-cyber-army-israel/>  (Accessed on 
20.02.2014) 
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people suspected of cooperating with Iran’s intelligence services and IRGC. (Khatin 
Ughlu: 2012) An Azerbaijani state broadcaster reported in February 2012 that 
“Azerbaijan's National Security Ministry has claimed that it has uncovered a terrorist 
group with links to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Sepah and Lebanon’s 
Hezbollah.”1 According to AZTV “the group was planning to stage attacks against the 
Israeli embassy and a Jewish cultural centre in the Azeri capital Baku…. the group had 
been collecting intelligence and stocking up on weapons and explosives.”(ibid) 
Based on similar evidence, some analysts have accused Iran of trying to destabilise its 
northern neighbour. Looking more realistically, considering the exacerbated 
instabilities in other neighbouring countries which in turn affect Iran’s security and 
stability, it has never been in the best interest of Iran to have yet another instable country 
on its doorstep. Time and again, Iranian officials, as well as experts, have emphasised 
on the importance of Azerbaijan’s stability for both the region and Iran. 
Assuming that Baku’s accusations are true, a more reasonable explanation for increased 
intelligence and security activities of IRGC or  other Iranian quasi governmental 
agencies in Azerbaijan could be found in Baku’s extended relations with Israel. While 
other aspects of these relations have already been discussed, Iran’s more immediate and 
real concern is the opportunity that Baku has provided for Tel Aviv for close espionage 
on Iran and carrying out terrorist attacks inside Iran. “Israel cooperates with Azerbaijan 
through exchanges of intelligence information, analysis of data and other activities. 
Israel even trains Azerbaijan’s intelligence and security forces, a factor that may lead 
to the increased influence of Israel over Azerbaijan’s security mechanism and 
strategies.”(Souleimanov, Ehrmann, Aliyev 2014:12) According to a report by 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Azerbaijan’s intelligence cooperation with 
Israel dates back to 1997, following Netanyahu’s visit from Baku. (Javdanfar 2010) 
Despite suspicions about Baku’s intelligence cooperation with Tehran’s adversaries, 
nobody initially talked about it openly. In his interview with an Iranian think tank, 
Afshar Soleimani, Iran’s former ambassador to Baku had pointed out in 2011, that 
undercover of an agricultural project in southern parts of the country near the cities of 
Lankoran, Masali, and in Nakhjavan; Azerbaijan has provided the opportunity for 
                                                          
1 Rianovosti (2012) Azerbaijan says it Uncovered Iran-linked Terrorist Group. Available at: 
<http://en.ria.ru/world/20120222/171452245.html> (Accessed on 20.01.2014) 
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Israel’s intelligence activities. He explained that installing surveillance equipments in 
these areas has enabled Israeli agents to eavesdrop on mobile and military wireless 
communications in Iran. However, it was a report by the Times London on 11th 
February 2012 that gave a clearer picture of intelligence activities in Azerbaijan as a 
‘gateway to Iran’. “Many point to the Gabala mission defence complex in the north of 
the country, on the Russian-Azerbaijani border, as a hub for intelligence work. It is here 
that Russia, and increasingly the US and Europe, use advanced surveillance equipment 
and radio networks to monitor Iran. It was originally built during the Soviet era, but Dr. 
Orujlu said that its equipment was now lent out to other agencies.”1 The paper also 
discussed further details about Israeli agents’ activities in Azerbaijan for keeping tabs 
on Iran.  
On February 17th, Tehran accused Baku of aiding “a terrorist element, involved in the 
killing of Iranian nuclear scientists, who belongs to the Israeli spy agency of 
Mossad…… According to the report, Azeri secret service helped Mossad agents in 
terrorist attacks against Iranians by providing technical and logistical support.” 2 Azeri 
envoy to Tehran was summoned to receive Iran’s objection for “granting asylum to the 
Mossad-trained assassins of Iranian nuclear scientists.”(ibid) Nonetheless, “The 
Azerbaijani foreign ministry condemned a protest note given to its ambassador in 
Tehran which complained about the alleged collaboration.” Baku considered the note 
as “a reaction to a formal protest last month from Baku to Tehran after two men with 
alleged links to Iranian intelligence were arrested on suspicion of plotting to kill 
prominent Israelis in neighbouring Azerbaijan.”3  
Dr. Ahmadi Roshan was the last in the series of Iran’s nuclear related assassinations 
which had started since 2007. Just two months after his death; Iran’s Ministry of 
Intelligence announced “that it has uncovered a large and sophisticated Israeli-backed 
terrorist network that was planning attacks inside Iran.”(Tovro 2012) The discovery 
was reportedly the results of several months’ efforts and surveillance of an Israeli 
command centre “in one of the regional countries and discovering the identity of the 
                                                          
1 The Times. (2012)Spy vs Spy: the Secret Wars Waged in New Spooks’ Playground. Available at: 
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article3316643.ecee> (Accessed on 10.01.2014) 
2 Press TV. (2012) Azerbaijan Safe Haven for Mossad Terrorists: Report. 
<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/227343.html> (Accessed on 6.1.2014) 
3 Hurriyet Daily News. (2012) Iran's Baku-Israel Spy Claim 'Slander,' Azerbaijan Says. Available at: 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/irans-baku-israel-spy-claim-slander-azerbaijan-
says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=13666&NewsCatID=355> (ACCESSED ON 27.01.2014) 
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agents active in that command centre.”(ibid) According to Raviv, who is co-writing a 
book on the history of Israel’s intelligence agency “although Israel has never 
acknowledged it, the country's famed espionage agency - the Mossad - ran an 
assassination campaign for several years aimed at Iran's top nuclear scientists. The 
purpose was to slow the progress made by Iran, which Israel feels certain is aimed at 
developing nuclear weapons; and to deter trained and educated Iranians from joining 
their country's nuclear program.”1 In a 2014 article, he claimed that according to his 
sources who are close to Israel’s intelligence services they are pressured by Obama’s 
administration to stop their assassination campaigns inside Iran. (ibid) 
Just a few days after the above discovery and siege; the Azerbaijan Minister of National 
security announced the arrest of 22 Azerbaijani nationals who have been hired and 
trained by Iran “to carry out terrorist attacks against the US and Israeli embassies as 
well as Western-linked groups and companies.”2 Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
immediately issued a rebuttal and protested the actions of the Azerbaijani authorities. 
Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Tehran was summoned once again and was told about 
Israeli machinations "to discredit Iran", resulting in "brotherly and friendly government 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan taking part in this game". Tehran stressed that the incident 
virtually cancels the agreement signed at the trilateral meeting of foreign ministers of 
Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey on March 7th, as well as the arrangements entered into by 
the defence ministers of the two countries a week earlier.3 
Even if the above developments are taken with a pinch of salt, one can obviously 
recognize an ongoing intelligence war between Iran and Israel in Azerbaijan. In other 
words while Azerbaijan has avoided direct conflict with Iran, it has provided its much 
stronger allies, particularly Israel with the opportunity to pose a direct threat on Iran’s 
security. This, in fact, means that Azerbaijan has neutralised Iran’s efforts to manage 
indirect conflict with Israel through proxies and within Israel’s neighbourhood by 
                                                          




%5D> (Accessed on 02.03.2014) 
2 The Telegraph. (2012) Azerbaijan Arrests '22 Iranian spies'. Available at: 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/azerbaijan/9144424/Azerbaijan-arrests-22-Iranian-
spies.html> (Accessed on 25.01.2014) 
3 Pravda. (2012) Spy Scandal between Azerbaijan and Iran Turns Epic. Available at: 
<http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/21-03-2012/120843-spy_scandal_azerbaijan_iran-0/> (Accessed in 
15.12.2013) 
216 
permitting Israel to bring crucial military and intelligence apparatus to Iran’s 
neighbourhood. Israeli president’s admiration of Azerbaijan for its role in countering 
Iran’s influence in the Middle East1 shows the importance of Baku’s cooperation 
against Iran. With such picture in mind, it is perfectly natural and justifiable for Tehran 
to take measures to combat the shadow war run by Baku’s allies within Azerbaijan’s 
territory against Iran’s security. 
 
5.3.4.3. Societal Sector 
The referent object in the societal sector is “large scale collective identities that can 
function independently of the state, such as nations and religions….. Given the 
conservative nature of identity, it is always possible to paint challenges and changes as 
threats to identity.” (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde 1997:22-23) The societal sector, 
therefore, focuses not only on cultural factors but also on ethnicity related issues. 
There is little doubt about tremendous effects of their shared cultural heritage and 
similar societies on Iran-Azerbaijan’s bilateral relations. Bahrami, Iran’s former 
ambassador to Baku emphasizes that “there are no other two countries in the world with 
such degree of common history and culture.”2 The two nations share many costumes 
and traditions like Nawruz and Yalda, many foods, music, dance, and other cultural 
components. While these factors have been the focal point of Iran’s soft power in 
Azerbaijan and have always been emphasised by both countries’ officials as a basis for 
closer political and economic relations; it has become increasingly a source of tensions 
in bilateral relations. One of the reasons which had turned these shared cultural factors 
to a bone of contention is Azerbaijan’s efforts to confiscate them as its own cultural 
heritage. This trend has become more obvious and serious since 2008 when the 
UNESCO Intangible Heritage Program was established. In a politically motivated bid 
for creating an internationally recognised identity; the 20 years old Republic of 
Azerbaijan has registered some shared cultural heritage originated from the ancient 
                                                          
1 This Day Live. (2014) Israel Praises Azerbaijan’s Stance in Iran Crisis. Available at: 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/israel-praises-azerbaijans-stand-in-iran-crisis/145633/>  (Accessed on 
20.11.2013) 
2 Interview held on August 2013 
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Persian culture under its own name.1 While Iran’s government has just taken official 
steps to avert UNESCO’s decisions, both the media and the public were deeply irritated 
by Baku’s actions which were perceived as an attack on their identity and civilisation. 
There are also many popular Persian public figures in different areas of politics, 
literature, science, etc. who were born in those Persian cities that later became part of 
the present day Republic of Azerbaijan. Baku has taken the same approach towards 
these shared public figures that it has towards other shared heritages. Perhaps the most 
significant example is the case of the famous poet Nizami Ganjavi, who was born and 
died in Ganja when this city was still part of Persia and all his poems are in Persian 
language. However, to introduce him and his works as Azeri heritage, Baku has 
translated his works into Azeri, deleting from the translations any parts of his poems 
that admire Persia and its rich civilisation. In 2013, tiled calligraphies in Nezami’s tomb 
which contained his Persian poems were removed, to be replaced by Azeri translations, 
according to Azerbaijan’s ministry of foreign affairs’ spokesperson.2 Iran consequently 
lodged a complaint to UNESCO.3 
A more recent example is the book4 written by the Head of Azerbaijan’s Presidential 
Organisation, Ramiz Mehdiov, in which he has claimed that the Republic of Azerbajan 
is the heir to the Afshari government and that Nadir has been Azerbaijan’s king, not 
Persia’s. (Maleki 2015) 
As it was explained in the political dimension; the two countries’ shared ethnicity which 
could have been a valuable asset for development of relations, has been exploited by 
Baku for inciting irredentism among Iranian Azeri population and, therefore, has 
become a threat for Iran. However, shared language and ethnicity with at least 16% of 
Iran’s population is an incentive for Azerbaijani people to visit Iran, communicate and 
bond with Iranians not only in northern provinces but even in the capital and further 
beyond. This and waiving the visa requirements for Azerbaijani civilians by the Iranian 
government since early 2010 has facilitated the closer social interaction between 
                                                          
1 In 2012 “TĀR” which has been one of Iran’s famous traditional music instruments for centuries was registered as 
Azerbaijan’s intangible heritage. In 2013, Chogān, a traditional sport of centuries was registered as Azerbaijan’s 
national heritage. 
2 Alef. (2013) Talāshe keshvare Azerbaijan baraye tasāhobe Nezāmie Ganjavi. Available at : 
<http://www.alef.ir/vdcexv8zwjh8oei.b9bj.html?198432>  (Accessed on 20.11.2013) 
3 Voice of America. (2013) Nezāmi Ganjavi va monāghesheye Iran va Azerbaijan. Available at : 
<http://www.darivoa.com/content/nezami-ganjavi-and-iran-azerbaijan-dispute/1768716.html>  (Accessed on 
27.02.2014) 
4 Nader Shah Afshar: Diplomatic Correspondences. 
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Azerbaijani nationals and Iranians. According to Iran’s Tourism Organisation, the 
monthly average of Azerbaijani tourists visiting Iran were over 60,000 in 2012.1While 
many Azerbaijanis travel for the acquisition of basic commodities which are much 
cheaper in Iran; many others are pilgrim tourists, religious Shiites who travel for the 
pilgrimage of Iran’s holy places. Also, better quality and lower cost of health services 
in Iran has been an attraction for many Azerbaijanis who are disappointed with such 
services in their own country.2 Azerbaijan is also a popular tourist destination for many 
Iranians, more due to its social liberties that allow Iranian tourists to have access to 
many entertainments which are banned in their own country. 
While the above options provide direct channels of social interactions between the two 
nations; media is however, a more accessible and widespread channel of 
communications. While Iranians in northern provinces can watch Azerbaijan’s TV 
channels; Iran broadcasts its Azeri language programmes through Sahar network. 
“Today, Iranian TV stations are reported to attract more and more rural Azeris that do 
not benefit from the economic progress so far.”(NewYork Times as quoted by 
Mazziotti, Sauerborn, and Scianna 2013:9) 
For many years governments in both countries have resented broadcasts by the other’s 
media. There is a general concern in Iran that Westernised entertainment programmes 
in other countries’ media including Azerbaijan might corrupt the public moral. 
Broadcast of programmes with irredentist dimensions by some Azerbaijani channels 
such as AZTV and ITV have been a more worrying concern for Iranian officials. On 
the other hand Sahar TV news and political analysis in which Aliyev’s government was 
criticised heavily were antagonising Baku officials for years. Azeri authorities 
repeatedly criticised Sahar TV programmes. In 2009, Azerbaijan’s deputy foreign 
minister sent an objection note to Iran’s ambassador in Baku for ‘distortion of 
Azerbaijan’s policies and insult towards Azerbaijan’s national flag’.3 According to 
Iran’s ambassador ‘broadcast of political programmes from Sahar network had 
convinced Azerbaijani leaders that it is instigating a coup in the country’. Consequently, 
                                                          
1 Fararru. (2013) Āmāre gardeshgarāne vorudi be Iran e`lām shod. Available at : 
<http://fararu.com/fa/news/144764/ شد-اعالم-ایران-به-ورودی-گردشگران-آمار > (Accessed on 10.10.2013) 
2 For further details please see: Morāj’eye Bish az 49% Atbā’e Jomhuri Azerbaijan be marākeze darmānie 
Azarbaijan. Available at: <http://www.ccsi.ir/vdcj.veafuqeatsfzu.html> (Accessed in 10.02.2014)  Also see: 
Cherā bimārāne Azerbaijani barāye moāleje be Iran safar mikonand?  Available at: 
<http://qafqaz.ir/fa/?p=3698> (Accessed on 05.02.2014) 
3 Rianovosti. (2012) Azarbaijan az gozāreshe Shabakeye Sahar rasman be Safire Iran e’terāz kard. Available at: 
<http://pe.rian.ru/foreign/internatinal/20091007/123385715.html> (Accessed on 01.02.2014) 
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Iran’s National Security Council ordered Sahar TV on November 2012 to limit its 
broadcasts to social and cultural programmes. The TV channel is also banned from 
interviewing people whose remarks are damaging to Iran-Azerbaijan relations.1 The 
new policy set on Sahar TV for undertaking socio-cultural approach has reportedly 
helped in reducing tensions.2 The media war has been contained since Rouhani’s 
administration came to power. While Azeri TV broadcasted some positive programmes 
about Ayatollah Khomeini on the anniversary of his death; Iran issued a licence for 
ANS broadcasting network to work in Iran.3 
There is no doubt that the most distinctive and influential cultural commonality between 
the two countries is ‘Shiism’. While Shiites are scattered across the country, with the 
exception of Shiravan and Azerbaijan’s Northern provinces, they make the majority of 
the population in various parts of the country, particularly in Baku, Nakhjavan Republic 
and other important areas. (Jabbari 2010:66) As Souleimanov (2011) has put it, in the 
aftermath of Azerbaijan’s independence “the two nations were bound by a feeling of 
Islamic (Shi’i) solidarity, especially in the case of the Azerbaijani people who, 
following 70 years of Soviet domination and state atheism, were overcome by a desire 
to return to their spiritual roots.”Iran found this fact as its greatest asset which could be 
invested in establishing closer ties and exerting more influence in Azerbaijan. As 
Calabrese (1994:83) explains, while “Iranian diplomatic activities in the Soviet 
successor states have generally resembled those of any other government”, it was 
distinctive in that Iranian diplomacy was interrelated with “the promotion of Persian 
culture and the propagation of Islam. An important aspect performed by Iranians posted 
to diplomatic missions in the Soviet successor states has been the transmission of 
Persian culture.” However, due to the interwoven nature of the Persian culture with 
Islam and Shiism; promoting Persian culture was in a way promoting political Islam. 
While not denying an underlying political purpose of their religious- cultural activities; 
Iranian officials insisted that the aim of such activities was not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the newly independent countries but to foster closer ties.  
                                                          
1 RIANOVOSTI (2012) Pakhshe barnāmehāye zede Azerbaijani dar Shabake Sahare 2 mamnu shod. Available at: 
<http://persian.ruvr.ru/2012_10_07/90448307/> (Accessed on 10.02.2014) 
2 Quoted from the TREND Newsagaency: Site Khabari Tahlilie Haghāyeghe Ghfghāz. (2013) Arzyābie mosbate 
Safire Iran dar Baku az taghviate ruykarde farhangie Shabake Sahar. Available at: http://qafqaz.ir/fa/?p=2065 
(Accessed on 01.02.2014) 
3 Pāygāhe Khabarie Aftāb. (2014) Sodure mojavveze avvalin shabakeye Jomhūrie Azerbaijan dar Iran. Available 
at: <http://khabarfarsi.com/ext/8959847> (Accessed on 19/11/2014) 
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Since the people of newly independent countries including Azerbaijan which was “by 
far the most secularized of the republics of the former Soviet Union” (Dragadze as 
quoted by Bedford 2009) demonstrated considerable interest in learning more about 
their Islamic background; important Muslim countries from Iran and Turkey to Arab 
countries particularly Saudi Arabia used the opportunity to educate their Muslim 
brothers by their own version and interpretation of Islam. In the chaotic post 
independence political atmosphere, a considerable number of clergies, religious 
scholarly resources and funding got their way to Azerbaijan while many young people 
travelled to neighbouring countries particularly Iran for seminary education. 
As the country stabilised gradually, the authorities took notice of the role and influence 
of such considerable number of religious missionaries as a source of threat to their 
secular establishment. Therefore, several steps were taken to eliminate this threat 
including “an amendment to the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Freedom of 
Religious Belief in 1996 banning the activities of ‘foreigners and persons without 
citizenship’ from conducting religious propaganda.”(Bedford 2009:142) Numerous 
Iranian clergies who were leading local mosques and religious centres across the 
country were expelled. The 1997 official announcement requiring all religious 
communities to renew their official registration restricted further practice of Iranian 
backed organisations. While the 2001 establishment of the State Committee for Work 
with Religious Associations (SCWRA) was another step in further supervision of 
foreign missionaries; as Bedford (ibid:168) explains its prime object is the control of 
books and other published materials coming from Iran. 
This antagonism towards Iran and its religious influence in the country has made life 
difficult for “religious communities that, in reality or in theory, have links to Iran” (ibid) 
including those who have educated in Iran. Azerbaijani students who were studying in 
Iran’s seminary schools have been warned that upon their return they shall not be 
appointed to any posts in any governmental organisation. (Kaleji 2011) 
Despite the fact that for more than one decade Wahhabi extremism has been the main 
source of threat internationally; Baku officials perceive Iranian Shiite activism a more 
dangerous threat to their establishment. “One of the reasons often given by the 
authorities for their strong wish to keep religion out of politics is the concern they feel 
about Azerbaijan becoming an Islamic Republic a la Iran.”(ibid: 160) “Concern that 
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secular Azerbaijan has regarding Iranian relations with its co-religionists is best 
illustrated by Baku’s belief that Iran is directly funding, and actively providing 
ideological direction to the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA).” (Shanahan 2013:23) 
Founded in 1991, IPA was accused of operating against the state and banned in 1995. 
Although the party was never considered as a mass movement since it represented 
Iranian Shiite activism for Azerbaijan authorities, it was dealt with harshly. “In 2011, 
the chairman of the IPA Movsum Samadov was sentenced, along with six other party 
members to lengthy jail terms on charges of attempting to overthrow the state.” (ibid) 
The accelerated process of further secularisation of the country since the late 2000s has 
created further tensions between the two countries. In 2009 female students were 
banned from wearing hijab in schools, a rule which in the following year was applied 
to teachers and in 2011 was extended to university students as well. Despite widespread 
demonstrations across the country, the law was not abolished; instead demonstrators 
were arrested. Women with hijab are barred from entering government buildings and 
no identification document would be issued if the photo is taken with hijab. The hijab 
ban not only aroused “the ire of the religious Islamic community in Azerbaijan with 
their periodic demonstrations since the end of 2010” (Raufouglu 2012); but also brought 
about yet another round of warnings and accusations from both countries. Initially, the 
Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Major General Firouzabadi called on President 
Aliyev to “strengthen his government by respecting Islamic rules and people’s 
demands… Otherwise he will face a dark future since people’s awakening cannot be 
suppressed.” (ibid) Fiercely reacting; Baku summoned Iran’s ambassador to the Foreign 
Ministry, resulting in Tehran renouncing Firouzabadi’s remarks. 
A 2010 Wikileaks revelation demonstrates Aliyev’s serious concerns over religious 
ceremonies sponsored by Iran, particularly Ashura.1 To overcome these concerns heavy 
restrictions have been applied on religious rituals and ceremonies. Upon a new 
government order, all religious signs including the name of Allah were removed from 
all offices and government buildings as of 2010. There is an official ban on the 
broadcast of Azan,2 and students and young people are prevented from entering 
                                                          
1 “Aliyev said that Iranian provocations in Azerbaijan were on the rise. He specifically cited not only the financing 
of radical Islamic groups and Hezbollah terrorists, but also: -- the Iranian financing of violent Ashura ceremonies 
in Nakhchivan, -- the organization of demonstrations in front of the Azeri consulates in Tabriz and Istanbul, -- a 
violent religious procession recently in Baku”; in: US embassy cables: Azerbaijan leader in the soup. Available 
at :< http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/250649> (Accessed on 20.10.2013) 
2 Call for prayers 
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mosques to attend jamaat prayers. Holding jamaat prayers in the urban mosques 
particularly in Ganja became restricted and many mosques were clamped down or 
completely destroyed with various excuses. The closure of all seminary and religious 
schools across the country and deprivation of seminary students from social privileges 
and applying strict limitations on Ashura processions are among numerous anti 
religious policies undertaken by Baku officials in recent years. (Kaleji 2011) 
The above policies, as well as the arrest of Islamist activists, created a wave of 
opposition, also encouraged by the Arab spring. While Iran’s diplomatic apparatus did 
not show any official reaction; objections came from various other platforms 
particularly grand ayatollahs whose Azerbaijani followers were under pressure from 
these developments. Their request to stop such treatment of their followers was faced 
by Baku’s accusation of Iran’s interference in its domestic affairs. 
The manifestation of Azerbaijan’s increasing secularisation and Westernisation did not 
stop at this; neither did Iran’s unofficial objections, coming mostly from the media and 
clergies. Each occasion of similar nature mounted the tensions in bilateral relations, 
getting the two countries on the verge of undeniable enmity. The 2012 Eurovision song 
contest instigated yet another round of objections and accusations from Iranian clergies 
and official broadcasting network. Baku again accused Iran of interfering in its 
domestic affairs, oblivious to the fact that for several reasons Iran’s clerical 
establishment cannot see the above developments simply as Azerbaijan’s internal 
affairs.  
The first and most obvious reason is exactly the social and cultural closeness of the two 
countries, as well as their geographical proximity, which has consequently resulted in 
close interactions of the two nations. While Azerbaijan is worried that radical Shiite 
ideologies exported by its southern neighbour would radicalize its public and ultimately 
undermine the secular nature of the state; Iran’s religious establishment is concerned 
that pervasive Westernisation and social freedom in Azerbaijan might derail Iranians 
from the straight and narrow path of virtue. Moreover, “religious identification usually 
corresponds to some official or semi official leaders who claim to be able to speak on 
behalf of religious community.” (Buzan, Waever and de Vilde 1997:124)  Iran’s clerical 
establishment recognizes itself as the guardian of all Muslims particularly Shiites and, 
therefore, entitle to speak on behalf of Azerbaijan Shiite community to object repression 
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of fellow brothers and demonstrate concern over their destiny. More importantly, by 
further secularisation and Westernisation of Azerbaijan; Iran would effectively lose its 
most valuable asset for influence in that country. To put it briefly, dynamics of 
secularizing a Shiite community in the neighbourhood of a theocratic Shiite state has 




5.3.4.4. Economic Sector 
As Buzan and colleagues (1991:20) have put it, the economic sector focuses on “access 
to resources, finance and markets”. The most important economic relation between the 
two countries, prior to Azerbaijan’s independence goes back to the second decade of 
the twentieth century during which, the import of Azerbaijan’s oil had a particular 
importance for Iran. Due to lack of suitable transport networks and vehicles, transfer of 
oil from the south of Iran to its northern parts was neither easy nor cost effective. 
Therefore, the oil demand of the northern provinces was met by imports of Baku’s oil, 
which in turn had helped the development of Baku’s oil industry, as well as the Soviet 
Union’s economy. The Soviet’s Ministry of Foreign Trade, therefore, decided in 1923 
for the Baku to become the main base for trade with Iran. Branches of important Soviet 
trade corporations and active Trusts which had traded with Iran were based in this city; 
resulting in the increased importance of both the city and the trade with Iran became. 
(Amir Ahmadian 2005:118) Another important factor in Tehran-Baku economic 
cooperation was Azerbaijan’s Shipping Office (CASPAR) which in 1924 had equipped 
the port of Baku to railway, warehouses, industrial cranes etc. and opened its 
representative office in the Iranian port of Anzali, in order to facilitate shipping of 
Iranian goods. (ibid: 120) The 1941 launch of Baku- Astara railway was an important 
step in further development of trade relations between the two countries. The railway 
is not connected to Iran’s rail network though and its future connection has been an 
important topic frequently discussed between the two countries’ officials.  
Tehran-Baku’s close direct economic and trade relations which had ended in 1945 following 
the fall of the Iron Curtain; were resumed immediately after the independence of the latter. 
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During the initial post independence years, many transit routes to Azerbaijan were blocked 
due to the Karabakh conflict. This had consequently turned Iran into Azerbaijan’s prime 
trading partner. As Mamadov has explained, “in the 1990s, Iran was one of Azerbaijan’s top 
trade partners but has lost this position over the past decade.”1 From 2010, as a consequence 
of increased tensions between the two countries, trade rate plumetted considerably getting to 
$300 million in 2011. Tens of Iranian companies with years of successful business in 
Azerbaijan went bankrupt within a year. (Khatin Ughlu 2013) Some Iranian famous factories 
like Iran Khodro and Darya detergent production were closed down. The situation was 
worsened by the absence of any Iranian insurance company to insure Iranian businesses in 
Azerbaijan after license revocation of Azer-Asia insurance company in 2008. (Khatin Ughlu 
2012) Table 1 which offers a brief report of bilateral trade in the non oil sector since the 
independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan shows that the relations have reportedly picked 
up again since late 2012.  
In addition to food stuck, ferrous products obtained fom iron ore, tar, petrochemical products 
and construction materials have been the most demanded items by Azerbaijan to be exported 
by Iran over the years; while mineral fuels, iron and steel have been on top of the import list 
from Azerbaijan to Iran.  
Iran has also facilitates and regulates border markets and free zones in order to create 
jobs for local small traders and provide frontiersmen with more source of income. It 
also provides the opportunity for people from the Republic of Azerbaijan to buy their 
food stock and basic necessities more conveniently, as these commodities are much 
cheaper in Iran than in Azerbaijan. (AmirAhmadian & PourGholi 2012:276) 
Over the years, Iran- Azerbaijan Economic Cooperation Commission has been the main 
platform for regulating trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. The 
first meeting of the Commission was held in November 1992. A Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) was signed to confirm agreements on various issues including 
import and export of goods. The commission has held several bilateral meetings over 
the years. The 8th meeting was held in 2011, during which the two sides emphasised 
                                                          
1 Centre for Strategic & International Studies (2013) Iran-Azerbaijan Relations and Strategic Competition in the 
Caucasus. Available at:< http://csis.org/event/iran-azerbaijan-relations-and-strategic-competition-caucasus> 
(Accessed on 05.09.2015) 
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on planning for further cooperation and removing obstacles for doing so.1 A review of 
the follow up reports submitted by the same commission in the early years demonstrates 
numerous occasions in which Iran’s positive approach for expanding economic 
cooperation and trade relations with Azerbaijan have been faced with Azeri’s 
‘reluctance’, ‘unreliability’ and ‘non adherence to commitments’.2 
Dr. Bahrami, Iran’s former ambassador to Baku explains that “Iran has always shown 
a great interest in expanding relations, particularly in trade and economy with 
Azerbaijan. Baku officials have also been apparently keen on expanding these relations. 
In practice, however, we do not see as many developments as it has been discussed and 
mutually agreed by the two side’s officials. There are people in the middle and lower 
levels of Azerbaijan’s bureaucratic system who do not want these relations to develop 
due to their political views. Such people halt the process of materializing agreements 
when it gets to them.”3 
According to Pak Aeein, Iran’s present ambassador to Baku; the most important areas 
in which the two countries can develop their bilateral relations are transit, trade and 
energy. Bilateral trade between the two countries in the non oil sector reached to 500 
million Euros in 2015.There is of course a potential to increase this volume to 1 billion 
Euros.4  
However, further development of economic and trade relations are faced with two 
major challenges: infrastructure deficiencies and political barriers. An important 
infrastructure which can strengthen economic cooperation between the two countries is 
the banking system. Iran’s Melli Bank branch in Baku was established in 1993, but was 
not so active for a host of reasons, and became even more restricted by severing 
                                                          
1 Hashtomin Ejlāse Commissione Moshtarake Iran va Jomhurie Azerbaijan (The 8th Meeting of Iran’s Common 
Commission with the Republic of Azerbaijan). Retrieved on 01.02.2014 From The website of Iran’s Commercial 
and Trade Attache’ in Baku: <http://www.aztpo.com/Azerbaijan/faraj7.asp?k=198> 
2 During the fourth meeting of the commission, a deadline of 3 months was agreed by both sides to make practical 
preparations for achieving the set goals in issues such as trade and investment, reopening of border markets, etc. 
However, despite preparation and insistence from the Iranian side to act upon the agreement, the Azeri side was 
showing reluctance by installing and refraining from a clear response. One stark example of ‘unreliability’ is the 
case of ‘Refah chain store branch in Baku, known as ‘East Market’. According to the report of the company’s 
managing director with cooperation of some corrupt Azeri authorities, the Azeri partner has illegally seized the 
store land and with the help of Baku municipality has rent out the land to mobile vendors; undermining Refah 
Company’s investments and his own commitments. 
3 Interview in August 2013. 
4 Vābasteye Bāzargānie Jomhurie Eslamie Iran dar Baku. Hajme mobādelāte tejāri beyne Iran va Jomhurie 
Azerbaijan tā do barābar ghābele afzāyesh ast. Available at : <http://www.aztpo.com/news-
persian/Desc.asp?id=2463&id2=101&id53> (Accessed on 30.04.2016) 
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sanctions. Moreover, Iran’s Export Development Bank has sponsored and invested in 
several projects that improve economic cooperation, including $80 million for 
construction projects in early 2000s1, 80% of the required credit for exporting the 
Iranian manufactured Samand car to Azerbaijan and in 20062, and financing 37 million 
Euros for building a 25 story twin tower in Baku in 20093 4.  
Table 5.1: Iran and Azerbaijan Trade Trend 2001-20135 
Trade Balance Export to Azerbaijan Import From  Azerbaijan Trade Balance 
1993 68961 411184 -342223 
1994 201714 394525 -192811 
1995 163241 209574 -46333 
1996 189494 251843 -62349 
1997 193688 119245 +74473 
1998 120333 38842 +81491 
1999 119245 25992 +93253 
2000 248848 24165 +224683 
2001 313574 20847 +292727 
2002 250144 25259 +224885 
                                                          
1 Bonyāde Motāleāte Ghafghāz. Ta`mine mālie projehā dar Azerbaijan tavasote Banke Toseēye Sāderāt. Available 
at: <http://www.ccsi.ir/prtg.n9xrak9wnpr4a.html> (Accessed on 03.05.2016) 
2 Vezārate San`t M`adan va Tejārat (2006) Tashilāte Banke Tose`eye Sāderāte Iran barāye sāderāte 2500 







8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1> (accessed on 03.05.2016) 
3 It was initially estimated that the construction would take 36 months and the loan would be repaid with 4% 
interests after 2 years of project completion.  




%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%88> (Accessed on03.05.2016) 
5 The source for 1993-2010 data is Iran’s Costumes Annual Calendar quoted by AmirAhmadian, B. and Pour 
Gholi, and the rest is available at: Iran’s Commercial & Trade Attaché’s Website on: 
<http://www.aztpo.com/Azerbaijan/faraj7.asp?k=151> (Accessed on 20.06.2014) 
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Trade Balance Export to Azerbaijan Import From  Azerbaijan Trade Balance 
2003 307378 96468 +210910 
2004 256162 128766 +127396 
2005 330763 163930 +166833 
2006 281699.8 371267.2 -89567.4 
2007 322157.9 349979.8 -27821.9 
2008 240045 368867.3 -128722.3 
2009 171657.5 373791.4 -202133.9 
2010 111502.2 375464 -263961.8 
2011 503000 37000 +466000 
2012 548000 45000 +503000 
2013/6 285000 110000 +274000 
 
Prior to increased severity of the sanctions and the mounting pressure on various 
countries to comply with relevant regulations; Azerbaijan was one of the loop holes 
through which Iranian companies could circumvent sanctions. At least one Azerbaijani 
private Bank, the Royal Bank of Azerbaijn, was providing services for Iranians 
particularly for circumventing the sanctions, i.e. issuing debit and credit cards for 
Iranian citizens who were otherwise deserted from such services due to international 
sanctions. However, the bank went bankrupt as its license was revoked in 2012 by 
Azerbaijan’s Central Bank following the US embassy report of its money laundering 
and sanction busting activities.1 
Despite the 2010 negotiations for increasing Iran Bank Meli activities in Azerbaijan 
and proposals for establishsing a joint bank with Azerbaijani nationality and Iranian 
capital, such activities became increasingly impossible due to international sanctions 
                                                          
1 Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy. IRAN'S MONEY LAUNDERERS, SANCTIONS-BUSTERS, AND 
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD MONEY MAKERS: A BAKU SAMPLER. Available at: 
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BAKU175_a.html> (Accsessed on 05.05.2016) 
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and Iran- Azerbaijan mounting tension prior to 2014-5 developments, resulting in the 
blockade of $200 million of Iran’s money in Azerbaijan1.  
Following the improvement of bilateral relations, several rounds of negotiations for 
resolving banking problems and increased cooperations were held between the head of 
Azerbaijan’s Central Bank and his Iranian counterpart as well as Mahmoud Vaezi, 
Iran’s Minister of Communications and Information Technology who informed the 
media of the agreement to establish a joint bank with branches in both countries and 
proposals for using the $200 million blocked money as the initial capital required for 
this bank.2 Moreover, it was announced in 2014 that the status of Iran’s Melli Bank 
branch in Baku is going to be promoted from a secondary branch to a main one in near 
future.3 
Lack of appropriate transport system has been another important infrastructure 
deficiency. As Iran’s foreign minister explained in 2011; due to numerous problems in 
both countries’ transport systems; they are forced to acquire their needs from farther 
countries with higher cost despite their proximity. (Quoted by AmirAhmadian & 
Pourgholi 2012:315)  
 “Iran can provide the shortest transit route for Azerbaijan to access Asia, Persian Gulf 
and from there to Africa. Therefore, shared investment and bilateral cooperation for 
development of transit routes is in the interest of both countries.”4 One of the most 
important projects in this field is Iran-Azerbaijan rail network connection. The first post 
independence agreement for connecting the two countries’ rail network was reached in 
December 1993 (IPIS 2010:240). A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed 
in Sep 2015 which would help in revivng the North-South corridor. Based on this 
document signed in Astara, Azerbaijan rail network would extend to the shared border, 
                                                          
1 Financial Tribune. (2015) Iran, Azerbaijan Plan Joint Bank. Available at: 
<http://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business-and-markets/24131/iran-azerbaijan-plan-joint-bank>  
(Accessed on 05.05.2016) 
2 Ibid. 







A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86> (Accessed on 03.04.2016) 
4 Vābasteye Bāzargānie Sefārate Jomhurie Eslamie Iran dar Baku. Available at : 
<http://aztpo.com/Azerbaijan/Desc.asp?id=2690&id2=101000&id5=2> (Accessed on 26.04.2016) 
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where a terminal with the volume of 5 million tones would be developed. At the same 
time Iran, will also complete the Qazvin- Rasht-Astara railway. The whole project is 
planned to be completed within one year. 
 The second part of the same document is regarding the joint construction of a bridge1 
on the border river. According to AmirAhmadian (2008:169) the construction of a 
pedestrian bridge over the border river in Astara has been proposed by Iran’s 
Transportaion and Terminals Organisation. However, despite verbal agreements 
Azerbaijan has shown no interest to fullfill the proposal, apparently due to security 
concerns. Nonetheless, Baku has been willing to cover half the cost of construction for 
bridges in ‘Jolfa’ and ‘Poldasht-Shah Takhti’, as there is an annual traffic of more than 
one hundred thousand trucks and buses between the two countries and there is an urgent 
demand for such bridges. 
The complete and successful fulfilment of these projects can increase Iran- Azerbaijan 
trade relations up to 4 times and connect the Russia and Caucasus to Indian Ocean and 
the Persian Gulf countries, on the one hand and Iran to east European countries through 
Azerbaijan on the other.2 
Moreover, by completion of the large terminal in Bile Savar Customs, the provision of 
services to travellers and traders would be doubled.3The two countries also agreed in 
2015 that both Astara and Bile Savar Customs work 24hr/day. Moreover, Azerbaijan 
has issued 20.000 traffic permits for Iran’s Ministry of Roads and Transport, which 
would relieve some exports from custom duties.4 
Energy is another important aspect of Iran-Azerbaijan economic cooperation. Baku 
announced in 2006 that it has reached an agreement with Tehran over electricity 
                                                          
1 Rail, pedestrian and car bridges. 
2 Sefārate Jomhurie Eslamie Iran- Baku (2015) Iran- Jomhurie Azerbaijan, mehvarhāye haml o naghle Jādde`i. 
Available at: http://www.baku.mfa.ir/index.aspx?fkeyid=&siteid=193&pageid=8413&newsview=361789 
(Accessed on 27.04.2016) 
3 There has been 75% progress in development of this terminal by now. Vābasteye Bāzargānie Sefārate Jomhurie 
Eslamie Iran dar Baku. Available at : http://aztpo.com/Azerbaijan/Desc.asp?id=2690&id2=101000&id5=2 
(Accessed on 26.04.2016) 
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01.05.2016) 
230 
supplies. Based on this agreement; an energy clearing would be undertaken during 
alternating peak seasons of consumption in each country. This arrangement has 
continued successfully ever since. The two countries also agreed on building two 
hydropower stations on each side of the Aras River. 
Tehran and Baku have also invested heavily for the joint construction of ParsAbad-
Imishli transmission line. By completion of this project, the bilateral power exchange 
could potentially increase by 600 MgW1. However, the completion of the project 
remains to be seen as “it was initially planned to be completed by 2002”. 
(AmirAhmadian 2008: 169) 
Iran has been been supplying electricity to Nakhjavan since 1991. An agreement was 
reached in 2002 following negotiations between Iran’s Tavanir Company and Azer 
Energy reached that the local electricity company in Azerbaijan would increase the 
potential for transmission of up to 50 MgW through Jolfa’s 132 KV post, as well as 
constructing the Jolfa-Urdubad 132 KV transmission line. The plan was completed and 
launched by August 2004.2 
According to Iran’s ambassador, the joint construction of KhodaAfarin- Ghizghalasi 
dam is an example of successful bilateral cooperation in producing hydro electric 
energy.3The two countries also signed a joint plan for the establishment of Marazad-
Ordubad hydropower station during Aliyev’s 2014 visit of Tehran.4 
With regard to hydrocarbon based energy resources, Iran has a 10% share both in Shah 
Deniz Consortium and in Lankoran- Talesh-Deniz. Azerbaijan used to supply Iran’s 
north and North West provinces with refined fuel products. This however has reduced 
as Baku found other markets particularly in Mediterranean countries. 
                                                          
1 Pāygāhe Ettelā Resānie Vezārate Nirū. (2014) Tose`eye ravābete barghie Iran va Azerbaijan. Available at: 
http://news.moe.gov.ir/Detail.aspx?anwid=12962. (Accessed on 29.04.2016) 




%D8%A2%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF> (Accessed on 
28.04.2016) 
3 Sefārate Jomhurie Eslamie Iran- Baku. Ravābete eghtesādie Jomhurie Eslamie Iran va Jomhurie Azerbaijan. 
Available at : <http://baku.mfa.ir/index.aspx?fkeyid=&siteid=193&pageid=8429> (Accessed on 25.04.2016) 
4 Khabar Online. (2014) Arzyābie ravābete Iran va Jomhurie Azerbaijan dar Sāle 2014. Availabel at : 
<http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/392115/weblog/paakaein> (Accessed on 01.04.2016) 
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 The two countries signed a 25 years gas swap contract in 2005. Based on this contract 
Iran will swap an annual volume of one million two hundred thousand cubic meter of 
Azer gas at Astara- Nakhjavan border.1 A new round of gas negotiations were held in 
2010 which resulted in Iran increasing the import of gas from Azerbaijan by 2 million 
cub meter/day.2Following Iran’s Minister of Petrolume’s visit in 2011, it was agreed to 
develop the existing infrastructure in order to increase the daily swap initially to 2.5 
million, and reach to 5 million in the second stage.3 A new gas pipeline for transport of 
Iran’s gas to Nakhjavan was launched in 2015. However, again under the strategy of 
reducing dependency on Iran, a contract with Turkey had been signed in July 2010 to 
annually transport 500 million cubic meters of Azerbaijan gas to Nakhjavan free of 
Transit charge, as opposed to Iran’s 15% transit charge. (Abbasov 2010) 
SOCAR and Iran’s Research Institute of Petrolume Industry signed a MoU for the joint 
exploration of Caspian hydrocarbon resources in 20144, which for Iran is more with the 
hope of discovering further gas reserves, than oil. 
The same year Iranian Gas Export Company (IGEC) and SOCAR also negotiated over 
the possibility of storing Iran’s gas in the underground gas storages of Azerbaijan to be 
used during Iran’s peak times of use.5 
Iran’s location between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf has provided it with the 
advantage of petrolum swap between these two regions. In this method, the Caspian 
Sea petroleum producers deliver their products to Iran’s port of Neka in the north. The 
same amount of petroleum (weight wise) woud then is delivered to other countries by 
                                                          





%D8%A2%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86 > (Accessed on 
28.04.2016) 
2 Iran Ministry of Petrolume. (2010) Emzāye tafāhomnāmeye jadide gazi beyne Iran va Azerbaijan. Available at: 
<http://www.mop.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&ID=1ec5294a-e037-46b1-9806-
8ca8dc409ce6&LayoutID=26881592-6ec1-4678-9a88-f9e4c3dc0212&CategoryID=b37c877a-1ec5-4ae5-90a0-
a36ed666ca3c&SearchKey=> (Accessed on 29.04.2016) 
3 Vezārate Naft. (2012) Tose`eye hamkārihāye Iran va Azerbaijan dar zamineye energy. Available at : 
<http://mop.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=NEWS&ID=1daf66a2-4f06-4e25-affe-
e369bbe122ab&WebPartID=4ec6c46d-9f05-4498-905f-9a78a747c1b8&CategoryID=b37c877a-1ec5-4ae5-
90a0-a36ed666ca3c> (Accessed on 01.02.2012) 
4 Neconews. (2014) Gharārdāde naftie Iran va Jomhurie Azerbaijan. Available at : 
<http://www.neconews.com/vdcdsj0s.yt09o6a22y.html> (Accessed on 26.04.2016) 
5 ABC.AZ (2014) SOCAR offers Iran to Store Gas in Azerbaijan Underground Storages for Winter Needs. 
Available at: <http://www.abc.az/eng/news_18_09_2015_90896.html> (Accessed on 20.04.2016) 
232 
Iran through the Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf. The petroleum bought from northern 
borders would be delivered to Tehran and Tabriz refineries for domestic use. The 
petroleum swap project was initiated in 1997. Based on its contract with 4 international 
corporations, Iran would receive $1 for per barrel of crude oil received by customers in 
the Persian Gulf. At its peak the petroleum swap reached 130,000 barrels per day 
resulting in significant development of infrastructure in the port of Neka.1 Despite its 
considerable income the project was stopped in 2010 by MirKazemi, Iran’s the Minister 
of Petrolum who believed the project is a rip off.2  
However, Rouhani’s administration took serious steps to revive the project and return 
to the swap market by 2015. Significant increase in the capacity and infrastructure of 
the Naka port from 150,000 to 500,000 barrel/day is an attractive opportunity to bring 
back swap customers including Azerbaijan, to Iran’s market once again.   
Despite the aforementioned cooperations, the bilateral relation with regard to 
hydrocarbons has been also shaped by rivalry over resources, transport routes and 
markets. 
The late 2012 witnessed yet another round of Caspian related raw between the two 
countries as Iran announced the discovery of a new Caspian gas field with the potential 
capacity of up to 42 trillion cubic feet.3 Baku’s initial welcoming reaction was later 
replaced with claims of the field being located in Azerbaijan’s common maritime border 
with Turkmenistan, accusing Tehran of confiscating a field which belongs to Baku; 
while Iran’s Minister of Oil insisted that the field belongs to Iran and is located within 
its maritime borders.4 
                                                          




%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81> (Accessed on 24.04.2016) 
2 In addition to losing the swap income, Iran had to pay a hefty penalty of more than $5 million for unilateral 
withdrawal from the contract, not to mention being deserted from high quality, light weight crude oil of its 
northern neighbours. 
3 Jomhūrie Eslāmi. (2011) Vākoneshe Jomhurie Azerbaijan be kashfe meydāne gāzi. (2011), Available at: 
http://www.jomhourieslami.com/1390/13900930/13900930_18_jomhori_islami_eghtesadi_0005.html  
(Accessed on 15.01.2014) Also Tābnāk. (2011) Afzāyeshe naghshe Iran Dar Daryāye Khazar. Available at:  
<http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/210551/%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-
%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B4-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-
%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%B2%D8%B1> (Accessed on 20.10.2013)  
4 Information on rivalry and tensions over energy transport networks is covered in chapter 1 and 3 and earlier part 
of this chapter. 
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One example of market competition between the two countries is Iran-Turkey gas deal 
of the late 2000s. While negotiations were under way to find a deal which is beneficial 
for both countries; “the initiative stalled both for political reasons, but also because of 
concerns that Iranian natural gas was more expensive than its competitors in Azerbaijan 
(USD 330 per thousand cubic meters) and Russia (USD 400). Iran by contrast charged 
USD 550 per thousand cubic meters.” (Zasztowt as quoted by Shanahan 2013:24) 
Another example is the 2012 cancellation of Iran’s gas contract by a Swiss company, 
only to be replaced by Azerbaijan. A 25 years long contract was signed in 2008 between 
Swiss EGL and Iran’s NIGEC for the annual purchase of 5.5 billion cubic meters of 
gas. However, the sanctions prevented the start of devlivery. AXPO on the other hand 
became 100 percent share owner of EGL shares, and bought 5% share of the Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) Project which is expected to start delivery of Azerbaijan gas to 
Europe by 2020.  Consequently Axpo spoksman announced that "Axpo has gas 
contracts with the Shah Deniz Consortium for the whole gas capacities required, that is 
why we currently do not need any gas from Iran."(Kosolapova 2015) 
With hundreds of kilometres of shared borders, and their common membership in 
regional and international organisations such as ECO and the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference; there is such great potential for further trade and economic cooperation 
that the present volume seems ‘unconvincing’, as Iran’s former ambassador has pointed 
out.1 Confirming Bahrami’s belief, Baku’s ambassador claims that there is a potential 
for the two countries to reach their annual trade volume to $10 billion.2    
Meanwhile, domestic and international developments of both countries and their 
political relations have affected trade and economic ties as well. As Azerbaijan’s 
economy grew stronger and established closer relations with Western countries, it found 
more supplier options and became less dependent on its trade with Iran. On the other 
hand increased sanctions on Iran and isolation of the country, limited its trade 
opportunities with other countries significantly.  
With the prospect of laxing sanctions, Azerbaijan economic delegation was one of the 
first to visit Iran in the immediate weeks after finalisation of Iran’s nuclear deal.  
                                                          





5.3.4.5. Environment Sector 
“The environment sector concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary 
biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.” 
(Buzan 1991:20) While their shared long borders have provided Iran and Azerbaijan 
with various common environmental resources; Caspian Sea is the most important 
subject in their bilateral environmental relations. Located on the southern shores of the 
Caspian Sea, Iran’s agriculture, fishery, forestry and tourism is very much affected by 
this Sea. Therefore, while other countries are more interested in the exploitation of 
resources; Caspian environment protection is of special importance for Iran, 
particularly because the slope and water flow drive most of the pollutions towards the 
Iranian shores.  
The emergence of three new countries with their thirst for the Caspian hydrocarbon 
reserves initiated an increasing trend of pollution both for the Caspian and for the 
surrounding environment. The situation has become critical as a result of the 
undetermined legal status of the Sea. As long as the Sea is exploited under no binding 
legal regime, the countries are hesitant to undertake the cost and responsibility for 
pollution control and dredging. Consequently Caspian has become “one of the most 
polluted seas.” (Kostianoy & Kosarev 2010: 227) 
Caspian aquatic resources are of general importance for the neighbouring countries. Up 
until the late 2000s, the average annual fishing volume used to be around 600,000 tones. 
“Poaching is a serious problem that must be resolved with joint efforts of the Caspian 
states. The problem of over-fishing affects other species. Thus, in Iran over-fishing of 
Caspian trout, bream, zander, along with the damage of their habitats and spawning 
grounds, resulted in complete loss of these species. Zander disappeared due to massive 
catches in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.” (Aladin & Polotnicov 2003:14) Overfishing 
and increased pollutions in the Caspian Sea have resulted in the considerable demise of 
fishing resources particularly Sturgeon and Kilka fish reserves. Caspian littoral states 
eventually agreed to stop sturgeon fishing from 2014 for 5 years. The remaining 
reserves are polluted with chemical materials in their cells which are harmful to human 
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health.1 Speculations suggest that the mass mortality of the Caspian Seal which has 
endangered this species is due to the Sea pollution, as well as overfishing of some 
breeds of fish that are food to the seals.2 
According to Head of Caspian Ecology Research, there are three main sources for the 
Caspian pollution.3  
1- Petrochemical pollutions: Baku shores are filled with oil pollutions from oil 
tankers, entry and exit points, and oil rigs with outdated technology. There are 
16 carcinogenic oil derivatives in more than 122,000 tons of oil pollutions that 
enter the Caspian each year. While Caspian pollution is mostly oil related;4 
Azerbaijan is reported to be the first producer of oil pollutions. In 2013, Iran 
threatened that it “would lodge a complaint if British oil and gas giant, BP, 
continues polluting the Caspian Sea. BP simply dumps waste oil into the Caspian 
Sea waters instead of injecting it into the depth of 6,000 meters below the 
surface.”5 
2-  Industrial and agricultural pollutions: These pollutions are the most dangerous 
polluting factors in the Caspian Sea with serious health consequences for humans 
as well as other species. According to Iran’s Environment Agency’s deputy, most 
of such pollutions are originated from Russia.6However, according to Deputy 
Marine Environment of Iran’s Department of Environment, the post-mortem 
carried out on dead Caspian Sea seals has revealed a high level of DDT in their 
                                                          
1 Tasnim News (2013) Tavāfoghe keshvarhāye sāhelie Khazar barāye tavaghofe 5 sāleye saide māhiāne Khāviāri. 
Available at: <http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/233057> (Accessed on 20.02.2014) 
2 Seal Conservation Society. (2011), Available at: <http://www.pinnipeds.org/seal-information/species-
information-pages/the-phocid-seals/caspian-seal> (Accessed on 31.08.2015) 





(Accessed on 20.02.2014) 
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<http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/187506/> (Accessed on 20.02.2012) 
5 Press TV. (2013) Iran to Sue Azerbaijan over Oil Pollution in Caspian Sea. Available at: 
http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/01/27/285888/iran-to-sue-baku-over-caspian-pollution/  (Accessed on 
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(Accessed on 24.02.2014) 
6 Zistnews. (2013) Sahme Iran dar āludegie Khazar faghat ensānist/Rusie somume keshavarzi varede Khazar 
mikonad. Available at: <http://zistnews.com/News.aspx?ID=5835>  (Accessed on 19.02.2014). 
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bodies, resulted from the use of outdated and forbidden chemicals by the local 
farmers which are dangerous for both human and animals’ life.1 
3- Anthropogenic impact: “As the Caspian is an inland water body, anthropogenic 
(man-caused) impacts on catchment area (about 3.5 million km) accumulate 
here.” (Aladin & Polotnicov 2003:11). With a coastal population of over 7 
million, Iran is the main producer of anthropogenic pollution in the Caspian Sea.2 
To control such pollution, Iran’s Ministry of Energy has been obliged to install 
refineries and filters for coastal cities that have a population over 30,000. While 
this obligation has been effective in reducing human waste entering the Caspian, 
but it has not been enough, and not all such coastal cities have received the 
required technology. According to Iran’s Environment Agency’s deputy "around 
400 million cubic meters per year of this waste is produced in the Caspian 
provinces of Iran, only 40 percent of which is filtrated, and the remaining part is 
released into the sea without any filtration."3 While per capita pollution created 
by Iran is less than other littoral states, due to high population density in coastal 
areas, the accumulative volume of human swage polluting Caspian by Iran is 
more than the other four countries.4 The rise of Caspian water level has been an 
important factor in increasing anthropogenic pollution, as it washes away many 
residential areas and mixes up the Sea with water swages. (Mostaghimi 
2005:144) 
Concerns over environmental damages inflicted on the Caspian Sea encouraged the 
littoral states to start joint efforts for saving its environment since 1998. In 2003 the 
littoral states signed the Caspian Sea Convention known as Tehran Convention. The 
Convention came into force as of 12 August 2006 and since then the day is celebrated 
as the Caspian day among these states. Four complementary protocols were ratified 
during subsequent years which have provided the ground for pollution control and 
                                                          
1 Department of Environment. (2015) Estefāde az somuūme keshāvarzie mansukh shodeye donyā dar hāshieye 
Daryāye Khazar. Available at: <http://www.doe.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&ID=adcb61cd-
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2 ECO News (2012) Sahme Iran dar āludegie Daryaye Khazar 12% ast. Available at: 
<http://www.econews.ir/fa/NewsContent.aspx?id=195838> (Accessed on 20.02.2014) 
3 AZERNEWS. (2013) Iran Warns Over Caspian Sea Pollution. Available at : 
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4 Khabar Online. (2012)  Iran Daryāye Khazar rā Microbi Aludeh Mikonad Keshvarhāye Digar Nafti. Available 
at: <http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/187506/> (Accessed on 20.02.2012)  
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protection of biodiversity.1 However, despite the existence of these protocols the level 
of cooperation for environment protection has not been proportionate to the level of 
existing challenges particularly the ever increasing pollutions. Moreover, the issue has 
become another source of controversy between Iran and Azerbaijan, with Iran 
threatening to sue Azerbaijan for petroleum pollutions and Azerbaijan accusing Iran of 
creating more damage to the Sea through human swages.2  
 
5.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has initially provided a historical background on the inception and 
developments of the Republic of Azerbaijan as well as its general post independence 
foreign policy. It has then reviewed Iran-Azerbaijan relations, from a general point of 
view, providing a background on regional and international geopolitical environment 
in which these relations have been shaped. The last part of the chapter has offered 
detailed analysis on various sectors of bilateral relations particularly in the post Cold 
War era through the adaptation of Buzan and his colleagues’ security framework. By 
employing this framework, the review has analysed existing opportunities and threats, 
cooperation and rivalry between the two countries in each sector. 
The political sector has demonstrated how Baku is posing a threat to Iran’s ethno 
territorial integrity by promoting the myths of ‘Southern Azerbaijan’ and the ‘Greater 
Azerbaijan’. The aforementioned myth has had the most damaging effects on bilateral 
relations. One can imagine that if the Republic of Azerbaijan had any other name which 
was not the same as Iran’s northern provinces; and Baku could not easily be posing 
such threat to Iran’s territorial integrity by instigating irredentism among the large Azeri 
population in these provinces; the relations could have benefitted from a relative trust 
and be based on a much friendlier terms. Another important issue which also affects 
Iran’s territorial integrity is the dispute over Caspian Sea demarcation. Moreover, while 
                                                          
1 Sāzmāne Hefāzate Mohite Zist. (2014) 21 Mordād rūze Daryāye Khazar. Available at: 
<http://www.doe.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&ID=c34a5a09-b091-4aae-899e-
b30a84ad4ff5&LayoutID=2c358b27-c014-4445-b9b2-12970163bf98&CategoryID=b21cd579-acbc-4fb4-83ce-
a064c5d61bf6&SearchKey=> (Accessed on 06.05.2016) 
2 Pāygāhe Khabari Tahlilie ZistBoom. (2012) Ettehāme moteghābele Iran va Baku darbāreye mansha`e ālūdegie 
Daryāye Khazar. Available at : <http://zistboom.com/fa/news/5814/ -تهران-و-باکو-متقابل-اتهام
خزر-یایدر-یآلودگ-منشا-درباره  (Accessed on 24.02.2014)  
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the opposing nature of states has resulted in the perception of political imposition; 
contending patterns of amity and enmity and regional alignments has created more 
security threats and tensions in Tehran-Baku relations. 
Over the years, there has been limited military cooperation between Iran and 
Azerbaijan. However as the chapter has demonstrated in details, the two countries bear 
threat to one another in several ways, including the militarisation of the Caspian Sea, 
the possibility of exploitation of Azerbaijan’s air and land space for attacking Iran, 
Azerbaijan’s arms deal with Israel and its military and intelligence cooperation with 
this country against Iran is on one hand and Tehran’s efforts in countering these threats 
including cyber attacks on state related websites and other possible intelligence 
activities is on the other. 
The societal sector covers a diverse range of crucial issues in the two countries bilateral 
relations. Complex cultural and ethnic ties are the most significant characteristics of 
Iran-Azerbaijan social relations. In addition to the shared ethnicity which has provided 
Baku with a precedent for irredentist sentiments and promoting the myth of Greater 
Azerbaijan; shared cultural heritages have become another bone of contention and 
extended the scope of rivalry to cultural issues. On the other hand, adherence of the 
majority of both countries’ population to a common sectarian confession is considered 
by Iran as an asset for further influence, while Baku perceives it as an element of threat 
for Azerbaijan’s secular state. 
The economic sector has looked at areas of cooperation such as trade and energy, 
discussing barriers to the further expansion of cooperation which are mainly either 
infrastructure deficiencies or political barriers, such as sanctions. The section also 
explains that despite their trade and economic co operations, the two countries compete 
over hydrocarbon resources, transport routs and markets. Moreover, the economic 
interdependence is not deep enough to result in closer political relations or at least not 
be affected by political tensions. 
The main environmental issue between the two countries is the Caspian pollution, 
resulting from exploitation of undersea resources, poaching and over fishing, household 
swages, shipping and transport. The chapter has argued that undetermined legal status 
of the Caspian Sea has resulted in littoral countries failure to accept responsibility for 
the environmental protection of the Sea. 
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As demonstrated by this analysis, while there certainly is room for improvement of 
bilateral relations through confidence building and détente; the existence of geopolitical 
imperatives and conflicting interests such as territorial disputes, resource and market 
rivalries, incompatible nature of states, as well as transregional interferences which has 
securitised the bilateral atmosphere, makes partnership between the two countries an 
unlikely development. Although emphasising particularly on their shared heritage, 
officials in both countries, try to play down heated disputes and pursue a degree of 
cooperation; but the existence of the aforementioned factors can potentially tarnish 
bilateral relations between any given two countries. In such circumstances, even a 
potential asset such as shared heritage has become an added threat. Therefore while 
both countries try to avoid an outright conflict and save face by emphasising on existing 
strong links between the two nations, as long as the above factors remain unchanged, 
the likelihood of enmity is much more than amity.   
The following conclusions can also be drawn trough the application of theories with the 
analysis provided in this chapter: 
1- Iran has failed to articulate and adopt a clear and consistent proactive policy 
towards the Republic of Azerbaijan since the independence of the latter. This 
failure is mainly rooted in Tehran’s continuous misconception and 
miscalculations about Azerbaijan, which has deserted Iran of effective policy 
initiatives and resulted in a generally reactive policy towards this neighbour.  The 
main source of such deficiency could be found in excessive reliance on 
constructive analysis of the existing circumstances both at regional and state 
level; which has resulted in Iran’s overestimation of the role and influence of its 
common heritage with Azerbaijan and the ‘Shiite’ factor on the one hand, and 
underestimation of the implications of Azerbaijan’s ‘secular’ state and its 
Western orientated foreign policy on the other. The combination of these factors 
has created a security atmosphere much deeper and more complicated than what 
Iran had initially anticipated. 
2- Nonetheless, as demonstrated by the review of bilateral relations under various 
administrations in both countries, the attitude and approach of both countries 
administrative leaders have had crucial effects in exacerbating or diminution of 
tensions and subsequent increase or decrease of opportunities and threats. 
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3- Through the picture provided by this study, Iran-Azerbaijan relations can be 
explained with defensive realism theory of international relations. Talaiferro has 
defined some auxiliary assumptions from which defensive realism proceeds. 
These assumptions specify “how structural variables translate into international 
outcomes and state’s foreign policies.”(2001:131) He believes that “structural 
modifiers such as the offense-defense balance, geographic proximity and access 
to raw materials- influence the severity of the security dilemma between 
particular states.”(ibid) The geographical proximity of Iran and Azerbaijan, as 
well as their rivalry over hydrocarbon resources, has increased the severity of 
security dilemma between the two countries. He also emphasises on the role of 
leader’s calculations and perceptions in translating material power into foreign 
policy. As already explained, there was an initial miscalculation on the part of 
Iran, overestimating social and historical bonds in Azerbaijan’s approach towards 
Iran, which has resulted in Tehran’s rather passive and reactionary position with 
respect to Baku.  
Taliaferro has further argued that “domestic politics can limit the efficiency of a 
state’s response to the external environment.”(ibid) The existence of a large Azeri 
population in provinces bordering with the Republic of Azerbaijan has been an 
important determining factor in shaping bilateral relations. However, they are not 
the only domestic factor limiting Iran’s efficiency in response to Azerbaijan. As 
demonstrated by several cases in this chapter, media, clergies, quasi government 
organisations, etc. play an important role in shaping these relations. 
As explained by defensive realism “pairs of states may pursue purely security-
seeking strategies, but inadvertently generate spirals of mutual hostility 
or conflict.”(Taliaferro 2001:129) Throughout this chapter, it was demonstrated 
how Iran and Azerbaijan are seeking strategies to galvanise their security against 
existing regional and international threats. However, due to conflicting interests 
and policies this has generated spirals of mutual hostility. Defensive realism also 
explains instances where the two countries have cooperation on issues such as 
trade and economy or environmental protection; “under certain conditions states 
can engage in mutually beneficial cooperation.” (ibid: 130)  
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The next chapter will examine Iran’s bilateral relations with the Republic of Armenia, 
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IRAN’S RELATIONS WITH THE 







Armenia, the smallest and the least economically developed country in the South 
Caucasus, with approximately 40 kms of shared borders is Iran’s closest ally in the 
region. As it would be demonstrated in this chapter, there is a long historical precedent 
to Iran-Armenia friendship extending over the millennia. This historical precedent has 
been an important factor in setting the tune in bilateral relations. 
Regional developments, as well as both countries’ foreign relations, are among other 
factors that set the context in which their relations are formed. This chapter will briefly 
discuss Armenia’s foreign policy and its relations with important regional and external 
actors, as well as the effects of the Karabakh conflict on these policies and relations. 
It will then move on to analyse Iran’s bilateral relations with Armenia in the same 
sectoral model used for analysing its relations with the Republic of Azerbaijan. The 
analysis will demonstrate a consistent pattern of behaviour between the two countries 
based on mutual trust and respect, cemented by shared historical and cultural heritage, 
and close social relations enhanced by the presence of respected Armenian ethnic 
minority in Iran.  
The chapter will argue that while trade and economic relations, particularly bartering 
energy has been the cornerstone of bilateral relations, some other strategic drives 
namely; shared regional challenges and grievances such as sanctions and isolation, 
converging patterns of alliance and rivalry, as well as incentives such as the positive 
role that the Armenian lobbies in the West can play in favour of Iran have been among 
various factors directing development of bilateral relations from cordial and friendly 




6.2. Armenia’s Shared History with Iran 
Armenia’s particular geography has probably been the most important factor affecting 
its history. Geographically situated on a high mountainous plateau, “Armenia has been 
called the ‘Armenian Fortress’ and the ‘Armenian Island’.” (Masih & Kirkorian 1991: 
xix) From a strategic point of view, this mountainous terrestrial characteristic has 
provided the country with natural frontiers which could help in securing the boundaries 
of any Empire located in it.  
As a consequence of situating at the crossroad of rival powers, Armenia has been 
frequently fought over “either to provide a buffer against neighbouring states and tribal 
confederations or as means to achieve greater strategic goals.” (ibid: xx) Despite 
centuries of statehood, “throughout much of its history, Armenia has rarely been united 
in a single political entity.” (ibid) Development and flourishing of Armenia have been 
dependent on the equilibrium of surrounding powers. In the absence of equilibrium, 
“the stronger power filled the vacuum and turned Armenia into battlefield.” (Garsoian 
as quoted by ibid) 
The first Armenian dynasty, Yervandunis, was established under the auspices of 
powerful Medes in the 6th century B.C. “Later, the Persians who replaced the Medes 
in 550 and ruled until 331 B.C. kept this dynasty in power.” (Sadri 2007: 67) According 
to Xenophon, the famous Greek historian, there existed close relations between Tikran 
Yervandian, the Armenian king and Cyrus the Great, the founder of Achaemenians. 
Armenians fought alongside Cyrus against Azhdahak and Medians and supported the 
establishment of the Achaemedian dynasty. Armenians were serving as commanders in 








2010:23) “The Yerevandunis dynasty continued to rule Armenia with a fair degree of 
autonomy even after Alexander the great brought an end to the Persian Empire.” (ibid) 
As a result of this political autonomy together with their geographical isolation, 
Armenians grew into a cohesive and distinct group of people. (ibid) 
 
                                                          
1 Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasus And 




Map 6.2: Armenia and the Roman Client States in Eastern Asia Minor ca. 50 AD1 
 
 
Based on Tacitus historiography, Melkomian (2010:24) writes that Armenians were 
culturally and traditionally very close to Parthians and fought Romans together, 
eventually breaking Romans through Persian-Armenian alliance in 61-2 B.C. 
Armenians continued to have close relations and respectable positions in Parthians 
courts. However, according to Sadri (2007: 68), they eventually allied themselves with 
Rome and converted to Christianity in 314-5 A.C. This development which coincided 
with Sassanid era is recognised as the root of Western orientation among Armenians 
and the “foundation that would separate Armenians from the Muslim Arabs, Turks and 
Persians who later became dominant forces in the region.” Then in 387 A.C Armenians 
were divided between Persia and Rome. The larger eastern part went under the Sasanid 
rule and the Western part under the Romans. (Melkomian 2010:25) However, the 
demise of Byzantine Empire completely cut off Armenia from the Christian West, 
leading the country to the “dark centuries”. (Panossian as quoted by ibid)  
“After the fall of the last Armenian kingdom in historic Armenia, in the eleventh 
century, many Armenians ….  settled in Cilicia, on the Mediterranean Sea. An 
                                                          
1 Available at: 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Armenia_(antiquity)#mediaviewer/File:Roman_East_50-en.svg> 
(Accessed on 05.09.2014) 
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Armenian kingdom was eventually established and played a vital role in near Eastern 
affairs until it was conquered by the Mamlukes in 1375. This marked the end of the last 
Armenian political entity until the establishment of the Republic of Armenia in 1918, 
almost 550 years later.”(Masih & Kirkorian 1991: xxi) 
Following the occupation of both Persia and Armenia by Arabs; political, economic 
and cultural relations between these two countries increased and entered into a new 
phase with the aim of preventing further penetration of Arabs. Through natural alliances 
shaped for resisting against Seljuks, Mongols and other Turkish tribes; friendship and 
cooperation between the two nations and their governments flourished.  
In later centuries, Armenia once again became a buffer zone between two warring 
Empires, the Ottoman Turks and the Safavid Persians. In trying to avoid getting caught 
between the two Muslim Empires, Armenians appealed to their Christian brothers, 
Europe and Russia. However, as the might of Muslim Empires did not crack till late 
1800’s, Armenians remained isolated from Europe. (Sadri 2007:69) 
The 15th century rivalry of Ottomans and Safavids resulted in the ultimate partition of 
Armenia between regional powers. Ottomans occupied most parts of Western Armenia 
and the remaining parts went under the Persians’ suzerainty.  In the early 17th century, 
Armenians on the northern side of the Aras and the Ararat Plain were forcefully 
migrated to different parts of Persia. They established the new city of Jolfa around 
Isfahan, which later become an important hub of domestic and foreign trade. 
Considering their political and economic influence, Safavid shahs bestowed privileges 
on Armenians who had settled in Iran. They enjoyed the same privileges under the Qajar 
dynasty too. (Melkomian 2010:25) 
The rise of Russia in the late 18th and early 19th century as a new regional power 
challenged the hegemony of both ancient powers in the Caucasus and transformed the 
geopolitical dynamics of the region. (Masih & Kirkorian 1991: xxi)  As a consequence 
of Turkamanchai Treaty, based on which Armenia was ceded to the Russian Empire; 
the political destiny of Armenia slipped out of Persia’s hands and went under the control 
of Ottomans and Russians. “When the Ottoman Empire initiated a war against Russia 
in the fall of 1914, the fate of the Ottoman Armenians was all but sealed.” (ibid: xxv) 
Perceived as traitors, the Armenian population of Western Armenia became the subject 
of extermination. Although the exact number of Armenians killed during the event may 
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never be determined, it has been estimated that 1.5 million Armenians lives were spared 
between 1915 and 1923. (ibid) Following these horrid events, Persia warmly welcomed 
the Armenians who had to leave their country and helped them rebuild their lives. 
(Sarkissian as quoted by Melkomian 2010:26)  
Iran’s relation with Armenia entered a new phase after the end of the World War I and 
the latter’s independence in 1918. The first independent Armenian state after more than 
5 centuries was struggling with numerous external challenges such as conflicts with 
Georgia over Akhal Kalk and Lori, and Azerbaijan over Karabakh and Zangezur. The 
unresolved issue of Western Armenia, domestic problems including refugees and non 
existing economy, in addition to Bolsheviks efforts to overthrow the Republic were 
among other challenges. Therefore, the only safe side appeared to be on Armenia’s 
southern border with Iran. The appointment of Prince Arghutian as Armenia’s 
ambassador in Iran was an evidence of the importance which was attached to relations 
with Iran. Unfortunately, due to the tension-ridden domestic scene; exploiting such 
opportunities was not a priority for Iranian officials. Although a delegation was 
appointed to establish relations between Iran and the three republics of the Caucasus, 
but the mission did not bear any fruits due to the fast regional developments and the 
collapse of three Caucasian republics. (IPIS 2009:164) 
The situation was not any better in Armenia. A contract that was drafted for establishing 
Batumi-Ghares-Yerevan-Tabriz road in Yerevan never got to the negotiation step due 
to the collapse of the Armenian Republic, which was eventually annexed to the Soviet 
Union in 1920-192. (ibid)  
The importance of Armenia in regional dynamics was not reduced even after the end of 
the World War II. To counter the possible invasion of NATO through Turkey, hundreds 
of Eastern Bloc military units were stationed in Armenia. (ibid: 27) Even after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of CIS, the strategic importance of 
Armenia was not reduced, as Armenia-Turkish border remained one of the main 
crossroads of the world’s greatest nuclear powers, NATO and the CIS.  
On the other hand, although Armenia’s territorial conflicts with its neighbours were 
frozen under the Soviets, they were by no means resolved. “One of the major legacies 
of Soviet nationality policy was territorialisation of ethnicity.” (Masih & Kirkorian 
1991: xxvii) Based on this policy, which was devised and executed by Stalin, each 
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nationality must have a corresponding territorial unit. “The impact of Soviet nationality 
policies on Armenia is difficult to overestimate. ... Armenia lost land and population to 
almost all of its neighbours. The predominantly Armenian populated regions of present 
day southern Georgia, Akhalkalak, and Akhalteshke were given over to Georgian 
administration, as well as half of the Lori district. The historically Armenian district of 
Nakhichevan became an autonomous formation within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist 
Republic, while Karabagh, with its overwhelming Armenian majority, was turned into 
an autonomous region under jurisdiction of Baku.” (ibid) 
As the most ethnically homogenous Republic of the former Soviet Union, Armenia was 
a fertile ground for the rise of nationalist sentiments during Perestroika.  Following 
some heated domestic developments, “in late summer of 1991, the Armenian 
Communist Party Congress decided to dissolve the party, and Armenia was proclaimed 
an independent and sovereign republic on September 23, 1991.” (Nuriyev 2007: 57) 
 
6.3. Armenia’s Foreign Policy 
According to Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; “the foreign policy of the 
Republic of Armenia is aimed at strengthening the country’s external security, 
maintaining external favourable conditions for the development of the country, 
presenting the positions of Armenia on the international scene, raising efficiency of 
protecting the interests of Armenia and its citizens abroad, deepening engagement in 
the international organisations and processes, strengthening cooperation with the 
friendly and partner states, as well as resolving regional problems and creating an 
atmosphere of cooperation.”1 Armenia’s National Security Strategy document has 
outlined the country’s foreign and security policies more comprehensively. The 
document has considered two concepts of ‘complementarity’ and ‘engagement’ as the 
main principles of the country’s foreign policy.  
Although it was Kocharyan’s administration that widely promoted the concept of 
complementarity in 1998; as German (2012:36) explains “the principle of 
                                                          
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. Foreign Policy. Available at: <http://mfa.am/en/foreign-
policy/> (Accessed on 30.04.2014) 
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complementarism has defined Armenian foreign policy since independence”. 
According to Poghosyan (2011: 196) complementarity means that “Armenia would 
promote its national interests on the international scene while ‘refraining from 
competition and antagonism’ and through reliance on ‘the potential of partnership and 
balance’ among regional and global powers. Resisting “polarization of geopolitical 
interests in the region”, is the assumed purpose of such policy. German (2012:36) 
believes that complementarity “stresses the importance of pursuing Armenia’s national 
interest through a balance of policies that do not favour any one country or bloc, a 
strategy that has become more significant as the West began to take a more direct 
interest in the South Caucasus at the beginning of the 21st century”. The concept of 
engagement on the other hand, emphasises the importance of participation in regional 
and international processes and initiatives that are beneficial to Armenia’s national 
interests. 
However, the above principles have been in sharp contrast to the realities of Armenian 
foreign relations and the geopolitical environment since the independence of this 
republic more than two decades ago. In addition to regional geopolitical developments; 
the Karabakh conflict has played as a major impediment in comprehensive 
implementation of the above principles. 
The Karabakh Conflict: While chapter 5 of this study has provided some background 
on the Karabakh issue, the effects of this protracted conflict on Armenia cannot be 
overestimated and needs further discussion. Armenia would have been struggling for 
survival with a collapsed economy, insufficient infrastructure, and other security threats 
to its sovereignty even without any war. Yet, the Republic entered its latest period of 
independence handicapped by the Karabakh conflict and its consequences.  
The fact that Nagorno Karabakh’s secession from the Republic of Azerbaijan has 
continuously been a priority in Armenia’s post-independence agenda shows the 
importance of the issue in domestic politics. However, any attempt to integrate the 
Nagorno Karabakh into Armenia directly, would have been in breach of international 
law and left Yerevan open to international condemnations. In order to avoid such 
pressure and not to risk its regional relations; “instead of trying immediate unification 
with Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia recognized Nagorno-Karabakh’s 1991 declaration 
of independence. In this way, Yerevan could frame the conflict as a civil war in 
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Azerbaijan and not a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”(de Waal as quoted by 
Sadri 2007:71) However, due to the saliency of the issue, President Ter Petrosian’s 
clever policy did not work long and “Armenia was soon undeniably engaged in the war 
for Nagorno-Karabakh.” (Sadri 2007: 72)  
Armenia’s further military success in Karabakh brought about more economic and 
diplomatic challenges for the country. “Under the Soviet Union 80% of Armenia’s rail 
traffic passed through Azerbaijan.” (de waal as quoted by Sadri 2007:74) The 
immediate consequence of the war was the loss of major trade routes and transport 
infrastructure resulting in an acute shortage of food and fuel supplies due to the 
blockade imposed by Azerbaijan, which consequently left Turkey as the main 
appropriate channel for essential commodities. Therefore, despite the dark history of 
the so called Armenian genocide, and the pressure of Diasporas; “Armenia’s foreign 
policy in 1991-2 emphasised the establishment of normal relations with Ankara. 
Economic necessity and re establishing the old east-west trade link outweighed 
nationalist priorities.” (Herzig 1999:96) The policy was fruitful for a while and Turkey 
permitted the use of its territory for transfer of humanitarian assistance to Armenia 
through its airspace, railroads, and ports. “The possibility that this kind of good will 
would grow into a more meaningful relationship led to talks in which Armenian- 
Turkish representatives operating with the tacit approval of authorities in Yerevan 
began negotiations over the expansion of port facilities in the Turkish city of Trabzon 
on the Black Sea. This port would be used to accommodate increased Armenian trade 
with Europe.” (Masih & Krikorian 1999: 98) 
However, as Armenia became more explicitly involved in the Karabakh conflict and 
Azerbaijan suffered more defeats, Yerevan’s hopes to keep relations with Turkey as a 
separate issue from its conflict with Azerbaijan proved wrong. Armenian offensive 
continued irrespective of increasing international condemnation, resulting in the 
occupation of 20% of the Azerbaijan territory, which provided a connection rout 
between Armenia and Karabakh, as well as a buffer zone between Karabakh and 
Azerbaijan against any Azerbaijani offensive. Yerevan-Ankara relations that had 
already become tense following the 1992 occupation of Shusha and Lachin turned 
hostile as Armenian forces seized the Azeri province of Kalbajar. Turkey cut diplomatic 
relations with Armenia and imposed border blockade which has continued ever since. 
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The above developments created a new environment in which, Armenia was deprived 
of two of its main trade and transport routes and caught between two adversaries. While 
the immediate consequence of this situation was sever energy and food shortages, 
Armenia has been faced with longer term and more serious consequences particularly 
in its foreign and security policy during the last decades.  
The country’s isolation has provided Russia with the opportunity to exert more influence 
on Armenia, and has resulted in Yerevan’s subservient status towrads Moscow. As already 
discussed in chapter two; Yerevan’s dire economic circumstances has drowned the country 
in heavy debts to Russia. To redeem some of its ever increasing debts, Yerevan was forced 
to involve Russian public and private companies in Armenia’s economic infrastructure 
through Russia’s ‘equity for debt relieve programme’. This heavy Russian involvement is 
not only in sharp contrast to the policy of ‘not favour(ing) any one country or bloc’, but has 
practically undermined Armenia’s sovereignty, which in turn has limited the country’s 
engagement with the international community to a level that does not contradict Moscow’s 
interests in the region. 
While Armenia’s relations with major regional players would be discussed further in 
this section, the above details suffice to demonstrate how the Karabakh conflict has 
been an impediment for the realisation of a ‘balanced foreign policy’ branded as 
‘complimentarity’. 
Although the geopolitical shift resulting from direct Western involvement in the region 
could have provided Armenia with greater development opportunities, failure to settle its 
conflict with Azerbaijan has left Yerevan in a disadvantaged position. It has resulted in 
Armenia’s exclusion from major international projects, particularly energy pipelines, 







6.3.1. Historical Review of Armenia’s Post-Independence Foreign Policy 
Armenia’s post-independence foreign policy has been relatively stable. By reviewing 
this policy, one can see general continuity and consistency in direction, principles and 
priorities; though the depth and intensity of its relations or focus on a particular subject 
may have varied at times.  
Close relations with Russia has been an important aspect of Armenia’s foreign policy. 
According to 2007 Armenia’s national security strategy, “the importance of Russia’s 
role for the security of Armenia, the traditional friendly links between the two nations, 
the level of trade and economic relations, Russia’s role in the Nagorno Karabakh 
mediation effort, as well as the presence of a significant Armenian community in 
Russia, all contribute to a strategic partnership.” This benevolence towards Russia is to 
a large degree “premised upon shared Christian heritage and juxtaposition of the images 
of barbaric Asiatic Turk and enlightened Europeanized Russian”. (Mirzoyan 2007:37) 
Russian military and economic assistance which played an important role in the survival 
of the country in the early post-independence years and “provided a basic security 
umbrella that had become absent immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union” 
has also been a strong foundation for such trust among Armenia’s politicians towards 
Russia. (ibid: 55) 
The two countries signed a bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance in 1991. However, two important factors encouraged Armenia to forge an 
even closer relationship and to realign with Russia. The first was anxiety over “the 
military threat posed by Turkey and Azerbaijan.” (Herzig 1999:96) Russia’s strenuous 
relation with Azerbaijan in this period became an advantage to Armenia’s efforts.  The 
other was “the realization that Russia had remained a far more important power in the 
region than had initially appeared to be the case.” (ibid)  
Over the years, the pattern of close cooperation which was established in 1992-3 
developed asymmetrically in a way that kept Armenia extremely dependant on its 
relations with Moscow. The consolidation of links between the two countries’ defence 
and military sectors was essential in Armenia’s progress in Karabakh war and also 
“enabled Armenia to build what is, according to the country’s leaders, the strongest 
army in the south Caucasus.”(Wolfson 2002:3) Economically, “credit from Russia’s 
Central Bank was vital to support Armenia’s budget in this period.” (Herzig 1999:97)   
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The March 1995 signing of yet another treaty “allowed Moscow to establish the 102nd 
Russian military base in the city of Gyumri, which is located close to the border with 
Turkey. Yerevan also hosts Russian border troops which guard Armenia’s border with 
Iran and Turkey.”(ibid) Russia’s base in Armenia is “the only such facility outside of 
the Russian Federation where the host country receives neither rent nor 
reimbursement.  Armenia pays for the totality of its costs and expenses.” 
(Hovansiannisian 2010)  
This process was continued with the signing of a critically important military 
agreements and further developments in bilateral relations which eventually culminated 
to the signing of 1997 Armenian-Russian Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance. The significance of this treaty is that it “envisages mutual military 
support if either side is attacked or considers itself threatened by a third party. The two 
parties further pledged not to join any alliance or defence treaty directed against Russia 
or Armenia. For Armenia, the treaty ensured Russian support in the case of the 
Azerbaijani attempt at a military revenge, while for Russia Armenia was the only base 
from which it could secure its Southern flank and project influence over the 
region.”(Mirzoyan 2007:63) Another agreement on deepening military cooperation by 
the two countries’ Defence Ministers in November 2003, which coincided with the 
Georgian political crisis, was heralded by Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor Ivano calling 
Armenia, "Russia's only ally in the south." (Iskyan 2004) Following the 2014 Ukraine 
developments and growing tension between Russia and Western countries, The Russian 
Air force started upgrading “the Soviet-era Erebuni airbase in Armenia, which houses 
the Russian 3624th Air Base and currently hosts a squadron of MiG-29 fighters and Mi-
24 attack helicopters.”(Daley 2014) 
Another important development was the 2003 transfer of the management of Armenian 
energy sector to Russia as part of the ‘debt for equity’ programme. Also in 2008 based 
on an “agreement between the Russian and Armenian governments transferred 
Armenian Railways to Russian Railways’ subsidiary, South Caucasus Railways for 30 
years. The agreement committed the Russians to investing $230 million in Armenia 
during the first five years of operations and subsequently an additional $240 
million.”(ibid) 
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“The predominance of Russian capital in strategic sectors of Armenia’s economy (such 
as the energy, transport and telecommunications sectors), the country’s dependence on 
Russian loans, and remittances from Armenian expatriate workers employed in Russia 
(over 10% of the country’s yearly GDP)” (Ananics 2014); as well as Armenia’s security 
reliance has provided Moscow with leverage to isolate Yerevan from constructive 
interaction with the West. This in turn has given a more free hand to Russia to exert 
more influence in the South Caucasus through subordinating Yerevan to Moscow’s 
will. The existing relations were significantly strengthened in 2010, with the signing of 
an extension to the 1995 agreement on the 102nd Russian military base at Gyumri, 
extending the operation of the base until 2044. (German 2012:37) 
Armenia’s 2014 decision to withdraw from EU’s trade association and join the Russian 
led Eurasian Economic Community Custom’s Union, is a stark example of the above 
analysis.  Developments came after years of negotiations between Armenia and EU.1 
Cleverly manipulating Armenia’s weaknesses to maximise its own interests; Russia 
increased the price of energy supply to Armenia by 50% as of July 2013 following a 
practical warning through the sale of $1bn armament to Azerbaijan in spring; forcing 
Yerevan to eventually interrupt its negotiations with the EU. “Soon after President 
Sargsyan’s decision to join the Customs Union, another expansive phase of Russia’s 
military presence in Armenia began.”(Grigoryan 2014) According to the Polish OSW 
think tank, “the process of integration with the CU has reduced the Armenian 
government’s room for manoeuvre on the domestic political scene and has made this 
scene subordinate to the Kremlin’s interests. As a consequence, the president, who was 
dominant in domestic politics until recently, is losing his power to Moscow, and the 
oligarchic government system is becoming entrenched.”(Ananic 2014) 
“Turkey was among the first countries to recognize Armenia’s independence after the 
collapse of the USSR.” (Poghosyan 2011:204) However, as already explained, 
Armenia’s strategy to keep the Karabakh conflict separate from its regional relations 
did not work with regards to Turkey. The diplomatic relations broke out and Ankara 
imposed land and air border blockade following Armenian’s advances into 
Azerbaijan’s territory in 1993, as a symbol of Turkish brotherly alliance with the latter. 
“The airspace was opened in 1995, but for the opening of the land border and 
                                                          
1 Armenia’s negotiations with the EU had started in 2009. 
264 
establishment of diplomatic relations Turkey put forward a number of preconditions, 
particularly, return to Azerbaijan of the areas currently under the control of NKR and 
abandonment of the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide.”1 
As a result of a negotiation process facilitated by Switzerland, a ‘Protocol on 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations’ and ‘Protocol on Development of Relations’ 
were signed between Turkey and Armenia, and sent to relevant authorities in each 
country for ratification. However, under both domestic and Azerbaijan’s pressure, 
“after the protocols were signed, Turkey abruptly changed its position and refused to 
implement agreements on the normalisation of the relations within a reasonable 
timeframe and without any preconditions, linking the ratification of the Protocols in the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
issues.”2 On the Armenian side, the protocol was first sent to the Constitutional Court 
for approval. “The court found the protocols to be commensurate with the Armenian 
Constitution with its reasoned statement, which contained contradictory elements to the 
latter and the spirit of the Protocols.”3 Eventually on April 2010, in a televised message, 
Sargsyan suspended the ratification process of the protocols. Armenia, categorically 
denies accepting any preconditions for opening the borders and establishing diplomatic 
relations.  
Relations with the West have been an important aspect of Armenia’s foreign policy 
since the early post-independence days, initially through OSCE’s mediation efforts. 
Two important factors have acted as major catalysts for developing Armenia’s relations 
with the West. First is the shared Christian heritage, which is the basis for Armenian’s 
argument for their belonging to the European civilisation. The other is Armenia’s active 
Diaspora, which have a crucial role in pursuing their vision of Armenian nation’s 
interests in Western countries. (Mirzoyan 2007:261)  
While integration with the European structures was initially a strategic vision for 
Armenia (Oskanian as quoted by Mirzoyan 2007:260) it has been impeded by the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict, as the resolution of the conflict along with democratic 
reforms were initially set as prerequisites for the country’s accession and membership 
                                                          
1 The Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Republic of Armenia, Available at: 
<http://www.mfa.am/en/country-by-country/tr/> (Accessed on 13.05.2014) 
2 ibid 
3 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Relations between Turkey and Armenia. Available at: 
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-armenia.en.mfa> ( Accessed on 13.05.2014) 
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to the Council of Europe. This dilemma was resolved in June 2000 when the Council 
of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly decided to admit both Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
(Mirzoyan 2007:261-263). Efforts have been made by Yerevan to strengthen relations 
with the EU and NATO through participation in cooperation and development 
programmes such as IPAP and the European Neighbourhood Program. However, “in 
2006 Robert Kocharian emphasised that Armenia would not join EU or NATO, as 
‘membership of Collective Security Organisation and the high level of military-
technical cooperation with Russia solve the task of ensuring the country’s security.” 
(German 2012: 37) Armenia’s relations with NATO and EU would only develop to a 
degree that Russia seems fit. Any attempt of closer relations would be torpedoed by 
Moscow as it would contradict Russia’s regional interests.  
According to Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The United States of America is 
the most important partner for Armenia.”1 This statement which seems ignorant of the 
impact of Russia’s place in Armenia’s foreign policy demonstrates the importance that 
Yerevan attaches to its relationship with the United States, as well as the fact that “The 
USA is the biggest humanitarian and technical aid provider to Armenia.”2  
Armenia’s well organised, highly educated, and influential Diaspora in the US has 
played a quintessential role in putting this small faraway republic on the US radar long 
before its independence. “The PR campaign for Armenia on the US domestic political 
scene have guided and informed the US position towards Yerevan and the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict until 1996 when America’s own geostrategic objectives in the region 
became clarified and crystallized.”(Mirzoyan 2007:222) While effective factors in the 
success of Armenian lobbies are outside the scope of this research, providing some 
examples is important in demonstrating their influence in the US, particularly in the 
Congress. Implementation and maintenance of Section 907 of the Freedom of Support 
Act, which prevents the US government aids to Azerbaijan3, as well as securing an 
annual aid of roughly about $90 million for Armenia are among their most considerable 
achievements. Armenia’s selection as a country eligible to apply for the Millennium 
Challenge Account -a five year account aimed at reducing poverty around the world- 
                                                          
1 Available at: <http://www.mfa.am/en/country-by-country/us/>  (Accessed on 15.05.2014) 
2 ibid 
3 The practice of the Act by US government was suspended in 2002 as a result of Azerbaijan’s provision of support 
for US war on terror. 
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in 2006 was another accomplishment of the Diaspora. Through this programme 
Armenia received $236 million of grants in 2010. 
Poghosyan (2011:202) considers three main dimensions for US-Armenia relations. The 
first is US position as the co-chair of the OSCE Minsk group mediating for the peaceful 
resolution of the Karabakh conflict. The second dimension is fostering Armenia’s 
engagement with Euro Atlantic organisations and encouraging Turkish-Armenian 
reconciliation though it remained futile. The third is monitoring Iran-Armenia relations 
in order to make sure that it is limited and in the context of providing Armenia with its 
essential needs particularly with regard to energy supplies.  
While deep down Armenia has always been interested in developing its relations with 
the United States; the geopolitical realities of the region have limited the opportunities 
for this aspiration. The first and foremost is the fact that Armenia cannot afford 
increased relations with the United States at the expense of antagonising Russia. The 
United States also has been cautious about Russia’s sensitivities in its relations with 
Armenia. The other geopolitical reality is that Armenia has less importance for the US 
compared to its regional adversaries; Azerbaijan with its valuable energy resources and 
Turkey as a NATO partner, and the potential hob of energy. As explained above, the 
main factor which has kept Armenia on Washington’s radar despite these geopolitical 
factors is the effective Armenian Diaspora in the US and Yerevan’s relations with Iran. 
 
6.4. Iran-Armenia Post-Independence Relations 
“The Islamic Republic of Iran officially recognised the independence of Armenia on 
25th of December, 1991.”1 Iran’s embassy in Yerevan was opened in April 1992 and 
Armenia opened its Tehran embassy in December the same year. “Since then, the two 
countries had neither border or economical disputes nor ethnical or religious rivalries. 
Moreover, their successive leaders welcomed strengthening of their relationship on 
many occasions and committed themselves to realize numerous flagship projects.” 
(Moniquit & Racimora 2013:3) Starting from a cordial stage, the relations have 
dynamically developed into a strategic partnership, according to Iran’s ambassador in 
                                                          
1 Available at: <http://www.mfa.am/en/country-by-country/ir/> (Accessed on 25.06.2014). 
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Yerevan.1 According to Armenia’s National Security Strategy document (2007:19); 
“development of traditional neighbourly relations between Armenia and Iran is based 
on a number of shared realities: shared borders, historic and cultural ties, and mutual 
economic interests.”The same document also indicates further development of 
neighborly relations by implementing diversified programs of cooperation with Iran, as 
an important element in the regional directions of the Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Armenia.  
The first stage of Iran-Armenia engagement was rocky to some degree, with the two 
countries “grappling with new geopolitical realities forced upon them through 
…extraordinary changes.”(Mirzoyan 2007:191) As Mirzoyan (2007:192-3) has 
correctly pointed out “Iran demonstrated good will that was not shaken either by the 
Armenian military audacity at times even undermining Iran’s mediation efforts, nor 
even the shooting down of an Iranian C-130 in the environs of Stepanakert by the 
Armenian forces resulting in the death of thirty-four people.” 
Each of the above mentioned incidents had the potential to spoil bilateral relations. As 
explained in previous chapters, Iran’s mediation efforts in which Tehran had invested 
tremendous amount of time and credit was undermined by Armenia’s capture of Shusha 
exactly when delegations from both belligerent sides were signing a ceasefire 
agreement in Tehran. Papazian, then the advisor to Ter Petrosian explains “undoubtedly 
we put Iranians in a difficult position. Frankly speaking the perception was that 
Armenians and Iranians have conspired against Azeris. There was a setback in bilateral 
relations for a few months, but then Ter Petrosian sent me as special envoy to Tehran 
to hand in his letter to Rafsanjani. I was received by Iran’s deputy president, Habibi 
who took the letter. After that meeting the relations started to warm up 
again.”(Hacoupian 2010) 
The second event was the shooting down of the C-130 Iranian cargo plane by Armenian 
anti aircraft missiles. The plane was carrying students and families of diplomats who 
                                                          
1 Contact. (2013) Iranian Ambassador to Armenia: Armenia's Interests are the Interests of Iran and vice versa. 
Available at: <http://www.contact.az/docs/2013/Politics/021200028176en.htm#.VeiLWvlViko> (Accessed on 
30.08.2015) 
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were returning home for Nowruz celebrations. The incident was put to rest with the 
official apology of the Armenian government.1 
Nonetheless, the most significant evidence of Iran’s goodwill was the provision of fuel 
and basic commodities during the difficult winter of 1991-1992 despite considerable 
pressure from public opinion particularly Azerbaijani population of Iran, against 
Armenia.  
Iran’s official neutral position on Karabakh conflict and its mediation efforts, as well 
as its considerable tolerance towards Armenia in testing times (such as the above 
examples) and provision of essential commodities at times of crisis, laid the foundation 
of stable positive relations for years to come. Close relations with Iran has been the 
subject of general consensus and support among all Armenian parties, politicians and 
public. 
Iran’s stable relations with Armenia mean that one cannot find significant highs and 
lows, or major turning points. However, there are milestones at which the relations have 
been stepped up through the signing of major agreements and contracts. These 
occasions would be further discussed under the ‘economic sector’.  
Although the economy is the cornerstone of Iran-Armenia relations; there are obviously 
other aspects to consider. This section will discuss these aspects applying the same 
pattern used in evaluating Iran-Azerbaijan relations.  
 
 
6.4.1. Political Sector 
As many analysts have pointed out, judged hastily, Islamic Iran’s relations with 
Christian Armenia initially seemed an unlikely develpment. However, their sustained 
cordial and close relations have been exemplary in proving the importance of mutual 
rationality, understanding, and positive approach in bilateral relations. Unlike many 
regional and international countries which viewed Iran’s religious state as an 
                                                          
1 According to a former Iranian diplomat wishing to remain anonymous, based on the acquired evidence, the plane 
was instructed towards the Karabakh zone’s dangerous corridor by Azeris. Further persuasion of the issue would 
have only created more regional tensions. (interview in Summer 2013) 
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impediment to bilateral relations and invested on using the ‘anti Iran’ card in their 
bargain with great powers; Armenia views Iran as a bridge for its relations with other 
Islamic countries particularly in the Middle East. Iran, on the other hand, looks at 
Armenia as a bridge to the CIS1 and the European markets. Neither saw the ideological 
difference as an impediment, but as a part of the context in which their relation is 
shaped. 
Each side has shown considerable caution in issues sensitive to the other. One example 
is with regard to stationing peacekeeping forces in the region. As the ‘Agenda for 
Armenia Foreign Policy’ document emphasises, “Armenia should inform the 
international community and OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs that as soon as the issue of 
deploying peacekeeping troops to the zone of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be 
discussed, Iran’s opinion should be considered, since Iran has common border with the 
conflict zone.” (2010:22) This is in sharp contrast with the policy undertaken by 
regional and external players for isolating Iran and keeping it out of regional equations.  
Nonetheless, while under present circumstances no threat and vulnerability of the 
borders is felt from the Armenian side, the potential threat that powerful radical 
nationalist political parties pose with their view of Iranian border provinces may not be 
ignored. These parties consider portions of Iran’s Eastern and Western Azerbaijan 
provinces as part of the ‘Greatest Armenia’. This approach is manifested in books and 
maps written by such groups and also in the practice of Armenian frontiersmen who 
demonstrate such sentiments in their national and religious occasions when they attend 
Iranian border churches such as St. Stepanous. Since the Armenian government has 
never showed any corrective actions towards the above mentality, it can pose a threat 
to Iran’s territorial integrity in a distant future. (TISRI 2007:410)  
Some common interests, as well as shared concerns and grievances that play important 
role in bringing the two countries closer together, include; 
Balancing Turkey: The rivalry among regional players for filling the vacuum was 
intensified in the post Soviet space. While Turkey was presented as an ideal model in 
which ‘Islam’ and ‘Western values’ are blended in nicely, there were radical pan 
                                                          
1 Armenpress. (2010) Armenia May become Bridge between Iran and CIS. Available at: 
<http://armenpress.am/eng/news/801244/armenia-may-become-a-bridge-towards-the-iranian-market-for-
lithuanialithuanian-press.html> (Accessed on 30.04.2012) 
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Turanists who promoted the idea of uniting all post Soviet Republics with Turkic 
background from China to Balkans and further, into one great federation. Turkey’s 
membership of NATO and its alliance with the West was an asset for gaining support 
towards such ideas. Though farfetched, but if realised it would have resulted in the 
establishment of a great Turkic Empire in Eurasia which would diminish all strategic 
equations in the region and endanger the national security of regional countries. (IPIS 
2008:28)  Some Iranian analysts and politicians believe that Western countries were 
eager to support Turkey in its expansionist aspirations. According to these analysts, the 
corridor swap proposal also known as the Goble Plan, suggested for resolving the 
Karabakh conflict was meant to essentially kill two birds with one stone. First to solve 
the Karabakh conflict, second to create a direct link between Turkey and the rest of the 
Turkic world.  
In 1992, as a way out of the Karabakh conflict, Goble proposed that “various 
participants need to begin to consider the possibility of a territorial swap including the 
following concessions: sending part of the NKAO to Armenia, with the area controlling 
the headwaters of the river flowing to Baku and areas of Azerbaijani population 
remaining in Azerbaijani hands; and transferring the Armenian-controlled land bridge 
between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan to Azerbaijani control.”1Tehran has categorically 
opposed the plan, due to major threats that such plan would entail for Iran’s security. 
Regardless of any hidden agenda for the Plan or any other Western initiative for 
realising Turkey’s expansionist aspirations, Armenia is the main geographical barrier 
between Turkey and the rest of the Turkic world.  
With the so called Armenian genocide in mind, Turkey has an adversarial status on the 
Armenian’s psyche exacerbated by Ankara’s alliance with Baku and the long term 
blockade of the country. From this perspective, Iran has been perceived in Armenia’s 
post-independence history as “another power that can counter-balance Turkey's activity 
in the region”. (Novikova 2000:62) Armenia’s 2001 Foreign Ministry’s guidelines 
clearly states that “Iran plays a role of balancer vis-à-vis Turkey”. 
                                                          
1 Reliefweb. (2000) How the "Goble Plan" was Born and How it Remains a Political Factor. Available at: 
<http://reliefweb.int/report/armenia/how-goble-plan-was-born-and-how-it-remains-political-factor> (Accessed on 
30.04.2014) 
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Summing up, one can see how “Armenia and Iran therefore consider their role once 
again as a fence against the growing influence of Turkey in the Caucasus and even in 
Central Asia.”(Moniquet & Racimora 2013: 31) 
Azerbaijan’s Expansionist Aspirations: As explained in chapter 5, despite ongoing 
military conflict with Armenia, and Iran’s vocal support of Azerbaijan’s territorial 
integrity; Baku officials have continuously promoted the ‘Greater Azerbaijan’ 
aspiration, threatening Iran’s territorial integrity. “It therefore made sense for the 
authorities in Tehran to seek to preserve the integrity of Iranian territory by supporting 
Armenia in its war against Baku over the Nagorno-Karabakh question.”(Therme 
2008:2) While the term ‘support Armenia war against Baku’ is an overestimation, one 
can see how Armenia’s survival has been a balancing factor for Iran’s geopolitical 
interests and leverage for containing Azerbaijan’s ambitions. 
North-South V East-West Axis: As explained in chapter 5, Azerbaijan’s antagonistic 
postures particularly Baku’s irredentist approach and territorial claims over Iran’s 
northern provinces, as well as its alliance with the West resulted in the polarization of 
regional alliances. Hence the diplomatic landscape witnessed the formation of “a pro-
western horizontal axis linking Baku, Tbilisi and Ankara by drawing a geopolitical 
East-West line, and …. a vertical axis linking Moscow, Yerevan and Tehran by drawing 
a geopolitical North-South line.” (Minassian as quoted by ibid) 
US refusal to include Iran in the pipeline network projects, and Baku’s insistence on 
bypassing Armenia, despite the fact that these countries could have offered the most 
economic routes, and the fact that these networks have reduced Russia’s monopoly over 
energy transport routs have reinforced this polarisation and diverging alliances. 
Together alone: Exacerbated by its challenging geography (landlocked, no energy 
resources, etc.) the imposed blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, which accounted to 
80% of the country’s borders effectively isolated Armenia to the point of suffocation. 
The country has no common borders with Russia. Armenia’s immediate neighbour to 
the north, Georgia was struggling with its own security and post independence 
challenges as well as state building processes during the initial years of Armenia’s 
independence. “Moreover, Armeno-Georgian relations were complicated by Armenian 
claims to the territory of Javakhk belonging to Tbilisi.”(Therme 2008:2) The two 
countries had no official diplomatic relations till summer 1993. Therefore, the only 
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stable immediate neighbour which its friendly relation could help Armenia’s survival 
was Iran. Relations with Iran provided the much urgent lifeline for Armenia. The 
importance of Iran’s role in Armenia’s survival is demonstrated by Ter Petrosian 
admitting that “without Iran, Armenia would suffocate in a few days”1 and Azerbaijan’s 
deputy prime minister’s remark that “if Tehran breaks ties with Armenia, Yerevan will 
starve.”2 
Iran, on the other hand, has been faced with increasing international isolation mounted 
over the geopolitical isolation which was explained in chapter 3. Relation with Armenia 
has been Iran’s way of circumventing its isolation and playing an effective role in 
regional equations. The importance that Armenia attaches to its relations with Iran has 
prevented marginalisation of Iran in regional interactions particularly regarding various 
initiatives for resolving the Karabakh conflict. According to its national security 
strategy document (2007:20) “Armenia appreciates the balanced position which Iran, 
as a major actor both in the region and within the Islamic world, has adopted regarding 
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict…. Armenia also values Iran’s engagement in various 
processes in the South Caucasus region and regards it a factor contributing to 
maintaining balance and stability in the region.”  
Therefore, the shared sense of “acute insecurity and isolation in the region” (Mirzoyan 
2007: 186) has been one of the most important factors in drawing the two countries 
together. Each country finds a path out of isolation and regional marginalisation in the 
other one which brings with itself “a similar language of balance and mediation.” (ibid: 
173) 
In addition to the above factors, the role and influence of the Armenian lobby in 
Western countries is an important incentive for Iran.  According to Brzezinski 
(2006:63), the Armenian-American lobby is among “the most effective in their 
assertiveness”. With a population of around 1 million in the United States, the success 
of this lobby particularly in the Congress is as Gregg (2002:2) has put it ‘surprising’ 
and disproportionate to their voting impact.  Some examples of Armenian lobby’s 
achievements in the US have already been discussed in this chapter.  
                                                          
1 Today’s Zaman. Iran-Armenia Ties Strengthening to Counter Turkey-Azerbaijan Alliance, (2013) Available at: 
<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-311218-iran-armenia-ties-strengthening-to-counter-turkey-azerbaijan-
alliance.html>  (Accessed on 29.06.2014) 
2 ibid 
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The population of around 400,000 Armenian descents in France has become more 
politically active since the late 1980s, to a degree that some have even become 
prominent figures in France’s political system. “Édouard Balladur, who was born in 
İzmir in 1929 and was the French Prime Minister during 1993 and 1995, and Patrick 
Devedjiyan, whose roots go back to Elazığ and who was a minister in Sarkozy’s cabinet 
from 2008 to 2010, are two figures who stand out.”(Sahilyol 2012:3) The most 
significant achievement of this lobby is the “Armenian Genocide Denial Law, which 
was adopted by the French National Assembly in December 2011 and further approved 
on January 23rd, 2012 in the French Senate.” (ibid: 2) Though the French Supreme 
Court later found the Law unconstitutional, its adaptation by the Assembly and its 
approval by the Senate and the support it received from the French government despite 
its negative effects on France-Turkey relations proves the strength and influence of this 
pressure group. Armenians also have successful lobbies in other European countries 
such as Spain, Norway, Greece, etc. 
Using powerful Armenian lobbies in various Western countries to pursue Iran’s 
interests has been contemplated in some Iranian political circles for years. This is 
particularly true in the case of the United States where lack of any diplomatic relations 
and powerful lobby to look after Iran’s interests on the one hand and the existence of 
influential hostile lobbies such as AIPAC on the other, have often exacerbated the 
negative atmosphere against Iran. The best evidence for such view has come from 
President Rouhani in his meeting with religious minorities’ MPs; when he said 
“problems would be overcome with the efforts of all Iranians. There is no difference 
between Muslims and religious minorities. Like the Armenian lobby, their lobbies can 
be effective in foreign policy.”1 
 
6.4.2. Military Sector 
Iran’s military relation with Armenia is arguably the least developed dimension of their 
bilateral relations which has received less attention and practical steps.  
                                                          
1 President’s Meeting with Religious Minorities MPs (2013). Available at: <http://www.president.ir/fa/72699> 
(Accessed on 30.06.2014)  
274 
On May 1992, Armenian and Iranian presidents signed a joint statement on 
development of friendly and good neighbourly relations which included cooperating in 
the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling, air piracy and the illegal export 
of historic documents; cooperating against mass murder, nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons, etc. 
In 1997, Iran, Armenia and Greece, signed a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation that 
included an agreement of military cooperation observed by many as an anti NATO 
alliance. “Within Athens-Tehran-Yerevan trilateral cooperation format, there was much 
speculation although all parties stressed that the cooperation was not directed against 
anyone.”(Mirzoyan 2007:199) 
With development of defence and security cooperation in mind, over the years 
retrospective visits undertaken by both countries’ officials have been under the United 
State’s ‘suspicious eyes particularly as the existence of exceptional concentration of 
plants specializing in military radio electronics and electrical engineering in Armenia 
had left room for speculations about the potential foreign investors with interests “in 
purchasing components and half-finished equipment and know-how for Soviet-model 
aviation and rocket technology.”(Wolfson 2002:2) 
In March 2002 Iran’s Minister of Defence paid a two days visit to Armenia, declaring 
that “we now want to develop relations in the area of defence and security”, adding that 
this cooperation will not be directed against third countries.1 A memorandum on 
defence and security cooperation was signed during this visit.2 Just a few weeks later, 
on May 2002, two Armenian companies were sanctioned by the US State Department 
due to breach of Section 3 of the Iran Non Proliferation Act of 2000, which applies 
penalties on entities for the transfer to Iran of equipment and technology controlled 
under multilateral export control lists.3 Both the companies and the Armenian Customs 
Chief denied the accusations4, as well as Iran’s ambassador to Armenia who not only 
                                                          
1 Asbarez. (2002) Iran’s Defense Chief Hopes for Closer Ties with Armenia. Available at : 
<http://asbarez.com/46483/irans-defense-chief-hopes-for-closer-ties-with-armenia/>  (Accessed on 02.07.2014) 
2 Asbarez. (2002) Iran Armenia Sign Accords. Available at: <http://asbarez.com/46492/iran-armenia-sign-
accords/> (Accessed on 02.07.2014) 
3 Notices Published In The Federal Register During 2002 Department Of State, Office OF Trade Controls 
International Traffic In Armas Regulations. (22 CFR Part 120 et seq.) Available at: <http://t-
b.com/files/2002state.htm> (Accessed on 02.07.2014) 
4 RadioFree (Armenian). (2002) Armenian Customs Chief Denies Sensitive Equipment Sales To Iran. Available at: 
<http://www.armenialiberty.org/content/article/1567844.html> (Accessed on 25.06.2014) 
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rejected the accusations, but also accused US of “trying to control Armenia's relation 
with Iran by exerting psychological pressure.”1 
While such developments made both sides more cautious in their military relations, it 
certainly did not deter Iran from using Armenia in its efforts to access military 
equipment, at least not until the early 2000s. According to a US cables released by 
Wikileaks, the United States confronted Serge Sargsian for transfer of weaponaries 
bought in 2003 when he was Armenia’s Defence Minister.2 Some of the anti-tank 
rockets and heavy machine guns purchased from Bulgaria found their way to Iran and 
then Iraq where they were used in attacks against US forces.  
The most important among series of retrospective official defence and security visits 
was the July 2012 security agreement signed “in the presence of Iran Interior Minister 
Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar and Head of Armenian Police Force Lt. Gen. Vladimir 
Gasparyan.”3 Cooperation in fighting organised crimes, drug smuggling, security-
disciplinary issues and border affairs are among items of this agreement.  
However, aside from the above controversial cases and despite releasing several joint 
statements and memorandums of understanding on defence and military cooperation, 
as well as retrospective visits by high ranking defence and military figures, there is not 
much news or evidence of any practical steps even on less significant issues of trainings 
or joint military exercises.  
This situation however, is quite understandable given the balancing act that each side 
has to undertake with regard to its relations with other regional and international 
players, i.e. Iran with Azerbaijan and Armenia with NATO and US, and the fact that 
any considerable military cooperation would raise the alarm among Armenian lobbies 
in Western countries. 
 
5.4.3. Societal Sector 
                                                          
1 RaidoFree (Armenian). (2002)  Iran Denies Sensitive Equipment Transfer From Armenia. Available at: 
<http://www.armenialiberty.org/content/article/1567859.html> (Accessed on 25.06.2014) 
2 The Guardian (2010) US Embassy Cables: Armenian Defence Minister Rebuked over Arms Sales to Iran. 
Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/187156> (Accessed on 
20.06.2014) 
3 Press TV. (2012) Iran, Armenia Sign Agreement to Boost Security Cooperation. Available at : 
<http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/07/11/250362/iran-armenia-sign-security-pact/> (Accessed on 03.07.2014) 
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The shared historical background which was briefly discussed in previous sections is 
the main asset in Iran-Armenia social relations. According to Prof. Asatryan who chairs 
the Centre of Iranian Studies at Yerevan State University (quoted by Mirzoyan 
2007:176-177), “the link between Armenia and Iran is founded not only on the common 
genetic heritage, historical and cultural traditions, common worldview and 
philosophical perceptions but is intimately connected to the idea of 
monotheism.”Adding to aforementioned factors Mirzoyan emphasizes on the 
ancientness and belonging to the Aryan civilisation axis as the focal point of social 
connection between Iran and Armenia. Interestingly, Iran’s former ambassador to 
Armenia also points to the ‘shared ancient civilisation’ as the main factor in the warm 
rapport between Iran and Armenia.1 Mirzoyan (2007: 177) believes that all the 
aforementioned factors build “a solid social and intellectual foundation for cooperation, 
but also facilitates the formation of a well-trained diplomatic staff that is largely 
exposed to Iranian culture and mode of thinking.”  
The ethnic Armenian community in Iran has been a valuable asset in developing 
bilateral relations both before and after the 1979 revolution. With a population around 
300,000 they constitute the largest non Muslim community in Iran with over 200 
churches across the country and two representatives in the Parliament (Majlis).  
Armenians’ assimilation in the Iranian society since their settlement in various parts of 
Iran in recent centuries have left positive impact by proving that they have become an 
integral part of the  Iranian society and its development. Although active in many 
different sectors, the more significant influence of the Iranian-Armenian community 
perhaps could be considered on the Iranian art and culture. They made efforts in 
founding schools, playhouses, music centres and film industry. The first European 
teachers who served in Iranian schools were invited to the country by prominent 
Armenian figures. The first Armenian schools in Iran started their activities as early as 
the first half of the 17th century.  
Armenians have also played an important role in transfer of technology from other 
countries to Iran since the Qajar era and have been among prominent founders of 
industry in Iran. This particularly applies to the art and technology of jewellery which 
                                                          
1 Interview with Dr. Koleini, August 2013. 
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was initially established in Tabriz and then promoted in Isfahan and Tehran through 
training courses ran by Armenians. (Melkomian 2010:32-34) 
The Iranian history has witnessed the influential roles played by prominent Armenian 
political figures such as Mirza Melkom Khan Nazemuddoleh and Yepram Khan 
Davutian who made considerable efforts in developing the constitution and establishing 
the constitutional government.  
Armenians supported their Iranian compatriots during the Islamic revolution of 1979 
and the eight years war with Iraq, with several martyrs in both events. This in itself has 
provided the Armenian minority in Iran with a more respectable social status.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Republic of Armenia 
provided the opportunity for Iranian Armenians to facilitate the relations between their 
country of origin and their country of residence, an opportunity well appreciated by 
both countries.  
“Meanwhile in the Armenian capital Yerevan there is a growing Iranian/Persian 
community, which contributes to the close ties between the countries through various 
business, university and cultural exchanges. Iranians constitute the largest Muslim 
community in Armenia, estimated at roughly 2,000 people in 2002.”(Zarifian 
2008:138) 
The newly independent Republic of Armenia did not try in any ways to distance itself 
from the shared cultural and historical background with Iran. Instead, it used the legacy 
as an invaluable capital which can bring both sides closer together. The inclusion of the 
‘Blue Mosque’ in the list of UNESCO world heritage sites1 is among the most recent 
steps, demonstrating Armenia’s appreciation of its Iranian heritage.2 So is the 
sisterhood of the two cities of Isfahan and Yerevan. 
Over the years, social and cultural ties between the two nations have grown in parallel 
with political and economic relations. Armenia has become a popular destination for 
Iranian tourists and more than 1500 Iranian students are studying in Armenian 
universities. (Girgosyan 2012) On the other hand, “there is a genuine interest in the 
                                                          
1 ArmenNews Press. (2013)  Iran Welcomes Involvement of Blue Mosque in UNESCO List. Available at : 
<http://armenpress.am/eng/news/706749/> (Accessed on 01.07.2014) 
2 The Blue Mosque in Yerevan is the only remnant of the 18th century Iranian architecture in Armenia. 
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Persian culture and language among ordinary Armenians.” (Mirzoyan 2007: 176) At 
present, Persian language is taught in 12 schools and 5 universities. Armenia has the 
highest ranking in learning the Persian language among non Persian CIS countries. The 
Iranian embassy has provided interested academic organisations with equipments and 
resources necessary for learning the language. (Melkomian 2010:69) 
The 2001-2004 joint programme for cooperation between the Armenian Department 
for Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments and the Iranian Cultural 
Heritage Organisation was “of particular importance and significance for Armenia. 
More recently, the Iranian proposal to inscribe the Armenian Church of Saint Thaddeus 
to U.N.E.S.C.O. was welcomed by Armenia and the Armenians. It is assumed that this 
church along with a few others (namely St. Stephanus, Corcor, Chupan, and Blessed 
Virgin) will be accepted by the U.N.E.S.C.O. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that these 
efforts are being done by Islamic Iran while the laic Turkey refuses to propose any of 
its hundreds of Armenian monuments to the U.N.E.S.C.O.”(Zarifian 2008:137) 
The two countries signed a pact on media cooperation in 2007. Based on the pact Iran’s 
broadcasting services and Armenia’s Public Television will each open an office in 
Yerevan and Tehran, retrospectively.1 Agreements were also reached for making joint 
TV series. “The Armenian Deputy Director of Public Television and Radio, Levon 
Galstian, stated that the joint TV series would familiarize the two nations with each 
others' culture and lifestyle.”2 
Moreover, in 2014, the Assembly of Muslims of Armenia created the position of mufti 
for the republic and appointed Arsen Safaryan, a graduate of an Iranian seminary in 
Qum, as the head of muftiate. The move, on the one hand, challenges the Baku-based 
Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of the Caucasus with supervision claims over 
Shiite Muslims throughout the post Soviet space. On the other hand it provides Iran 
with “an opening to expand its influence among Shia not only in the post-Soviet space, 
also a direct challenge to Azerbaijan, but also among the nearly 400,000 Armenian 
Muslims (the Hemshins) living in the Middle East and Europe and also among the 
Yezidis who vastly outnumber the Shia in Armenia.”(Goble 2015) 
                                                          
1 Press TV. (2007) Iran, Armenia Sign Media Cooperation Pact. Available at: 
<http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/6772.html>  (Accessed on 04.07.2014) 
2 Press TV. (2007) Iran, Armenia to Make TV Series. Available at:< http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/21234.html>  
(Accessed on 02.07.2014) 
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The 2014 establishment of ‘Iran-Armenia Friendship Society’ was another step in 
developing relations in various arenas. 
While general reciprocal cordiality in the societal relations has provided a positive 
context in which other aspects of Iran-Armenia bilateral relations are shaped, it is 
important to keep in mind that the situation in border cities are different than in capitals. 
Armenia’s southern cities are bordering Iran’s Azerbaijani cities. According to TISRI 
(2007: 409-411), the historical grudge that Armenians hold against Turkic people, in 
general, affects the way they treat Iranian Azerbaijanis. While they have positive 
relations with other Iranian ethnicities, Armenians treat Turkish Iranians unfavourably 
and with ‘hidden contempt’. Although official statements emphasize on totaly friendly 
relations between the two nations, concerned about the immediate consequences of such 
feelings from the Armenian side, Iranian authorities treat issues of social effects with 
more reservations. For example, Iran’s Ministry of Health has ignored Yerevan’s 
repeated requests for employment of Armenian heart surgeons and other medical 
specialists in Iran’s Eastern Azerbaijan’s hospitals, out of concern for the 
aforementioned societal factors. (ibid) 
 
 
6.4.4. Economic Sector 
Economy has been the cornerstone of bilateral relations since the independence of 
Armenia particularly as the blockade by both Azerbaijan and Turkey had left the 
country struggling for survival in the freezing winter of 1991-1992, and has effectively 
deprived the country out of potential benfits of 80% of its borders, ever since.  
In February 1992, Tehran was the first destination for Armenia’s Foreign Minister 
Hovansian official visits, concluding with the signature of several agreements which 
guaranteed the transit of Iranian goods through the Armenian territory; construction of 
a gas pipeline to supply Iranian natural gas to Armenia, which started 12 years later1; 
                                                          
1 BBC World. (2007) Iran, Armenia Open Gas Pipeline. Available at : 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6466869.stm> (Accessed on 06.07.2014) 
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and the construction of a temporary bridge over the Aras River, which was launched a 
few months later. 
To find a solution for the most pressing issue of survival in that winter, Armenia’s 
Energy Minister, Tashjian, travelled to Tehran to strike an immediate deal for the 
delivery of 550,000 tons/year of fuel oil to his country. The fuel oil was seen as an 
immediate relief which could dramatically change the circumstances before the 
construction of a gas pipeline. However, as the only railway connecting the two 
countries passed through the Azerbaijan territory of Nakhjavan, “the newly constructed 
bridge over the Aras river became the only physical but most importantly, functional 
and reliable link with the outside world and allowed for some deliveries of fuel oil to 
Armenia’s southern regions and of cheap Iranian consumer goods that were in great 
demand.” (Mirzoyan 2007:173) The psychological importance of the first delivery of 
fuel oil to Armenia might have been even more than its material value, as it gave a 
moral boost to the “Armenian society that had been virtually cut off from the outside 
world and left with no power in the midst of freezing winter temperatures” (ibid) 
leaving a deep note of appreciation towards Iran among Armenians. 
Following the establishment of a lasting ceasefire in 1994 which helped in stabilizing 
the South Caucasus, Iran mounted its efforts in developing its economic outreach in the 
region. Bilateral economic relations reached another milestone in 1996 with the launch 
of various joint ventures; branch opening of the Iranian Mellat Bank in Yerevan to 
facilitate trade activities of numerous Iranians in Armenia; and most important of all a 
multimillion dollar contract for development of the gas pipeline.  
Following the exclusion of both Iran and Armenia from major pipeline projects and 
transport networks in the region, Armenia’s acute need for the Iranian energy, as well 
as Iran’s geopolitical objectives shaped the context of Tehran-Yerevan energy 
cooperation in a “multiple levels of power play between various regional states”. (ibid: 
193) At the time of initial negotiations, the plan was for this pipeline to become part of 
a much larger network with the participation of Turkmenistan. However, to discourage 
Ashgabat from cooperating with Tehran in pipeline network projects, US offered a 
considerable budget “to finance a feasibility study of an alternative gas pipeline that 
would be laid beneath the Caspian Sea, via Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum line, parallel to Baku-
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Ceyhan oil pipeline in order to avoid transiting through either Russia or Iran”. (Lippman 
as quoted by Mirzoyan 2007:201)  
To fulfil the aspiration for a gas pipeline network which could transfer Iran’s gas 
initially to the region and eventually to Europe, there were also considerable 
deliberations for Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Crimea-Europe route. “The Ukrainians openly 
stated their interest in the project because a transit pipeline from Armenia would 
provide the shortest route from Iran to Ukraine.”(Mirzoyan 2007:202) While US 
sanctions were obviously a major impediment for the realisation of such aspirations, 
Russia’s intolerance of any rival for its gas market has been another major obstacle 
which has left the above plans futile.  According to a wikileaks published cable, under 
Russia’s pressure the size of the Iran- Armenia pipeline was reduced by half (from a standard 
1500 millimeter diameter to about 730 millimeters) -- effectively limiting Iran's pumping 
capacity and Armenia's ambitions to become a conduit for Iranian exports to other parts of the 
Caucasus1. The pipeline was eventually sold to Russia for $30 million2rubbing Armenia off any 
future transit income. 
Since lack of financial resources on the Armenian side had hindered the progress of the 
aforementioned project, the pipeline, which allows for the export of 1.1 billion cubic 
m/year of gas, became operative only in 2007. According to a 2004 leaked cable from 
the US embassy in Yerevan, following President Khatami’s visit to Armenia, it was 
agreed for Iran Export Development Bank to finance the pipeline which extend 41 km 
into Armenia, to Kajaran. “The Armenian Ministry of Energy will pay back the loan 
over 7 years at 5 percent annual interest.”3  Exported gas is bartered with Armenia’s 
electricity based on a 20 years contract signed in 2004 and launched in 2009.4 
                                                          






3 Public Library of US Diplomacy (2004) Available at : 
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04YEREVAN2019_a.html> (Accessed on 10.07.2014) 
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The second half of the 2000s witnessed yet another round of developments in trade and 
economic relations. In 2006, Armenia joined the Eurasia North-South transport corridor 
which can potentially link Russia to India through Armenia and Iran and act as a trade 
catalyst. “The envisioned route would consist of goods travelling from Mumbai, India 
to Bandar Abbas, Iran by sea, and then through Iran and the Caucasus to Russia by road 
and rail.”(Almasyan 2014)  
Following President Kocharyan’s trip to Tehran in July 2006, agreements were reached 
for new projects. The construction of a third power transmission line that would connect 
the Armenian and Iranian power grids was the most important project among them. 
“The 312-kilometer-long line is meant to allow for a substantial increase in Armenian 
electricity supplies to Iran.”(Danielyan 2006) The Armenian government was 
simultaneously completing “a second, bigger highway leading to the Iranian border in 
the hope of boosting trade with Iran.”(ibid)   
The same year, Iran signed a trilateral agreement to export electricity to Georgia 
through Armenia in a power exchange bid. According to Fattah, Iran’s Energy Minister 
of the time “Iran will transfer some 50mw of electricity to Georgia within the next two 
to three months while Georgia would transfer the same amount in spring.”1 
Armenian Energy and Natural Resources Minister, Armen Movsisian’s trip to Iran in 
2008, resulted in confirmed agreements for the construction of joint hydropower plants, 
Meghri’s2 130 MW in the Armenian territory and the Ghare-chilar plant in the Iranian 
territory.3 The project which is agreed to work on a Built Operation Transfer basis and 
was symbolically launched on October 2012 has not had much progress due to 
                                                          
1 Global Energy Network Institute. Iran, Armenia, Georgia, Sign MoU on Supply of Electricity. Available at: 
<http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/technical-articles/transmission/armenian-diaspora-news-forum/iran-
armenia-georgia-sign-mou-on-supply-of-electricity/index.shtml> (Accessed on 18.05.2016) 
2 According to TISRI (2007:369-372) Meghri is a small city on the Armenia’s border with Iran, with a population 
of about 4000 Armenians with no minority among them. Despite its small size, Meghri has a geographically 
strategic location, significant for the country’s territorial integrity. Hence, there is a significant attention towards 
this city from political/economic Armenian nationalist circles. For the last two decades, Armenia’s strategy has 
been to turn this small city to trade and economic feedig channel of Armenia and as such has great importance in 
Armenian politics. Yerevan’s government effectively considers Meghri as the friendship bridge with Iran and 
encourages any investment in this area. 
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Armenia’s financial problems. Following some pull and push between the two 
governments; Iran eventually agreed to fund the completion of the power 
plant1estimated to be more than $500 millions2. 
The two countries signed another contract in summer 2015 for the construction of third 
power transmission line which would increase the capacity for electricity transfer.3 
According to the managing director of Iran’s Export Development Bank which is going 
to provide 80% of the required finance for the construction of the line, the total cost of 
the project would be around 107 million Euros. The remaining 20% would be financed 
by Armenia4. 
The construction of the Meghri-Tabriz gas pipeline was completed in December 2008. 
The 142 kilometre pipeline has a delivery capacity of 2.3 billion cubic meters per year. 
However, in order to contain Iran’s aspirations of connecting Armenia’s gas pipeline to 
the European market and to maintain its monopoly over the gas market, Russia became 
involved in the construction of this pipeline from the very start by Gazprom investing 
$200 million and later on by purchasing the share of the part of the pipeline that runs   
in the Armenian territory via the ArmRosGaz Company (45% owned by by Gazprom, 
10% by Itera and the remainder by the Armenian Energy Ministry). Gas deliveries were 
expanded after the April 2010 completion of the Yerevan Thermal Power 
Plant.”(Moniquet & Racimora 2013: 12-13) 
In his 2008 address to the parliament Serzh Sargsyan promised the construction of an 
ambitious 470 km Iran- Armenia railway project which had already been proposed since 
the late 1990s. However, like any other important infrastructure project, it was faced 
with financial challenges on the Armenian side. While Iran has confirmed its 
commitment to invest $400 million to build a railroad link to the Armenian border, the 
problem has been the railway construction within the Armenian, as according to 
Grigoryan (2015) the total cost of the project would be “on a level comparable to 
Armenia’s annual budget”. According to an Auguet 2014 memorandum from Armenia’s 
                                                          
1 Interview with Dr. Mohammad Riahi, Former Managing Director for Water Research Centre. Iran’s Ministry of 
Energy. May 2014 
2 Pāygahe Ettelā` Resānie Vezārate Niru (2012) Aghāze amaliāte sākhte nirugāhe Megri. Available at: 
<http://news.moe.gov.ir/Detail.aspx?anwid=2548> (Accessed on 10.05.2016) 
3 Iran Daily. (2015) Iran, Armenia Sign 3rd Power Transmission Line Contract. (2015) Available at: 
<http://www.iran-daily.com/News/124223.html> (Accessed on 30.08.2015) 
4 Ibid. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs “the Export-Import Bank of China could provide a loan for 
about 60 percent of the construction costs, with a 3.5-percent annual interest rate”. (As 
quoted by ibid) According to a statement published by the Chinese investors who would 
provide up to 60% of the required finance,1 the railway mainly passing through the 
Armenian territory would be a key part of the International North-South Transport 
Corridor, creating “a major commodities transit corridor between Europe and the 
Persian Gulf region, with conservative long-term traffic volume forecasts of 18.3 
million tons per annum.”2 The manager of the Russian company operating existing 
Armenia railroads announced in 2014 that the South Caucasus Railroad Stock Company 
will be operating the Iran-Armenia link, when the project which is envisaged to start in 
2016 be completed in 20223. There has been no indication whether the same company 
is going to solve the investment problem or not. According to the Armenian government 
this railroad would be the shortest transit root from the Black sea ports to the ports in 
the Persian Gulf and would create an important transit corridor between Europe and the 
Persian Gulf4. 
If fully implemented, the railway will have significant economic achievements as well 
as security outcomes for Armenia. The most immediate achievement would be breaking 
away the blocked imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey and better facilitated access to 
Iranian market. Connecting to Iranian railway network would also improve trade access 
to Central Asia and the Persian Gulf markets. Moreover, “in case of the restoration of 
the Abkhazian railway (which does not work because of the Georgian-Abkhazian 
conflict), Armenia will obtain not only regional, but also international transit status, 
unifying the Black sea basin with Iran and the Persian Gulf.” (Davtyan 2015) 
                                                          
1 ArmenInfo. (2014) Transport Ministry of Armenia: Armenia May Become a Transit Country with 
Implementation of the Railway Project with Iran. Available at: 
<http://www.arminfo.info/index.cfm?objectid=833AD6B0-7EA1-11DF-8F54001EE5A5ED9C > (Accessed on 
20.01.2015) 
2 Asbarez. (2014) Chinese Investors Show Interest in Armenia-Iran Railway, Available at: 
http://asbarez.com/119740/chinese-investors-show-interest-in-armenia-iran-railway/ (Accessed on 23.7.2014) 
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There was an agreement in the same year for the construction of a highway for 
connecting Iran’s city of Tabriz to Armenia. The project was launched in 2010, but due 
to financial problems it has only had 25% progress till 20141.  
Another development in 2010 was the start of construction of a 300 kilometre oil 
pipeline from Iran to Armenia. “The pipeline will transport oil from Tabriz refinery in 
Iran’s northwest to Armenia’s Ararat province via the border city of Meghri.”2 The 
second oil pipeline was reportedly scheduled to be completed in 2014 and is supposed 
to pump 1.5m litters of petrol to Armenia on a daily basis (440,000 t annually).  
Furthermore, the same year, a “Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry 
of Economy of the Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Trade of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran on Regime Definition of Free Trade”3 was signed. 
Iran’s friendly relations with Armenia have also been a blessing for Armenia’s tourism 
industry. Since 2008, there has been a surge in the number of Iranian tourists visiting 
Armenia. While 2011 witnessed the highest rate of Iranian tourists, there was a decrease 
afterwards due to economic difficulties within Iran. According to Armenia’s Head of 
Tourism in the Ministry of Economy, more than 100,000 Iranians visited Armenia in 
2013.4 Estimating that each tourist spends around $700 to $1000 in Armenia, the 
average annual income from Iranian tourists is around $20 million5. According to Iran’s 
Cultural Heritage and Tourism Organisation Agency, Armenia’s economy has become 
so dependent on Iranian tourists that the reduction of their numbers in the last three 
years has cost many jobs in Armenia. Quoting TREND News agency, the above source 
                                                          






(Accessed on 18.05.2015) 
2 Pipeline & Gas Journal. (2009) Construction begins on Iran to Armenia Pipeline. Available at : 
<http://www.pipelineandgasjournal.com/construction-begins-iran-armenia-pipeline> (Accessed on 10.08.2014)  
3 Bilateral Relations. Available at: <http://www.mfa.am/en/country-by-country/ir/> (Accessed on 30.05. 2015) 
4 Bāzdide Bish az Sad Hezār Gardeshgare Irani az Armanestan dar Sāle Gozashte.(2013)  
<http://www.iras.ir/vdcjv8et.uqexyzsffu.html > (Accessed on 10.06.2014) 





has pointed out that thanks to the increasing number of Iranian tourists, the rate of 
Armenian currency’s devaluation has slowed down considerably.1 
Establishment of a visa free regime between the two countries which has been under 
negotiations by successive Armenian administrations would certainly increase the 
volume of Iranian’s trade and tourism with Armenia. According to Tehran Times, a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Civil Aviation Organization 
of Iran and the Ministry of Finance and Economy of Armenia in May 2014 for 
improving aviation services and expanding transportation infrastructure. Moreover, 
“The memorandum is intended to eliminate the restrictions on frequency of flights, 
directions and capacity in the field of air communication between two countries.”2 If 
materialised, increased flights with competitive prices and services would also increase 
trade and tourism opportunities between the two countries. It does worth mentioning 
that there were unconfirmed reports of an Armenian firm helping Iranian airlines to 
skirt sanctions.3 
With regard to small over the border trade, Nordouz-Meghri border market is the main 
channel of connection between the two countries. Interestingly, Iran’s Eastern 
Azerbaijan merchants have a considerable weight among Iran-Armenia active 
merchants. More than 80% of the members of Iran-Armenia Business Association are 
Iranian Azerbaijanis. (TISRI 2007: 405-407) 
Economic relations with Armenia found a strategic dimension following the application 
of extensive sanctions on the Iranian banking system, as Iran reportedly used Armenian 
banks to circumvent Western imposed banking sanctions. According to a report by the 
Brussels based think tank, “European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center 
(ESISC)”, the special relationship between Tehran and Yerevan has offered Iran the 
chance to “evade international sanctions and pursue its nuclear ambitions…. The 
potential sanction-busting alliance between the two neighbours also allow Armenian 
                                                          
1 Gardeshgarāne Irani fereshteye nejāte pule Armanestan shodand.(2013) Available at: 
<http://dornews.com/NewsDetails.aspx?News=1991686> (Accessed on 05.06.2014). 
2 Armenia and Iran to Increase Weekly Flight. (2014), Available at: 
<http://www.nexis.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/search/newssubmitForm.do> (Accessed on 20.01.2015) 
3 US Says Armenian Firm Helped Iranian Airline Skirt Sanctions. (2013) Available at: 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/12/us-usa-iran-mahan-idUSBRE9BA1CZ20131212> (Accessed on 
01.07.2014)  
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goods and services ‘to open up to warm seas routes’ while permitting Iran to benefit 
from access to the Black Sea and to circumvent international sanctions.”1 
Table 6.1: Iran-Armenia Trade Report 
Year Import from Iran ($) Export To Iran ($) Trade Balance ($) 
1997 69,464,744 42,395,156 -27,069,588 
1999 78,404,551 34,154,192 -44,250,359 
2000 73,190,079 30,025,021 -43,165,058 
2001 72,843,332 31,454,875 -41,388,457 
2002 58,035,579 29,298,051 -28,737,528 
2003 66,920,973 21,653,644 -45,267,329 
2004 75,485,684 30,212,276 -45,273,408 
2005 100,950,978 24,909,296 -76,041,682 
2006 113,013,907 29,064,699 -83,949,208 
2007 141,010,352 37,396,662 -103,613,690 
2008 200,856,340 24,467,762 -176,388,578 
2009 133,901,354 14,018,724 -119,882,630 
2010 217,711,254 39,642,100 -178,069,154 
2011 216,998,069 94,301,438 -122,696,631 
2012 219,485,837 94,211,602 -125,274,235 
2013 187,570,186 85,869,686 -101,700,500 
2014 206,373, 195 83, 738, 362 -122,634, 833 
Source: Available at: http://cometrade.un.org (Accessed on 17.05.2016) 
Moreover, Armenia has used the leverage of its powerful lobbies to voice its opposition 
to further sanctions on Iran, arguing that it would ultimately put further pressure on and 
damage Armenia’s vulnerable economy.2 
Following the election of President Rouhani in 2013, negotiations were undertaken for 
further development of relations through reviving financially troubled projects or new 
initiatives like the establishment of free economic zones on Iran-Armenia border.3For 
example in 2015, Torkan, the President’s Chief Advisor and the Head of Supreme 
                                                          
1 PR NEWSWIRE. (2013) Brussels Think-Tank Says Emerging Alliance Between Iran and Armenia Could 
Circumvent Western Sanctions. Available at: <http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/brussels-think-tank-
says-emerging-alliance-between-iran-and-armenia-could-circumvent-western-sanctions-187449231.html> 
(Accessed on 08.09.2015) 
2 Tehran Times. (2012) Anti-Iran Sanctions Damaging Armenia Economy: Armenian PM. Available at: 
<http://www.tehrantimes.com/component/content/article/103590> (Accessed on 1.08.2014) 
3 Arka News Agency. (2014) New Free Economic Zone on Armenia-Iran border to be focused on joint enterprise 
work. Available at: 
<http://arka.am/en/news/economy/free_economic_zone_on_armenia_iran_border_to_be_focused_on_joint_enter
prises_work/ > (Accessed on 20.01.2015) 
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Council of Iran’s Free Trade, Industrial and Special Economic Zones announced that 
Aras industrial site on Iran’s border with Armenia will be expanded.1Moreover, in June 
2015 it was announced that the two countries will start the building of the third 
electricity transmission network within the next 18 weeks, to be fully operational by 
2018.2 
According to an Iran-Armenia Chamber of Commerce board member, Iran’s trade 
development centre will soon be opened in Armenia to facilitate export of Iranian 
products to countries like Russia and Georgia.3  
Table 6.1 provides a summarised picture of Iran-Armenia trade relations since 1997.4  
According to reports, the total trade turn over between the two countries in 2013 
reached $293 million, with Iran’s positive balance of $103 million.5 
 
  
                                                          
1 IRNA. (2015) Aras Industrial Site in Iran-Armenia border to be expanded. Available at: 
<http://www3.irna.ir/en/News/81469187/> (Accessed on 30.05 2015). 
2 gulf in the media (2015) Iran-Armenia to start building 3rd power transmission line. Available at: 
<http://www.gulfinthemedia.com/index.php?id=754717&news_type=Economy&lang=en> (Accessed on 
14.06.2015) 
3 Customs Today. (2015) Iran to open trade center in Armenia to trigger exports. Available at: 
<http://www.customstoday.com.pk/iran-to-open-trade-center-in-armenia-to-trigger-exports/>(Accessed on 
30.05.2015) 
4 As Armenia has been the source of the data, the export is from Armenia and the import is to Armenia. The 
negative balance is therefore for Armenia’s trade. 
5 Islamic Invitation Turkey (2014) Official: Value of Iran-Armenia Trade Balance Hits $293 mln. Available at : 
<http://www.islamicinvitationturkey.com/2014/05/09/official-value-of-iran-armenia-trade-balance-hits-293mln/> 
(Accessed on 30.05.2015) 
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6.4.5. Environmental Sector 
Due to the very short length of the shared borders, the two countries naturally have very 
limited space for environmental relations and interactions. An important environmental 
concern has been the pollution of the Aras River by Armenian factories. Aras River 
joins the Kura River in Sabirabad village and then pours into the Caspian Sea. 
According to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, an annual 
volume of over 350 million cubic meters chemically and biologically polluted waters 
are injected into the Kura River without any neutralisation. Samples taken from the 
Kura River also contain heavy metals, phenols, and oil extractions, radioactive and 
other harmful materials. Armenian Zangezur Copper Molybdenum Combine is 
reportedly the main source of the Aras pollution. Despite establishing wastewater 
recycling facilities beside this factory, the plant apparently has not worked 
continuously.1 The issue was discussed extensively in a meeting held between the two 
countries’ Energy Ministers in Tehran in February 2014. A firm agreement to step up 
joint efforts in monitoring and reducing water pollution in the Aras River was an 
outcome of this meeting. 
Another highlight of bilateral environmental relations is the ongoing plans and 
negotiations for “establishment of a Peace and Friendship Park at their joint border area 
in northwest of Iran….. The park will cover 160,000 acres of land straddling the Aras 




Following a review of the historical context which has resulted in the formation of the 
present state of Armenia and the foundation for Armenia’s regional amities and 
enmities, the chapter has examined Armenia’s foreign policy and relations. It 
                                                          
1 TREND (2013) Iran Gets Armenia to Halt Araz River Pollution. Available at: 
<http://en.trend.az/regions/iran/2241761.html> (Accessed on 01.07.2014). 
2 ARMENPRESS (2014) Iran- Armenia Hold Final Talks on Building Peace Park on Joint Border Area. Available 
at: <http://armenpress.am/eng/news/750041/iran-armenia-hold-final-talks-on-building-peace-park-in-joint-
border-area.html> (Accessed on 01.07.2014) 
 
290 
demonstrated how the Karabakh conflict has resulted in Armenia’s regional isolation 
and undermined its foreign policy of complementarity. Armenia’s blockade and 
isolation which has further weakened its impoverished economy has created a vicious 
circle in combination with Russia’s leverage and influence over Armenia’s domestic 
and foreign affairs to a degree that has undermined the country’s sovereignty. Russia’s 
leverage has become a defining factor for the level of Armenia’s relations with other 
regional and international players. 
The chapter has then examined Iran’s relations with the Republic of Armenia using the 
sectoral model described in chapter five. Various political factors in drawing the two 
counties together such as isolation, mutual concerns with regard to expansionist 
aspirations of Turkey and Azerbaijan, development of an alliance involving Russia, 
Armenia and Iran against US, Azerbaijan and Turkey; as well as the importance of 
Armenian lobby for Iran has been discussed under the political dimension. It also 
argued that unlike many other countries, Armenia has neither considered Iran’s 
theocratic government as an impediment for its relations nor has tried to use anti Iran 
sentiments as its bargaining chip with great powers. Rather, it has seen Islamic Iran as 
a bridge for expanding relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Iran, on 
the other hand, considers Armenia as a bridge to the CIS and the European markets. 
The chapter carries on reviewing the military dimension of relations, which aside from 
a couple of controversial cases of violation of imposed sanctions on Iran, has arguably 
been the least advanced dimension of Iran-Armenia rapport. 
In the societal dimension, elements of shared heritage which have brought the two 
societies closer and more interested in each other’s culture, and the role that these 
societal factors play in bilateral relations have been discussed along with the role of 
ethnic Iranian Armenians in development of these relations. The section has argued that 
mutual respect and practical appreciation has turned shared heritages to an invaluable 
asset in developing social relations between the two nations.  
Economy has been the most important aspect of Iran-Armenia rapport since the 
independence of Armenia, with the energy as the main element of the trade. Providing 
Armenia with the much needed essential supplies, particularly delivering fuel oil in the 
first post-independence cold winter was a fundamental step from Iran’s side for building 
a long lasting economic relation that became even stronger through bartering Iran’s gas 
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with Armenia’s electricity. While energy has been the centrepiece of Iran-Armenia 
relations, there have been various joint economic projects between Tehran and Yerevan, 
including an ambitious 470 kilometre railway which would make Armenia as a key part 
of the International North-South Transport Corridor, connecting South Caucasus to 
India through Iran. Tourism is also another important aspect of Iran’s economic 
relations with Armenia. 
While relation with Iran has helped Armenia to survive the imposed blockade by 
Azerbaijan and Turkey, Yerevan has allegedly helped Tehran to circumvent extensive 
sanctions imposed on Tehran, and has vocally objected extending these sanctions on 
the grounds that it would affect Armenia’s economy. 
Due to the short length of shared borders, there are limited environmental issues 
between the two countries. The most important one has been the pollution of Aras River 
by Armenian industries which was comprehensively discussed between the two 
countries’ Energy Ministers in February 2014 and a firm agreement to step up joint 
efforts in monitoring and reducing water pollution has been reached. There has also 
been a proposal and relevant discussion in establishing a Peace and Friendship park 
around the joint border.  
By examining Iran-Armenia post Cold War relations, this chapter demonstrated that 
although Iran has always perceived shared religion as an important catalyst in its 
relations with other countries, but the absence of this factor does not necessarily impede 
its cordial relations. Iran’s pragmatic regional policy in the South Caucasus manifested 
in its official neutral stance towards the Karabakh conflict, together with converging 
interests, shared grievances and common regional challenges has resulted in 
progressive development of Iran’s friendly relations with its smallest neighbour in this 
region to a strategic alliance level in recent years. 
As demonstrated in this review, while many factors contributed in developing such 
stable relations, an overarching factor has been mutual respect and understanding 
towards each other’s priorities and limitations resulting from a realistic evaluation of 
regional geopolitics. This approach has prevented the two countries’ relations turning 
sour at testing times described in this chapter. 
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The following chapter will wrap up this study, offering conclusions based on the 
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This study was an attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of the application 
of Iran’s foreign policy and behaviour, roots of continuity and factors of change in a 
regional context, using the case studies of its relations with two neighbouring countries; 
the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
The novelty of the study is in its focus on an aspect of Iran’s relations that has not been 
systematically studied to this extent, which is Iran’s relation with a region in the post-
Soviet space. Though the South Caucasus was part of the Soviet Union for seven 
decades; but as explained throughout the chapters, prior to 19th century Russia- Persia 
wars, it was part of the Persian Empire. The study has discussed systemic changes 
resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union at regional and international level, as 
well as reviewing the importance of the South Caucasus, together with goals and 
policies of important players in this tiny part of the world. 
What makes the research more interesting is the choice of case study countries. Both 
Azerbaijan and Armenia are Iran’s immediate neighbours on the north, they both tried 
to break away from Russia at the first chance they got in the early 20th century, but 
neither did last long and both were integrated into the Soviet Union. However, 
Azerbaijan is a Muslim Shiite majority country, while Armenia is a Christian country; 
both involved in a smouldering conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh. Contrary to the 
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popular assumption that Iran would stand by Azerbaijan in its struggle against Armenia, 
Tehran has continuously taken an official neutral stand towards the conflict.  Moreover, 
as a consequence of several factors which have been discussed extensively; while Iran’s 
relation with Christian Armenia is at the partnership and alliance level, its relation with 
Muslim Azerbaijan is moving round a grey area between détente and outright 
animosity. 
To provide a comprehensive picture the study has reviewed Iran’s foreign policy from 
the Pahlavi era (briefly) till present. Borrowing from the Constructivist theory of 
international relations; two sets of ideational factors shaping Iran’s foreign policy have 
been introduced. 
The first set is rooted in Iran’s geostrategic location straddled between two important 
waterways of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf which house two energy hubs of the 
world; and the role that Iran plays as a land bridge providing the only link between 
South Asia and the Mediterranean Sea. This important geostrategic location has been 
one of the main factors which has turned the country into the battlefield of rival tribes 
and dynasties in ancient times, and occupation or outright interference of great powers 
in the more recent history. This in turn has created a multidimensional collective 
identity and shared mentality among Iranians, with one dimension rooted in the glorious 
legacy of the Persian Empire with its rich civilisation, who ruled considerable parts of 
Asia for several centuries, and the other rooted in the long history of subjection to 
outside conquerors and dominant powers. Iranians ambition to be major regional power 
and their particular sensitivity to any forms of external intervention and the extreme 
measures they are willing to take with such concern are the manifestation of this 
complex identity. 
The second set constitutes those ideational factors resulting from Iran’s post revolution 
state transformation. This does not mean such norms and identities did not exist within 
the Iranian society, but that they came to fore as factors shaping the state policy as the 
republic was established based on particular interpretation of Islamic values. The 
combination of both sets of factors, gave Iran’s foreign policy a ‘neither East, nor West’ 
direction which swiftly took a sharp anti Western turn, and inspired the anti hegemonic 
principle which encompasses defending the right of all Muslims and supporting the 
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rightful struggle of oppressed against oppressors. These principles have put Iran on the 
course of frequent collision with great powers specially the United States. 
However, as argued in the introduction, due to its complex nature, theoretical analysis 
of Iran’s foreign policy in its entirety requires more than one single paradigm or theory. 
The study has therefore employed more than one theory for analysing the subject.  
A review of developments in different post revolution periods has provided an account 
of foreign policy evolvement from strictly ideological to a more rational pragmatic 
approach. Iran’s departure from revisionist confrontation to détente and cooperation, 
return to confrontation and revisiting détente again, is an evidence of continuous 
evaluation and adjustment in Iran’s foreign policy approach in response to regional and 
international developments and in reaction to the behaviour of other players with 
security and influence in mind; meaning that Tehran has constantly taken measures to 
increase its security in the face of perceived imminent threats. 
Further analysis of Iran’s post Cold War regional policy both in the Middle East and 
the South Caucasus provides an account of various threats that Iran has been facing, 
particularly in the post September 11th era. Despite the importance of Central Asia, 
particularly Pakistan and Afghanistan for Iran’s security, this study has not examined 
Tehran’s foreign policy in this region. Iran has kept a distance with this region 
particularly following the presence of US in Afghanistan and its close involvement wit 
Pakistan since the start of the war on terror. Hence, the study has only focused on the 
two regions that Iran is closely involved with. 
To put it briefly, the initial revolutionary zeal manifested in the quest for the export of 
the revolution and challenging great powers created a sense of threat particularly for 
Iran’s neighbours which consequently isolated the country and provided Iraq with the 
opportunity to attack Iran. As the hardships of 8 years war proved the grave costs of 
relentless hostility, late 1982 witnessed a fundamental shift in Iran’s foreign policy 
strategies and approach reflected in the ‘open door’ policy which sought a ‘rational, 
sound and healthy relations with all countries’. This policy was further developed by 
the end of the war and throughout the construction era.  
As securing economic development became the Islamic Republic’s prime goal, the need 
for foreign investment and know how, encouraged the state to take further steps for 
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rapprochement with the world particularly with neighbours. Iran’s neutral stand 
towards the first Gulf War enhanced its status among Arab countries of the Middle East. 
Nonetheless, Tehran’s pragmatic policy and its rapprochement efforts did not achieve 
the results that it had aspired for. Iran’s hopes and proposals for a regional security 
arrangement based on cooperation among the Persian Gulf countries was perished and 
replaced with serious security concerns when some GCC countries signed a security 
pact with the United States. Hence, GCC countries’ increased sense of security came at 
the expense of Iran’s decreased security.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union exacerbated Iran’s security concerns due to several 
factors including the absence of ‘another superpower’ to counterweight Tehran’s 
archenemy; the emergence of several unstable and conflict ridden new republics on the 
vicinity of Iran’s northern borders which also draw the attention and later involvement 
of great powers in that region particularly due to the Caspian energy resources; and 
shifting alignments both in the Middle East and the South Caucasus which left Iran in 
a disadvantaged position vis a vis any country which received US support.  
As the need for investment and technology to develop infrastructure for exploiting rich 
Caspian carbohydrate resources provided Western countries with justifications for 
active involvement in the South Caucasus, a new Great Game emerged in the region 
which involved geopolitical rivalry among regional and trans-regional players. The 
outcome of these rivalries and alliances for Iran was isolation out of energy transport 
networks and many other developments in its northern neighbourhood despite its 
pragmatic, generally non ideological approach towards the region since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.  
Nonetheless, and despite the above negative developments, Iran continued to make 
positive efforts hoping to build the confidence which could facilitate further 
cooperation and integration both at regional and international level. While the efforts 
paid off to some degree, and Tehran’s  détente policy and rapprochement efforts 
continued throughout Khatami’s administration, the post Sep.11th developments 
resulted in such toxic atmosphere that even Iran’s direct cooperation with the US in 
Afghanistan, could not reduce the hostility towards Tehran. 
To have a better understanding of Iran’s evaluation of international atmosphere and its 
sense of threat in the post Sep.11th era, two parallel trends should be kept in perspective. 
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The first trend is the gradual shift from overtly ideological rejectionist foreign policy 
towards the prevalence of pragmatism based on the country’s security and national 
interests. The other trend is the pervasive US presence all around the country and 
increased hostility which undermined Iran’s confidence building and rapprochement 
measures. The combination of these two exacerbated Tehran’s siege mentality which 
in turn facilitated the securitisation of Iran’s politics. It also gave rise to domestic 
players who believed that the Islamic Republic’s rivals and adversaries have been 
emboldened by Tehran’s ‘appeasement policy’ and urged for a non compromising 
approach which resulted in the adoption of confrontational strategies during 
Ahmadinejad.  
However, the confrontational approach resulted in further securitisation of the 
international atmosphere against Iran. While Iran’s nuclear dossier was at the epicentre 
of international concerns, regional countries had a more serious sense of threat arising 
from Iran’s ascending power and influence in the region as a consequence of post 2003 
regional geopolitical shifts. To deal with the resulting security dilemma, regional 
countries joined forces with great powers to mount pressure on Iran by further isolation 
and punitive sanctions.  As the sanctions hit the cords of the economy and the military 
threat became increasingly imminent, the perils of a confrontational approach became 
so evident that the next president won the election on the platform of ‘moderation’ and 
‘prudence’, returning to a foreign policy of ‘rapprochement’ and ‘détente’, with 
particular focus on solving the nuclear dilemma, which consequently moderated the 
hostile international atmosphere that had created imminent threats.  
As demonstrated by the above brief review, while Iran’s foreign policy principles have 
remained the same in the post 1979 revolution era, the approach has frequently changed 
to cope with developments and threats which has challenged the security and survival 
of the state; a typical behaviour of security maximising states. This behaviour 
particularly fits the protocol when considering the fact that by putting its weight behind 
Iran’s rivals, US has continuously tipped the balance against the Islamic Republic, 
which consequently resulted in the state facing security dilemma in both regions. 
Hence, Tehran has constantly had to adapt strategies which would resolve the dilemma. 
Important conclusions which can be drawn from the review of Iran’s regional policy 
include; 
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 One of the strategies that Iran has adopted in both regions is making alliances 
with different players regardless of their ideological backgrounds. As such, 
neither the secular nature of Asad’s government excluded it from becoming an 
integral part of the axis of resistance, nor has the Christian character of Armenia 
deserted Yerevan from Tehran’s warm rapport. The crucial element has been 
the support each could provide in Iran’s quest for security and regional 
influence. 
 The constant threat posed by the presence of external players and their effort to 
isolate Iran in its own neighbourhood has contained Iran’s influence, 
particularly in the South Caucasus. 
 To limit its isolation and to have a powerful ally, Iran has continuously observed 
Russia’s sensitivities and concerns in the region and made great efforts in 
keeping Moscow on its side, sometimes even at the expense of undermining its 
other policies and strategies. It can be argued that Iran has effectively accepted 
the South Caucasus as Russia’s back yard and attached a secondary status for 
itself in that region. Tehran has and would advance its involvement and 
influence in the South Caucasus only to the level that would not be considered 
by Moscow as trespassing. 
 While Iran attaches a different degree of importance to South Caucasus in 
comparison to the Middle East;1 it has pragmatically taken a non ideological, 
accommodating and constructive approach towards this small region. Tehran’s 
official neutral stand regarding the Karabakh conflict and its mediation efforts 
are among examples of such policy. 
 Unlike the Middle East, Iran’s involvement in the South Caucasus has been 
mainly focused on economic and socio-cultural projects since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. 
 Iran’s pragmatic policy in the South Caucasus has been undermined by the 
consequences of its general foreign policy and the subsequent Middle East 
policy, particularly its stance vis a vis Israel. Hence, the outcome of its South 
Caucasus policy has been considerably different from potential optimal 
outcomes. 
                                                          
1 Reflecting the status that Tehran considers for itself in each of these two regions. 
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The empirical chapters of the study have provided detailed analysis of Iran’s relations 
with its two northern neighbours by adapting the sectoral model suggested by Buzan 
and his colleagues. 
The first case study is focused on relations with Azerbaijan, initially providing a 
historical background which explains that the territories which constitute the present 
day Republic of Azerbaijan were part of the Aran Khanate of the Persian Empire. The 
khanates were ceded to Russia following Persia’s defeat in two wars with Tsars in the 
19th century. The review has emphasised on the fact that prior to 1918, no political or 
territorial entity named Azerbaijan existed in the north of the Aras River. Therefore 
calling the new country which was established by the Musavat Party, as the ‘Democratic 
Republic of Azerbaijan’ was faced with objection from Iranian elites to no avail.  
This name selection was conveniently adopted by the Bolsheviks after they integrated 
the young republic into the Soviet Union as it served their expansionist purposes. 
Furthermore, efforts were made to cut the South Caucasus off from its Persian 
background, including the closure of Persian education and cultural centres, forced 
deportation of Persian inhabitants of the region, etc. The above  strategies together with 
the onslaught of cultural and political elites as well as the second round of alphabet 
change within ten years which left the majority of the population illiterate; provided a 
fertile ground for indoctrinating the people of the region with a distorted version of 
history that included the myth of the ‘Great Azerbaijan’ which was divided into two 
parts, with the ‘Southern Azerbaijan’ (which is the original ancient Azerbaijan, 
constituting northern provinces of Iran) occupied by the Persian Empire, who was 
portrayed as an external hegemon. The study has demonstrated how the 1918 peculiar 
name selection together with the promotion of distorted version of history by 
Bolsheviks, became an important stumbling blocks of the future bilateral relations with 
Iran.  
In reviewing the Republic of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy since its independence, the 
study has argued that during the two short lived administrations of Mutalibov and 
Elçibey, the country’s interactions with the world, particularly regional countries was 
mostly a reflection of these leaders’ ideologies rather than an outcome of a carefully 
defined policy based on accurate evaluation of threats and opportunities or national 
interests. As a result, Elçibey’s radical nationalist approach left a damaging effect on 
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relations with Iran, as his open promotion of the ‘Greater Azerbaijan’ myth and 
encouragement of secessionist movements was alarming for Iran. Due to their shared 
historical and cultural legacy particularly the religious sect, Tehran had up to that point 
viewed Baku with such brotherly feelings that despite its official neutral stand regarding 
the Karabakh conflict, it had provided Azerbaijan with supply of arms and training of 
irregular forces and had let its civilians fight alongside Azerbaijani forces. This was in 
addition to the provision of humanitarian relief for refugees and supplies for the 
Nakhjavan Republic. Elçibey’s radical nationalism and irredentist approach put an end 
to Iran’s delusion in seeing Azerbaijan as a united ally; forcing Iran to see the potential 
threat in that country. 
Through adapting a flexible, multi vector foreign policy, Heidar Aliyev seek to maintain 
positive relations with regional powers, while establishing a strong link with the EU 
and US that would guarantee their technological support and investment in developing 
Azerbaijan’s infrastructure, particularly with regard to energy. This in turn opened the 
doors to further involvement of the West in the region to much dismay of Russia and 
Iran, whose security and interests were at risk with such development. Particular efforts 
were made by the US to isolate Iran out of important regional developments including 
transport networks, despite the fact that Iran could have provided the shortest, most 
economic rout. While Iran’s exclusion from such projects soured the bilateral relations 
which were just warming up, and despite disputes over several issues including the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea, the two countries kept on the path of détente while ran by 
Heydar Aliyev and Khatami. 
As Ahmadinejad’s confrontational approach created more tensions with the West; and 
Iran’s nuclear crisis resulted in further international sanctions and isolation; Baku’s 
relations with Tehran which normally benchmarks Western relations with Iran, 
deteriorated to a degree that Azerbaijan was considered more as a ‘threat’ rather than a 
‘friend’. Later on when Iran’s international status and its relations with the West was 
improved with Rouhani’s détente and dialogue approach; so did its relations with Baku. 
The study has then evaluated Iran- Azerbaijan relations in 5 sectors, based on 
definitions provided by Buzan and his colleagues. The political sector has provided an 
account of issues which have resulted in increasing political tension between the two 
countries. Azerbaijan’s claims over Iran’s northern provinces and its overt and covert 
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efforts in promoting the myth of the ‘Greater Azerbaijan’, dispute over the Caspian Sea 
demarcation, opposing states’ ideologies which has resulted in the perception of 
political imposition and diverging patterns of geopolitical alignments; are the main 
factors through which the two countries pose political threats for one another. 
Expanding on the latter factor it should be explained that Azerbaijan’s Western oriented 
foreign policy and its efforts to gain maximum benefit from these relations has placed 
Baku’s policies on the course of collision with Iran’s general foreign policy. Against 
the back drop of Azerbaijan’s alliance with the West, Iran has formed an alliance with 
Armenia and Russia. Contrary to another myth that Baku has been promoting over the 
years; this alliance does not constitute Iran’s support of Armenia against Azerbaijan in 
their conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh. While the alliance has prevented Yerevan’s 
suffocation between Baku and Ankara; Tehran has continuously maintained a clear 
position on the sanctity of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity over the years. 
With over 600 km shared borders, the two countries, inherently have shared security 
concerns and some degree of cooperation. However, although political disputes have 
never degenerated to border clashes; there is a mutual perception of military threat 
between the two countries. While dispute over the Caspian Sea demarcation has been a 
factor in arms race among territorial states, Iran’s most serious concern arise from 
Azerbaijan’s increased cooperation with Israel and its mutual understanding with the 
latter in perceiving Iran as an existential threat. To counter Iran’s perceived threat, 
Azerbaijan has facilitated Israel’s eavesdropping and espionage against Iran. Tehran 
has also accused Baku of providing Tel Aviv’s agents with access and intelligence for 
the assassination of Iran’s nuclear scientists. These developments mean that while Iran 
was trying for years to keep the conflict away from its borders; Baku has paved the way 
for Tehran’s adversary to move the threat right on Iran’s borders. Azerbaijan’s heavy 
purchase of Israeli arms which included at least one item with no use in any perspective 
war with Armenia has been another cause of concern for Iran. Contemplations about 
the use of Azerbaijan’s military bases in any future attacks against Iran has been an 
added concern, though Baku has repeatedly emphasised that it would never let its 
territory be used in any attacks against neighbouring countries. On the other hand, in 
addition to existing evidence of cyber attacks by Iran against Azerbaijan’s websites; 
Baku has accused Tehran of facilitating intelligence and terrorist operatives in 
Azerbaijan. 
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While shared history and cultural heritage are potentially valuable assets for developing 
bilateral relations; they have been more the source of tensions than cooperation in the 
case of Tehran-Baku relations. On the positive side, the kinship with Iranian 
Azerbaijanis is a strong bond which has been strengthened with the provision of visa 
free regime for Azerbaijani nationals since 2010 by Iran. The aforementioned regime 
has also resulted in a considerable flow of tourism between the two nations, who share 
religious sect of Shiism. The kinship has however been exploited by Baku for 
instigating secessionism and dissent among Iranian Azeris, not always through 
government channels, but more frequently by other official agents such as parliament, 
media, etc. Iran has retaliated at times by inciting secessionism among Talysh 
minorities of Azerbaijan who have close ties with Iran. 
On the other hand the societal bond based on Shiism is faced with Baku’s antagonism 
as is perceived as Iran’s instrument for expanding its influence in that country and to 
undermine Azerbaijan’s secular state.  Iran’s considerable sensitivity towards 
Azerbaijan’s accelerated process of secularisation and social Westernisation in recent 
years has been used as evidence to the above perception and created more frictions 
between the two countries. 
Another societal bone of contention has been the confiscation of shared cultural heritage 
by Baku, in an attempt to promote a valuable identity for Azerbaijan. Many Persian 
dignitaries such as poets, scholars, etc. have been introduced as Azeris. Furthermore, 
since 2008 that the UNESCO Intangible Heritage Program was established, Baku has 
been quick to introduce shared cultural heritages for Azerbaijan, a move which was 
faced by public dismay in Iran.  
In the immediate aftermath of the independence and throughout the 1990s Iran was 
Azerbaijan’s main supplier of essential goods as the economy of the newly independent 
republic was in ruins and the roads were blocked due to the ongoing war; with the 
Republic of Nakhjavan being on the verge of humanitarian crisis due to its separate 
location from the mainland Azerbaijan. Iran played a quintessential role in preventing 
such crisis. However, Baku’s expanding relations with other countries offered the 
diversity of suppliers who could offer better quality and lower price and, therefore, were 
better positioned to replace Iran in the Azerbaijan’s market. Since the late 1990s Iran-
Azerbaijan economic relation has not been strong enough to strengthen the political 
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relations while deterioration of political relations has negatively affected trade and 
economic relations. Although energy swap is an important part of the economic 
relations, the two countries continuous dispute over the Caspian Sea energy resources 
and rivalry over markets have been a source of economic threats. 
Although the two countries share a considerable space of environment due to their long 
common borders; the most important environmental issue is regarding the Caspian Sea. 
The unresolved status of the Caspian Sea legal regime has been an impediment for the 
full establishment of regulations and accepting responsibility for the protection of the 
Caspian environment, hence while the Sea has become increasingly polluted by 
exploitation and transport of carbohydrate resources as well as domestic swage; littoral 
countries have been reluctant to shoulder the costs and troubles of dredging. 
Accusations about who is most responsible for the pollution have become another 
instance for Baku and Tehran to point fingers at each other. 
As briefly demonstrated, in all five sectors under examination, Iran and Azerbaijan are 
either rivals or source of threat for one another. The security seeking strategies of these 
two states have generated spirals of mutual hostility. While some positive steps may 
reduce the tensions, there is no realistic outlook for any future alliance or even close 
friendship between the two countries. Promotion of two myths of “Greater Azerbaijan” 
and “Iran’s support of Armenian occupation of Azerbaijan territories” among all levels 
of Azerbaijan’s society from school students to elites which would ultimately foster 
deep seated grudge against Iran among generations, does not particularly promise any 
rosy future in bilateral relations. 
Through the examination of Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan, the study has established 
that excessive reliance on evaluation of the circumstances based on constructivist 
theories, particularly during initial post independence years, resulted in underestimation 
of the threats that Baku can pose for Iran. Consequently, Iran has failed to have a long 
term realistic foreign policy towards Azerbaijan and has generally taken short term 
measures and reactive policies. 
The research has then focused on studying Iran’s relations with the smallest and the 
least economically developed country in the South Caucasus, the Republic of Armenia. 
Through a brief historical review, it has initially established the long precedent of 
friendly relations and alliance between the two countries, continuing in the post 
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independence era, despite some rocky start. The main hiccup was Armenia’s violation 
of ceasefire with Azerbaijan, mediated by Iran.  
The study has then examined Armenia’s foreign policy, arguing that Armenia’s 
aggression of the Azerbaijan territories and smouldering Karabakh conflict have 
undermined Armenia’s foreign policy principles of ‘complimentarity’ and 
‘engagement’. As of 1993, Turkey has cut all diplomatic ties with Armenia in support 
of Azerbaijan. Moreover, the country’s blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey has resulted 
in Armenia’s isolation that has consequently prevented the country’s development, 
which in turn has resulted in Yerevan’s excessive dependence in Moscow to a degree 
that at times undermines the country’s sovereignty. Such deep seated dependence 
means that Yerevan can only develop its relations with other players to a degree that its 
subordinate status vis-a-vis Moscow would allow. Therefore, over the years, Armenia 
had to give up on its initial strategic vision for integration with Western structures. 
Taking the same sectoral pattern and relevant definitions, the study has examined Iran’s 
relations with Armenia. As it has been explained in the political section; several shared 
interests and concerns have drawn Iran closer to Armenia. While Karabakh’s 
smouldering conflict is an important factor preventing Baku from further efforts in 
realising the ‘Greater Azerbaijan’ dream; Armenia’s location and lack of diplomatic 
relations with Turkey has prevented the realisation of Ankara’s dream of establishing a 
Turkic Empire in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Iran, on the other hand has 
provided Armenia with a counter balance against pressures coming from this important 
regional player. Moreover, as a result of geopolitical developments which have been 
discussed in details throughout various chapters, Tehran together with Yerevan and 
Moscow has formed a counter balancing alliance against the pro-Western Baku, Tbilisi 
and Ankara axis. The shared sense of acute insecurity and isolation in the region has 
been one of the most important factors in drawing the two countries together. Each 
country finds a path out of isolation and regional marginalisation in the other. 
The role of Armenian powerful lobbies in Western countries has been an important 
incentive for Iran considering various international challenges that it is faced with. 
Iran’s military relation with Armenia is arguably the least developed dimension of their 
bilateral relations. Despite some controversies in early 2000’s about Iran’s provision of 
restricted military equipments through Armenia; there has been no significant 
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development in this dimension ever since. Given the sensitive balancing acts that each 
side has to undertake with regard to its relations with other regional and international 
players; the situation is quite understandable. 
Examination of Iran-Armenia societal relations demonstrates the extent of positive 
interaction between the two countries based on shared history and cultural heritage, and 
facilitated particularly by Armenian Diaspora in Iran. 
The study has introduced economic cooperation as the main pillar of Tehran’s warm 
rapport with Yerevan. While the main aspect of the two countries economic relations 
has been in the energy sector, the friendly relations and societal links have been a 
blessing for Armenia’s tourism industry in recent years. On the other hand, Iran’s 
economic relations with Armenia found a strategic aspect following the imposition of 
extensive sanctions on the Iranian banking system, as Iran has reportedly used 
Armenian banks to circumvent Western imposed banking sanctions. Moreover, 
Armenia has used the leverage of its powerful lobbies to voice its opposition to further 
sanctions on Iran, arguing that it would ultimately put further pressure and damage 
Armenia’s vulnerable economy. 
Due to very short shared borders, the two countries have not had many issues in the 
environmental arena. Concerns over the pollution of the Kura River caused by an 
Armenian factory were discussed in a meeting Energy Ministers of the two countries. 
Through historical review of Iran-Armenia relations and analysis in the five sectors; the 
study has established the long historical precedent for such positive relations, as well 
as the importance of mutual rationality, understanding, and positive approach in 
bilateral relations. 
The chapter has demonstrated that although Iran has always perceived shared religion 
as an important catalyst in its relations with other countries, but the absence of this 
factor does not necessarily mean lack of cordial relations. This in itself is another 
evidence of Iran’s pragmatic approach in its South Caucasus policy. Armenia, on the 
other hand, has not perceived Iran’s religious state as an impediment for friendly 
relations and unlike many neighbouring countries, including Russia and Azerbaijan, 
has avoided using the Iran card in bargaining with great powers. 
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As demonstrated by this research, while Azerbaijan poses threat for Iran’s interests and 
security in each and every one of the five examined sectors; Armenia not only does not 
pose any threats for Iran but also has a complementary role for different sectors of Iran’s 
security. Hence, it is only natural for a realist, security seeking state like Iran to forge 
closer ties with Armenia, regardless of the latter’s different religion or its longstanding 
occupation of a ‘Muslim land’. 
Further Studies: This study can be the basis or inspiration for several other research 
projects. The most immediate one can be the extension of the same framework to study 
Iran’s relation with Georgia which together with present study would provide a 
comprehensive picture of Iran’s relations with all three neighbours in the South 
Caucasus. 
Buzan and his colleagues have introduced South Caucasus as an integral part of the 
‘post Soviet space’ in their study of regional security complexes. Using the same 
framework to study Iran’s relations with other countries in this security complex; would 
provide us with a comprehensive picture of Iran’s relations with this RSC and factors 
shaping these relations and Tehran’s policies in the post Soviet space. Such study would 
be more interesting particularly with regard to Caspian littoral states, since Caspian 
resources have been the source of tension between Iran and other littoral states as well 
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Durham University School of Government and International Affairs Research 
Ethics Policy Principles  
The School’s research ethics policy is guided by the following principles:  
1. All research, by undergraduates, postgraduates and members of staff that 
involves living subjects must involve the understanding and application of 
relevant ethical considerations.  
2. It is ethically appropriate that research should be competently and suitably 
conducted, but this does not imply favouring any particular method.  
3. Stricter ethical procedures apply where participants are vulnerable or are 
unable to give informed consent, such as social services users or people legally 
deemed noncompetent.  
4. Other circumstances where particular attention to ethical issues is necessary 
include when participants would take part in a study without their knowledge 
or consent at the time (but see 6 (a)), when the study would involve discussion 
of sensitive topics, when the study could cause discomfort or harm beyond the 
risks encountered in normal life, and when financial inducements are to be 
used. 
5. Please refer to the Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) Research 
Ethics Framework (REF)  
6. Informed consent must always be obtained at a level which is appropriate for 
the research process concerned. Thus: (a) Consent is not required for 
ethnographic and related observational studies conducted in locales where 
people would normally expect their behaviour and actions to be observable by 
others. (b) Consent in relation to interview research, including interviews 
conducted as part of a social survey or participation in focus groups, should be 
based on simple agreement to participate in the interview process with the 
right to withdraw at any point.  
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7. Where a guarantee of anonymity is given as part of the process of obtaining 
consent, this must be strictly observed at all parts of the research process and 
in written outputs.  
8. Research involving deception on the part of the researcher raises particular 
ethical issues. It is not automatically unethical but research involving 
deception must always be based on a specific justification of the use of 
deception.  
9. There should be provision for feedback on the results of the research to be 
given to participants if they request it, unless a justification for withholding it 
is provided.  
 
Procedures: 
1. All research done under the auspices of the School, including independent or 
semi-independent research by undergraduates in projects or dissertations must 
be done in compliance with the principles stated above. To this end all 
proposed research should be evaluated, if necessary modified, and approved 
with respect to its ethical implications.  
2. Specifically, all research proposals should be accompanied by a completed 
Ethical Implications form. This will be received and evaluated in the first 
instance as follows: Researcher category Form received by: Staff Chairman or 
Chairwoman of the Ethics Committee (or another member of the Ethics 
Committee) Postgraduates: Research students Director of Postgraduate Studies 
Taught MA Dissertations Dissertation Supervisor Undergraduates: 
Dissertations Supervisor Projects Module Convenor or other full-time staff 
teaching module  
3. In the case of modules in which semi-independent research takes place in a 
structured series of steps, provision must be made for the submission of the 
Ethical Implications form at an early stage, alongside initial research 
proposals, at a date indicated in the module booklet.  
4. In the case of undergraduate and taught MA dissertations, the Ethical 
Implications form must be submitted to the prospective supervisor alongside 
the form specifying the topic and supervisor.  
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5. In the case of research students, the Ethical Implications form must be 
submitted in advance of the student being admitted and preferably alongside 
the student’s application.  
6. In cases where there are no ethical implications or when ethical implications 
have been satisfactorily addressed in the proposal, the initial recipient of the 
completed form will endorse it to that effect and pass it on to the School office 
for record keeping. 
7. In cases where ethical implications have not been satisfactorily addressed in 
the proposal, or external evaluation is required, the initial recipient of the 
completed form will endorse it to that effect and pass it on to the Ethics 
Committee for further consideration. 
8. The Ethics Committee will be responsible for monitoring the submission of 
forms, resolving problematic cases by modifying the research proposal, and 
reporting annually to the Board of Studies and the relevant Faculty committee. 
9. Prospective recipients of the Ethical Implications form are encouraged to 
discuss and resolve ethical problems with the prospective researcher in 
advance of submission of a proposal.  
 





STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND TURKMENISTAN12 
Presidents of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, Russian Federation and Turkmenistan on behalf of their states, 
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,               
          In the fourth Caspian summit, held in Astrakhan at the invitation Russian 
Federation President Vladimir Putin, in accordance with the understanding reached at 
the summit of the Caspian littoral states in Baku in November 2010, up to the 
outcome of the Caspian summits in Ashgabat (2002), Tehran (2007) and Baku 
(2010), based on the norms and principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law, 
         taking into account the geopolitical changes in the region, a climate of 
cooperation, good neighborly relations and mutual understanding between the Parties, 
         guided by the desire to deepen and expand good-neighborly relations between 
the Parties, 
         based on the fact that the Caspian Sea is of vital importance to the Parties, and 
only they have sovereign rights in the Caspian Sea and of its resources, 
         emphasizing that the solution of the key issues of the Caspian agenda is the 
exclusive responsibility of the Parties, 
         acknowledging the political, economic, social and cultural importance of the 
Caspian Sea, 
         conscious of its responsibility towards present and future generations for the 
conservation of the Caspian Sea, the sustainable development of the region, 
         reaffirming the need for the early development and the conclusion of the 
Convention on legal status of the Caspian Sea, which will be the basic international 
treaty regulating the activities of the Parties in the Caspian Sea, 
         declare that the activities of the Parties in the Caspian Sea will be carried out on 
the basis of agreed principles, including: 
                                                          
1 Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tm/en/turkmenistan-int-en/2044-statement-of-the-presidents-of-the-republic-of-
azerbaijan-islamic-republic-of-iran-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-russian-federation-and-turkmenistan (Accessed on 
13.05.2016) 
2 Both the text and the format are copied exactly from the website of Turkmenistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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         1) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, sovereign 
equality of States, non-use or threat of force, mutual respect, cooperation and non-
interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
         2) the use of the Caspian Sea for peaceful purposes, turning it into a zone of 
peace, good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation, resolution of all issues related 
to the Caspian Sea by peaceful means; 
         3) ensuring security and stability in the Caspian region; 
         4) ensure a stable balance of arms of the Parties in the Caspian Sea, the 
implementation of military construction within reasonable adequacy taking into 
account interests of all Parties, undiminished security for each other; 
         5) compliance with the agreed confidence-building measures in the field of 
military activities in the spirit of predictability and transparency in accordance with 
the common efforts to strengthening regional security and stability; 
         6) is not the presence of the armed forces not belonging to the Parties in the 
Caspian Sea; 
         7) the national sovereignty of each Party over coastal sea space within 15 
nautical miles and exclusive rights of each Party to the extraction of water biological 
resources within the adjacent 10 nautical miles, followed by the total water space, 
with the understanding that the question of the application of techniques in 
establishing baselines will be the subject of further consultations of the Parties; 
8) freedom of navigation outside the sea space under the national sovereignty 
of each Party, subject to the sovereign and exclusive rights of coastal States and the 
rules in respect of certain activities by the Parties laid by them in this regard; 
          9) to ensure the safety of navigation; 
          10) of the navigation in the Caspian Sea, the passage to / from it only vessels 
flying under the flag of each of the Parties; 
          11) the right of free access from the Caspian Sea to other seas, oceans and back 
on the basis of universally recognized norms and principles of international law and 
agreements of the Parties concerned, taking into account the legitimate interests of a 
Party of transit in order to promote international trade and economic development; 
          12) delimitation of the seabed and depths of the Caspian Sea on the basis of 
universally recognized principles and norms of international law in order to 
implement the sovereign rights of the Parties on the subsurface use and other 
legitimate economic, business activities related to the development of the seabed and 
subsoil resources, by agreement of the Parties; 
376 
          13) the application of agreed standards and rules on reproduction and regulation 
of the use of biological resources; 
          14) protection of the Caspian Sea environment, conservation, restoration and 
rational use of its biological resources; 
          15) responsibility of a Party that allow contamination,  and for damage to the 
ecological system of the Caspian Sea; 
          16) To promote scientific research in the field of ecology, conservation and use 
of biological resources of the Caspian Sea; 
          17) to create favorable conditions for the development of mutually beneficial 
economic cooperation in the Caspian Sea; 
          18) conducting marine scientific research outside the sea area under the national 
sovereignty of each Party in accordance with the rules of law agreed by the Parties, 
subject to the sovereign and of exclusive rights of coastal States and the rules for 
certain types of research, laid by them in this regard; 
          19) Freedom of flights of civil aircrafts in accordance with ICAO regulations. 
  
President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev               
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hasan Rouhani 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan NursultanNazarbayev    
 President of the Russian Federation VladimirPutin   
 President of Turkmenistan GurbangulyBerdimuhamedov 
   




List of Iran- Republic of Azerbaijan High Rank Visits 
 
To Iran 
August 1991 Ayaz Mutalibov the President of RAz 
July 1994 Heydar Aliyev  the President of RAz 
May 1996 Heydar Aliyev  the President of RAz 
December 1997 Heydar Aliyev  the President of RAz 
March 2000 Vilayat Guliyev Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
June  2000 Heydar Aliyev  the President of RAz 
May 2002 Heydar Aliyev  the President of RAz 
July/August 2004 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
January 2005 Elham  Aliyev  the President of RAz 
June 2007 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
October 2007 Elham  Aliyev  the President of RAz 
March 2009 Elham  Aliyev  the President of RAz 
December 2009 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
March 2010 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
March 2011 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
August 2012 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
April 2014 Elham  Aliyev  the President of RAz 





August 1991 Ayaz Mutalibov the President of RAz 
February 1992 Ayaz Mutalibov the President of RAz 
July 1994 Heydar Aliyev  the President of RAz 
May 1996 Heydar Aliyev  the President of RAz 
December 1997 Heydar Aliyev  the President of RAz 
March 2000 Vilayat Guliyev Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
June  2000 Heydar Aliyev  the President of RAz 
May 2002 Heydar Aliyev  the President of RAz 
July/August 2004 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
January 2005 Elham  Aliyev  the President of RAz 
June 2007 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
October 2007 Elham  Aliyev  the President of RAz 
March 2009 Elham  Aliyev  the President of RAz 
December 2009 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
March 2010 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
March 2011 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
August 2012 Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of RAz 
August 2013 Ozay Asadov Head of RAz National Parliament 
April 2014 Elham  Aliyev  the President of RAz 









December 1991 Ali Akbar Velayati, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
August 1993 Ali Akbar Velayati, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
October 1993 Hasehmi Rafsanjani the President of IRI 
March 1996 Ali Akbar Velayati, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
April 1997 Ali Akbar Velayati, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
August 1998 Kamal Kharrazi, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
October 1996 Hassan Habibi, First Vice President of IRI 
April 2002 Kamal Kharrazi, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
August 2004  Seyyed Mohammad Khatami the President of Iran 
November 2005 Manuchehr Mottaki, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
December 2005 Mahmood Ahmedi Nejad the President of IRI 
May 2006 Mahmood Ahmedi Nejad the President of IRI 
June 2006 Manuchehr Mottaki, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
August 2007 Mahmood Ahmedi Nejad the President of IRI 
September 2008 Manuchehr Mottaki, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
Febreuary 2009 Manuchehr Mottaki, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
November 2010 Mahmood Ahmedi Nejad the President of IRI 
March 2012 Ali Akbar Salehi, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
April 2012 Mostafa Najar, IRI Interior Minister 
October 2012 Ali Akbar Salehi, the Foreign Minister of IRI 
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October 2012 Mahmood Ahmedi Nejad the President of IRI 
November 2014 Hassan Rouhani, the President of IRI 





List of Iran- Republic of Armenia High Rank Visits 
 
To Iran 
February 1992 Raffi Hovhannisian the Foreign Minister of RA 
May 1992 Levon Ter-Petrosyan the President of RA 
1994 Levon Ter-Petrosyan the President of RA 
1995 Levon Ter-Petrosyan the President of RA 
April 1995 Vahan Papazyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
May 1995 Hrant Bagratyan the Prime Minister of RA 
January 1996 Vahan Papazyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
1997 Babken Ararktsyan the Chairman of the National Assembly of RA 
January 1997 Alexandr Arzumanyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
June 1997 Alexandr Arzumanyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
August 1998 Vardan Oskanyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
September 1998 Vardan Oskanyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
December 1999 Vardan Oskanyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
February 2001 Vardan Oskanyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
December 2001 Robert Kocharyan the President of RA 
April 2004 Vardan Oskanyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
July 2006 Robert Kocharyan the President of RA 
December 2006 Vardan Oskanyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
September 2008 Edward Nalbandyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
April 2009 Serzh Sargsyan the President of RA 
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September 2009 Hovik Abrahamyan the Chairman of the National Assembly of RA 
September 2010 Edward Nalbandyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
Octobet 2010 Tigran Sargsyan the Prime Minister of RA 
March 2011 Serzh Sargsyan the President of RA 
September 2011 Edward Nalbandyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
April 2012 Edward Nalbandyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
August 2012 Edward Nalbandyan the Foreign Minister of RA 
July 2013 Armen Mosisian the Minister of Energy & Natural resources of RA 
August 2013 Serzh Sargsyan the President of RA 
March 2014 Edward Nalbandyan the Foreign Minister of RA 



















February 1992 Ali Akbar Velayati the Foreign Minister of IRI 
1994 Ali Akbar Velayati the Foreign Minister of IRI 
September 1995 Ali Akbar Velayati the Foreign Minister of IRI 
December 1996 Hasan Habibi the First Vice President of IRI 
April 1997 Ali Akbar Velayati the Foreign Minister of IRI 
August 1999 Kamal Kharazi the Foreign Minister of IRI 
April 2003 Kamal Kharazi the Foreign Minister of IRI 
September 2004 Mohammad Khatami the President of IRI 
February 2006 Manuchehr Mottaki the Foreign Minister of IRI 
September 2006 Haddad Adel the Speaker of IRI Majlis 
March 2007 Mahmoud Ahmadinajad the President of IRI 
July 2007 Manuchehr Mottaki the Foreign Minister of IRI 
October 2007 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the President of IRI 
March 2009 Manuchehr Mottaki the Foreign Minister of IRI 
January 2010 Manuchehr Mottaki the Foreign Minister of IRI 
October 2010 Ali Larijani the Speaker of IRI Majlis 
November 2011 Ali Akbar Salehi the Foreign Minister of IRI 
December 2011 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the President of IRI 
March 2013 Ali Akbar Salehi the Foreign Minister of IRI 












 Declaration on Establishing Diplomatic Relations Between the Republic of 
Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Agreement on Consular Cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Agreement on Trade and Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation 
between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Agreement on Cultural and Scientific Cooperation between the Republic of 
Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran for 1992-1994 
 Banking Agreement between the Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia 
and the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Joint Declaration on Cooperation and Good-neighbourhood between the 
Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
1993 
 Trade Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran 
 Agreement between the Ministry of Communication of the Republic of 
Armenia and the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 
1994 
 Agreement on Border Trade between Meghri Region of the Republic of 
Armenia and Marand Region of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Agreement between the Goverment of the Republic of Armenia and the 
Goverment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the areas of Culture, Science, 
Education, Sport, Tourism and Mass Media 
1995 
 Protocol of the 1st Joint Session of Coordination Committee of Iran-Armenia 
Relations 
                                                          
1 Available at: <http://www.mfa.am/en/country-by-country/ir/> (Accessed on 12.05.2016) 
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 Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Armenia and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in the area of Agriculture 
 Agreement between the Goverment of the Republic of Armenia and the 
Goverment of the Islamic Republic of Iran on International Transportation 
of Goods 
 Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran for 1995 
 Agreement on Construction of Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline 
 Agreement on Construction of Joint Run-of-River Power Plant on Araks 
River 
 Agreement on Construction of Iran-Armenia High Voltage Transmission 
Line 
1996 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Armenia and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in the area of Healthcare 
 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Customs 
Department of the Republic of Armenia and the Customs Agency of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
1998 
 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Armenia and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in the Field of 
Agriculture 
2001 
 Memorandum of Understanding of the 3rd Joint Session of 
Intergovernmental Commission of RA and IRI 
 Joint Declaration of Presidents of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 
 Agreement on Meghri-Kajaran automobile tunnel 
 Agreement ûn Cooperation in the Area of Protection of Monuments 
 Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Ecology 
 Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Academic Degrees and Higher 
Education 
 Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran on Customs Cooperation 
 Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Certification and Standardization 




 Memorandum of Understanding of the 4th Session of Intergovernmental Joint 
Economic Commission of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 
2003 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Energy of the 
Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Energy of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran on Cooperation in the Area of Electricity 
2004 
 Memorandum of Understanding of the 5th session of Intergovernmental 
Commission on Coordination of Economic Relations between the Republic 
of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Treaty on Construction of Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline 
 Memorandum on Cooperation in the Area of Agriculture with Ardebil 
Province 
2005 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Healthcare of the 
Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Healthcare and Medical Education 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in the area of Healthcare and 
Treatment 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Education and 
Science of the Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Education of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in the area of Education in 2005-
2008 
2006 
 Memorandum of Understanding of the 6th session of the Intergovernmental 
Commission of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of 
Armenia and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 
Establishment and Activity Conditions of Educational and Cultural Centers 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration of the Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in the area of 
Archive Matters 
 Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran on Legal Cooperation of Civil and Criminal Matters 
 Agreement on Extradition between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 
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 Joint Declaration of the Presidents of the Republic of Armenia and the 




 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Ministry of 
Energy of the Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Energy of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Armenia and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in Construction 
and Operation of Run-of-River Power Plants on Araks River 
 Executive Plan for Media Cooperation between the Council of Public TV and 
Radio Company of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Broadcasting 
 Memorandum of Understanding of the 7th session of Intergovernmental Joint 
Commission of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of 
Armenia and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Utilization 
of Development Assistance 
 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of Sport between 
Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs of the Republic of Armenia and the 
Physical Education Organisation of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Joint Declaration of H.E. Robert Kocharyan the President of the Republic of 
Armenia and H.E. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the President of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Armenia and the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 
Cooperation in the area of Banking Supervision 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Armenia and the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran on Establishing Consulates General 
2008 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources of the Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Energy of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in Construction of Araks Run-of-
River Power Plant and on Regulation of Technical Issues 
 Memorandum of Understanding of the 8th session of Intergovernmental Joint 
Commission of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
2009 
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 Agreement between the Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia and the 
Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in the area of 
Banking Supervision 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication of the Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Roads and 
Transportation of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Railway Cooperation and 
on Building a Direct Railway between the Republic of Armenia and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Economy of the 
Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Trade of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran on Regime Definition of Free Trade 
2010 
 Memorandum of Understanding of the 9th session of Intergovernmental Joint 
Commission of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 Executive Program on Co-operation in the Fields of Culture and Artistic 
between the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic 
Culture and Relations Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the 
Years 2010-2012 
2011 
 Memorandum of Understanding of the 10th session of Intergovernmental 
Joint Commission of the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran 
 Memorandum of Understanding on Islamic Republic of Iran’s Development 
Assistance to the Republic of Armenia,(December 2011) 
 Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Armenia and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on amendments in the 
Agreement on Cooperation for Construction and Operation of Hydro Power 
Plant on the Araks River, (December 2011) 
 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Armenia and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on cooperation in the field of 
Labour and Social Issues(December 2011) 
 Action Plan for the Implementation of MoU on Environmental Cooperation 
between the Department of Environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
the Ministry of Nature Protection of the Republic of Armenia for the Years 
2012-2013. (December 2011) 
  
 
 
